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11.  Towards a PerformaTive reading 
of energy securiTy
‘Man pursues Values through Institutions on Resources.’1
1.1 introduction
I have never considered myself wealthy. Even so, I have never known hunger or thirst 
and the longest period I have been without electricity involuntary has been half a day 
at most. In other words, I have had the fortune to grow up and live in a society with 
the norms, institutions and markets that cater for an abundance of natural resources. 
That said, these same political markets produce a number of adverse effects to those at 
its fringes. Climate change, energy poverty, scarcity, food banks and a degrading bio-
diversity are but some of the terms that indicate the negative sides of our current political 
economy. A political economy that has benefited many, but not without excluding some 
and harming others.2 Simultaneously, this political economy is constantly defended 
and secured against the threats and dangers that its beneficiaries believe to exist. 
Any understanding of political economy thus needs an understanding of the security 
processes at work in the production, distribution and consumption of energy, food 
and other natural resources. In line with this argument, this thesis analyses the role of 
security in relation to the construction and defense of political markets by focusing on 
the concept of energy security within political economies dealing with energy.
There are multiple ways to study the topic of energy security. Some scholars approach 
it conceptually, historically or quantitatively, many take a policy-oriented route and a 
select few offer a broader social critique.3 What many of these analyses have in common 
is that they search for an answer to what energy security is or ought to be – often 
simultaneously. What is studied are questions like how energy security should be defined, 
what exactly needs to be secured, what the threats are, who is in need of energy security, 
what needs to be done to counter the threats, and so on.4 This thesis is not concerned 
with such questions. In fact, the core argument of this thesis is that the studies asking 
these questions hardly help us understand what energy security is, let alone what it does 
in and of itself. What this thesis promotes is a shift away from a pre- and descriptive 
1 Lasswell 1969, 17 [emphasis removed].
2 Le Billon 2005a, 5.
3 Conceptually, qualitatively or historically: Winzer 2012; Chester 2010; Cherp and Jewell 2014; Yergin 1991. 
Quantitatively: Kruyt et al. 2009; Jansen and Seebregts 2010; Brown et al. 2014; Narula and Reddy 2015. 
More policy oriented: Luft and Korin 2009; CIEP 2004; Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005; Bahgat 2006; Vivoda 
2009. And from a social critique: Sheller 2014; Illich 1974; Shove and Walker 2014; Byrne and Toly 2006.




understanding of the concept of energy security towards an understanding of energy 
security as performative: to see the designation and use of the concept of energy security 
as an act in itself.5 By seeing energy security as an act, the repeated practice of its use 
‘constitutes’, ‘maintains’ or ‘changes’ the meaning of the concept itself and the enactment 
of its material effects, and thereby the potential involvement and identity of the actors 
behind it and the possible routes of action that are open to them.6 Such a performative 
approach forces scholars to move away from the ‘quest for certainty’ inherent in studies 
that want to understand what energy security is and replace this with the acceptance that 
the concept of energy security is embedded, structured, productive, malleable and used 
differently by different people in different places at different times.7 
The performative understanding of energy security that is proposed in this thesis 
builds primarily on critical International Relations (IR) theory and Critical Security 
Studies, but also draws on insights from New Materialism, Development Studies, 
Political Geography, Sociology and Philosophy. In thinking through the concept of 
energy security by unpacking it with the help of these different literatures, a reflexive 
stance is imposed on both the author and reader towards the triangle of political 
economy, security and natural resource policies. A triangle that relates closely to the 
(in)famous Energy Trilemma within energy studies depicting the tradeoffs between 
economic concerns, security concerns, and environmental concerns when it comes 
to decisions on energy.8 These tradeoffs point to the fact that energy security is only 
one aspect within the wider debate on energy, which also includes discussions that 
start from an energy transition or energy justice perspective.9 To be clear, the goal 
here is not to offer a specific performative reading that explains energy security, but to 
problematize current understandings of energy security through a rigorous theoretical 
reflection on the concept and an unpacking of the practices that shape it. These include 
the different security logics, the core concern of scarcity, the materiality of the actual 
energy infrastructures and the knowledge practices that surround these infrastructures 
as well as a deeper understanding of the politics and power relations behind the 
organization of energy. These four, in all their intricacy and heterogeneity, are shaped 
by and are shaping the future of energy production, transportation and consumption.
1.2 argument, contribution and approach
One of the main problems identified within the conceptual energy security literature 
involves the  realization that any definition of energy security is inherently unstable, 
5 Butler 2010; Barad 2003; Bialasiewicz et al. 2007.
6 Aalberts 2006, 3.
7 Herborth 2012.
8 On the Energy Trilemma, see Figure 2 and its discussion in chapter 4.4.
9 Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; Sovacool 2013.
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which leads ensuing research to question the ‘slippery’, ‘blurred’, ‘polysemic’, 
‘multidimensional’, ‘deepening and widening’, ‘totality or banality’ of the concept 
itself.10 Those few studies that do reflect upon the concept, either quantify, categorize 
or try to find logics behind different forms of energy security (chapter 4). Instead 
of problematizing this openness, this thesis argues for an acceptance of its inherent 
empty and contextualized nature and calls for an understanding of energy security 
as a security practice that is always already political, in line with earlier work from 
Ciuta and Bridge.11 It calls for a performative understanding of energy security 
that does not stop at the identification of the threat and the success or failure of its 
countermeasures. Instead it moves beyond such questions to the acts that are needed 
to make energy security come into being in the first place and the subsequent broader 
socio-material implications and effects that follow from this becoming. 
Such an approach immediately highlights three alternative insights for energy 
security. First, the proliferation of energy security does not stand on its own. It is 
mirrored in food security (chapter 3), just as the analyses of security (chapter 5) and 
scarcity (chapter 6) highlight multiple logics that can all be used to approach energy 
security. Allowing for multiplicity in these underlying and often misunderstood 
concepts adds a layer of complexity, but also reinforces the need for a different way 
to approach energy security. Second, a performative perspective imposes a reflection 
on the linguistic and material underpinnings of energy in relation to security and 
neoliberal markets (chapters 7 and 8). What returns throughout this thesis is the 
importance of knowledge gathering on and within socio-technical energy systems 
and the normative and ethical dimension inherent to these observations. A third, 
but not final, alternative insight centers on the self-referential aspects of the theories 
that are used to examine and explain energy and energy security, like neorealism and 
neoliberalism. From a performative approach, these theories are not just explaining 
energy security, but are actively involved in producing its future. The basic assumptions 
of these theories, on whether to trust the state, the market or humankind, are a 
recurring theme in natural resource debates which are characterized by the conflicting 
positions of Ricardians12 (technical optimists, neoliberalists), neo-Malthusians 
(geopolitics, environmentalists), and Distributionists (social/justice movements).13 
10 Chester 2010; Löschel, Moslener, and Rübbelke 2010; Sovacool and Brown 2010; Dyer and Trombetta 
2013; Ciuta 2010; Cherp and Jewell 2011b.
11 Ciuta 2010; Bridge 2014. Other critical discursive articles include: Smith Stegen 2011; Byrne and Toly 
2006; Campbell 2005; Cooper 2013; Fischhendler and Nathan 2014; Herbstreuth 2014; Kurze 2008; 
Lovell 2008; Nyman 2014; Teschner and Paavola 2013.
12 This line of thinking is more often known under the header Cornucopian: referring to the trust in science 
and markets to conquer scarcity and find abundance. Chapter 6 takes issue with this idea of abundance – 
arguing that abundance is actually the anti-thesis of this approach. Instead, this thesis builds on the work 
of Barnett & Morse (1963) and uses the term Ricardian to designate this stream of thought.




By unpacking some of the underlying practices and assumptions behind energy 
security and by offering a performative understanding of energy security, this thesis 
contributes to a deeper understanding of energy security based firmly in the otherwise 
overall deploringly absent humanities literature in energy studies.14 In the process, 
this thesis opens up the concept of scarcity, reflects on the role of the material in social 
research and argues for an extension of the natural resource nexus literature from its 
current empirical focus to a similar reflection on the theories behind these natural 
resources. In addition, outside the energy security literature this thesis contributes to 
the Critical Security Studies (CSS) literature. What becomes clear after scrutinizing 
the close relation between security and markets from a typical Western “abundance” 
perspective, is the fact that CSS is largely absent from energy and other natural 
resource debates, while in turn these socio-technical systems hardly return within the 
CSS literature. True, CSS has excellent contributions on the relation between finance 
and security,15 but always in relation to terrorism, not in relation to natural resources, 
even though there are clear connections, especially, with the recent research into the 
materiality of security.16 
Besides CSS, another notable absence from this thesis is International Political 
Economy (IPE). This is notable, first, in terms of the initial concern of this thesis and, 
second, in terms of the origins of the discipline of IPE itself, as this field traces its 
own roots to the 1973 oil crisis.17 This absence, however, is perhaps more indicative 
of the relative independence of natural resource debates than that it results from the 
empirical and theoretical scope of IPE with its overwhelming focus on economic and 
financial institutions, globalization, and the organization of markets. In her classic 
States and Markets from 1988, Strange remarks that energy is a ‘classic case of the no 
man’s land lying between the social sciences, an area unexplored and unoccupied by 
any of the major theoretical disciplines.’18 Recent work by Hughes & Lipscy shows 
that this mismatch remains valid, as current energy issues are still conspicuously 
absent in top tier IR/IPE journals.19 Hancock & Vivoda explain this through pre-
selection practices in the publication strategies of energy scholars, which makes them 
bypass IR and IPE journals and thus the debates and agenda-setting functions of 
these journals.20 Interestingly, Hancock & Vivoda still refer to energy as part of IPE 
14 Sovacool 2014, 11. Also, Urry 2014.
15 Amoore and de Goede 2008c; De Goede 2012.
16 Aradau 2010; Schouten 2014; Walters 2014; Aradau, Coward, et al. 2015.
17 Gilpin and Gilpin 2001. Gilpin’s classic handbook only mentions energy four times: either as a side note 
or in relation to the 1973 origin of IPE. An exception is Keohane 2009. That said, the field of IPE builds 
of course on the political economy literature and on works from Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and others. 
18 Strange 1994, 195. See also: Stoddard 2012a, 2.
19 Hughes and Lipscy 2013.
20 Hancock and Vivoda 2014.
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and do not see it as a separate field that is following its own progression, nor as a 
topic that belongs to a broader natural resource debate. What is more, their future 
research options for energy cover a range of issues, but the politics of security is 
not one of them. Instead, they argue for a move away from the focus on oil to other 
energy resources and issue areas like renewables, biofuel, electricity and sovereign 
wealth funds. That they feel the need to mention such basics is shocking; and again is 
something that can be traced to the lack of integration of energy studies into IPE and 
IR (and their desire to be a part of that).
Last, a brief reflection on methodology and methods in this thesis. The scope 
and intent of this thesis is such that there is not one theory or method(ology) that is 
appropriate for its subject. In fact, as Aradau & Huysmans argue in a recent critical 
reflection, methods inherently fixate a particular epistemological and ontological 
position.21 Choosing a method (or a theory) as a ‘neutral’ way to analyze an event is 
therefore a self-defeating exercise, because methods and methodologies are part of the 
politics of ontology (chapter 7) that help shape a particular world while they are used 
to analyze that specific world. The theoretical scope of this thesis and more precise 
the shifting ontological positions within these theories inhibit it from clearly taking 
up one theory or method over another. Many of the theories discussed in this thesis 
are not applicable positivist theories, as they do not offer in- or deductive explanatory 
schemes. Still, that does not mean that they do not offer tools to study their subjects. 
Most of the theories below make assumptions on ontology (what exists in the world) 
and epistemology (what we can know of this world) and thereby offer a way to study 
how their respective realities work. In terms of methods, it could therefore be argued 
that this thesis, in an equally loose manner, combines – but does not apply – aspects 
of deconstruction, discourse analysis, genealogy, ‘pearl-fishing’, diffractive-reading, 
disclosure, actor-network accounts and so forth. What is shared by all these methods 
is a critical stance towards ontology and, in particular, epistemology or the awareness 
that the knowledge we have of the world helps shape it. In other words, they are all, 
to some extent, performative. To repeat, this thesis does not offer the performative 
reading of energy security. In fact, in addition to the methods mentioned above, 
this thesis discusses multiple explicit performative approaches, ranging from the 
speech acts in chapter 5.4 and the performativity of Butler in chapter 7.3, to Barad’s 
interpretation of intra-action in chapter 7.5 and Foucault’s insights on power/
knowledge in chapter 8.4. For this thesis, a non-specified performative reading 
offers the openness and self-reflexivity to understand and cope with the world of 
energy security and its becoming.22 In short, building on such an openness and self-
reflexivity, this thesis strives to come to a more extensive, but nonetheless temporal 
21 Aradau and Huysmans 2014; Aradau, Huysmans, et al. 2015.




understanding of the socio-material drivers behind conceptual understandings and 
practices of energy security.
1.3 overview of chapters
The chapters in this thesis are divided in three parts. Part I sets the stage by 
introducing the concept of energy security and by problematizing current approaches 
to energy security. Part II unpacks energy security theoretically to come to a deeper 
understanding of the drivers behind energy security. Finally, Part III provides two 
illustrations of an alternative performative reading of energy security. 
Part I Conceptualizing Energy Security consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 
provides a brief historical conceptualization of energy security. It traces the evolution 
of the concept in line with its expanding referent object, from a concept focused on 
security of physical supplies via economic and ecological security towards an ethical 
and energy systems understanding. Chapter 3 provides a counterpoint. In line with 
discussions on the resource nexus – that all natural resources are intimately linked on 
a biological and economic level – the assumption behind this chapter is that a similar 
historical conceptualization of food security offers novel insights for the discussion of 
energy security. Three things stand out from this comparison. First, that food security 
has witnessed a similar broadening of its referent object as energy security. Second, 
that food security is less state centric oriented as energy security. Third, that from 
a theoretical perspective food security has a strong critical tradition that is absent 
in the study of energy security. These three reflections are taken up in chapter 4, 
which discusses how the current literature approaches energy security. It discusses 
the categorization of the growth of the number of referent objects behind energy 
security, the role of geopolitical and neoliberal theoretical understandings of energy 
security and some recent theoretical developments within the field of energy security, 
including the search for underlying logics and contextualization. After concluding 
that a constant search for the perfect definition of energy security is a never-ending 
and highly normative struggle, this thesis moves on to the question what energy 
security does. 
To make this performative move and to come to an understanding of the constant 
proliferation of energy security, part II Unpacking Energy Security contains four 
chapters. Chapter 5 offers a theoretical discussion of security along a two-track 
approach that first discusses how the security literature describes security and then 
moves on to analyze what security does. Even at first glance this chapter reveals the 
emptiness of the idea of security as well as the multiple different logics behind it that 
all revolve on the will to know the future and to decide upon its undesirability. This 
chapter also offers two ways to approach a performative reading of energy security with 
its discussion of Securitization Theory and Risk. Whereas the Risk literature returns in 
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later chapters, this chapter exemplifies Securitization Theory with a brief illustration 
on the securitization of Russian gas imports by the European Commission. Following 
the discussion on security, Chapter 6 on scarcity offers a similar problematization, 
but in relation to natural resources and the markets and supply chains behind them. 
It starts by answering what scarcity is, finding four different understandings of a 
generally taken-for-granted concept, and then moves on to analyze the relativity 
of desire as a driver behind the proliferation of things to secure. It closes with a 
reflection on the self-referentiality inherent in the concept of scarcity through 
processes of normalization and structuration, which together make scarcity into an 
intractable issue. Chapter 7 on the relationship between materiality and knowledge 
tries to come to terms with the social understandings of security and scarcity in 
relation to the geology and socio-technical infrastructure that underpins energy 
systems. This chapter, first, analyses the linguistic arguments and the performativity 
of concepts, and then continues by introducing new materialist understandings of 
the role of matter within such a performative epistemological understanding. Matter 
here becomes both an impediment (technical solutions to social concerns) and driver 
(technological change like the electrification of society) for security arguments 
towards energy and other fields. Nevertheless, in line with security, this chapter ends 
by highlighting the importance of knowledge gathering practices and the ethics of 
observation behind these practices, as materiality offers both the surprise of socio-
material events as well as the achievement of closure following the interpretation of 
these events. Chapter 8, the last chapter of Part II, returns to security by introducing 
the work of Michel Foucault on biopolitics. It argues for an understanding of security 
as a form of political power that is both negative and productive, in addition to seeing 
security as a way to govern freedom and the continuous circulation of goods and 
people. With his reflections on security, scarcity, knowledge & materiality, Foucault’s 
work is useful to reflect on a number of connections between the insights from the 
different chapters of Part II. 
Part III Performing Energy Security, the last part of this thesis, offers two chapters, 
each with an illustration that utilizes one or more theoretical insights from Part II, to 
reflect upon the constitution and reification of the concept of energy security as well 
as its practical consequences. Chapter 9 discusses the debate on the earthquakes that 
result from natural gas extraction in the north of the Netherlands. This illustration 
shows how the insecurity of locals conflicts with the risk assessments of national 
institutions and how the debate unconsciously reifies current understandings of 
natural gas security. Besides conflicting security logics, this chapter also highlights 
the importance and politics of knowledge practices over material events. In turn, 
chapter 10 on smart grids breaks away even more from the dominant state centric 




security (chapter 5.4) or the reification of energy security (chapter 9) in this case a 
traditional understanding of energy security paves the way for a new technical 
system. A Foucauldian reading of this debate shows how security concerns (related 
to supply and sustainability) are behind the reengineering of the electricity grids. In 
this modernization, however, the concept of energy security is transformed as well. 
This chapter shows how it shifts from an understanding that is centered on access and 
availability to one steered by the logic of resilience and the acceptance that sometimes 
some customers need to be cut-off from the grid (voluntary or involuntary) for the 
benefit of the overall grid. 
Finally, the conclusion will summarize some of the main findings of this thesis on 
energy security, draw out five themes and reflect on the lessons that can be learned for 




P A R T  I
II.  conceptualIzIng energy 
SecurIty

The crux behind debates on energy security is that the insecurity of someone living in 
a European country differs from those living elsewhere in the world, as well as from 
those within the same country. Different geographical, temporal and environmental 
circumstances dictate different energy needs while different market and regulatory 
structures dictate the options people have to fulfil these needs. Yet despite these 
differences, almost all individuals are connected through global energy systems and 
markets of coal, oil, natural gas, uranium, wood pellets, corn, renewable technology, 
battery storage and so on. Not a single country can run from the climate effects of 
these markets nor can it be entirely independent from them. Simultaneously, energy is 
closely connected to the production, trade and consumption of other resources, while 
those same resources enable the production of energy, be they water (cooling/hydro), 
food (biofuels) or rare earth minerals (renewable technologies).1 Furthermore, these 
same energy sectors are slowly transforming from a traditional fossil fuel based system 
into a renewable electrified energy system, thereby changing the earth’s topography, 
physical infrastructures, market structures, social habits and power structures.
This complexity returns in debates on the concept of energy security. In fact, 
Hildyard, Lohmann & Sexton rightly remark that there are two things confusing in 
the concept of energy security: the concept of energy and the concept of security.2 
For Hildyard, Lohmann & Sexton both of these concepts hide many of the underlying 
socio-political and economic choices behind energy consumption and production, as 
they only implicitly touch upon the actual choice for a particular energy source or the 
decision who is in need of security. These latter choices are often foregone conclusions 
in most policy oriented energy security debates that try to secure these in the first 
place. Chapter 5 will discuss the intricacies of the security side of energy security. In 
relation to the energy side of the assemblage, a quick reflection on the meaning of the 
word already shows that a physicist’s definition of energy differs from an economic 
or a political conceptualization.3 Physicists understand energy as the work (joule (J)) 
needed to lift something over a fixed distance and they observe that energy cannot be 
created or destroyed in a closed system, but that it can only be transformed into other 
less useful types of energy (the First Law of Thermodynamics).4 This clearly contrasts 
with an economic understanding of energy as a commodity to be produced, sold and 
wasted. Let alone with a political understanding of energy as a strategic resource that 
1 Andrews-Speed et al. 2012; Beisheim 2013; Beddington 2009.
2 Hildyard, Lohmann, and Sexton 2012, 6. For a similar argument see: Bridge 2014.
3 Stern and Aronson 1984, 14–21. In their work, Stern and Aronson identify four perspectives besides a 
physicist understanding of energy. These include energy as a commodity (economics), as an ecological 
resource, as a social necessity and as a strategic material. See also Illich 2009, 13.
4 In turn, power denotes the work done per unit of time (J/s = watt (W)). In terms of the discussion on 
materiality in chapter 7, energy is an interesting phenomenon as it is neither matter, force nor social 
construction, but all of them together. 
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needs to be acquired and controlled. In this respect, Jansen & Van der Welle remark 
how it is not energy itself that is in need of securing, but useful energy: the energy that 
fits current socio-technical energy systems.5
There are multiple ways to study how security shapes and simplifies the complexity 
of energy supply chains. This part builds on two brief conceptual histories and an 
analysis to investigate the evolution in academic thought on the concept of energy 
security. Chapter 2 discusses the proliferation of the concept of energy security as 
encountered and discussed in the energy security literature. Chapter 3 provides a 
mirror to the energy security literature by providing a similar conceptual history of 
food security. While facing different market mechanisms and a different materiality, 
the theoretical debate on food security is comparable to energy security and has 
experienced a similar evolution and proliferation, except that the food security 
literature is less state centric and more critical. Chapter 4 builds on these insights 
and explores how the energy security literature deals with the proliferation of its own 
concept. In this chapter, the shift from the meaning of the concept of energy security 
to the theoretical and methodological approaches that are used to study energy 
security opens the way for a performative understanding of energy security.
5 Jansen and Van der Welle 2011, 240. For politicians and those working from a security perspective the 
referent object of energy itself (that what needs securing) is never the issue, it can be anything. See also 




22. The ProliferaTion of energy securiTy
‘Nothing exists that is not energy, or not affected by energy.’1
2.1 introduction
The concept of energy security has evolved along the cyclical whims of the expanding 
energy markets, in particularly the global oil market. Over the years, the concept ‘has 
quietly slipped into the energy lexicon and assumed a relatively prominent position.’2 
One of the most accepted and basic definitions of energy security is provided by the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), which defines energy security as ‘adequate, 
affordable and reliable supplies of energy.’3 Implicit in this definition is the sense that 
an agent is energy insecure when the supplies of energy are not adequate, affordable 
or reliable. However, who defines what is adequate, affordable or reliable? What kind 
of energy is needed? Who needs to make sure that energy is secure? It seems that 
the simplicity of the concept quickly breaks down under questioning. An alternative 
definition is provided by Ciuta who describes energy insecurity as ‘the product of 
the contradiction between a general trend of increasing energy consumption and 
a contradictory trend of decreasing energy reserves […].’4 Easily grasped in its 
simplicity and a core logic behind many of the geopolitical oriented considerations 
on energy security, chapter 6 on scarcity will question this neo-Malthusian line of 
thinking (and hence this definition). For now, this chapter will provide a history of 
the evolution of the concept of energy security. 
Much of the literature that studies energy security retraces its origin to the 1970s 
oil crises. Not only for its political and economic importance, but also because the 
actual concept of energy security originates from around that period. Of course, this 
does not mean that the concerns captured by the concept of energy security did not 
exist before the 1970s. For instance, security of supply concerns have a long history, 
arguably from the moment that people became dependent on others for their tools 
(in the Bronze Age).5 However, the political meaning of the concept of energy, as 
denoting a combination of coal, oil, gas and electricity industries and supply chains, 
only emerged in the early second half of the 20th century.6 Before this political 
understanding of energy, the discussions focused simply on the resource in question. 
1 Ciuta 2010, 124.
2 Chester 2010, 887.
3 IEA 2010a, 559; More generally, the IEA defines energy security as ‘the uninterrupted availability of 
energy sources at an affordable price’: see IEA 2015.
4 Ciuta 2010, 126.
5 Buijs, Sievers, and Tercero Espinoza 2012, 201.
6 Patterson 2008, 2; Illich 2009. 
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There was a coal problem or an electricity problem, never an energy problem. The 
difference becomes clear when one compares Jevons’ 1865 argument on the importance 
of coal with Schumacher’s 1964 argument on the importance of energy: 
Coal in truth stands not beside but entirely above all other commodities. It is 
the material energy of the country - the universal aid - the factor in everything 
we do. With coal almost any feat is possible or easy; without it we are thrown 
back into the laborious poverty of early times.7
There is no substitute for energy. The whole edifice of modern society is built 
upon it. Although energy can be bought and sold like any other commodity, 
it is not ‘just another commodity’ but the precondition of all commodities, a 
basic factor equal with air, water, and earth.8
In comparing these two quotes, three things become apparent. First, the current 
understanding of energy (and thus energy security) is a relatively modern 
understanding that has evolved in tandem with developments in markets, society 
and technology. Second, while the meanings and content might change and concerns 
can be added to the concept of energy security, some of the primary concerns, like 
security of supply, seem to remain stable over time. Lastly, the importance and all 
pervasiveness of energy in modern societies makes any security argument that calls 
for the protection of energy a self-evident argument, for how can one not secure ‘the 
factor in everything we do’ or ‘the precondition of all commodities’?
In reality, the public and scholarly attention to energy and energy security concerns 
fluctuates. The oil crises of the 1970s spurred an increase in attention, but declined 
in the late 1980s when the market dynamics changed back from the 1970s producer 
market (where producers are able to dictate the market price) to a buyers’ market 
(where demand sets the price). This buyers’ market lasted until the rise in prices from 
2003 onwards and culminating in the price hike of 2008 following unrest in producing 
countries, increasing demand from Asia and other developing countries, tightening 
refinery markets and decreasing production in non-OPEC countries. Together these 
market developments brought back energy security concerns and fears for a competition 
over the remaining fossil resources (and renewable technologies).9 While the general 
opinion was that this particular producer market was structural, the same price hike 
of over 140$ per barrel in July 2008 coincided with the beginning of the financial crisis 
that plummeted economic growth and the global demand for energy. This drop in 
demand, in turn, coincided with an increase in investments in renewables and shale 
7 Jevons 1866, chap. I – Introduction and Outline. See also Yergin 1991, 543.
8 Schumacher and Kirk 1977, 1–2. See also Yergin 1991, 559.
9 Hoogeveen and Perlot 2005; Yergin 2006; Mallaby 2006; Klare 2008.
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gas technology after the increase in oil and gas prices between 2003 and 2008, in a 
situation comparable to the responses to the oil crises in the 1970s, which spurred 
deep-sea non-OPEC oil and gas field exploration. Together these factors have reduced 
fossil fuel prices and thereby many of the energy insecurity concerns in Western 
energy policies. Even such a brief overview already shows that, when analyzing energy 
security, one constantly has to be aware that energy has both physical (geographic, 
technologic, infrastructural, environmental), economic and political aspects. 
The concerns captured with the concept of energy security are wide-ranging and 
proliferating. In a recent prominent analysis, Chester captures this proliferation 
by arguing that energy security is a ‘polysemic’ concept, by which she refers to an 
understanding of energy security that differs depending its context. In arguing for 
a contextual approach to energy security, whole-heartedly supported by this thesis, 
it is no longer possible to see the concept as a neutral policy goal. Energy security is 
instead a ‘plastic phrase used by a range of different interest groups to signify many 
often contradictory goals.’10 Below this polysemic complexity will be introduced 
through a brief sketch of the historical shifts in the meaning of energy security. 
While impressionistic and impossible to date precisely, it is possible to identify five 
general shifts in this brief overview of the evolution of the energy security literature.11 
Chapter 2.2 discusses the shift from a physical to a political security of supply; chapter 
2.3 embraces the economics of energy security; chapter 2.4 adds the concerns and 
complexity of climate change and sustainability; and chapters 2.5 and 2.6 move away 
from a state centric focus, respectively downwards towards the individual and upward 
to the protection of energy systems. The range and complexity of the energy supply 
chain and all its perceived threats will be analyzed more closely in chapter 4. From the 
start, however, it should be noted that what most of these energy security definitions 
with their Western outlook share is a choice for the market and a consumer bias as 
they focus on security of supply over the security of demand of producers.12 
2.2 from Physical to Political security of supply
The availability of and access to natural resources, like water and food, have in some 
form always been a concern for individuals and governments. In the late 19th century, 
Jevons and Lord Kelvin raised such concerns in relation to the increasing reliance 
10 Hildyard, Lohmann, and Sexton 2012, 5. For similar arguments see: Winzer 2012, 36; Labban 2011, 327.
11 Interestingly, the positions themselves were already identified by Stern and Aronson 1984. Yet, when 
analyzing the energy security literature many of these positions are only incorporated at later stages. 
These five themes are here interpreted inclusionary, as together making up the definition of energy 
security (in line with the multiplicity behind a politics of ontology – see chapter 7).
12 Chester 2010, 891.
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on coal for shipping, production, heat and electricity.13 However, while Jevons and 
Lord Kelvin discussed the future of British coal supplies and the potential for imports 
and exports, oil was gradually gaining in significance after the development of the 
combustion engine. Consequently, concerns over the availability of domestic coal 
decreased while security of supply concerns over (foreign) oil increased. Churchill’s 
decision to shift the complete British navy to oil before World War 1 led to one of the 
first debates that fits a modern understanding of energy supply security.14 Weighing 
the increased speed and capacity of the Royal Navy in favor of a dependency on 
foreign oil from Persia, the British navy tried to minimize that dependency as much 
as possible. On the one hand, the Admiralty decided to control as much as possible of 
the supply line itself. Amongst others, by taking ownership of a company nowadays 
known as British Petroleum (Anglo-Persian), by using that same naval power to 
secure its own supply lines, and by building a domestic reserve. On the other hand, 
in line with Churchill’s claim that ‘[s]afety and certainty in oil, lie in variety and 
variety alone,’ it promoted a global competition of oil suppliers by entering into 
supply contracts with other companies and their access to oil resources elsewhere in 
the world.15 
While the modern energy security literature picked up the diversification 
argument, the main argument in Churchill’s speech is actually not one of dependency 
but one of price volatility and market manipulation by a small group of companies.16 
He feared that the navy would become dependent on volatile oil markets and, more 
precise, would be overcharged for its oil needs. In Churchill’s own words: ‘The 
problem is not one of quantity; it is one of price […]’ and if we are not careful ‘[i]t 
would mean, however, that we should be made to pay an excessive price for it.’17 Still, 
while Churchill clearly points towards the economics of oil markets, he does so in 
regards to the military and from within a frame of national security concerns. Hence, 
the argument is still based on security of supply concerns – as is the energy security 
literature at this point.
In fact, this military security of supply argument remained dominant up until the 
oil crisis of 1973, even though oil became increasingly important in other sectors of 
society, including mobility, industry and electricity generation.18 Heavily influenced 
by two World Wars and the early years of the Cold War, energy security was mainly 
interpreted in terms of its military value: as a necessity to win wars and thus as 
13 Jevons 1866; Yergin 2012, 3.
14 Yergin 1991, 153–164.
15 Ibid., 160; Parliamentary Debates, Commons 1913, 1477.
16 Parliamentary Debates, Commons 1913, 1473.
17 Ibid., 1473, 1474.
18 Mitchell 2000.
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something in need of protection.19 During the Second World War, many resources, 
including oil, were heavily regulated. These restrictions only relaxed after the war 
with the realization that the oil flowed quite abundantly and prices remained low. 
The Cold War, in turn, highlighted the (strategic) military vulnerability of energy 
infrastructure (oil refineries, pipelines, electricity plants, etc.) and gave birth to the 
field that nowadays is called critical infrastructure protection.20
This changed with the 1973 oil shock when the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) reduced its production level and installed an export 
restriction towards Israel, the United States of America (USA) and the Netherlands. 
This first use of the ‘oil weapon’ against industrial consumer countries reinforced two 
insights: a strong feeling of foreign dependency and a realization of the importance of 
energy for economic and social life.21 The first insight was an acute and broadly shared 
feeling of dependency across publics in industrialized countries and a longing for the 
1960s uninterrupted flows of low cost oil.22 The crises also brought forth the public 
realization that oil consumption had long trumped coal by tripling in total volume 
since the end of the Second World War.23 Moreover, it led to the recognition that 
decolonization meant that many of these oil sources no longer fell under colonial rule 
nor under Western markets as they were increasingly being nationalized.24 Contrary 
to the public, this was less of a surprise to energy experts who had been noting the 
incidents leading up to 1973. These include the European security of supply concerns 
raised in relation to the Suez Crisis in 1956, the nationalization of Western owned 
extraction and transport facilities in former colonies, and the long American debate 
in the 1950s in which domestic oil producers called for and received import quotas 
against cheap foreign Middle Eastern oil (lasting from 1959 until 1973).25 
Still, the 1973 oil crisis and its 1979 sibling following the Iranian Revolution 
shook the world. In response, the industrial countries initiated a number of practical 
measures to support their continuing oil consumption. This includes the installation of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974 (planned by Kissinger in 1969) and the 
support from Western governments for the development of new non-OPEC controlled 
oil and gas fields, new technological development as well as the shift to alternative 
19 Ibid.; Cherp and Jewell 2011b.
20 Collier and Lakoff 2008b.
21 Cherp and Jewell 2011b. Stern 2006b, 1650 argues that the ‘Oil Weapon’ was first termed by the League 
of Nations debating possible sanctions against Italy in 1935, and first applied by the United States of 
America when it sanctioned Japan over its occupation of China in 1941 (80% of Japanese imports).
22 Mitchell 2000.
23 Yergin 1991.
24 Cherp and Jewell 2011b.
25 Stern 2006b; Yergin 1991, 535–540.
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energy sources (nuclear).26 It also initiated a spur in energy security research.27 For 
Yergin, who later became known for his book The Prize on the evolution of the oil 
industry, the 1970s oil shocks and the following energy policies of consumer countries 
showed that ‘[t]he focus of energy security concerns is on the shocks – interruptions, 
disruptions and manipulations of supply – that can lead to sudden, sharp increases in 
prices and can impose heavy economic and political costs.’28 Up to this day, politically 
engineered supply disruptions remain at the core of energy security concerns. In 
respect to these disruptions, Nye warned directly after the second oil crisis that the 
USA should not strive for energy independence, as it would always be part of the 
global oil market. He argues that in a global market the price for a product is set by 
the last barrel that is sold, meaning that even with very little imports, those imports 
still influence domestic price levels and one is still dependent on international affairs 
and energy markets.29 Equaling imports with vulnerability therefore only works up to 
a point and neglects the insight that trade also offers an instrument to dampen supply 
shocks (see chapter 6). 
2.3 securing the economics of energy
These latter reflections on the link with global energy markets and the economic and 
political costs of supply shocks relate to the second insight gained from the 1973 oil 
crisis: the by then central importance of oil for economic and social life in general. 
The economic crisis that followed the increase in oil prices thus extended Churchill’s 
military concerns about price volatility to the economy as a whole. The concept of 
security of supply broadened to include price fluctuations and their effects on the 
overall economy besides the existing concerns for uninterrupted, physical flows of 
supplies.30 In a key text on the link between economics and energy security, Bohi & 
Toman define energy security as ‘the loss of economic welfare that may occur as a 
result of a change in the price or availability of energy’.31 To this day, the IEA uses a 
similar starting point for its definition of energy insecurity: ‘Energy insecurity stems 
from the welfare impact of either the physical unavailability of energy, or prices that 
are not competitive or overly volatile.’32 Initially however, the welfare impacts of oil 
disruptions remained framed in terms of a dependency on foreign countries. This 
26 On Kissinger see: Labban 2011.
27 See for example: Akins 1973; Bradley 1973; Levy 1973; Pollack 1973; Gordon 1974; Kemp 1978; Stobaugh 
and Yergin 1978; Deese 1979; Lieber 1980.
28 Yergin 1988, 112; Yergin 1991.
29 Nye 1981, 12–13. For an earlier take on dependency see: Lubell 1961. For a more recent discussion see: 
Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007; Greene 2010.
30 Bohi and Toman 1996, 3.
31 Ibid., 1–2.
32 IEA 2007, 12.
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changed with the privatization and liberalization of consumer countries’ energy 
markets in the 1980s and 1990s, after Thatcher’s struggle with the coal miners in 
Great Britain.33 In line with Churchill’s early concerns about a British dependency 
on a limited number of oil companies, the meaning of energy security extended 
to an overall economic vulnerability of consumer countries. In this broadened 
understanding of vulnerability, not only foreign countries and companies are deemed 
problematic, but so are domestic companies and acts (labor strikes) that might hamper 
the flow of oil, gas, etc.34 
With the shift in referent object towards the broader economic impact of a supply 
disruption, the solution to prevent and minimize potential negative impacts of such 
a disruption shifted as well. Following the neoliberal inspired privatization and 
liberalization programs, consumer governments increasingly relied on independently 
operating markets and international institutions to prevent supply disruptions. This 
market-based understanding of energy security has become quite influential and 
lies at the core of modern definitions of energy security.35 The main argument for a 
market-based energy security policy is that in a well-functioning market ‘economic 
costs may rise but physical shortages do not materialize’ due to the self-correcting 
nature of the market (for a critique of this argument see chapter 6 on scarcity).36 In a 
neoliberal perspective, markets are seen to be delivering security in two ways.37 On 
the short-term, they prevent physical shortages by shifting supplies to where they are 
needed based on fluctuating price levels. On the long-term, markets promote security 
because they allow for the free flow of finance and thereby enable investments when 
and where they are needed to supply future demand.38 The greater efficiency promised 
by markets, which in theory leads to lower end-user prices, is seen as a welcome bonus 
to this self-correcting nature.
Because energy markets are now seen as the main option to prevent and level out 
any supply disruptions their future existence is itself cause for concern. This returns 
in relation to the functioning of markets as well as to the idea of free-markets. On the 
one hand, scholars working on the economics of energy study the markets themselves 
and ask whether they are operating as they should (they never do). Bohi & Toman, 
for example, focus on the ‘energy security externalities’ or why energy prices do not 
reflect all costs and benefits associated with the product. They pay attention to the level 
of oil imports (either directly in volumes and prices or indirectly through inflation 
33 Bohi and Toman 1996, 3; Cherp and Jewell 2011b.
34 See Mitchell 2013 for an alternative interpretation of these strikes.
35 IEA 2007, 12 & 32.
36 Bohi and Toman 1996, 4.




or the trade balance), the fluctuations in prices, and to security expenditures.39 A 
more recent contribution by Metcalf also studies externalities and briefly reflects on 
the economics behind energy taxes, the quest for independence and the economic 
value of diversity and strategic reserves.40 Similarly, the IEA’s attention to ‘regulatory 
failures’ in more recent reports on energy security shifts the problem from innocent 
markets to imprudent governments.41 
On the other hand, on a more abstract level the idea of neoliberal markets 
itself needs protection. For example, one of the reasons why the recent surge in 
resource nationalism, from both state-owned producer companies in Russia and the 
Middle-East and state-owned consumer companies in China and India, is seen as 
threatening by Western consumer countries is because it endangers the idea of free 
energy markets (see the illustration on the securitization of energy in chapter 5.4).42 
Interestingly, there are calls to install a consumer cartel to level this playing field (in 
addition to the IEA). The recent proposal for a European Energy Union for instance 
included the idea to negotiate collectively on natural gas with external suppliers.43 As 
Labban argues: somehow ‘[c]artel behavior on the part of the producers […] justifies 
a consumers’ cartel; but whereas the former appears to undermine the security of 
the energy market, the latter appears to guarantee it, as it paradoxically promotes 
market principles ….’44 From proposals like the one above, the impression rises that 
free-markets are just an instrument for Western consumer countries to govern their 
security of supply by playing on their primary strength, namely purchasing power.
While the market delivers both a way to flatten supply shocks and is seen to 
organize a long-term balance between supply and demand, it also creates insecurity. 
Price volatility is one insecurity, bull (upward trend) and bear (downward trend) 
markets another. Both point to the inherent uncertainty of markets. While markets 
only work when left to their own device, that same lack of control together with the 
speed of unpredictable and emotion driven shocks leads to calls for intervention (see 
chapter 8). As Mitchell argues: ‘The paradox for policymakers is that extensive and 
open energy networks both provide resilience and transmit shocks to physical supply 
and short-term price.’45 While the relation between security and markets has never 
been an easy partnership, the choice for privatization and competition has created 
a situation wherein the search for lower costs led to a political-market with money 
39 Bohi and Toman 1996. They also conclude that except for the trade balance, which depend on the country 
in question, none of the indirect price effects have been proven.
40 Metcalf 2013. See also Mulder, ten Cate, and Zwart 2007 on Strategic Reserves.
41 IEA 2007, 33–34.
42 Labban 2011.
43 European Commission 2015, 6; Beckman 2015.
44 Labban 2011, 335.
45 Mitchell 2000.
40
2The ProliferaTion of energy SecuriTy
saved on spare capacity, back-up installations and investment in new long-term viable 
technologies. This process is said to have contributed to the Gas Bubble in the UK 
and to the power blackouts in both America (California, New England) and North-
Western Europe early 2000s.46 
These local blackouts point to another shift in the concept of energy security. 
Although extended over time to include gas, the concept of energy security still 
focused mainly on oil markets at this stage. For example, in his 1988 article Yergin 
defined energy security as ‘ensuring the availability of oil at reasonable prices’.47 
However, the increasing reliance on nuclear energy and the development of renewable 
energy sources, the Gas Bubble in the UK, and the more recent blackouts of the early 
2000s, all point towards electricity as a major source of energy on its own. At present, 
electricity, from whatever source, is counted as the second source of all globally 
consumed energy.48 What is more, the extensiveness of the electricity grid, ranging 
across the globe, is seen as highly vulnerable to external influences, both man-made 
and natural. In extending the referent object of energy security and the number 
of energy sources, the quite narrow concept of security of supply evolved into the 
broader concept of energy security.
2.4 sustainable energy security
Environmental concerns are another externality of energy markets that 
simultaneously result from the use of fossil energy fuels and will affect the future of 
those energy markets. Environmental and climate change concerns can be traced to 
the neo-Malthusian literature of the late 1960s and their officially acknowledgement 
in the report of the Brundtland Commission in 1987.49 At stake in this third thematic 
proliferation are not the short-term security of supply concerns but the security of the 
livelihoods of future generations. 
The link between energy security and climate change is strong but not always as 
obvious as stated. In an overview, Mulligan describes four phases. For Mulligan it 
starts in the 1960s and 1970s when there was a clear link between energy scarcity and 
the impact of energy use, a link that was captured with the term ‘ecological security’. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, he sees the attention shifting to the conflict potential of these 
environmental impacts under the heading of ‘environmental security’.50 The third 
46 Mitchell 2002, 6; Bielecki 2002, 236.
47 Yergin 1988, 114. To be fair, however, in the same article his main conclusion was based on the importance 
of energy efficiency, which he claimed had ‘turned out to be the most important incremental energy 
“source” of all’ during the 1970s and 1980s, see ibid., 114–115. 
48 Chester 2010, 889; Bielecki 2002, 247–248.
49 Brundtland 1987; Meadows et al. 1972; Ehrlich 1970; Carson 1981; see Mulligan 2010 for an historical 
overview; Dalby 2006; Dalby 2002; Dalby 2014.
50 See: Homer-Dixon 1991; Homer-Dixon 1994.
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phase, in the late 1990s, shifted the discussions back to the global level with a focus 
on climate change and the Anthropocene. This move to ‘climate security’ includes 
the fourth phase of renewed attention to questions of energy resource scarcity, which 
became prevalent again around 2005 and 2006.51 The complex relationship between 
climate change and energy security highlighted by these shifts lead some authors to 
conclude that this link is an ‘unnecessarily broad extension’ of the concept of energy 
security.52 There are in fact two reasons to incorporate sustainable energy in the 
concept of energy security, but also two that question this. 
First, there is a clear relationship between global energy consumption and its 
negative impacts on climate change and environment degradation. This includes CO2 
and methane emissions that result from fossil fuel consumption, but also biodiversity 
impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects like hydro dams, open-pit mining and 
first generation bio-fuels (including indirect land use change (ILUC)). In turn, climate 
change is affecting potential future energy production and extraction. There are three 
main areas where climate change is said to impact energy supplies. Firstly, there is 
the direct link between energy and climate change impacts. This is exemplified by 
extreme weather that disrupts electricity distribution or by the need for fresh water in 
the production and extraction of energy resources (e.g. coal, shale gas, biofuels etc.) 
and for the cooling of energy plants. France, for example, was forced to shut down 
a number of its nuclear reactors in the summers of 2003 and 2009, as high summer 
temperatures resulted in a rising temperature of the river water, which in turn made 
cooling of the reactors impossible.53 Secondly, a more indirect relationship focusses 
on the impact of climate change and environmental degradation on vulnerable 
areas, most often poor and less developed regions.54 In these circumstances and 
through its impacts on water, air and food, climate change is said to act as a threat 
multiplier causing migration and increased pressure on the resources that are left (for 
a discussion see chapter 5). Thirdly, a last link can be found in the consequences of the 
measures against climate change upon future energy production. This link returns 
especially in the argument of a ‘Carbon Bubble.’55 This financial argument builds 
on the premise that the remaining carbon fuels that can be safely burned without 
an increase of global temperatures above the agreed 2°C is not comparable to the 
fossil fuel reserves the major oil and gas companies deem financially viable reserves 
and upon which they built their investment portfolios. Simply put, according to this 
51 Mulligan 2010; La Branche 2013, 403–404.
52 Wright 2005, 2273; Luft, Korin, and Gupta 2011.
53 Pagnamenta 2009.
54 Brown and Dworking 2011.
55 Carbon Tracker Initiative 2011.
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argument, the companies are not worth what they and the financial markets think 
they are.
Second, climate change is part of energy security because the solutions to climate 
change reflect the solutions for a future secure energy supply. In principle, both build 
on a sustainable energy supply (a reduction in greenhouse gasses) from renewables 
and passive energy (efficiency, isolation, etc.). By expanding the volume of locally 
produced renewable energy sources and by increasing the efficiency of equipment, 
the CO2 emissions and total demand for energy are reduced, as well as the level of 
dependency from external energy sources. While this argument is correct in that 
decentralized and domestically produced renewable energy could prevent physical 
shortages, there are some drawbacks from an energy security perspective. These 
include the intermittent nature of renewable energy that requires the construction 
of conventional back-up capacity, storage capacity or demand side management 
programs (see chapter 9 on smart grids for a discussion). It also needs to come to terms 
with the fact that renewables favor electricity production, whereas transportation 
is still mainly reliant on oil. The transformation of both sectors is a challenge that 
will take decades, with fossil fuels remaining prominent in the foreseeable future. 
During this transformation, cultures of consumption, but also cost imperatives and 
the difficulty of providing public goods within private markets might undermine 
the optimal solution to both climate change and energy security.56 For example, 
the recent downward pressure on German wholesale electricity prices is one of the 
contributing factors to the resurgence of coal as a major input source for electricity 
(together with the decision to close nuclear power plants and the shale gas revolution 
in the US, which put downward pressure on global coal prices). Again, countries and 
individuals are not isolated from the global energy markets. It hardly matters whether 
you import a little or a lot of an externally produced source of energy, in case of a 
tightening market international prices will go up and so too will domestic prices.57 
This argument goes in fact both ways. It also makes it impossible for a country – 
especially in the EU – to stimulate domestic renewable production directly as these 
effects spread out over other countries.58 
The link between climate change and energy security is clearly a complicated one. 
In this respect Luft, Korin & Gupta make two critical remarks.59 Firstly, although 
they do not question the direct linkages between climate change and energy supplies, 
as in the example of rising temperatures/adverse weather impacts on French energy 
production, they do question the usefulness of including second-order effects of 
56 Brown and Huntington 2008; Luft, Korin, and Gupta 2011, 48–51.
57 Mitchell 2000.
58 Mallaby 2006.
59 Luft, Korin, and Gupta 2011.
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climate change, like migration and civil conflict, to the concept of energy security. 
For Luft, Korin & Gupta these indirect effects open the definition of energy security 
to many other second-order concerns. They mention religion, which could easily be 
ascribed a role in energy security analyses as well.60 Secondly, they critically reflect 
upon the inherent negativity of the relationship between climate change and energy 
supply. From an energy security perspective, they argue that theoretically there 
could be positive developments as well. In this respect, they point to the recent surge 
in interest towards the Arctic where higher temperatures enable new trade routes 
and deep-sea oil and gas exploration.61 Bad for the environment, but potentially 
increasing the security of a fossil fuel based energy system. The fact remains that 
both are linked very closely in a multitude of ways. Hence, this rethinking of the 
relationship between climate change and energy security highlights a third general 
reflection on the constant struggle between the short-term urgency of energy supply 
shocks and its long-term environmental impacts.62
2.5 human energy insecurity
Together with the surge in environmental awareness, the energy security literature 
also moved away from its state centric approach to human centric appraisals of energy 
security. Among others, the 1994 UNDP report on human security helped codify the 
focus shift towards the individual as a referent object in energy security discussions 
by arguing that:63 
Of the world’s six billion people, one-third enjoy the kind of energy on demand 
that Americans take for granted […], and another third have such energy 
services intermittently. The final third – two billion people – simply lack access 
to modern energy systems.64
This geographical inequality is further complicated by the realization that in energy 
secure nations there too are individuals who do not enjoy such provisions. The 
resulting break with a state centric understanding of energy security is captured with 
the concept energy poverty; a concept that comes in three flavors.65 
The first interpretation of energy poverty focusses on the individual from an 
economic developmental perspective, and is used especially in relation to individuals 
60 Ibid., 46.
61 Ibid., 47.
62 La Branche 2013, 412.
63 UNDP 1994.
64 Wirth, Boyden Gray, and Podesta 2003, 138.
65 Bhattacharyya 2013, 424.
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in underdeveloped countries. In these countries and regions, the energy security of 
the poor is centered on the availability of and access to modern electricity and cooking 
equipment. This interpretation stems from a developmental engineering perspective 
that, on the one hand, analyses the health consequences of traditional biomass energy 
consumption and, on the other hand, emphasizes the construction, improvement 
and affordability of a minimum energy infrastructure (based on an appraisal of basic 
energy needs in that particular environment).66 
A second understanding of energy poverty is largely favored in developed Western 
countries. Here access and availability are not the core problem, but affordability 
is. Also called fuel poverty, this idea, which Moore traces back to the early 1980s, 
considers everybody who spends more than 10 percent of his income on energy 
as energy poor.67 Discussions range on what counts as income, how fuel costs are 
calculated and at what percentage or threshold someone can be considered energy 
poor. This latter benchmark is often connected to considerations of minimum energy 
needs, predominantly in terms of minimum room temperatures during winter and 
subsequent social support programs for those who fall below this line. 
Together these two readings lead to a third overarching understanding of energy 
poverty. At a more abstract and global level, energy poverty is discussed comparatively 
in terms of global energy justice.68 This perspective also starts with the actual access 
to and affordability of energy, without which there is no justice at all. However, the 
ideal type of energy justice goes further. In a recent contribution, Sovacool argues 
that a just energy world is based on intergenerational (between generations) and 
intragenerational (within a generation) equity, in terms of availability and affordability 
of energy, access to high-quality information, and decision-makers following 
due process and acting with prudency and responsibility when deciding on energy 
investments.69 Heffron & McCauley make a similar distinction between distributional 
justice (dealing with access and affordability) and subsequent procedural justice 
in relation to collective decision-making processes.70 Comparable to the other two 
approaches to energy poverty, the focus on distributional justice implies that in this 
case as well the core question remains ‘how much and what kind of energy enables a 
person to live a truly human life without interfering with or diminishing the ability 
of others to do the same.’71
66 Bhattacharyya 2013; IEA 2010b; Kaygusuz 2011; Prasad 2011; Sokona, Mulugetta, and Gujba 2012; 
Okereke and Yusuf 2013.
67 Moore 2012; Hills 2012; Middlemiss and Gillard 2015.
68 Pachauri 2011b; Goldthau and Sovacool 2012; Sovacool 2013; Sovacool, Sidortsov, and Jones 2014; Heffron 
and McCauley 2014. For an early discussion see: Illich 1974.
69 Sovacool 2013, 12.
70 Heffron and McCauley 2014.
71 Sovacool, Sidortsov, and Jones 2014, 197.
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Two general remarks can be made about this literature. First, the shift towards 
individuals is not uniform. While energy justice is often discussed in favor of an 
individual’s access and affordability to energy, the measurement of this often caps at a 
household level (see chapter 3). Especially in relation to the two more applied energy 
poverty perspectives, the ease of measurement dictates a focus on household levels 
and thereby obscures intra-household and family disparities. Of course, without 
physical access for the household as a whole the individual has no access either. In 
this respect, Pachauri defines household energy security 
in terms of access to secure, stable, and reliable supplies of modern energy at 
affordable prices in amounts adequate to meet demands for energy services in 
full so as to ensure human health and well-being. In contrast, energy insecurity 
can be seen as a lack of, or inconsistent access to, sufficient affordable energy of 
the type and quality necessary for a healthy life.72
To be fair, this is a relatively comparable definition of energy (in)security to other 
more national and state centric oriented definitions. 
However, second, Pachauri’s definition does introduce the importance and 
difference between energy supplies and energy services. ‘As energy expert Amory 
Lovins has long pointed out, people do not want energy or kilowatt hours; they 
want “hot showers, cold beer, lit rooms”.’73 People are not interested in oil; they are 
interested in the services that are made possible by burning oil: movement, light, 
heat, cooling, etc. Whereas much of the state and market centric perspectives of 
energy discussed above focus on the access, availability and affordability of energy 
supplies – oil, gas, coal, electricity, etc. – and the markets to deliver them, the focus 
on individuals and the constantly returning question of what needs to be considered 
as basic energy needs highlights the services to which those supplies are put to use.74 
Patterson expressly starts from energy services and shows how this enables the 
inclusion of alternative ways to reach those services that have nothing to do with 
commoditized fuel supplies, like an optimal use of ambient energy.75 In doing so, the 
referent object of energy security shifts once more to a point between the security of 
supplies and the impact on economic and social life.76
72 Pachauri 2011a, 191.
73 Hildyard, Lohmann, and Sexton 2012, 8; quoting Lovins 1990, 21.
74 Patterson 2008; Patterson 2010; Jansen 2009; Jansen and Seebregts 2010.
75 Patterson 2008. Ambient energy refers to the energy already available: sunlight, body heat, the shadow 
of threes, and so forth.
76 See also: Winzer 2012, 37.
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2.6 securing energy systems 
A last shift in perspective (and referent object) can be found in discussions on the 
protection of energy systems. Difficult to pinpoint to a particular publication or 
time, this perspective builds on ideas about complex systems in the environmentalist 
literature and the protection of vital systems in the 1950s and 1960s strategic defense 
literature.77 From these origins, the security of energy systems moves away from a 
state centric understanding of energy security. Not towards human energy security or 
energy services, but to the complexity of vital energy supply chains. When analyzing 
the energy security literature from a systems perspective, the protection of total 
supply chains as well as the interaction with adjacent vital systems often return. 
However, besides these much discussed vital energy systems there is another systems 
reading, a critical one, that reviews the self-referentiality in current energy systems. 
For authors like Illich and Bryne, discussed below, the system itself is problematic as 
the current organization of energy is inherently pushing for more of the same, and 
consequently, in terms of the above discussed sustainability and equality concerns, 
threatening from a security perspective.
Regarding the first “traditional” energy system debate, it should be clear that a 
focus on energy systems disregards individuals and nations except as part of the overall 
system. Often the physical infrastructure is the focal point of energy security analyses, 
especially in relation to the vulnerability to military or terrorist attacks (but also 
extreme weather and human error or maintenance).78 Under the general heading of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), the physical infrastructure of electricity grids 
and power plants, oil and gas pipelines or refineries is protected against intentional 
disruptions.79 These disruptions can be aimed at the infrastructure itself (nuclear 
power plant) or indirectly at the services that the infrastructure enables (disrupting 
socio-economic life through the electricity grid).80 In an energy system where there 
are always nodes or parts of the system that are less protected than others, the desire 
to defend against unpredictable attacks from both a physical or cyber origins results 
77 For an analysis on the origins of CIP see Collier and Lakoff 2008b; Collier and Lakoff 2008a; Lakoff and 
Collier 2010; Collier and Lakoff 2015. For one of the earliest systematic reflections see Lovins and Lovins 
1982. Collier and Lakoff have described its genealogy by analyzing the correlation between the “invention” 
of scenario studies and the protection of large-scale infrastructure systems following the Second World 
War. What they show is how the growing material development of vast and connected infrastructures – 
of energy, communication and mobility – together with a deeper scientific understanding of biological 
and chemical flow processes has led to a governing of complex interconnected infrastructure systems. 
A governing of systems, which in turn has been heavily influenced by scenario techniques, which led 
to an understanding of inherent vulnerability that nowadays supports all approaches to infrastructure 
systems. For an interesting reflection, see Coward 2009.
78 Cherp and Jewell 2014.




in the desire to protect the entirety of the infrastructure system.81 This includes the 
infinitely small-scale daily objects and practices that lie at the base of these large-
scale assemblages.82 At the same time, knowing that total protection is not possible, 
the aim becomes to build a resilient system that can handle adverse disruptions with 
minimum impact. To speed this along, attention is paid to those installations that are 
prioritized as most vulnerable or are likely to have the highest impact.83 However, 
although prioritization is useful, the core characteristic of a system as a referent object 
is that it is never closed. For example, the electricity grid, when seen as a system, links 
to other infrastructure systems - telecommunications, finance, water, public services 
and transportation – and is hence vulnerable to potential cascading effects between 
them. This leads to the urge to control those systems too and thereby highlights the 
constant tension between a search for control and a constant sense of vulnerability 
(see chapter 5).
If the concept of system is interpreted more broadly, it becomes possible to engage 
with the critical literature that discusses the energy system as part of society in what 
it calls an ‘energy regime’.84 Scholars working from such a critical Marxist inspired 
perspective study the internal logics of the physical energy infrastructure, energy 
markets, regulatory regimes and production and consumption habits of individuals in 
relation to the lock-in effects that uphold the status quo of current energy regimes.85 
It argues that the technological path-dependency of increasingly complex systems and 
the neoliberal market incentives within this system (see chapter 6), constantly work to 
reinforce the desire for more energy consumption and thereby foreclose any serious 
reflection upon the consumption itself. For these critical authors, the energy regime is 
a regime that builds upon failures and externalities by patching the holes, thus adding 
more of itself in a constant reinforcement of its basic tenets. In other words, it argues 
that current energy regimes do not reflect upon the underlying dynamics that help 
cause those externalities and insecurities. In addition, new solutions, like modern-
day renewable energy, only seem to gain general reception because of their direct link 
towards the existing regime, for example by way of gaining financial viability.86 As 
Hildyard, Lohmann & Sexton remark:
81 Ibid., 338.
82 Mayer and Acuto 2015, 678; Voelkner 2011; Voelkner 2012. In this respect, Graham and Thrift discuss 
the mundane activities of maintenance and repair of the electricity grid, and in particular how, while 
often overlooked in political debates, the organization of these activities is a highly political affair that 
influences the future direction of the grid, and consequently our electricity consumption. See: Graham 
and Thrift 2007; see also Bennett 2005.
83 Farrell, Zerriffi, and Dowlatabadi 2004, 440.
84 Byrne and Toly 2006; Hornborg 2013; Illich 1974; Illich 2009; Nye 2014; Huber 2009; Huber 2011a; Huber 
2011b; Labban 2010.
85 Byrne and Toly 2006.
86 Ibid., 15–16.
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If fossil-fueled capitalism has defined what we mean by energy, then merely 
to use the word uncritically is to make a commitment to certain assumptions 
about scarcity, foreclose certain alternatives and cover up some of the most 
important issues that need to be discussed. Paradoxically, having a serious 
discussion about “energy security” requires taking a therapeutic step back 
from the modern concept of Energy itself.87
From this perspective, energy security or general security practices are not something 
to be achieved, but an ‘administrative logic’ (chapter 8) that is part of the self-
reinforcing nature of the current neoliberal energy regime.88 In other words, this 
energy regime literature argues that any understanding of energy security would not 
be complete without a critical reflection on what energy security does in terms of 
possible consequences and effects, besides questioning the essence of what energy 
security is. 
2.7 defining energy security
The brief historically oriented analysis of the concept of energy security above clearly 
highlights the proliferations of the different themes and forms that are captured by a 
broad policy oriented reading of the concept of energy security. The main conclusion 
that can be drawn from this overview is that energy security is an empty concept, 
but an empty concept with strong political and social impacts and one that is always 
filled by someone with a reference to something or someone. Although the meaning 
of energy security itself evolves over time (from individual resources to energy), what 
mainly shifts are the referent objects that are in need of security (supplies, services, 
human health, national wealth, environmental sustainability, infrastructure systems, 
etc.). With the growing importance of energy in all aspects of socio-economic life 
where ‘[n]othing exists that is not energy, or not affected by energy’, that means that 
by now almost all of our lives are subject to and in need of energy security.89 
Many definitions of energy security try to capture this proliferation by adding 
aspects to the core definition of the IEA on ‘the uninterrupted availability of energy 
sources at an affordable price.’90 Table 2 in the annex, list a number of definitions, 
but in terms of extensiveness, two are worth mentioning. On the one hand, the 2000 
European Commission’s green paper on energy security (supplies) provides one of the 
most extensive definitions of energy supply security available today:
87 Hildyard, Lohmann, and Sexton 2012, 19–20.
88 Bridge 2014, 3.
89 Ciuta 2010, 124.
90 IEA 2015; Cherp and Jewell 2014, 417.
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[E]nergy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the well-being of its 
citizens and the proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical 
availability of energy products on the market, at a price which is affordable 
for all consumers (private and industrial), while respecting environmental 
concerns and looking towards sustainable development. (...) Security of supply 
does not seek to maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, 
but aims to reduce the risks linked to such dependence.91
Likewise, Barton et al. in a 2004 legal discussion of energy security (services) define 
it as
a condition in which a nation and all, or most of its citizens and business have 
access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable 
future free from serious risk of major disruption of service.92 
Not only do these definitions highlight that there is no agreement on what needs 
protection (the source of energy or energy in general, the infrastructure, the supplies, 
the services, the market that delivers them), whose energy needs are protected (the 
state, the market or business, the individual or the system as whole), but they also leave 
open who decides on the relativeness of these definitions (who decides on relativeness 
of affordable, sufficient, proper functioning, respecting, serious). In addition, the 
definition of Barton et al. leads to the question whether it is truly possible to achieve the 
theological goal of energy security at all. While the European Commission searches 
for energy security for all, Barton and colleagues offer a definition that acknowledges 
that energy security is reached when most of the citizens and businesses are secure, 
not all of them. 
Following similar lines of argumentation, the general conclusion by energy 
security scholars seems to be that energy security cannot be defined universally and 
that the referent objects will keep expanding.93 One exception includes a recent 
reflection by Cherp & Jewell, who argue that even though the meaning of energy 
security is contextual, there is still some shared core idea behind it.94 They point 
towards the values behind energy, the ‘acquired values’ of modern life, but do not 
explain these further.95 In response, Ciuta disagrees with Cherp & Jewell’s analysis 
of some hidden shared understanding of energy security (as well as the search for a 
perfect all-encompassing definition) by asking whether it is the totalizing tendency 
91 European Commission 2000, 2.
92 Barton et al. 2004, 5.
93 Winzer 2012; Chester 2010.
94 Cherp and Jewell 2014.
95 Ibid., 416.
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of energy that transforms the current understanding of energy security into a banal 
form of security.96 If everything is energy and hence part of energy security, than its 
security becomes in essence unexceptional (banal) and consequentially no longer a 
form of security. In other words, Ciuta argues that the totality of energy should not 
be translated upon its security side, as that would make it banal.97 Ciuta thus warns 
against the normalization that occurs when a concept like energy security builds 
on an unreflective understanding of the concept of security itself. In one of the few 
reflections on energy security that builds on insights from CSS, Ciuta points towards 
the performative political and ethical effects of energy security that will be subject of 
discussion in Part II. 
Definitions of energy security do not only contain assumptions about referent 
objects or particular theologies of security that explain what energy security is and 
ought to be, but also hide another layer of assumptions and value judgements on a 
range of issues that include economic growth, progress, technological development, 
scarcity and abundance, trust in markets, and so forth.98 Even the cursory glance 
provided above clearly highlighted the difference between two dominant readings 
of energy security (discussed in more detail in chapter 4). On the one hand, a 
geopolitical interpretation of nation states caught in a zero-sum game of conflict 
over the last remaining scarce resources, and on the other hand, a neoliberal market 
oriented interpretation of energy security that puts its faith in energy markets to 
distribute resources and develop or find substitutes if needed. Such differences in core 
assumptions on conflict (yes, no), scarcity (yes, no), control (politics, markets) and 
potential technological development (unimportant, substitution), are what separate 
the different readings of energy security. Nevertheless, these two readings dominate 
the discussions on energy security and while they differ on important assumptions, 
the capital intensive and centralized decision-making tendencies behind both of them 
have historically implied that energy security is a concern for national governments. 
This state centrism in turn leads Hildyard, Lohmann & Sexton to differentiate 
between the high-politics of Energy Security (state centric, geopolitical readings 
of free-markets) and the low-politics of energy security (individualized services, 
sustainability and system’s maintenance).99 In other words, while the five evolutions 
identified in this chapter might add to a broader and deeper understanding of energy 
security, they are not read and discussed equally.
96 Ciuta 2010, esp. 138.
97 Ciuta 2010.
98 von Hippel et al. 2011a; Valentine 2011.




The brief overview above shows that what started as a political security of supply 
concern quickly evolved into a set of concerns on political and military intervention, 
market externalities, environmental consequences, health, affordability and the 
resilience of systems. The continuing evolution of the concept of energy security shows 
a proliferation of concerns and referent objects that follows the evolving technological 
application of energy in our lives. The resulting discussion brought into light the empty 
and polysemic nature of energy security and thus the need for contextualization. This 
evolving conceptualization makes for a banal understanding of energy security on 
two accounts. First, because it spreads a simplistic binary (either/or) understanding 
of security that stems from the two dominant theoretical readings of energy security 
(geopolitics and neoliberalism). Neither of these provide an actual reflection on the 
broader (ethical) security theories and questions behind energy security; they simply 
reflect the normative logic and power politics behind current energy markets. Second, 
it keeps including new (commoditized) referent objects as a way to tackle newly 
identified shortcomings. Consequently, energy security is something that will never 
be reached, as it will always fail the new shortcoming. However, as Bridge argues, 
precisely in this failing ‘”[e]nergy” when conjoined with “security” creates a potent 
discursive couplet that is reductive and performative in equal measure.’100
100 Bridge 2014, 1.
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‘Starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. 
It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat.’1
3.1 introduction
A clear absence in the energy security literature is a comparison with the security 
literatures of other natural resources. This is noteworthy for two reasons. First, 
in general, there is an increasing literature on what is called the nexus between 
natural resources that analyses the close connections between the different natural 
resources.2 This nexus between energy, food, water, etc. is studied independently 
by the respective resource fields, including the respective security literatures of these 
resources. One potential consequence of these separate disciplines is that scholars 
miss a part of the complexity of the intra-action of the nexus itself. Another potential 
consequence is that they could miss theoretical insights from these other fields, for 
instance on security logics. Second, for energy security in specific, the connections 
with both water and food are obvious. The previous chapter on energy security 
already discussed the importance of water for electricity production. Likewise, the 
dual connection between food and energy became pungent in the recent public 
attention to biofuels when the energy community believed to have found in biofuels 
the substitution for oil and pushed for EU and USA regulation to support its 
development. This move surprised food security scholars, who could only voice their 
concerns about the consequences for global food supplies and prices in a later stage of 
the debate. Together with the fact that the food security literature is more developed 
than the security literature on water and minerals, this chapter focusses on the food 
security literature to act as a mirror to the literature on energy security. 
The resulting comparison leads to three notable observations. First, both 
energy security and food security show a similar conceptual proliferation, even 
with their diverging materiality and market structures (in particular the number 
of suppliers). However, where the energy security literature pushes this discussion 
explicitly towards questions of contextualization, the food security literature does 
not, or at least not explicitly, as the minimum calorie intake is less subject to the 
social environments than energy comfort levels. Second, this chapter finds that food 
security has a stronger diversification of levels of analysis. Whereas energy is still 
overwhelmingly analyzed from a developed Western nation state perspective, food 
security is analyzed from a more diverse range of perspectives and shifts rapidly 
1 Sen 1983, 1 [emphasis in original].
2 Beddington 2009; Evans 2010; Beisheim 2013; Andrews-Speed et al. 2012.
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between individual farmers, household level consumption, national food reserves 
and the global capitalist agricultural system of production and consumption.3 
Lastly, the food security literature is characterized by a stronger and more critical 
theoretical reflection, in part following its historical Marxist influences and focus on 
underdeveloped countries and regions, contra the overly Western developed starting 
point in energy security studies. 
As with energy security, the concept of food security has expanded over time in 
line with the changing agricultural markets. And like energy security, food security 
is not easily definable as its meaning(s) and the concept itself evolve with the demands 
placed upon it. A recent, extensive definition of food security is provided by the FAO, 
which states that 
[f]ood security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.4 
While this is a broadly shared definition, the total number of definitions of food 
security is said to range over two hundred; a number identified by Smith, Pointing 
& Maxwell in 1992 and repeated ever since.5 Despite these definitions, there 
are two general remarks that can be made. First, discussions on food security are 
interchangeable with discussions on hunger, a term that covers both short-term 
transitory food insecurity (sometimes leading to famine), seasonal food insecurity 
and chronic food insecurity (undernourishment).6 Second, while food insecurity 
and hunger are interchangeable, the concepts of food security and food safety are 
not. Whereas food security discusses the access, availability and acceptability of 
food itself, food safety discusses the quality of the food that is produced or is being 
produced and the techniques of production themselves, in particular in relation to 
any negative effects on human health.7
The proceeding chapter is organized around the shifts identified within the 
literature that analyses food security. Comparable to energy security, chapter 3.2 starts 
with an initial discussion on the lack of food and national self-sufficiency and the shift 
to discussions on the access to food. Chapter 3.3 discusses the wider relationship 
3 Jarosz 2011 provides an excellent overview of the concept of food security. The overall line of the overview 
of food security provided here follows this article.
4 FAO 2010b, 8.
5 Smith, Pointing, and Maxwell 1992. See also: Jarosz 2011; Shaw 2007; Maxwell 1996 or Table 3 for some 
of the main definitions of food security.
6 FAO 2006a, 268: ‘Chronic food insecurity involves a continuously inadequate diet caused by the persistent 
inability to acquire food. Transitory food insecurity is a temporary lack of adequate food access for a 
household, arising from adverse changes in food prices, food production or household incomes’.
7 Mooney and Hunt 2009, 485.
54
3a comParison wiTh food securiTy
between food and economics. Chapter 3.4 analyses the shift to acceptable and 
adequate foodstuffs for both people and the environment. Chapter 3.5 is comparable 
to the discussion on energy poverty and touches upon the justice claims behind food 
production. Lastly, chapter 3.6 closes with a critical reflection on the current food 
system from a food regime perspective. In addition, throughout this chapter other 
shifts become apparent. These include a broadening of the levels of analysis, a shift 
from a food only perspective to a broader livelihood perspective and a shift from 
mainly objective to more subjective perspectives.8 Perhaps even more so than with 
energy security, in this chapter on food security ‘the trace of the old is always already 
present in the form of the new.’9 Meaning that these changes of and within the 
concept of food security are not drastic turning points or hard boundaries, but should 
be seen as gradual evolutions without a clear pinpointing in time and place.
3.2 national reserves and a lack of food
Overviews of the food security literature often start in the 1970s with the World Food 
Conference in Rome in 1974.10 Before the 1970s, the concept of food security did not 
exist. The concerns themselves did, of course, all the way back to Malthus’s claims 
that the world could not sustain further population growth.11 However, they were 
mainly addressed in terms of a production problem that could be solved through 
trade, aid and national reserves.12 This changed with the World Food Conference. 
At the conference, it was decided that food security was to be provided by national 
governments through an increase in domestic production and stocks as market 
mechanisms were not favored to straighten out any supply imbalances.13 In hindsight, 
the food security conceptualization at this time was only marginally influenced by the 
1960s literature on the environment and the limits to growth literature, even though 
this firmly build upon Malthus’s warnings of population growth and insufficient food 
supplies. Perhaps not surprising, as Western policy makers and economists found 
themselves supported by 30 years of steadily increasing production levels (even 
though the conference itself was a direct response to the food crises of 1972-1973 in 
the Sahel and the 1971-1974 price increase following the oil crisis). The definition of 
food security therefore was defined as the ‘availability at all times of adequate world 
supplies of basic foodstuffs … to sustain a steady expansion of consumption … and 
8 For these three additional shifts see: Maxwell 1996, 156.
9 Alcock 2009, 13.
10 World Food Conference 1974.
11 Malthus 1798.
12 Alcock 2009; Geier 1995; Jarosz 2011; Hopma and Woods 2014.
13 See: FAO 1983a, 6, 9–10.
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offset fluctuations in production and prices.’14 In other words, it proceeds from a 
global perspective, it already indicates the importance of the quality of the foodstuffs, 
it is geared towards population growth and it calls for reserves that can reduce 
market shocks.
Besides calling for an increase in stocks, the Conference also pushed for a 
minimum level of international coordination of these stocks.15 In contrast to the IEA 
administered Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR), this has proven to be too ambitious, 
up to this day. Still, the call for national reserves has been repeated in various trimmed 
varieties, for instance by the FAO itself in 1979.16 Slowly, the position on national 
reserves changed when international agreements to build national stocks – in the 
ideal case even putting them under a globally coordinated supply scheme – faced 
competition from countries and trade companies who feared to lose either (or both) 
their sovereignty or profit. In a 1983 report the FAO acknowledged this political 
reality by arguing that globally agreed national reserves had proven ineffective and 
inefficient, especially in case of countries with limited domestic production levels.17 
More efficient and politically feasible, according to the FAO, would be that the main 
exporting countries, or the private companies within those countries, would create 
and hold stocks to be sold in times of need – partly because this was the case already 
anyway.18 Such a focus on a balance between supply and demand was reflected in an 
updated definition of food security: ‘ensuring that all people at all times have both 
physical and economic access to the basic food that they need.’19 
The idea that the global market would distribute the surplus produce in a cost-
effective manner is still practiced today. Current understandings of food security 
have subsequently de-coupled the goal of national self-sufficiency (based on national 
reserves) from the concept of food security. This largely follows an economic re-
interpretation of food security in terms of risk and the relatively high (insurance) 
costs of stockpiling.20 Unfortunately, the recent food crises in 2007/2008 showed 
that some countries prohibited the export of surplus food staples in order to control 
fears and price increases in their own countries.21 In such a situation, food insecure 
countries not only need to outbid each other for the limited supplies that are still sold 
14 Ibid., 165: Annex A ‘International Undertaking on World food Security.’ Resolution 1/64. Adopted 
November 1974. 
15 Ibid., 165–177: Annex A and B.
16 FAO 1979, The Struggle for Food Security, 42 as quoted in Jarosz 2011, 122–123.
17 FAO 1983a, 1. This overview also differentiates between three sorts of ‘stocks’ and the competition that 
takes place between these different stocks:  working stocks, emergency stocks, and food aid/development.
18 Jarosz 2011 claims that from a discourse perspective, in doing so this report reinforced the power and 
position of Northern countries and, especially, Western food trade companies.
19 FAO 1983b; as quoted in: FAO 2006b, 1.
20 FAO 1983a, 12–13.
21 McMichael 2009a, 287; Mooney and Hunt 2009, 475–477.
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on the world market, they also have to outbid food speculators who entered the food 
markets in the hope of riding the price hike.22 
3.3 food for growth and growth for food
Besides increasing resistance against stockpiling, the food security literature of the 
early 1980s was also influenced by the publication of Amartya Sen’s influential book 
Poverty and Famines. Published in 1981 for the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), this book starts with Sen’s famous opening, partly quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter, that: ‘[s]tarvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough 
food to eat. It is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat. While the 
latter can be a cause of the former, it is but one of many possible causes.’23 From a lack 
of food, Sen shifts the attention to the distribution of available food. He does so by 
focusing on entitlements or ‘the ability of people to command food through the legal 
means available in the society’ in terms of production, trade, gifts, sales, and so on.24 
The insight that even in times of surplus hunger is not eradicated is valid up to this 
day and shifts the attention from an increase in food production towards the access 
to and distribution of food.25 
This extension of the concept of food security with an emphasis on access and 
distribution was enforced by the World Bank report Poverty and Hunger in 1986. 
This report incorporated the arguments of Sen by defining food security as having 
‘to do with access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy 
life’.26 This definition shifts the concept on multiple levels. First, the focus on all 
people moves the level of analysis from the national to the individual. Second, it 
shifts the focus from the availability of food to the access to food. Third, in doing so 
it highlights the temporal dynamics of food insecurity, as the report differentiates 
between transitory and chronic food insecurity.27 In effect however, the World Bank 
translated the access to food as described by Sen into purely economic terms by 
conceiving it in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction.28 In other words, 
22 McMichael 2009a, 287.
23 Sen 1983, 1 [emphasis in original].
24 Ibid., chap. 5.
25 See Gilmore and Huddleston 1983, 31 for a 1980s reflection. And Shepherd 2012, 198 for a more modern 
reflection.
26 World Bank 1986, 1.
27 For (1) and (2) see Maxwell 1996, 156. For (3) see: Clay 2002.
28 Alcock 2009, 26–28. Alcock states on page 30 that: ‘Poverty and Hunger represents a clear and pertinent 
example of the instability and productivity of discourse. Sen’s entitlement theory of famine echoes 
throughout the text but in a modified form, its terms adapted to fit the hegemonic growth discourse of 
the World Bank – ‘entitlement’ has become ‘income’, ‘access’ has become ‘purchasing power’, ‘famine’ has 
become ‘hunger’. Sen lost ownership of his words as soon as they were written and despite considerable 
effort since to restate the terms of his argument [...], they now reach their audience primarily through 
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instead of apprehending access in terms of legal entitlements (including monetary 
access), the World Bank viewed it as a lack of purchasing power to be countered by a 
growth in income (this was given as the reason for the increase in the number of food 
insecure people between 1970 and 1980).29 
In the same report, the World Bank also completely breaks with any remnant self-
sufficiency ideals by claiming that no nation will ever become 100% food secure and 
as such can only decide on the levels of supply risk that it wants to accept.30 While 
such a conclusion, technically, still leaves the decision in the hands of a national 
government, the World Bank steered the debate by arguing against simplistic (e.g. 
cost-ineffective) food reserves and subsidies to either farmers or consumers: 
[Governments] often use measures that work against economic growth and 
food security in the long run. Such measures include persistently overvaluing 
currencies, spending large sums on consumer food subsidies, and building 
costly storage facilities to hold excessive stocks of food grain. These measures 
often result in economic waste, draw resources away from more productive 
activities, slow economic growth, and thus aggravate rather than alleviate 
long-term food insecurity.31 
As an alternative, the World Bank argues for international trade as one of the cheapest 
and optimal solutions to supply or demand disruptions, whether chronic, transitory, 
man-made or natural.32 Not only does it argue against them, the early structural 
adjustment policies that forced developing countries to accept the World Bank’s 
policy choices incorporated this latter perspective and broke down many large-scale 
social food programs, as they were considered too costly, ineffective and disruptive.33
The World Bank extended this economization in 1988 when it described food 
security in terms of both an input and an output to economic growth.34 Not only is 
an increase in purchasing power, or economic growth, a requirement to become food 
secure (input), food security itself is an important requirement for economic growth 
(output) as it enables healthy workers. In line with this latter insight, it was repeated 
that food aid programs are not cost-effective because they do not lead to optimal 
long-term economic growth as they create systemic imbalances in food markets. On 
the other hand, the World Bank did note that food aid could mitigate short-term price 
the cognitive lens of more authoritative knowledge-brokers like the World Bank’.
29 World Bank 1986, 3.
30 Ibid., vi. On the move from security to risk, see chapter 5.5.
31 Ibid., 6 (but compare this with the remarks about cost-effectiveness on p9).
32 Ibid., 9.
33 Jarosz 2011, 125.
34 World Bank 1988, 5.
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fluctuations as long as it is targeted towards specific groups of food insecure people 
(e.g. local farmers, rural landless, cashless urban consumers).35 One of the interesting 
remarks in this respect is that the World Bank also advised countries providing food 
aid to pay more attention to the work of NGO’s, especially those programs that focus 
on ‘small farmers, in particularly women.’36
3.4 sustainable food, adequate nutrition and 
development
In the 1990s, this economic development perspective became increasingly ingrained 
in the food security literature. Simultaneously, in a counter move, the concept was 
proliferating in four other directions and specifications. First, the literature on 
environmental security came up with an explicit role for food as an intervening 
variable between environmental degradation and (civil) conflict.37 The attention 
thus shifted to a lack of food as a source of conflict and the consequences of conflict 
on food security. In itself, this constituted a shift from earlier discussions on “food 
power” or the withholding or actual delivery of food as a weapon for political gain 
during conflicts (the Cold War).38 
Second, this literature is closely connected to the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report, which initiated a close connection between food and human 
security and thereby bridged debates on human rights, development and food by 
shifting the level of analysis firmly back to individuals and vulnerable populations.39 
Shepherd, for example, defines food security minimalistic when he claims it is 
‘securing vulnerable populations from the structural violence of hunger’.40 Third, the 
early 1990s and especially the World Declaration on Nutrition of 1992 witnessed an 
extension of the concept of food security to include notions of nutritional value. It 
was no longer enough to eat sufficiently, but the available food should also include all 
the proper nutrition needed for an active and healthy life.41 Lastly, Jarosz discusses 
the increasing attention paid within debates on food security to the role of women, 
whether as female consumer or farmers, as a rising focal point for policy prescriptions 
against food insecurity.42
35 Jarosz 2011; World Bank 1988, 10, 12.
36 World Bank 1988, 13.
37 Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon 1995. See also the foreword by Eduoard Saouma in FAO 1993, vii or 
the discussion in chapters 2 and 6. 
38 Wallensteen 1976; Nau 1978; Coffey 1981.
39 UNDP 1994.
40 Shepherd 2012, 196.
41 For example: FAO 1993.
42 FAO 1998; Jarosz 2011, 129–131. For a more recent work: FAO 2010a.
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While energy security saw more or less distinctive academic fields on issues 
like human security and environmental security (at least a separation between 
developed and underdeveloped regions), the focus of the food security literature on 
underdeveloped regions means that it is characterized by an inclusionary tendency. 
This can be witnessed during the World Food Summit that produced the Rome 
Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action in 
1996.43 At this summit, the standard definition of food security was once more 
reconceptualized: 
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life.44 
This definition embeds all three earlier ‘evolutions’, including availability (physical 
access), access (economic access), and nutrition. Furthermore, it includes a new 
cultural aspect of food preferences. From 1996 onwards, people are food insecure when 
they do not have access to the food that fits their cultural eating habits, irrespective 
the calories and nutrition available in other forms. While extended once more, this 
definition still excludes any notion of social access in terms of ‘legal and political 
constraints faced by some groups in their attempts to acquire food’ as Alcock rightly 
indicates.45 In fact, Clay argues that even though the statements on food security 
have become broader and more subjective in nature, the actual applications of food 
security have become narrower and more technical.46 He refers for example to the 
focus on poverty reduction within international development debates, which is often 
translated into objective food targets; for instance the 1996 World Food Summit that 
decided on the halving of the number of people affected by food insecurity in 2015.47 
Against the backdrop of the neoliberal market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the number of food insecure people increased again by the early 2000s. This 
increase was attributed to market failures, primarily a failure in regulation and bad 
governments.48 In this respect, the 2004 and 2005 reports of the FAO and World Bank 
are interesting for their focus on large scale programs aimed at facilitating potential 
income growth, among which the development of markets and infrastructure.49 In 
43 FAO 1996b.
44 Ibid., para. 1. 
45 Alcock 2009, 38.
46 Clay 2002, 3.
47 Ibid. A target that the FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012 claim to be ‘within reach’. But also a relative target, 
mainly solved because of an increase in the world’s population, not because the absolute number of 
hungry people in the world halved (although this dropped from 1 billion to around 850 million today).
48 Jarosz 2011, 132.
49 FAO 2004; World Bank 2005b.
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doing so, Jarosz remarks how these institutions disregarded the independent role 
of governments and neglected other structural causes beside market failures and a 
lack of purchasing power (AIDS, war, displacement, and so on).50 The World Bank 
continues this shift to large-scale programs and active intervention when it returned 
the discussion to national levels of governance and possible ways to increase domestic 
food production.51 This shift back to state centrism coincided with the renewed 
attention to genetically modified crops, spot-irrigation and other technological and 
thus capital-intensive solutions that became available to increase the production of 
food. For Western analyses, these large scale capital-intensive developments are not 
only needed to tackle the 850 million people that are currently starving from a lack of 
food (contra Sen’s work), but also provide the main answer to the long term question of 
‘how to feed the 9 billion in 2050’.52 This narrow quantitative and economic reading 
of the broadening concept of food security leads Jarosz to claim that: 
At the end of the 1990s, food security is indistinguishable from neoliberal 
development discourse, which emphasizes competitive entrepreneurial 
individuality, deregulation of international trade, an economistic definition 
of poverty alleviation, and the privatization and downsizing of social services 
[…]. At the same time, international food security policy discourse defines 
food access in terms of individuals’ and nations’ abilities to pay for it in the 
global and corporate controlled marketplace.53
The economic and financial crises late 2000s and the food crisis of 2008, have led 
to a renewed attention and reflection on the role between hunger, food insecurity, 
aid, trade and economic growth.54 Interestingly, whereas the FAO seems more open 
to question the inter-linkages between development and food security, the World 
Bank still primarily asks how agriculture can spur development. In general, the link 
between economic growth and food production is not questioned (although the link 
between trade and food security is).55 Instead, attention is directed towards the 
specific linkages between economic growth (partly in terms of poverty reduction) and 
food security. Either by emphasizing how an increase in agricultural production leads 
to economic growth via income growth and an improvement of children’s health, or 
by noting how an increase in economic growth leads to less food insecurity and more 
50 Jarosz 2011, 132.
51 World Bank 2007.
52 Evans 2009.
53 FAO 1996a; FAO 1998; Jarosz 2011, 130–131.
54 FAO 2003; FAO 2005a; FAO 2010a; FAO 2011b; FAO 2011a; FAO 2012b; FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012; 
World Bank 2007; World Bank 2005a.
55 FAO 2003, 18.
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agricultural production. From these analyses, what becomes clear is that at one point 
in time of the development of a region, the causality of these two relations needs to 
turn around as growth in agriculture only leads to a limited, but at the same time 
very much needed basic level of poverty reduction. As such, growth in agricultural 
production is said to be better shaped to fight poverty than that it is to increase overall 
economic growth, while a further increase in food security heavily depends on the 
latter.56 To enable this switch, the institutions currently favor a ‘twin-track approach’ 
that builds on both (conditioned) long term social support programs and direct 
short-term support in the form of cash, food aid or stocks as a form of insurance to 
hedge against food insecurity.57 These social support programs are extremely wide 
and include social protection nets, education and training, health care, sanitation or 
infrastructure.58 In short, they are about development more than about hunger. 
3.5 a right to food and food sovereignty
Another development in the 1990s can be found in the emphasis of the the social 
aspects of food by the FAO in discussing a ‘right to food’.59 The right to food is not a 
new term and can be retraced to the UN Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. It 
was re-affirmed at the World Food Summit in 1996 and it has been receiving more 
and more attention. In 2001, almost 20 years after Sen’s groundbreaking work on 
entitlements, the FAO reformulated the definition of food security into its latest 
current understanding that includes the social access to food: 
A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.60
With food security rephrased as an essential human right, food insecurity is no 
longer something to be avoided, but actively combated. Critics of this move, however, 
highlight how a right to food is empty without any obligations attached to it, and so 
far, there are none.61 More important, they question the close and almost automatic 
56 FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012, 28; FAO 2009.
57 FAO 2004; FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012.
58 FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012.
59 Suppan 2008; Lee 2007; Boyer 2010; FAO 1996b; FAO 2005b; Economic and Social Council 1999. 
60 FAO 2001, 49 [emphasis added]. See also the overview in Clay 2002.
61 Clay 2002, 6–7 quotes O’Neill, O. 1986. Faces of Hunger: an essay on poverty, justice and development. 
London: Allen and Unwin. Compare this to the critique of Shepherd 2012, 196 on the absence of agency 
in the main definition of food security.
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link between the right to food and a Western highly capital-intensive agricultural 
system geared towards maximum output.62 
This contrasts with the interpretation of food security by social movements, like 
the global farmers movement La Via Campesina, which strive for a discussion of food 
security in terms of food sovereignty. Officially launched by La Via Campesina and 
institutionalized at the 2007 Nyéléni forum in Mali, food sovereignty stands for ‘food 
security through local knowledge, resources, and producers rather than reliance 
on international trade.’63 This movement does not argue for autarchy, but offers an 
alternative to the mainstream understanding of food security based on a systemic 
understanding of consumption and production in the developed and underdeveloped 
world. In particular, it takes issue with the increasing and systematically build-in 
dependency of the food insecure and food-importing countries on the food secure 
and exporting countries. Over time, the movement has taken a broader view besides 
import dependency and also included the dependency on technology (in particularly 
GMO’s or the commodification and patenting of local knowledge and local plants 
and crops), on capital requirements, on phosphate, fossil energy (oil) and seed, on 
monocultures, on the exclusion of external costs within price levels, on the oligopoly 
market structure at the level of international trading houses, and so forth. In a way, 
food sovereignty is an attempt to make food security less about a capitalized Food 
Security and to draw it away from international institutions and global markets 
towards local contextualized food security debates.64
These are not abstract theoretical discussions on the meaning of a concept. In 
relation to climate change and agriculture it is possible to observe a general split 
between, on the one hand, industrialized production in the developed countries and, 
on the other, small-scale agriculture in the developing world. The industrialized 
agricultural business-model, which is often described as one of the main polluting 
sectors in the world, is protected by the food security discourse. In turn, the small-scale 
agriculture in the developing world is portrayed as the main victim of global climate 
change following increasing ‘vulnerability patterns’ in local systems against which 
the local small holders need protection.65 For both sides sustainable production is 
said to be key, although the interpretation of what constitutes sustainable production 
differs completely. For underdeveloped regions, sustainable development is phrased 
62 Jarosz 2014.
63 Suppan 2008, 112.
64 Lawrence and McMichael 2012, 135.
65 FAO 2008, para. 1. These patterns are influencing all three degrees of household vulnerability: (1) those 
who are unable to provide for themselves in any situation (due to sickness, age, etc.); (2) those who are 
unable to generate sufficient income/means of trade from their ‘resource endowments’; and (3) those 
who are vulnerable to changes in social and economic circumstances (civil war, climate change, price 
spikes). See FAO 2003, 9–10.
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in terms of local knowledge (and training) to create healthy ecosystems based on 
an overall resilience, soil fertility, natural resistance to diseases and biodiversity in 
order to adapt to shocks and prevent environmental degradation. For developed 
regions, it is mainly the latter: preventing environmental degradation and climate 
change, framed in terms of emissions, by creating closed systems that include all 
external shocks. The difference between food security and food sovereignty thus not 
only highlights a disagreement on the concept of food insecurity but also a more 
fundamental disagreement on the future of agricultural food production. Both sides, 
however, seem able to find common ground. This is best exemplified by the FAO, who, 
for the last five years, is promoting small-scale sustainable production options that 
are supported by scientific knowledge and markets, but which move away from capital 
and fossil fuel intensive production systems.66 Then again, the capital intensive 
productivist argument is strong and analyses of food (in)security generally start 
from a ‘business-as-usual’ position that combine current production capacities with 
patterns of future population growth and then argue for an increase in the amount of 
production, only to conclude that such an increase is unsustainable.67
3.6 defining food security
Comparable to energy security, the FAO remarks in relation to food security that it 
‘is a multi-faceted concept, variously defined and interpreted.’68 In academic studies, 
likewise, food security is said to be a ‘fluid’, ‘multi-objective phenomenon’ that can 
only truly be identified by ‘the food insecure themselves.’69 For food too, this leads 
to the general realization that ‘[u]ltimately, the role of agriculture in reducing poverty 
and undernourishment will depend on the specific context.’70 This contextualization 
returns in the range of referent objects that are part of the concept of food security. 
Mooney & Hunt, for example, argue that food security is simultaneously phrased in 
terms of hunger, in terms of development, and in terms of risk and (food) safety of the 
66 FAO 2011a. In terms of the attention to scientific knowledge, Hopma and Woods 2014 argue that the 
FAO already in 1996 depoliticized food security by redefining it from a political problem in a scientific 
problem.
67 De Schutter 2014, 5.
68 FAO 2003, 3.
69 Jarosz 2014; Maxwell and Smith 1992, 4–5.
70 FAO, WFP, and IFAD 2012, 35. In short, the report finds that for the general population economic growth 
and poverty reduction are often based on smallholder production increases. Important linkages in this 
respect are: the history of private landownership; that the poor must have a say in the development 
process; that people can build on effective institutions; that growth needs to be accompanied by poverty 
reduction; that poverty reduction initially takes place through food and health services. For poor rural 
landowners the vicinity of cities and roads and other infrastructure is quite important, as are social 
protection nets, education and training. For not-so-poor farmers what matters is non-agricultural 
income.
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agricultural system in the developed world.71 However, if one wants to discuss food 
security today, in its broadest sense the question is no longer about the fight against 
hunger but about a ‘more complex picture … of over-, under-, and malconsumption, 
all coexisting, often within the same region and country.’72 Food security is no longer 
a ‘goal in itself ’, but a means towards a specific ideal of what constitutes healthy living. 
It is this ideal that also categorizes obesities as a form of food insecurity that should 
be governed (see chapter 8).73 
Like energy security, food security too is studied from a range of perspectives 
and levels of analysis. Where they differ is in the constantly shifting levels of analysis 
within food. For example, while energy security faces similar levels of analysis as food, 
it is nonetheless primarily focused on the national level. The food security literature, 
instead, has been shifting from the nation state to an international food system and a 
focus on markets and individuals (and households) from early on. Where energy and 
food security debates differ as well is in the strong critical Marxist inspired literature 
on food security and food systems. Increasingly, this also includes a (re)turn to the 
perspective of food regimes.74 
Based on a historical socio-political analysis of the relation between modern global 
agricultural systems and capitalism, the food regime literature makes a number of 
claims. First, Lang makes the general argument that policy makers should include 
food supply chains within analyses of agriculture ‘because power and capital have 
moved off the land … with retailers shaping what and how things are grown, processed 
and sold.’75 Whereas in the field of energy the market structure generally favors 
producers, within food the market structure channels a multitude of farmers through 
a concentrated group of traders, chemical input companies and seed suppliers.76 
Secondly, Lang points out that in the case of food the broad range of choice that a 
customer faces in the supermarket essentially stems from monoculture production.77 
Most of the processed food originates from a limited number of food sources, all 
of which are grown as monocultures. This radically opposes energy where a wide 
range of input sources with differences in quality and substance are transformed into 
a number of mono-products. In terms of food, one consequence of this form of mono-
production is a continuous downward cycle within ‘the global system for pricing 
farm products and farming inputs acts strongly against the long-term interests of 
71 Mooney and Hunt 2009.
72 Lang 2010, 89.
73 Pinstrup-Andersen 2009, 7.
74 Puchala and Hopkins 1978; McMichael 2009a; McMichael 2009b; Lang 2010; Van der Ploeg 2010; 
Giménez and Shattuck 2011; Sage 2013.
75 Lang 2010, 88. However see: FAO 2003; FAO 2004.
76 Giménez and Shattuck 2011.
77 Lang 2010, 88.
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food security’, especially in terms of the external cost to soil, biodiversity, resource 
use and climate change (and the number of farmers).78 Third, in relation to food 
markets, McMichael argues more principally that while price signals indeed signal 
‘financial and productive shifts at the moment’, one can only know what they mean by 
interpreting them from within a wider historical context that ‘leads to [an] analysis of 
the control and political management of the global food system.’79 Building on these 
food regime insights and other critical theory, Mooney & Hunt quote Devereux who 
argues that in the end ‘[t]here is no technical reason for markets to meet subsistence 
needs and no moral or legal reason why they should.’80 This argument is taken up in 
chapter 6.
Lastly, from an alternative critical perspective, the self-identified role of the FAO is 
worth nothing.81 From its institutionalization onwards, the FAO has identified itself, 
and is recognized, as the main knowledge center on food and agriculture.82 The FAO 
defines food (in) security, collects and presents the data, and so forth. Alcock shows 
how this role has evolved over time, from its initialization in 1945 where it was to 
“collect, analyse, interpret, and disseminate information relating to nutrition, food 
and agriculture”, to its website in 2009 where the FAO describes itself as “a knowledge 
network’ which uses ‘the expertise of our staff … to collect, analyse and disseminate 
data that aid development”.83 Alcock focusses in his analysis on the absence of the 
word ‘interpretation’ and the replacement of the term ‘information’ with ‘data’, 
indicating a depoliticisation of the FAO’s role between the first and the second role 
description, while in fact the whole second section is geared towards ‘development’.84 
The current slogan of the FAO, which reads ‘[i]mpact: Turning Knowledge into 
Action,’ shows a similar depoliticisation and scientification at work.85 
One of the consequences of the importance of the FAO’s role as a knowledge 
broker could be witnessed with the 2008-2009 food crisis. In 2009, the FAO estimated 
that the number of undernourished people would rise to above 1 billion. However, 
new calculations in 2012, based on a renewed methodology and some updated 
78 Cribb 2011, 124.
79 McMichael 2009a, 283 [emphasis added]. On page 287, McMichael states that ‘[b]y the twenty-first 
century, centralization of global food stocks—60% in corporate hands, six of which control 80% of the 
global wheat and rice trade, while three countries produce 70% of exported corn (Angus 2008), was 
matched by the displacement of millions of small farmers.’ 
80 Mooney and Hunt 2009, 477 quote Devereux 2001, Food Security: Contested Claims, 246.
81 Alcock 2009. For a similar analysis on energy see Friedrichs 2011.
82 Other UN organizations involved in food: International Fund for Agricultural Development, IFAD 
(finance of food production programmes); World Food Programme (emergencies); World Food Council 
(incorporated in FAO since 1993).
83 Alcock 2009, 7. The FAO’s four pillars are: (1) putting information within reach; (2) sharing policy 
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baseline assumptions, levelled the number of undernourished people to the current 
870 million in 2010-2012.86 Partly this was due to these renewed assumptions, partly 
to the fact that the 2009 peak was an early estimate, and partly it followed from the 
fact that the FAO measures and estimates the number of chronically undernourished 
people, not those suffering from transitory food crises.87 In short, the role of the FAO 
and World Bank stand out as they simultaneously provide overarching definitions of 
food security as well as the data to study these definitions, in addition to setting the 
main programs to combat food insecurity – comparable to the IEA in energy. 
Part II will analyze in depth why this is important by analyzing how these 
definitions and security practices both open up and close down particular courses 
of action. Shepherd highlights similar consequences when he argues that by ‘casting 
food security as an availability problem … actors use food-security language to 
legitimize competition over increasingly scarce food-production.’88 In response to an 
availability problem, people start hoarding, while if the same situation would be cast as 
an entitlement problem people would be more willing to think and act cooperatively. 
Besides the exclusion of alternatives, like the food sovereignty discourse, another 
option is to include ever more dimensions, levels of analysis and referent objects 
to the concept in an attempt to do it all. The food security debate, more than the 
energy security debate, shows how this only makes the concept into a holy grail that 
is interpreted by different people, in different places at different times in various ways. 
It makes defining food security a political act. 
3.7 reflection
This chapter argued for a comparison between the literatures on energy security and 
food security that extents current material and policy connections towards theoretical 
lessons. From a theoretical perspective, the main conclusion is that food security 
and energy security have witnessed a similar proliferation from supply concerns to 
broader economic concerns, the inclusion of sustainability concerns, the shift from 
states to markets and later to individual rights and security based approaches, and 
a move towards a systems perspective. There are four differences in regard to this 
proliferation. First, the shifting levels of analysis in food security contrast with the 
more state centric approach in energy security. Second, the food security literature 
focused more on the food politics of insecure developing countries versus the security 
86 In fact, similar effects can be encountered in the early warning systems of the FAO: The 1974 Global 
Information and Early Warning System for Food and Agriculture (GIEWS); the 1999 Food Insecurity 
Vulnerability Information and Mapping System (FIVIMS); and the 2008 Food Security Information and 
Early Warning System (FSIEWS).
87 Lappé et al. 2013.
88 Shepherd 2012, 197.
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of abundance in energy for developed countries. Third, the food security literature 
offers a critical reflexivity that is largely absent from the energy security literature. 
Lastly, the food security debate has a stronger and more focused counter-discourse 
with the idea of food sovereignty. The increasing attention to decentralized electricity 
production in the energy security literature cannot match this counter-discourse, 
so far, also because it takes place within the regular energy settings and not at its 
fringes. These differences in turn open up a number of questions. Among them the 
question what precisely drives the proliferation of energy and food security? And how 
are scholars making sense of this proliferation? 
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44. analyzing energy securiTy
‘Defining energy security takes more than asking around’1
4.1 introduction
The multiplicity of energy security, it’s ‘slipperiness’ or ‘multidimensional’ character, is 
well acknowledged within studies on the concept of energy security.2 With energy as 
one of the core pillars of modern societies, energy (in)security arguably is everywhere, 
crossing a wide range of energy sources, actors and positions within the energy supply 
chains.3 However, chapter 3 on food security showed that this proliferation is not unique 
to energy security, which leads to the argument that the security logic is driving the 
proliferation instead of the referent objects of energy or food. This is not how the energy 
security literature sees it.4 Cherp & Jewell, for example, argue that the proliferation 
of energy security results from the inherent complexity of the supply of energy, the 
uncertainties within such a complex energy system, and the conflicting positions that 
actors have within this system.5 Another recent overview attributes this proliferation to 
the difference in ‘academic disciplines […], historical contexts […], levels of development 
[…], timeframes […], market dimensions […], value chain […], levels of analysis […] and 
the primary or transformed fuel in question.’6 In other words, all aspects and positions 
of the energy supply chain as well as its broader economic and historical context, including 
the different disciplinary theoretical reflections on the issue of energy. This chapter turns 
to this last aspect and discusses how the energy security literature tries to get a hold on the 
proliferation and complexity of energy in order to secure it.
There are multiple ways to come to grips with the multiplicity of energy security. 
Three are worth highlighting and are analyzed in this chapter. First, chapter 4.2 
discusses how both qualitative and quantitative approaches analyze this multiplicity 
by categorizing and systematizing the wide range of energy security threats. In turn, 
chapter 4.3 looks at the theories that are used to handle the complexity. For energy 
security, there are three main theoretical lenses: a geopolitical, a neoliberal and an 
historic-materialist analysis.7 Third, chapter 4.4 studies the work of a number 
1 The title of Cherp 2012.
2 Ciuta 2010; Sovacool and Brown 2010, 102; Chester 2010; Dyer and Trombetta 2013; Sovacool and 
Mukherjee 2011; Sovacool 2011b.
3 Ciuta 2010, 133.
4 With the exception of Ciuta 2010; Bridge 2014.
5 Cherp and Jewell 2011a.
6 Zeniewski, Martinez-Anido, and Pearson 2013, 40.
7 There are many more social theories used to analyze energy (transitions). A place to start is Smits 2015, 
21; or Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988.
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of scholars who are trying to find the driving logics behind energy and energy 
security practices. 
Missing from this chapter is a discussion of the emerging use of Securitization 
Theory in the energy security literature, but only because this literature is extensively 
discussed in chapter 5.4.8 With this in mind, this chapter problematizes the 
mainstream energy security literature, for while it is necessary to have an idea what 
energy security is, such a search for definitions does not help to understand what 
energy security does. And without a reflective understanding of how the search for 
definitions actually shapes human relationships and human relations with nature, 
the literature misses a core understanding that could move the field out of its current 
impasse of the constant struggle to tackle the proliferation of energy security and 
come to a fuller understanding of the practice that is energy security.
4.2 defining, differentiation and categorization
Qualitative and quantitative research, irrespective the theoretical background, always 
start with some sort of categorization – all research does.9 For the energy security 
literature, a well-known categorization is provided by APERC, which tries to order 
the complexity of energy security through its four A’s: Availability, Accessibility, 
Affordability and Acceptability.10 This, however, is nowhere near the only category 
available. Quite a number of scholars on energy security at one point in their 
career produce a list of their own categories, some resembling the four categories of 
APERC, others with up to 20 dimensions.11 In addition, quantitative research takes 
this categorization a step further by providing a range of indicators for each of the 
categories, with one study finding up to 320 indicators in total.12 The previous chapters 
discussed a range of threats to energy and food that are categorized in Figure 1. This 
figure is based on APERC’s four A’s: Availability, Accessibility, Affordability and 
Acceptability (Sustainability). While other categorizations are possible, a simple and 
descriptive one such as Figure 1 provides for a way to include both security of supply 
and security of demand perspectives and is indicative of the range of threats, the level 
of analysis, and overall complexity of the security dimension of natural resources. 
8 Christou and Adamides 2013; Fischhendler, Boymel, and Boykoff 2014; Leung et al. 2014; Trombetta 
2012; Nyman 2014; Natorski and Herranz Surrallés 2008; Stoddard 2012b.
9 Including this thesis, although here categories are approached more loosely, to be defined and discarded 
(see the shift from definitions to reflection in chapters 5 and 6) just as fast. 
10 APERC 2007.
11 Hughes 2009 (4 categories); Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011; APERC 2007; Ang, Choong, and Ng 
2015; Sovacool and Brown 2010; Vivoda 2010 (11 categories with 44 indicators); Sovacool 2011c (20 
dimensions and 320 indicators).
12 Sovacool 2011c; Jansen 2009; Le Coq and Paltseva 2009; IEA 2011.
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Figure 1: Perceived Threats to and from Natural Resources
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On closer examination, Figure 1 shows that threats to natural resources are three 
sided. They can be found in the threats to a stable and continuous use of natural 
resources (supply interruption), in the threats that follow from an actual disruption 
in the use of natural resources (economic services, health impact), and in the threats 
that result from a stable and continuous resource use (climate change). In fact, the (in)
ability to respond to potential disruptions is nowadays itself seen as a potential threat 
in relation to natural resources.13 In such a case, the precautionary security logic that 
drives this (see chapter 5.2) makes anything or anybody that hinders the construction 
of a more resilient energy system circumspect in its own right. In other words, energy 
and energy systems are often both object of security and subject of security. They are 
in need of protection while also giving cause for concern.14 
More indirectly, Figure 1 also points toward energy security concerns and how 
they do not only differ per referent object and the value attached to the referent 
objects (either the resources, the services provided by the resources or the workings 
of the economy as a whole), but how the threats differ in scope as well.15 For Winzer, 
these scopes specify how energy security concerns differ not only in magnitude (the 
size) of the possible impact but also on the speed of the impact, or whether something 
comes as a shock or not. In addition, he mentions that the duration (the sustention) 
and the scale (the geographic spread) of the impact play a role, as does the uniqueness 
(the singularity) of the threat. Lastly, Winzer differs security concerns based on the 
perceived sureness of a possible impact. In other words, whether a threat is ‘predicted’, 
probable, or totally unknown.16
Simultaneously, the benefit of the Figure 1 is limited for a number of reasons. First, 
any categorization is always incomplete. What is more, the political effects of the 
categorization should not be underestimated. As Cherp & Jewell conclude in a similar 
discussion on energy security: 
the basis for these classifications is rarely systematically justified: they often 
seem almost as arbitrary as the lists of energy security concerns which they 
seek to structure. Moreover, classification is not integration. Placing several 
concerns in one group does not necessarily help us to understand them better 
or to develop integrated solutions.17 
Figure 1 is a prime example of this. It is per definition incomplete and its systemization 
is based on implicit assumptions on the meaning of the four categories in terms of 




17 Cherp and Jewell 2011b, 209.
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geography and technological prowess, politics and society, economics and ecology. 
More important, the close connections between the subcategories makes the initial 
differentiation often arbitrary. Subcategories like government regulation and 
technology are interwoven in all four categories and could be read as threat and 
solution at the same time.
Second, the chosen definition of energy security often pre-structures the 
conclusions that can be drawn, as such definitions fixate assumptions on energy, 
energy security and temporality.18 To be fair, that is exactly the purpose of 
simplification. On the other hand, this often leads to an acceptance of a pre-agreed 
upon status quo. This was exemplified in the discussion on food security, when the 
food security literature showed how hunger is often put forward, implicitly, as a 
supply problem that can only be solved by adding more supply without regard for 
social entitlements that hinder the distribution of available supplies. It also returns 
in qualitative energy research where, for example, Von Hippel et al. and Valentine 
show how studies that take a longer timeframe often value stability over costs whereas 
short-timeframe studies favor costs above all else.19 Likewise, Zeniewski, Martinez-
Anido & Pearson argue that quantitative approaches regularly favor free market 
solutions while qualitative approaches, which are often more socially oriented, prefer 
regulated energy markets.20 As they conclude: 
On a practical level, the definition of energy security and its scope conditions 
will crucially affect how both policy-makers and academics identify, order and 
manage risks and vulnerabilities affecting the energy system, in whatever form 
it is analysed.21 
Clearly, scholars like Valentine or Zeniewski, Martinez-Anido & Pearson want to 
draw attention towards a performative understanding of energy security. Such a 
performative reading would highlight that definitions of energy security always 
contain two aspects: what energy insecurity is, as well as what energy security should 
be. A definition of energy security thus always closes down a situation by defining it as 
a form of energy insecurity and simultaneously offers a specific normative alternative 
orientation as its solution. Defining does not come without a normative judgement on 
how to secure. 
The importance of a performative reading of energy security becomes apparent 
when realizing that the definitions and indicators of energy security are, if not 
defined, then strongly influenced by the IEA, an organization by and for developed 
18 Valentine 2011.
19 von Hippel et al. 2011b; Valentine 2011.




countries and their search for secure energy supplies (compare with the knowledge 
broker role of the FAO in chapter 3.6). In other words, modern understandings of 
energy security build upon definitions written by a small number of capital-intensive 
consumer countries and their identification of indicators based on their particular 
experiences.22 In time, Cherp & Jewell argue, these indicators are exported to other 
parties who are unable to develop such indicators on their own.23 This contrasts with 
food security where there exist a clear counter discourse with food sovereignty, made 
by and for communities within underdeveloped countries. 
A performative reading also discounts with any remaining ideas that energy 
security contains both absolute and relative aspects. Chester, for example, argues 
that Availability and Accessibility are absolute aspects of energy security as they 
are measurable, while Affordability and Acceptability are relative aspects that 
depend on weighing and agreement.24 However, the idea that there are absolute 
numerical aspects of energy security clearly overlooks the actual politics of energy 
reserves. A good example of this politics is the increase between 1982 and 1988 of 
the officially proven reserves by a number of OPEC members in the run up to new 
OPEC production quotas. These increases are circumspect as those countries were not 
witness to any obvious exploration or technological advancements in that time, while 
their respective quotas were going to be based on their total reserves.25 As the 2010 
World Energy Outlook stated:
Definitions of reserves and resources, and the methodologies for estimating 
them, vary considerably around the world, leading to confusion and 
inconsistencies. In addition, there is often a lack of transparency in the way 
reserves are reported: many national oil companies in both OPEC and non-
OPEC countries do not use external auditors of reserves and do not publish 
detailed results.26 
Another example can be found in Reynolds’ analysis of the Canadian decision in 
2003, together with the American EIA, to count the Canadian oil sands as full-
fledged oil reserves. Reynolds describes how Canada’s oil reserves increased from 6 
to almost 174 billion barrels after the political decision to 1) stretch the concept of 
crude oil to include oil sands bitumen and 2) to decree these oil sands as proven 
reserves instead of ‘remaining established’ reserves without physical, technical or 




26 IEA 2010a, 115; Cobb 2012.
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economic foundation.27 In other words, Chester’s absolute dimensions of availability 
and capacity are not as absolute as they seem and are effectively subject to a politics 
of ontology (see chapter 7). 
4.3 Theories of energy security
An alternative to analyzing the contents of energy security through categorization is 
a theoretical reflection on energy security. While a range of theories and disciplines 
is applicable to energy in general,28 the specific focus on energy security is primarily 
discussed by theories that are borrowed from IR and IPE, namely neorealist 
geopolitics, neoliberals focusing on markets and institutions, and critical historical 
materialist reflexive theories.29 As these latter are still only marginally used, Aalto et 
al. are right in claiming that the field of energy security lack theoretical ambition.30 
From a social science perspective and especially from the humanities, there is little 
theorizing on energy security.31 
This leaves two positivist theories from IR: a neorealist inspired geopolitics and 
a neoliberal inspired reading of energy security. First, geopolitics is the study of 
how geographic factors interact with international relations. It has a long history, 
but the demand from Asia and the 2008 oil price shock reinvigorated this approach 
for energy security from 2006 onwards.32 The geopolitics practiced within energy 
however has less to do with the theory of geopolitics and more with the politics of 
geographically dispersed natural resources. Actually, not even with the resources 
themselves, but instead with the politics of control over natural resources and the 
‘political intentions’ behind it.33 For this, it takes a particular mix between neo-
Malthusian ideas about scarce resources and neorealist IR theory. Neorealism within 
IR assumes an anarchic system with unitary and rational states that are concerned 
with survival.34 Combined with Malthusian assumptions, it proposes a self-centered 
zero-sum struggle over the last remaining resources in the world, to be protected or 
acquired for and by the state.35 Problems that are highlighted through this approach 
are a growing dependency on foreign energy resources, resource nationalism 
27 Reynolds 2005, 55.
28 Smits 2015; Rosa, Machlis, and Keating 1988; Aalto et al. 2014. 
29 For the first two see: Stoddard 2012a.
30 Aalto et al. 2014.
31 Sovacool 2014. With exceptions, of course, see for example: Urry 2014.
32 Correljé and van der Linde 2006; Bosse and Schmidt-Felzmann 2011; Barnes and Jaffe 2006; Criekemans 
2011; Klare 2008; Kropatcheva 2011.
33 Stoddard 2012a, 7; quotes: Ciuta 2010, 130. See also Casier 2011b.
34 Waltz 1988.
35 Klare 2001; Klare 2008; Klare 2012; Van der Linde, Perlot, and Hoogeveen 2006.
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and terrorism.36 It is a highly state-centric theoretical position that is inherently 
mistrusting of other actors, but also, as Campbell notes, focused ‘solely on the supply 
of oil without interrogating the demand for this resource.’37 Although the work of 
geopolitics scholar Criekemans, for instance, shows that geopolitics can be applied 
to other energy sources as well, including renewable energy, demand is indeed hardly 
ever discussed in this line of reasoning.38
Such a pessimistic neorealist reading of geopolitics contrasts with a positive 
neoliberalist understanding of energy security. A neoliberalist reading of energy 
builds upon non-zero sum understandings of neoliberalism in international relations 
believing that cooperation is possible if there are absolute gains to be made and 
international institutions are put forward to structure these international relations 
for an ongoing functioning of the international markets.39 This is the political 
underpinning of the economic perspective described above in relation to both 
energy and food security. It perceives markets as the best way to extract, distribute 
and consume natural resources. For this strand of literature, security, especially the 
simplistic neorealist geopolitical form of security described above, is a danger to the 
circulation of energy because it has the potential to dislocate energy markets. The 
main dilemma for all those involved in energy is therefore, according to Van der 
Linde, ‘how to weigh the short-term risks of a serious disruption or undersupply 
against the longer-term security of more domestically produced (cleaner) energies 
as long as prices do not reflect all the risks?’40 This latter observation - that prices 
do not reflect everything - in turn reflects the main, economic line of argumentation 
nowadays encountered that reinforces the importance of markets. Simultaneously, it 
highlights an aversion of power and active political manipulation of markets for goals 
other than profit.41
These two strands of literature are often used to analyze energy security debates 
as they take place in academia and public policy. Besides studies using Securitization 
Literature (chapter 5.4), the discussions in the chapters on energy security and food 
security showed another, albeit marginal strand of literature. Both energy security 
and food security are witness to critical analyses that question the power relations 
behind the respective systems of supply, distribution and consumption. Modern 
analyses of food and energy regimes, discourse analyses of energy and food security 
and the application of Securitization Theory to energy and food security are all 
attempts to break with the dominant policy orientation of neorealist geopolitics 
36 Labban 2011, 326.
37 Campbell 2005, 954.
38 Criekemans 2011.
39 Stoddard 2012a; Goldthau and Witte 2009.
40 Van der Linde 2007, 70.
41 Stoddard 2012a, 10.
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and market liberalist perspectives.42 These theoretical analyses, irrespective their 
diversity, principally share an understanding that theory is part of the reality that 
is analyzed. The reason why a neorealist geopolitical theoretical analysis seems so 
applicable is not because of the theory itself, but due to the fact that policy makers 
use that same theory to justify their decisions and their fears. When these non-
critical theories analyze the world in terms of friend and foes, they propose a binary 
understanding of the world that actually helps create a difference between them 
and us or between politics and the market.43 These differences are as artificial as 
the theories themselves (thus real) and become part of reality as they are enacted 
in the policy application of these theories. The difficulty of a critique on neorealist 
and liberal theoretical approaches to energy security, however, is that its subject is 
no longer energy security but the theories and other historical knowledge patterns 
that are in place about energy security. As such, this more critical strand of literature 
has a peculiar position within the overwhelmingly practical policy orientation that is 
prevalent in the field of energy security. 
4.4 searching for logics of energy security
Besides categorization and theorization, an increasing number of scholars is 
searching for all encompassing logics and discourses behind energy security. The 
search for (discursive) logics attempts to cross the level of detail of categorization and 
the perceived loss of practicality in theorization. This section briefly discusses three 
examples of such work on logics behind energy. It starts with the Energy Trilemma 
as an example for the relations between energy security and other logics of energy 
in general. Subsequently it moves to two recent contributions that search for logics 
of energy security in particular. Lastly, this section pushes the logics approach to a 
reflection on the logic of self-sufficiency and the logic of security itself to show that a 
search for logics is also not a final silver-bullet answer. 
A popular way to depict the underlying dynamics of energy policy is the use of the 
Energy Trilemma as depicted in Figure 2. It depicts energy security, economic equity 
(access and affordability, often just plain costs) and environmental sustainability 
concerns (regularly limited to CO2 emissions alone) as the “fundamental” policy 
positions that need to be combined in a tradeoff for any reasonable energy policy to 
work.44 In doing so, this trilemma shapes the debate on energy, as it sees the different 
positions as radical opposites that need to meet in the middle. What the middle is, 
42 On food and energy regimes see chapter 2.6 & chapter 3.6. On discourse analyses see Alcock 2009; Jarosz 
2014; Lovell 2008; Scrase and Ockwell 2010. On Securitization Theory see for example Nyman 2014; 
Natorski and Herranz Surrallés 2008; Shepherd 2012. 




differs per actor. Often it includes some 
form of a sustainable renewable energy 
system, but whether this system includes 
nuclear electricity or CCS depends on 
the specific agent. In other words, it can 
be argued that the trilemma flattens the 
complexity of energy debates not only into 
three distinct positions but also to a single 
level, while in reality all agents involved 
have to find their own middle ground on 
all of these positions before they can even 
participate in public energy debates. Agents are never purely security focused, as even 
the most dedicated energy security scholar defines energy security with economic 
and ecological aspects in mind. In addition, the trilemma excludes alternative 
views like social reflections on distribution, a focus on demand reduction or more 
functional discussions on maintenance.45 It also discusses energy in terms of private 
commodities instead of the services or public goods that are to be provided.46 
Another way to analyze energy security, to find some stable structure within 
these debates, is to search for the logics behind energy security. Two recent articles 
by Ciuta and Cherp & Jewell try to find such logics.47 Interestingly, both articles find 
precisely three logics or discourses that are present in energy security. First, Cherp 
& Jewell identify a discourse of sovereignty, which refers to military and geopolitical 
security of supply considerations as put forward by nation states. This comes close to 
the pessimistic and conflict prone neorealist geopolitical position discussed above 
and is comparable to Ciuta’s first logic of war, by which he refers to political-military 
conflicts over energy and other resources. Secondly, Ciuta identifies a security logic 
of subsistence, where energy is seen as an unavoidable driving force behind biological 
life. Energy from this perspective needs to be secured because it is a basic need that 
needs to be fulfilled. Lastly, Ciuta identifies what he calls ‘total’ energy security. In 
this reading, energy is a necessity for social life, as there is not one aspect of life that 
is not in some way enabled by the extraction, distribution and consumption of energy 
resources. In contrast to Ciuta, Cherp & Jewell move in another direction, away 
from the need for energy itself towards the protection of the socio-technical energy 
systems that provide for them. They identify a logic of robustness, which focusses on 
the technical vulnerability of production and transport capacity within the socio-
technical energy system. Clearly, this takes an engineering perspective to security and 
45 Graham and Thrift 2007.
46 Mulligan 2010; Patterson 2008.
47 Cherp and Jewell 2011b; Ciuta 2010. 
Figure 2: Energy Trilemma
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deals with the safety and stability of the physical infrastructure. Lastly, they identify 
a logic of resilience, by which they refer to an alternative meaning of security that 
focusses on multiple unpredictable complex systemic disruptions to which people need 
to adapt and mitigate. This includes infrastructure systems and rolling blackouts, but 
also instances like price volatility and ecological feedback loops. To some extent, the 
logics that Cherp & Jewell identify are closely connected to the academic disciplines 
behind them. Sovereignty follows a political science and IR reading of energy security, 
engineers look at the robustness of the energy infrastructure, and systems analysts, 
insurers and economists look at the resilience behind energy systems.
The question is whether these logics and discourses are not just another way 
to categorize (and prioritize) certain phenomena within energy security debates. 
Noticeable in this respect, is that both articles share a sovereign/war logic. Also 
interesting is that it would be easy to add to this logic, for example by adding the 
logics that structure how people deal with dependency (or the perceived lack of control 
over the access to a resource).48 In this respect, briefly, there are three extreme logics 
that a person, country or company can follow in response to a sense of “otherness”, 
which marks a dependency relationship characterized by fear and addiction.49 First, 
the agent can follow an isolationist (autarky) logic and become completely self-
sufficient.50 Second, s/he could follow an imperialist logic that degrees that one is 
entitled to the resources no matter what. Third, one can follow a “shared fate” logic 
and accept a level of dependency knowing that the situation is mutual. In reality, the 
choice for any of these logics is heavily influenced by neorealist and liberalist readings 
of international energy relations (reinforcing their political impact). The isolationist 
logic is excluded based on ideas about (economic) progress and an addiction to 
acquired lifestyles. The imperialist logic returns strongly in neorealist approaches 
to international energy relations. And the “shared fate” logic is propagated by the 
48 Not many scholars describe what dependency means for them. Somebody who does is Le Billon, following 
Ribot and Peluso, who discusses dependency by separating access from control. Whereas access is ‘”the 
ability to derive benefits” using all possible means’, control should be seen as either ‘gaining, controlling 
or maintaining access.’ Hence, ‘control can be defined as the ability to enforce the rights to benefit from 
resources, using all possible means’. See: Le Billon 2007, 175–176 quotes Ribot and Peluso 2003, 173; 
Ribot and Peluso 2003. 
49 See Friedrichs 2010.
50 Self-sufficiency is much debated, also in food. The FAO discusses this by separating self-sufficient in 
terms of production from self-sufficiency in terms of the holistic farming system. The EU might be 
self-sufficient because it produces more than it consumes, but at the same time this is based on massive 
imports of animal feeds and fuels, which both are open to political misuse and neither will turn out 
a relieve in case of a wrong harvest. Instead, the FAO states that the EU is food secure because of its 
material wealth and because it operates in a (self-promoted) open market that enables the EU to trade at 
will. See FAO 1996a, 285. A second distinction can be made between self-sufficiency and self-reliance. 
The latter implying that countries are able to ensure domestic availability of food, including imports and 
hence the capacity to acquire the foreign exchange needed for those imports. See FAO 2003, 35.
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(neo) liberalist understandings of a relationship of (complex) interdependency or 
reciprocal dependency.51 
On the one hand, the search for logics helps clarify processes and assumptions 
behind energy security. On the other, the two articles and discussion above show 
that it is a rather arbitrary process with strong links to categorization and heavily 
influenced by the theoretical assumptions and disciplines that are said to observe 
energy security relations. According to Ciuta, ‘energy is not, in this sense, the 
problem.’52 The problem instead comes in two ways. First, what is problematic are 
the knowledge practices behind energy security and its subsequent policies. A second 
problem relates to the fact that it is not energy that is secured. What is secured are the 
infrastructure, the markets, the price agreements, the system and so forth. Energy 
security in this sense is an empty concept that only ‘acquires meaning through a 
series of assumptions regarding the linkage between growth, sustenance and the 
environment.’53 The problem for Ciuta therefore ‘is that of formulating different 
concepts of security and creating context where these can acquire legitimacy and 
political grip’.54 This is exactly what Ciuta and Cherp & Jewell achieve. In simplifying 
the debates through a search for security logics, they manage to break with a simple 
understanding of security. That said, neither of these articles fully engages with the 
complexity of insights that is available within the CSS literature. Furthermore, they 
still try to define what energy security is – e.g. particular logics – and do not engage 
with what energy security does.55
4.5 reflection
This chapter discussed how energy security is analyzed by the literature and how the 
literature makes sense of the proliferation of the concept of energy security. It identifies 
three core strategies: categorization, theorization and a mix of both with the search 
for underlying logics. First, categorization was attributed to both the qualitative and 
the quantitative energy security literature and their search for core definitions and 
indicators of energy security. With categorization seen as an inherently artificial and 
incomplete political activity that delineates concepts and practices, its value cannot be 
separated from its real world effects. Secondly, theorization of energy security proved 
51 In case of energy, especially oil and gas, this interdependence can even be asymmetrical as the short-
term disruptive power of gas suppliers is only balanced on the medium to long term by the income 
dependency of producers. See Stoddard 2012b, 347.
52 Ciuta 2010, 139.
53 Ibid., 128.
54 Ibid., 139.
55 As will be discussed in chapter 5, the scholars working on energy with the help of Securitization Theory 
take this up, but are often incomplete as they neglect the shaping of the self and are too instrumental in 
their use of the theory.
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to be limited with realist geopolitics and market neoliberals offering competing 
interpretations and solutions to energy security. The critically inspired theories 
identified as a third strand of theorization pointed towards the performative power of 
these theories and the self-referential tendency within them as they selectively derive 
from and in turn help shape their own reality. The last approach, which was dubbed 
the search for logics, dealt with a combination of categorization and theorization in 
that it shifts focus to generalizable processes and discourses that repeatedly drive 
action and interpretation. These logics can be found on all levels. On energy in 
general, on the response to energy insecurity through different interpretations of 
dependency, and on the security logics behind energy security practices. Especially 
this last discussion opens up to the question and realization that there is a need for a 
deeper understanding of security itself to understand energy security. 

III.  unpackIng energy SecurIty
P A R T  I I

The goal of Part I was to introduce the notion of energy security and its changing 
use over time. Two things stand out from the discussion so far. First, the inherent 
empty nature of energy security and its constant proliferation in terms of ascribed 
content and scope. Second, the limited available critical literature on energy security 
(in comparison to the equivalent food security discussion) and the realization that 
the definitions, categories and theories dealing with energy (and food) security 
are anything but neutral indicators as they help shape what they analyze. For this 
thesis, what is lacking from the academic discussion on energy security is a more 
abstract theoretical reflection on what the concept and its definitions do besides 
the deliberations of what they are. What is missing is an understanding that the 
proliferation of the concept of energy security, which is based on demands for 
emancipation, in its totalizing categorical tendencies hides the multiplicity of energy 
and the daily political choices that are constantly being made and remade on its behalf.
In other words, while the proliferation of energy security shows the range of choices 
that can be made regarding the future of energy, it does not detail why those choices 
have been made. The conceptual analysis in Part I does not analyze the politics behind 
the choices; it only highlights the perceived need for security and a desire for energy. 
It does not question why certain issues are feared as a security problem and others not. 
It does not help us understand why people constantly need more energy. These desires 
and threats are often taken as self-evident in the traditional literature. But are they? 
And what is behind the constant proliferation of energy security (and food security)? 
What are the consequences of state-centrism for energy security compared to food 
security and what does it mean that food security has a clear counter-discourse in 
food sovereignty? What role does the scientification of food and energy security play 
in the governance of these fields? Why does the literature differ between a security of 
supply and a security of demand, but not between a security of abundance (protecting 
what we have) and a security of scarcity (gaining that what we do not have), or between 
a politics of insecurity (the use of security to highlight a new threat) and the politics 
of security (the use of security to deal with routine threats)? These are all questions 
that call for a deeper theoretical engagement with security and other aspects of the 
underrepresented humanities literature in the field of energy.1 
The four chapters that follow take up this call and together problematize any 
remaining notion that energy security is merely an identifiable problem in need 
of a solution. Chapter 5 builds on the wider critical security literature to provide a 
theoretical foundation for the concept of security in order to shed light on the constant 
proliferation of energy security. Chapter 6 on scarcity offers a deeper understanding 
of the desire for natural resources and aims to question the implicit assumption 
1 Sovacool 2014.
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that energy is scarce and hence worth obtaining, irrespective all the accompanying 
politics of dependency, energy markets, etc. Both of these chapters follow a similar 
line of argumentation: they start by discussing what security and scarcity are – in 
both cases quickly breaking with any narrow descriptions of these concepts – only to 
move slowly onwards to discuss what these concepts do when people call upon them. 
Together these two chapters on security and scarcity provide at least some theoretical 
grounding to explain the constant proliferation of energy security.
Another aspect from the chapters on security and scarcity is the attention to 
social constructs and the linguistic power of these conceptualizations. Together with 
the performative stance taken in this thesis, this calls for Chapter 7 to engage with 
both social constructivism and the performativity of concepts, and to discuss how 
knowledge relates to nature and material artefacts, like the energy infrastructure and 
its resources. In studying the logics and politics of security, the political economy 
around scarcity, and the relation between knowledge and materiality a single author 
kept returning. Chapter 8 will therefore introduce and discuss the later work of Michel 
Foucault on (bio) power and biopolitics in depth. In particular, it will detail his focus 
on the exercise of power or the governing that is done in the name of security through 
knowledge gathering practices and the role of the non-discursive (e.g. material) in 
this. To be clear, Foucault provides not the approach to energy security, but his work 
offers a thought-provoking lens to think about the relationship between security and 
political markets as a governing of the present.
One caveat is in order. Where Part I discussed the concept of energy security, 
the chapters that follow here in Part II are no longer about energy security as such; 
they discuss their respective topics in breath and on their own terms, in line with 
Figure 3. The goal of this thesis has never been to develop a theory, methodology or 
specific performative approach to study energy security but to problematize current 
understandings and knowledge practices of energy security through a rigorous 
theoretical reflection of its 
underlying practices. In fact, 
following its critical disposition, 
this thesis is antithetic to such 
a totalizing goal as any single 
theory, method or performative 
approach simplifies the inherent 
complexity of each of these topics 
and would inherently break with 
the contextualization that is of 
such importance to understand 
energy security. These chapters Figure 3: The Drivers of Energy Security
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therefore offer as much breadth as possible for a more complete understanding of 
the processes at work behind energy security (and the political economies of other 
natural resources). The illustration in chapter 5.4 and the two larger illustrations 
in Part III do so by showing how a performative reading could proceed and what 
potential insights it offers.
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55. securing undesired fuTures
 ‘The word security in political discourse signifies priority.’1 
5.1 introduction
The previous chapters showed that energy security is characterized by a constant 
proliferation that makes it very hard to point out what it is and how this totality 
undermines the inherent prioritization of security. Part I also showed that, while 
they overlap, energy security is still not food security. There is a material and 
organizational core to both of them that makes them different, yet they share the 
logic of security. This chapter unpacks this logic of security and in doing so finds 
four characteristics.2 First, security is not one logic. It consists of multiple forms of 
insecurity and logics of security, which rely on five different techniques to get to know 
the future. Many of these logics are inclusionary: there is always another unknown 
potentially threatening future, just as a failed counter-measure only inspires to do 
better. Second, security is ethical. It is the choice of what to protect and what not to 
protect, the choice between what to see as a threat and what not to see as a threat. 
Simultaneously, the urgency that is security dispels any thought about the ethical 
choices inherent to security. Third, security is something that is made; it does not exist 
out there, but is called upon or written by politicians, concerned citizens, security 
experts, insurers, etcetera. Lastly, this chapter will discuss that security is not only a 
goal, something that initiates action against a threat, but rather that it is an exercise of 
power, a way to govern the present based on an imagination of the future.
One of the most elegant descriptions of security is provided by Booth who states 
that ‘[s]ecurity … is a powerful political concept; it … energizes opinion and moves 
material power.’3 However, in line with the focus of this thesis it describes what 
security does instead of providing a definition of what security is. In terms of what 
security is: often security is simply defined as the absence of threats in line with 
Buzan, who sees security as ‘being protected from danger, feeling safe, and being free 
from doubt’.4 Alternatively, Brauch defines security as something that ‘is achieved 
if there is an absence of objective threats and subjective fears to basic values.’5 These 
definitions already show that security has neither a fixed value nor strong boundaries 
1 Booth 2007, 109.
2 This chapter discusses security, not energy security. However, being a logic it is possible to read this 
chapter almost from the beginning to end and just add the word energy before the word security to make 
it into a discussion on energy security.
3 Booth 2005, 23; as quoted by C.A.S.E Collective 2006, 456.
4 Buzan 1983, 19.
5 Brauch 2011, 99.
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defining its use, but that security is an empty logic that carries a multitude of 
meanings, for different people in different times.6 Security is both a state of being 
(the end-goal of ‘feeling secure’) and the means towards that end (either repairing 
threats or avoiding them). Security can be negative (negating threats and dangers) 
or positive (something to strive for). Definitions range from the individual to the 
international, from material (food) to symbolic (democracy) forms of security, from 
internal (rebellion) to external security considerations (invasion), from the security 
of public goods (air quality) to private services (insurance), and from objective and 
subjective to intersubjective notions of security (see this chapter).7 
With security construed as an empty logic, any content driven definition or 
explanation of what security is will have strong normative consequences. The chapters 
on the evolution of the concepts of food security and energy security show how these 
definitions do not only describe what the insecurities in the respective fields are, but 
are clearly aimed to steer what they ought to be. Any decision on insecurity contains 
an image of who/what is to be secured, and hence who is not part of that security. 
Following the definition of Booth above, this thesis moves away from any such 
substantive definitions and instead approaches security as the mode through which 
people identify undesirable futures and act upon them in the present. Such a broad 
definition might invite the comment that it is not even a definition, that it is too broad 
and unworkable because it can include anything that is deemed important.8 In other 
words, that it makes security into something banal: a critique that was forwarded 
earlier in relation to food and energy security. However, the approach to security that 
is proposed above enables a process driven analyses of what security is said to be, 
how it comes to be and how it affects current decision-making practices as well as the 
consequences of such decision-making. In other words, this broad definition enables 
to transcend the inherent duality within current understandings of security and to 
trace the actual origins and workings of security by focusing on how people come to 
know the future and decide upon its undesirability. 
This chapter consist of four sections. Chapter 5.2 deals with the question of what 
security is. It provides a detailed examination of security by letting go of any fixed 
definition, instead focusing on the general processes: the specific rationalities through 
which we approach uncertain futures, the techniques used to identify undesired 
futures, and the security logics that secure these undesirable futures. Together these 
make up what here is understood as security. Chapter 5.3 proceeds to discuss the 
normative dimension of security and goes so far as to argue that security essentially 
is a form of ethics. This chapter examines the close connection between security 
6 Booth 2007, 95–101.
7 Zedner 2003; Booth 2007, 105–106.
8 This points to the politics of (in)security.
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decisions and knowledge, the role of fear in relation to security, as well as the active 
political (mis) use of security to govern vulnerable populations. The last two sections 
shift to theories of security and deal with the process through which undesired futures 
are turned into a security issue. Chapter 5.4 looks closely at Securitization Theory, one 
of the core theories on security that provides a framework to study how people call 
upon security (interpreted as exceptional circumstances) in political arenas. Chapter 
5.5 studies the theoretical literature on the security technique of risk calculations 
(with its focus on routine security practices) and how this helps govern our daily lives. 
Chapter 5.6 offers a brief reflection. 
5.2 Tackling the unknown
5.2.1 Security and Insecurity
While the notion of security is hard to define, whether compared to its conceptual 
relatives of safety and certainty or its antagonists of insecurity, uncertainty, risks, 
threats and dangers, it is one of the dominant values in modern society and often the 
bottom line when it comes to survival. This has not always been the case. Zedner, for 
example, contrasts a “modern” strive for survival with historic notions of security 
that viewed it as something to be fearful off. Security, it was believed, would inevitably 
lead to overconfidence and a person’s undoing, because someone who feels totally 
secure no longer pays attention to life itself.9 Der Derian makes a similar argument 
when he distinguishes three different meanings of security.10 First, security refers to 
‘a condition of being protected’, in the Hobbesian meaning of security that refers to 
a secure state of being and an absence of fear. According to Der Derian, this is how 
security is interpreted within IR. Second, security is used in the ‘form of a pledge, a 
bond, a surety’. This understanding takes up center position in modern economics 
under the header of insurance, law and finance. Lastly, Der Derian identifies a historic 
interpretation of security when he defines it as ‘a condition of false or misplaced 
confidence’ and argues that this historic notion of wrongness of a condition of total 
security seems to have been lost in modern security debates.11 Recently, this latter 
interpretation is reintroduced by scholars like Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, who argue 
that life itself is radically uncertain and that when one tries to secures life, when one 
protects and stabilizes life, one actually ‘kills’ life itself (chapters 5.5 and 8).12 
Besides these three understandings, two other aspects constantly return in 
security. The first is the intricate relationship between security and insecurity. As 
9 Zedner 2003, 157 quotes Macbeth, Act 3.
10 Der Derian 1995, 28–29.
11 Ibid.
12 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008.
91
5Chapter 5
Dillon phrases it: ‘[a]ll security, however defined, is consequently a relationship 
towards insecurity, and vice versa. Security and insecurity belong together.’13 When 
a situation is framed as a security issue, it is impossible not to think about how it could 
be organized more securely. Similarly, when a situation is described as secure the first 
thing that comes to mind is what could break this security. It is impossible to think 
the one without the other, irrespective the referent objects and fields of application. 
The second aspect relates to the time dimension of security, as it is always the 
future that is insecure. Even if some historic knowledge is considered threatening, 
it is in relation to what might happen with it in the future. As Buzan, Wæver & De 
Wilde explain: 
The impossibility of applying objective standards of securityness relates 
to a trivial but rarely noticed feature of security arguments: They are about 
the future, about alternative futures—always hypothetical—and about 
counterfactuals.14
According to Anderson, this future orientation makes security into ‘a seemingly 
paradoxical process whereby a future becomes cause and justification for some form 
of action in the here and now.’15 In other words, people act now to foil what they 
fear might come about, for the moment that the threat comes about it is no longer 
the future but the present. From such a perspective, security is a form of epistemic 
uncertainty or a lack of knowledge about the future.16 The future is interpreted as 
either too complicated to comprehend in full (inherent incomplete knowledge) or as 
a constant source of surprise that could in principle be known if only there were 
enough resources to study them.17 In fact, while the future is inherently uncertain, 
many futures are known at the same time. These known futures are often seen as 
unpredictable and as something to be feared, but are just as often desirable in terms 
of material gain, political power or social status, and at other times seen as a positive 
experience that brings fun and enjoyment.18 The line between desired and undesired 
futures is hence not fixed: even in those instances where the future is feared, some 
feared futures are still desired and pursued for the thrill of it (e.g. skydiving) while 
other people seek generally acknowledged undesirable futures (e.g. suicide).19 
13 Dillon 1996, 33 [emphasis in original]; also Neocleous 2008, 28.
14 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 32.
15 Anderson 2010a, 779. Also Anderson 2010b; Massumi 2007.
16 Burgess 2011, 26.
17 Anderson 2010a, 781.
18 Anderson and Adey 2011.
19 Booth 2007, 104; Svendsen 2008.
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The beauty of security is that one way or another the future is opened up, reacted 
to and given shape in doing so. In this process, security offers both cause and 
justification for its actions. To understand security one therefore needs to ‘understand 
how anticipatory action functions, we must understand the presence of the future, 
that is the ontological and epistemological status of “what has not and may never 
happen”.’20 A process that Luhmann identifies as ‘time-binding’.21 Seen as a logic 
it becomes possible to focus on the processual nature behind the manifestation of 
the future in the present, in particular, the manner in which undesirable futures are 
identified and subsequently acted on. Hence, for this thesis, security is defined as the 
way people identify and approach undesirable futures in the present. Starting from 
this processual logic, the sections below try to identify often-used logics of insecurity 
and security, as well as a number of techniques of security. The following paragraphs 
first focus on different forms of insecurity by identifying more or less coherent ways 
of thinking about undesirable futures. The second paragraph deals with several 
techniques used to identify unwanted futures and the third paragraph deals with 
security logics or the strategies to counter or relate to the undesirable futures.22
5.2.2 Forms of Insecurity
A broader interpretation of security, one that sees security as the politics of 
knowing undesired futures and acting upon them in the present, shows that there 
are at least six ways to think about insecurity. These include threats, dangers, 
catastrophes, uncertainties, risks and safety.23 These terms are often conflated 
and used interchangeably, but nonetheless contain individual characteristics and 
particular logics that determine how situations are interpreted and how the future 
is approached.24 What makes it especially difficult is the double use of many of these 
concepts. Threats, uncertainty and risk, for example, are both generic understandings 
of insecurity that people use in popular language to discuss security, but also specific 
distinguishable rationalities of insecurity. 
To start with the conception of radical uncertainty. Generically, the future is 
uncertain. We do not know what the future brings. Still, there are things people fear, 
20 Anderson 2010b, 778 [emphasis in original]; quotes Massumi 2007 [n.p.].
21 Luhmann 1993.
22 See Anderson 2010b.
23 Alternatively, Daase and Kessler 2007 argue for a categorisation of uncertainty built upon four categories 
of knowledge. In their article these authors differentiate between known knowns (meaning actual threats 
that provide a clear basis for action), known unknowns (risks where the ontic structure is blurred but 
methods exist to diminish these unknowns), unknown unknowns (dangers in the form of uncertainty) 
and unknown knowns (ignored or forgotten actual threats). Daase and Kessler thus approach the 
concepts of risk, uncertainty, danger and threat from a systemic perspective by showing the ontic and 
epistemic differences between these categories.
24 Anderson 2010b, 789.
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outcomes people hope for, and things people expect will happen. In other words, there 
are degrees of uncertainty that are covered by other forms of insecurity. However, 
there are those events that truly do surprise, that do not fit the other categories of 
insecurity. The concept of radical uncertainty covers this final category of surprises.25 
Knight’s classic formulation of this problem is based on a distinction between risks 
and uncertainty. More precise, Knight sees risks as calculable and measurable 
whereas uncertainty is seen as something incalculable, often due to the uniqueness of 
a particular situation.26 Knight and many current positivists understand uncertainty 
as indeterminacy, as a problem of incomplete information that can and needs to 
be solved with more and better information. Keynes rejected this formulation and 
argued that more information is not always enough to overcome uncertainty as 
people also encounter situations of ‘ontic uncertainty’.27 In these situations, the rules 
of the game, the event or the setting of the uncertain future itself are unknown and 
people have to fall back on others and what they believe, not what they know. Keynes 
points here to situations where people do not add information, but start to reason 
by analogy. 
Kessler & Daase expand upon these insights and distinguish four different forms 
of uncertainty. They identify relative frequency where both game and chance are 
known (e.g. dice). A second form is logical probability where the ontological world 
is open but assumed to be known and people agree on a distribution of probabilities 
(e.g. climate change). Third, subjective probability a form of uncertainty where the 
ontological world is known, but the chance of winning is interpreted subjectively (e.g. 
stock markets). Lastly, they identify social probability by which the authors refer to 
the epistemic uncertainty of language itself: its open-endedness, double meanings, 
imprecisions and undefined concepts.28 This latter category of social probability 
comes close to what is here understood as radical uncertainty. Nevertheless, the 
ambiguity or excess of language is not the only source of radical uncertainty.29 
Above this chapter briefly referred to the general concept of life, as used by Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero, to denote the openness, potentiality and heterogeneity of the future. 
Similarly, Latour places his actor-networks against a background of ‘plasma’ (chapter 
7.4), Bennett discusses the ‘vibrancy of matter’ to describe the radical uncertainty 
which she finds in the plurality and heterogeneity of the assemblage of humans and 
non-humans (chapter 7.3 and 7.4), and Adorno focusses on his idea of ‘non-identity’ 
25 On surprise and the politics of events, see chapter 5.5.2.
26 Knight 1921; Best 2008; Kessler 2012c.
27 Keynes 1921.
28 Kessler and Daase 2008.
29 Best 2008, 356. Best argues that linguistic ambiguity has three functions: it could actually help govern 
forms of epistemic uncertainty, it could also be used as an instrument to govern through, and, lastly, it 
poses a limit to the actual governance that can take place.
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or that what is not conceptualized but still felt as missing.30 Whether stemming from 
linguistic, material or social-material assemblages, this form of radical uncertainty 
opens the future to change and free will.
This highly contrasts with the concept of threats that one often finds in IR and 
public policy documents. Like uncertainty, threats play a role on two levels. In its 
generic understanding, threats seem to denote all future instances that people deem 
undesirable. This use of threats conflates dangers, threats, catastrophes and other 
forms of insecurity geared towards the prevention of feared futures. What separates 
the specific notion of threats from other insecurities is the presence of a threatening 
other.31 Originally, Buzan argued that threats differ based on source, intensity 
(distance and urgency) and timeframe.32 From a critical perspective, however, the 
focus shifts to the realization that underneath these differences lies a self-other 
distinction. In terms of energy security, for example, the EU and its member states 
see the more recent policy choices by the Russian government once more as a threat 
to European oil and gas security (chapter 5.4). Simultaneously, in food security one 
could argue that the social food movements are perceived as a threat to the capital-
intensive companies aiming for an industrial food production and vice versa. Such 
a threat rationality, which Wæver calls a war logic, builds upon the identification 
of somebody as being a threat.33 Threats discriminate, always.34 Threats create an 
image of the other by delineating those who are dangerous as separate from us (the 
individual or group in need of security). What is more, as will be discussed later 
in this chapter, in doing so they not only give rise to the other, but simultaneously 
shape the self through the identification (and fixation) of the referent object; that what 
needs protection. 
Besides the self-other distinction of threats, there are three other ways to think 
about undesirable futures and they all share their origin in a non-human “outside 
world.” In its extreme, the notion of catastrophe refers to those events that are expected 
but cannot be countered in any meaningful way, as they cannot be experienced. The 
moment one experiences a catastrophic event, experience is no longer possible as you 
are death; thus leading to a desire to know catastrophes ‘without the inconvenience of 
having to live through the catastrophe itself.’35 Examples are hard to find as even for an 
explosion of Yellowstone Park, the impact of an asteroid or a zombie plague there are 
people adapting, tracking, preparing or moving house in the hope of surviving such 
30 Latour 2005b, 244; Bennett 2010b; Adorno 1973. For a discussion on Latour’s plasma, see Harman 2009, 
132–134.
31 Rasmussen 2004, 393. See also: Luhmann 1993, 21–22; Beck 2002, 41; Corry 2012.
32 Buzan 1983, 83–84.
33 Wæver 1995.
34 Massumi 2009, 162.
35 Burgess 2011, 61.
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imagined catastrophic events. Still, whether based on science or science fiction, the 
magnitude and inability for proper counter action prevents such issues to reach the 
security agendas of policy makers. This is where a catastrophe differs from a danger. 
Contrary to catastrophes, many policies are concerned with worst-case scenarios 
(more on security techniques below) about which people believe that, helpful or not, 
not acting is not an option. The ability to act makes such issues a danger (even when 
they are presented and dramatized as catastrophes). While some events are more 
urgent than others, danger refers to those instances where future events are known 
and counter actions are possible, but which are not predictable as to when they occur. 
A failed harvest due to bad weather or a fungus fits such a rationality. A last and related 
form of insecurity is one of safety. Here it is not so much a natural occurrence that 
needs to be countered, but a socio-technological event within a broader engineered 
system, often framed in terms of quality instead of quantity. Debates about food safety 
(quality of food) and nuclear safety (malfunctioning reactor) are a case in point as 
they display socio-technological failures affecting the safety of human life. Of course, 
the moment that people are held accountable for these failures the logic shifts to a 
threat rationality.
That leaves risk, the last type of insecurity. Risk is special in that there are not two 
but three meanings attached to the concept. First, like uncertainty and threats, risk 
is used generically to indicate undesired and uncertain futures. Second, risk is one of 
the main security techniques used to tackle the future, as discussed below. Yet, third, 
risk also functions as a form of insecurity. What distinguishes risk is that it deals with 
those possible future events that do not stem from ‘the other’ nor from ‘the outside 
world’ but instead result from collective action and decisions within a particular 
group. Risks follow decisions, or as Luhmann argues: ‘risks are attributed to decisions 
made, whereas dangers are attributed externally’.36 According to Luhmann, this means 
that risks are observer dependent: the risk that decision-makers discuss becomes 
an externality, danger or threat to the persons subject to the decisions.37 When the 
British government decides to construct the Hinkley Point C nuclear power reactor, 
they decide from a risk rationality. The local residents, however, do not face a risk but 
the actual decision and thus a threat. These decisions, Luhmann notes, are frequently 
made by people hidden within a range of different institutions of government and 
business. This ‘allow[s] for the possibility that modern society attributes too much to 
decisions, and so where the decision maker (whether an individual or an organization) 
cannot even be identified.’38 In addition, outside observers, like historians looking 
back at the construction of Hinkley Point C, could decide very differently on the 
36 Luhmann 1993, 107.
37 Ibid., 109.
38 Ibid., 119 [emphasis in original].
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thresholds of the risk that the current government uses to makes its decision.39 The 
insecurity behind risk is thus based on the repeated question whether something is 
the right decision or not. 
5.2.3 Knowing the Future
The six types of undesired futures are unknown, but people constantly imagine them 
with the help of a range of security techniques. It is possible to identify five general 
techniques to imagine the future. These are uncertainty, extrapolation, imagination, 
risk calculation and performance. Each of these broadly encompasses a specific 
way of approaching the future and making it knowable, combining both the above 
discussed insecurities and the below discussed security logics. The techniques are 
not only different, but they also have multiple uses. This is best exemplified with the 
three archetypes of future studies, a field that categorizes the use of these techniques 
in terms of forecasting, foresight and backcasting.40 Forecasting is about what will 
happen, often by extrapolating trends within society into the future (Malthus’ work 
on food and population growth). Foresight studies focus on what could happen by 
picturing a range of possible futures (IEA scenarios). Lastly, backcasting identifies one 
particular desired future and looks backward from that particular future to identify 
the requirements and actions necessary to reach it (reducing CO2 to remain under 
two degrees of global warming). The techniques discussed below can thus be used for 
multiple purposes. This section discusses the techniques, not their broader use.
Out of the five techniques uncertainty might be the most difficult to describe 
as it is not a technique per sé. Contra the other techniques, which all aim to gain 
knowledge over the future, the technique of uncertainty is the residual category 
that describes all those instances when people act in relation to the future without 
knowing precisely why. This includes moments of intuition, fate, luck, or, as some 
see them, moments of divine intervention (all post-hoc explanations): moments when 
something just does not feel right and people decide to wait for the next train or to 
eat something differently. People have no way of knowing the future, but still act as 
if they do. This also includes moments when judgement is sought from experts about 
situations that could go either way. Situations where none of the instruments below 
provide a decisive course of action and it is left to the “expert” to decide whether it is 
the right moment for action and to choose from a range of alternatives on the right 
course of action. If arranged systematically, for example through the Delphi method, 
the use of expert opinion becomes a way to imagine the future that is more closely 
related to scenario planning.41 
39 Ibid., 68.
40 Vergragt and Quist 2011.
41 Linstone and Turoff 2002; Mullen 2003.
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Scenario planning, in turn, is a technique that tries to imagine the future by 
offering multiple alternative futures. The idea of imaging multiple futures has a long 
history and lies at the core of military planning and games like checkers and chess. 
The development of scenarios sped up during World War 2 and continued in the 
1960s.42 Nevertheless, the use of scenarios outside the military only gained traction 
when Shell responded surprisingly quick and favorable to the 1973 oil crisis. This 
response was accredited to previous in-house scenarios to which its management was 
exposed in 1972 and which had forced the board to imagine just such a possibility and 
the responses to it.43 For Shell: 
[s]cenarios are not projections, predictions or preferences. Rather they are 
coherent and credible stories, describing different paths that lead to alternative 
futures. The process of producing and using scenarios is as important as the 
scenario stories themselves.44 
The importance of the process itself follows from the main function of scenarios, 
which is to order all possible imaginable futures into coherent stories. It is this 
ordering process and its socializing effect that helps participants understand the 
scenarios they are working with.45 After Shell’s success, the use of scenarios quickly 
spread across society.46 The main issue with scenarios is that, irrespective (or due 
to) their broad application, they are often developed by experts instead of executive 
decision-makers. This leads to situations where, in hindsight, the future is almost 
always imagined by someone somewhere, but that this does not guarantee that they 
are acted upon or favored by the decision-makers.47 Salter, for example, notes how 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were not a failure of imagination or scenario planning, 
but that the failure corresponds to the fact that the imageries in this case failed to 
convince the policy-makers in charge.48 This practice of using imagination and 
scenarios by policy and the media to identify as many possible futures as possible has 
also been called pre-mediation.49 
The third technique is extrapolation. This is a quantitative way of forecasting the 
future by estimating the future value of a variable through an extension of the historic 
trend into the future. In the case of natural resources, extrapolation can be traced 
to Malthus’ argument of arithmetic versus geometric change of respectively food 
42 Mietzner and Reger 2005.
43 Davis 2002.
44 Ibid., 1.
45 De Goede and Randalls 2009, 869.
46 For an overview of different types of scenarios: Mietzner and Reger 2005, 225–227.
47 Salter 2008a, 233.
48 Ibid., 235–236.
49 Grusin 2004; De Goede 2008a.
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production and population growth.50 More sophisticated approaches gained traction, 
in particular, during the first half of the twentieth century in relation to industrial 
development and, in particular, in relation to the military during the Second World 
War.51 However, extrapolation techniques really took off with the development 
of information technology that allowed for the handling of more complex trend 
analyses over larger data sets. One of the main examples remains the original Limits 
to Growth report, which reinforced (neo) Malthusian concerns on the environmental 
consequences of economic growth. Similarly, the price expectations in relation to 
natural resource commodities are partly based on trend analyses. An example would 
be the oil price expectations in 2008. At that time, a report by Goldman and Sachs 
stated that the oil price, at that moment hovering around 120 dollars a barrel, would 
continue to rise to 150 or 200 dollars per barrel (the price peaked at 147 dollar).52 
These days, extrapolation is often combined with scenarios wherein particular 
variables are altered to offer bandwidths of most likely trends.
The fourth technique is risk calculation. Where extrapolation deals with the 
identification of the future, ‘[c]alculation […] renders complex future geographies 
actionable through the numericalization of a reality to come – numbers that may 
thereafter circulate, be reflected on and take on an affective charge.’53 In other words, 
calculation focusses on the likely impacts and the chance of an event occurring. 
The technique of risk calculation thus centers on the statistical probability of well-
known events with known variables.54 Accordingly, and unlike the previous security 
techniques, risk calculation does not identify the future, but instead categorizes 
multiple futures. This leads some scholars to argue that risk should be seen ‘as a 
governance framework [which] seeks to focus scarce resources on risks that are ranked 
according to frequency and impact.’55 The reason that risk calculation is interpreted 
as a security technique, is because risk assessments are used to identify a set of futures 
that are not per definition undesirable or desirable. Risks display both possible costs 
and potential benefits and it is up to the individual to decide whether to take the 
risk or not. This subsequently points towards the politics behind risk calculation, as 
quantitative models do not explain the ‘disaster threshold’ or that point in time when 
people decide that the risks are no longer acceptable.56 Recent work by Amoore, 
among others, shows the importance of this, as risk calculation seems to be shifting 
50 Malthus 1798.
51 Linstone 2011.
52 Subrahmaniyan 2008. Other expectations predicted prices of $300 a barrel in 10 to 15 years: Korosec 
2009; Korosec 2011.
53 Anderson 2010b, 784.
54 Amoore 2013, 73.
55 Salter 2008a, 233.
56 Luhmann 1993, 2.
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from the statistical probability of imagined futures and their underlying variables to 
calculations that try to identify un-imagined events through a method that uses risk 
calculation to search for statistical correlations of non-related variables in extremely 
large databases (see chapter 5.5.5).57 
A last security technique is performance (or acting). This technique, too, does 
not primarily discover new futures, but instead enables people to experience a 
particular future. For Anderson, performance involves that ‘[f]utures are […] made 
present through practices that stage an interval between the here and now and a 
specific future through some form of acting, role-play, gaming or pretending.’58 By 
simulating a future, participants emotionally and affectively experience that future 
as they play it out in the present, leading to a better understanding of that particular 
possible future and one’s potential responses. The best-known examples are fire drills 
(e.g. on oil and gas platforms), the Cold War style war games, large-scale disaster 
management exercises and the stress testing of oil and gas systems by the IEA.59 On a 
more individual level, the performance technique is of course the corner stone behind 
many training programs. Pilots, soldiers, physicians and managers are all trained 
with simulators and real-life exercises. In these exercises, people act in the present 
based on imagined and experienced futures. They get to know particular futures, and 
the skills to handle them, by experiencing these futures.
5.2.4 Logics of Security
These security techniques do not stand on their own, but they identify undesired 
futures and thereby bridge the forms of insecurity with the logics of security that 
tackle these insecurities. Indeed, it is possible to detect seven security logics divided in 
four categories. The logics of prevention and deterrence deal with knowable undesired 
futures, the logics of pre-emption and pre-caution tackle unknowable futures, whereas 
the logics of preparedness and resilience counter unavoidable undesired futures. In 
relation to these security logics, there is a remaining category as well. While the logics 
below are all aimed at identifying and countering undesired futures, there are also 
undesirable futures where no action is taken at all. In line with Rumsfeld’s ‘unknown 
unknowns’ there are also ‘unknown knowns’: those things that are forgotten, 
misplaced or pushed out of the picture.60 Daase & Kessler identify this category of 
ignorance for those instances where nothing is done to counter undesirable futures, 
except perhaps to actively forget them.61
57 Amoore 2013, 73.
58 Anderson 2010b, 786.
59 IEA 2014.
60 Rumsfeld 2002; Daase and Kessler 2007.
61 Daase and Kessler 2007.
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First, when the undesirable future is known, when it can be attributed with a 
degree of certainty to a particular cause, it is possible to approach such futures through 
either a logic of prevention or a logic of deterrence. In a logic of prevention, one tries 
to prevent the undesired future from occurring, whereas in a logic of deterrence, 
prevention has failed and one tries instead to discourage the threat from occurring. 
For Massumi the difference between prevention and deterrence can be found in their 
internal justification. He argues that in a logic of prevention an undesired future stems 
from an externally given object or event with strong cause effect relationships for 
which the moment and force of impacts is unsure.62 Sharing the same epistemological 
knowable but undesired future, deterrence does not result from an external object but 
from the knowledge itself that something is going to happen soon and needs to be 
stopped before it happens. Deterrence misses the flexibility of prevention and replaces 
it with a certainty and total sense of urgency. To Massumi, this urgency and the lack 
of an exogenous foundation marks deterrence as a self-referential process: 
The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for 
deterrence is for its process to  have its own cause  and to hold it fast within 
itself. The quickest and most direct way for a process to acquire its own cause 
is for it to produce one. The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of 
the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation 
of a new process.63
In this new process, the perceived urgency of the undesired future loses all doubt; 
it becomes the justification for the urgency itself and makes the undesired future 
a reality in the present. In other words, the undesired future is known because it is 
acted upon as if it were real. It is performed.
Second, there are also undesirable futures that are ‘not yet fully formed’.64 These 
undesirable futures are both epistemological and ontological uncertain: they cannot 
be known because the ontic nature of the future is not fully known.65 In other words, 
there is some idea about what the undesirable future is but not where or how it will 
come about. A logic of pre-emption was originally coined in relation to pre-emptive 
wars: wars that break the peace in the face of an attack of the threatening other 
(contra preventive wars where one attacks without immediate threat of attack). Pre-
emption thus tries to halt a threat from coming into existence and hence does not 
deal with possibilities (risks) but with potentialities (scenarios); a constant flux of 
62 Massumi 2007.





self-referentially new potentialities.66 Similar to deterrence, the logic of pre-emption 
deals with these imagined undesirable futures by believing them to happen at any 
moment and with drastic impacts.67 Massumi sees pre-emption therefore as a logic 
that works affectively instead of causally, as it needs to create its own ‘otherness’ based 
on a constant regeneration of the fear of new potential threats.68 The best way to 
counter such fears is by acting upon them as if they are real. In doing so, pre-emption 
realizes the potential undesired future in the present. When one fears ones neighbor 
and treats him as a threat, everything the neighbor does potentially is threatening 
and thereby reinforces the fear and further justifies the actions one takes to “keep 
him in check”. Consequently, such an affective realization of an undesirable future 
cannot be proven wrong.69 When acting upon pre-emptive fear, there is no objective 
ground to reflect upon ones actions and subsequently no ground for proportionality 
to ones actions. Whether the undesired future ensues or not, countering the fear was 
the right thing to do. 
Comparable to a logic of pre-emption, a logic of precaution also works on and 
through potentially undesirable futures. Contrary to pre-emption however, precaution 
does not ‘unleash […] transformative events in order to avoid a rupture in a valued 
life’ but instead cautions against any actions that could potentially lead to undesired 
futures.70 This logic is best known through the precautionary principle, a principle 
that states that ‘when human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is 
scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that 
harm.’71 Often precaution leads to demands for more scientific knowledge, although 
it is just as often a justification to prevent undesirable actions completely.72 In other 
words, the precautionary logic contains strong debates on the proportionality of 
activities, weighing the potentiality of a decision to commence those activities against 
their potential impacts (in contrast to deterrence and pre-emption). Precaution is 
thus a logic that focusses primarily on the potential impacts of one’s own actions 
and one’s own decisions instead of something exogenous. In this, it closely resembles 
Luhmann’s analyses of a risk rationality although it misses the ability to calculate the 
impact of an action or decision as the potential future itself is still uncertain.73
66 Also Amoore 2013; Amoore and de Goede 2008c; De Goede 2008b; De Goede 2008c; De Goede 2011; De 
Goede and Randalls 2009; Anderson 2010b, 791.
67 Anderson 2010b, 791.
68 Massumi 2007 footnote 9.
69 Ibid., paras 17–20; Anderson 2010b, 791.
70 Anderson 2010b, 791; Commission of the European Communities 2000.
71 UNESCO World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 2005, 14.
72 Bigo 2010, 11; Ravetz 2004.
73 See also Anderson 2010b, 791.
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Besides avoiding undesired futures, some logics work to reduce the impacts of 
those undesired futures that are deemed unavoidable. A logic of preparedness, for 
example, focusses on a reduction of impacts. It has preventative qualities in that it 
deals with what you as an individual or social group can do to keep your current 
way of life.74 When analyzing natural resource use and critical infrastructure, 
preparedness includes well-known measures like the construction of reserves, 
redundancy, interconnections and back-up capacity, but also includes instruments 
like insurance and contract law. In the case of insurance, risk calculation is used to 
reduce the impact of certain undesired futures by spreading the costs for rebuilding 
over a group of people. In the case of contract law, the uncertainty of decision-making 
is reduced by agreeing to keep each other accountable and to discuss responsibilities 
and cost distribution in case of impacts. Preparedness (or mitigation) contrasts in 
this case with a logic of resilience. Resilience (or adaptation) is to be discussed in 
chapter 5.5, but for now can be described as a prudential way to tackle the future by 
taking a more pro-active approach, in line with pre-emption, in actively adapting 
towards undesirable futures.75 These two differ because a logic of resilience does 
not actualize a particular undesired future as pre-emption does. Instead, it makes 
agents see themselves as vulnerable and force them to be aware and constantly open 
to undesirable futures. A resilience logic does not try to prepare for the impacts of 
possible undesirable futures (as in a logic of preparedness), but forces the agent to 
adapt by changing himself instead of his surroundings. 
In conclusion, the above forms of insecurity, techniques and logics of security, 
quickly dispel any remaining illusion or hope for a clear definition of what security is. 
Security is all of those and more. Firstly, security relates to different types of insecurity 
following rationalities of threats, dangers, catastrophes, uncertainties, risks and 
safety. Secondly, security is the range of techniques used to gain knowledge over the 
future, whether through uncertainty, extrapolation, imagination, risk calculation 
or performativity. Lastly, security is the combination of logics that aim to counter 
undesired futures, whether known through the logics of prevention and deterrence, 
unknown through pre-emption and pre-caution, or unavoidable via preparedness 
and resilience. This multiplicity of logics and techniques reinforces the richness that 
lies behind the emptiness of security. An emptiness that is reflected in the shifts 
within the security literature, initially, from traditional military security concerns 
focused on the state to a broadening of its sectors away from military security and a 
deepening in terms of multiple levels of analysis. The chapters on energy security and 
food security both provide excellent examples of this. This chapter shows how the 
emptiness and proliferation of food and energy security indicates that security could 
74 Ibid., 792; Collier and Lakoff 2015; Collier and Lakoff 2008b.
75 Evans and Reid 2013.
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be seen as a (master) logic of urgency that builds on a range of other rationalities, 
techniques, and logics to get to know and prioritize undesired futures.
5.3 The ethics of security
5.3.1 Re-interpreting Security as Ethics
The security literature has been able to identify these techniques and logics by 
broadening its own scope of security. Initially, the theories of security evolved in 
response to the end of the Cold War by increasing the attention to topics that were 
considered low-politics, like energy and climate security. In turn, the theoretical 
debate on security shifted from realist understandings of security towards strong 
ethical critiques on security and a focus on individual human security.76 It started to 
discuss the role of risk in society as an alternative to security.77 The field also benefited 
greatly from the idea that security is something that is called upon (see the discussion 
on Securitization Theory in chapter 5.4).78 This claim in turn has been criticized 
and extended by approaches that interpreted security as routine practices and a 
form of governance.79 In other words, it is possible to trace a constant broadening 
and theoretical deepening of the idea of security on an academic level as well. In 
broadening its scope, the literature progressively builds upon a critical understanding 
that points towards the ethical implications of security. This will be taken up below 
with a discussion of the performative aspect of security as offered by critical security 
scholars and a subsequent discussion on fear or how, within these performative 
practices, people decide and act upon undesired futures.
This theoretical development coincides with the increasing use of the more open 
– e.g. epistemic and ontic uncertain – security logics and techniques that deal with 
multiple potential futures, like pre-emption and imagination. In line with Massumi, 
it is possible to argue that we have entered a period in which the manner used to 
approach the future is best characterized as a situation where the ‘absence makes the 
threat loom larger’ instead of smaller.80 It no longer matters whether an undesirable 
future has happened, is about to happen or is imagined to happen imminently or 
somewhere distant in the future. It no longer matters because, as Massumi continues, 
the current generic ‘[t]hreat is self-organizing, self-amplifying, indiscriminate and 
indiscriminable, tirelessly agitating as a background condition, potentially ready to 
76 Booth 1991; UNDP 1994.
77 Beck 1992; Beck 2002.
78 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998.
79 Bigo 2002; Balzacq et al. 2010; Dillon 1996; Huysmans 2011; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Amoore 
and de Goede 2008b; De Goede 2012; Amoore 2013.
80 Massumi 2009, 161.
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irrupt.’81 The generic idea captured by the concepts of threat, risk or uncertainty is 
everywhere and is constantly pressing for attention, making decisions on undesired 
futures as risky as the futures themselves.82 Risky, because they have no easy 
identifiable origin and their ‘”cause” [is] complex and non-local’ and often self-
referential. With the help of Massumi, it becomes possible to describe security as 
the ‘pragmatic and provisional’ ‘ascriptions’ of the undesirability of the future, each 
‘relative to a particular systemic take on the event.’83 
Besides being highly relative and context bound, the function of these generic 
insecurities as a background condition means that ‘[t]he potential of [the] threat 
is already, in the waiting, an incipient systemic disruption.’84 In highlighting that 
an ascription stems from and only works in relation to an existing system while 
simultaneously changing this system because of it, Massumi hints at the close 
connection between the identification of an undesired future and the consequential 
impact of that identification in the present. Campbell describes this more explicitly by 
showing how the identification of an undesired future ‘objectifies events, disciplines 
relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk.’85 
Security does things or as Dillon pushes this point: 
By being secured something becomes something that it previously was not. 
The act of securing both invents and changes whatever is so secured. … In 
short, for something to be secured it must be acted upon and changed, forced 
to undergo some transformation through the very act of securing itself. 
Securing something therefore violates the very thing which security claims to 
have preserved as it is. Securing an object is only possible on the condition that 
the integrity of the original thing is destroyed.86
The moment something is identified as undesirable the referent object and our 
relation to the referent object are changed, irrespective whether action has been taken 
or not. For Dillon the question therefore is not what security is, nor who or what is 
threatening or in need of protection, but instead
what does a representation of danger make of ‘us’ and of those who are not ‘us’? 
Not by asking who or what is threatened, or what is doing the threatening? 
But by asking how does the specification of threat and its discourse of danger 
81 Ibid.
82 Luhmann 1993.
83 Massumi 2009, 163.
84 Ibid., 161.
85 Campbell 1998, 3.
86 Dillon 1996, 122.
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determine ‘who’,  the ‘we’, and the ‘what’ that is said one the one hand to be 
endangered, and on the other to be doing the endangering? … And, finally, 
not by asking how to secure security? But, by enquiring about what is lost and 
forgotten, and who or what pays the inevitable price, for the way that ‘we’ are 
thus habited in fear?87
This gets to the core of the critical position on security in Critical Security Studies 
(CSS). Rejecting the assumptions that it is possible to separate theory from reality, facts 
from values and self from others, this position questions and problematizes the taken-
for-granted nature of security as something easily identified, with clear consequences 
and equally clear counter-measures. Instead, it focusses on the politics of security: 
the hard work that is needed to make something into a security issue, as was the case 
with the American diplomatic efforts to find support for the 2003 Iraq War. A critical 
perspective also focusses on the explicit and implicit consequences and silences of the 
security distinctions that are put forward in these political debates, and studies the 
effects and normalization of the security issue through its countermeasures, which 
constantly reinforce and materialize their own cause for concern.
From such a critical security position, it is possible to derive an understanding of 
security as a highly normative process, if not a form of ethics in itself. Burgess makes 
this argument when he states that: 
The unknown in its essence, by virtue of being unknown, is the foundation 
of ethics. This is the space where ethics “happens”; between necessity and 
randomness. Ethics, from a certain point of view, is nothing other than making 
decisions in the absence of certainty.88 
The close connection between security and ethics can be witnessed in the multiple 
ethical positions on energy and food security. Part I concludes that current definitions 
of energy and food security contain an equality principle when they support the right 
of all humankind to energy and food. On the one hand, such a position could be 
expanded by arguing along Kantian lines that it should be forbidden to actively cause 
harm. This would include not only those who actively withhold energy and food from 
those without, but could be pushed to include all those benefiting from a system 
that methodically excludes sections of the global population. On the other hand, 
a Utilitarian line of argumentation would claim that the benefit of most precedes 
the harm done to some and that an unequal system does not automatically imply an 
unethical system. Of course, contrary to both, it is also possible to argue in favor of a 
87 Ibid., 35.
88 Burgess 2011, 4. See also Browning and McDonald 2013.
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primary biological imperative to feed and protect oneself and one’s children first (the 
few over the many). This self-centered position conflicts with the Kantian definition 
of food security as it offers an argument for the protection of one’s possessions. 
Within CSS, the ethical dimension of security and the normativity of security 
choices are dealt with in different manners. First, a more positive form of security 
can be found in Booth’s theory of emancipatory security.89 Booth argues that true 
security can only come about if people are free of ‘the life-determining conditions 
of insecurity’, which for him cannot come to pass without their equality and 
emancipation.90 In his work, Booth explicitly studies security in terms of what should 
be. Not in terms of an utilitarian end-goal, as the future cannot be known precisely, 
but as an egalitarian process that constantly strives for a more equal and inclusionary 
humanitarian world. For Booth a critique of current security practices alone is not 
enough, those practices need to be improved. To do this he accepts the exclusionary 
effects of security, but only because he explicitly starts from those who are least secure 
in life. As Booth makes clear:
Like health and status, security is a condition that is not difficult to define; 
in each case, the starting-point should begin in the experiences, imaginings, 
analyses, and fears of those living with insecurity, ill-health, or low status.91
If security is the drawing of boundaries, then Booth’s position is to shift the 
exclusionary aspect of security onto those who are more secure, not less. 
Second, Booth’s explicit positive interpretation of security contrasts with the 
interpretation of scholars like Dillon and Massumi for whom security is neither 
positive nor negative. For these and other scholars following the insights from 
Foucault, security is the process through which society is organized and governed 
(see chapter 8).92 They study how security is used to govern society, but refrain from 
normative judgements on whether the governing is good, bad or successful. They do 
not focus on the objects in need of security, but focus on the process of security by 
studying for example how freedom and equality are used instrumentally as a form of 
governance. 
Lastly, Booth’s positive reading of security also contrasts with those who see 
security negatively. This is, for example, the position of scholars working from a 
Securitization Theory perspective (to be discussed below).93 This theory analyses 
how agents use security arguments to justify extraordinary measures that ignore 
89 Booth 1991; Booth 2007.
90 Booth 2007, 256, 348–392.
91 Ibid., 98.
92 Foucault 2007.
93 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998.
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normal decision-making procedures. It poses security as something that is created 
temporarily to deal with an undesirable future and hence should be returned to the 
normal state of affairs through a process of desecuritization.94 Securitization Theory 
has a similar analytic perspective as the Foucauldian approaches, but defines security 
negatively. Another example, albeit one that is less analytical than Securitization 
Theory and more strongly driven by a negative understanding of security, can be 
found in the work of the Foucauldian and Marxist inspired scholar Neocleous who 
equals security to oppression.95 
For Neocleous, security is and has been actively (mis)used to structure society 
in such a way that it is beneficial for the elites and capital rich.96 He makes this 
claim with five arguments. First, he offers a discussion of early liberalism, which, 
according to him, deals not with the ideal of liberty but with security and the role that 
security and exceptions play in organizing liberty itself, in particular the protection 
of property (see chapter 6). Second, he argues that the increasing use of emergency 
laws has become the new normal and indeed originates from within the law and not, 
as argued by Securitization Theory, as an exception to the law (see chapter 5.4). Third, 
he shows that the emergence of the concept of national security in the 1950s and 
1960s did not follow foreign military concerns but followed widespread domestic 
social security practices in the 1930s, including the introduction of an insurance 
business model that reinforced national policies of social security. Fourth, he points 
to the equation of national security, which results in constant insecurity everywhere 
by refueling constant fears, with a patriotic national identity, which is based on 
loyalty and a norm of correct behavior (see chapter 8). Lastly, he discusses the close 
connection between capital/business and security in the security industry where 
security is transformed into a commodity to be sold and bought at will (creation of 
demand/insecurity) while, simultaneously, capital, business and finance are deemed 
in need of protection themselves as well. With this last point Neocleous pushes the 
business-security linkage argument a step further than, for example Leander, who 
studies the ‘commodification of violence’ by focusing solely on the role of private 
security companies and how their supply of security creates the actual demand 
for it.97
While these positions within CSS differ in respect to the ethical position of 
security in the governing of the state and political economy, they do highlight the 
importance of a reflection on the hidden normativity of one’s view on security in 
general and the security choices one makes in particular. Unfortunately, any such 
94 Ibid.; Wæver 1995.
95 Neocleous 2008.
96 This paragraph is based on: Ibid.
97 Leander 2003; Leander 2005. See also C.A.S.E Collective 2006, 464.
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normative reflections on security are dispelled by the inherent logic(s) of security that 
overrule any ethical reflection with the urgency of the threat.
5.3.2 Fear and Undesirable Futures 
The above-mentioned logics and techniques describe how futures are characterized as 
undesired and as something in need of prevention, adaption or mitigation. However, 
they do not explain why a future is deemed undesirable. The intricate amalgamation 
of ethics and security has already offered a glimpse of the origin of insecurity by 
showing that security is something that can be actively used and called upon. This 
section enquires further into these processes by analyzing how fear works and is 
mobilized collectively to make some futures feared and others desired (to be clear, 
fear is only one motivational force, others include anger, grief, profit and power).98 
In general, people desire and fear to lose three things. First, a conservation of the 
status quo (goods, relations, needs). Second, a solution to the threat or object that they 
fear. Third, knowledge itself, in particular, the ontological certainty derived from a 
knowledge of the future.99 These three together indicate that fear and desire are not 
one-on-one related. Hence, it should not come as a surprise that the processes behind 
fear and a desire for security are as context bound and relative as security itself. Some 
people desire an emotion of fear (adrenaline junkies) while others fear their desires 
(addicts). Similarly, emotions like fear and desire on their own do not explain why 
some futures are feared or desired, nor which referent objects are so desired that 
they need security. Fear is an emotion, but also a mechanism of security. Below, this 
section will focus, respectively, on the cause and identification of fear, the active (mis)
use of fear, how fears are shifting to the fear for fear itself and how this latter shift 
affects society.
First, fear results from desire while it simultaneously enables the desire to act upon 
that fear. ‘In fear we are met by something outside ourselves, and what we meet is a 
negation of what we want.’100 We fear a rejection of our desires, but at the same time, 
fear also spurs a desire for action. As Svendsen continues, fear is an emotion ‘through 
which we consider the world’, a ‘contagious’ emotion that ‘seek[s] to conserve’ and 
simultaneously spurs ‘creativity’ to counter itself.101 The reason fear and desire are 
so closely connected is because fear is a ‘passion’ that is always applied towards an 
object.102 This includes obvious objects, like food or energy, but also a fear for the 
unknown – where the unknown becomes the object to be feared. Contrary to fear, 
98 See also Åhäll and Gregory 2013.
99 On ontological security, see Wendt 1999, 131.
100 Svendsen 2008, 12.
101 Ibid., 13–16, 71.
102 Frost 2010, 160.
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anxiety and panic miss such an object.103 Anxiety, for instance, is pure emotion that 
disperses itself to other people through mimesis.104 Where fear offers ‘the illusion of 
individual autonomous agency’, anxiety has no (un)desirable external object and thus 
cannot be countered.105 In other words, fear differs from anxiety and notions like 
resilience and its sense of vulnerability, as the desire to counter the fear provides it 
with an object that leads to the ability to act upon it. In other words, fear empowers 
the individual, while anxiety and vulnerability undermine any such empowerment. 
Building upon this distinction between fear and objectless anxiety or panic, 
Robin distinguishing private fears from two forms of public fears. As private fears, 
Robin understands phobias for spiders and so on. Under public fears Robin includes, 
on the one hand, exogenous fears, which are defined by political elites and which, 
through a politics of fear and self-other distinctions, come to determine the political 
agenda. On the other hand, Robin identifies endogenous fears based on the inherent 
inequalities within society.106 In this latter case, fear, through security practices, not 
only helps identify the self in relation to the threatening other but also fixates the 
socioeconomic and political hierarchies within society. Endogenous fear is not about 
survival or physical harm, but Robin sees it more broadly and defines this form of 
political fear ‘[as] an apprehension of harm, and because harm is the deprivation of 
some good to the individual, wielders of power can arouse fear merely by threatening 
the individual’s enjoyment of that good.’107 This form of fear deals not with fear in the 
sense of explicit threats to life and limb, but with the fear to lose employment, liberty 
or education. In other words, the ‘quite fears’ or the ‘low-grade fears’ to livelihoods.108 
Interestingly, Robin sees these public fears being hidden behind a depoliticized idea of 
private fears and terrors. For Robin, it is the conflation of private and public fears that 
leads to ‘a separation of fears from morality and politics’ as fears are no longer seen 
as originating from politics and as a result reinforce the underlying social order.109 
Whereas Robin analyses the institutionalized depoliticisation of fear, others 
conflate the public fear of Robin with the understanding of anxiety proposed by 
Svendsen and Frost. Scholars like Massumi, Dillon or Furedi, for example, argue 
that fears are feared, not because of the objects to which the fear is attached nor 
because of the active manipulation of fear, but because of the fear for fear itself.110 
Fearing fear itself or the ‘objectification’ of fear can be linked, according to Furedi, 
103 Ibid., 167–170; Svendsen 2008, 35–37.
104 Frost 2010, 169. Compare with the mimetics as discussed in chapter 6.4.
105 Ibid., 160.
106 Robin 2004, 16–18.
107 Ibid., 19.
108 Furedi 2007.




to the idea of constant vulnerability and risk, which gained momentum in the late 
1980s.111 The idea behind vulnerability is one of victimhood and ‘[t]o be a victim is 
to be relieved of responsibility for the situation in which one finds oneself.’112 Such 
a sense of vulnerability leads to a constant attentiveness to ones surroundings. An 
attentiveness that starts to blur underlying causes and objects, away from a person’s 
direct experiences with the object and towards attention to fear itself. This fear for 
fear itself and how it motivates or ‘activates’ people, is something Massumi elsewhere 
describes in relation to the color coded terror warning systems.113 These yellow, 
orange, and red coded schemes indicate threat levels and are aimed to change people’s 
routines without sharing the information or evidence behind the indicated threat 
level. According to Massumi, such a coding scheme works on the future present ‘pre-
effect of fear’, by which he refers to the unconscious effects of fear: 
As William James famously argued, fear strikes the body and compels it to 
action before it registers consciously. When it registers, it is as a realization 
growing from the bodily action already under way: we don’t run because we 
feel afraid, we feel afraid because we run.114
The body acts even before we are consciously aware of it. Only when we realize that 
our body responds, whether via fight, flight or freeze reactions, do we feel afraid. This 
private feeling then continues to drive us. Massumi describes how people start to 
reflect on their bodily reaction, trying to find the object or source of, what by then has 
become, their fear.115 In rationalizing the moment and source of fear, the fear becomes 
an affective emotion. Moreover, in recounting the fear and its source to others in a 
later step, the fear becomes an object, one that is anticipated and forces the body to 
react without the initial unconscious bodily response.116 As an emotion, fear ‘becomes 
its own virtual cause’.117 When the color shifts from yellow to red, the collective calls 
upon the embodied private fear, without ever experiencing the original object ‘that 
we have become fearful in response to’.118 Fearing the fear itself thus has two effects: 
it decouples the social from the material (the body) while simultaneously linking the 
individual to the collective.119 
111 Ibid.
112 Svendsen 2008, 52–53.
113 Massumi 2005, 36.
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Such a publically shared sense of private fear has many forms and can be found 
everywhere, to be called upon and experienced together and alone. Whereas Robin 
and Neocleous focus on elites using this public fear for their benefit, Furedi shows 
how extensive the use of this public fear is across government, business, media and 
NGO’s. In other words, everyone trying to generate ‘awareness’ and influence people’s 
individual lives based on the urgency of a particular cause (or a reduction of the 
urgency of other causes).120 ‘When we witness the autonomisation of fear’, Furedi 
states, ‘then the question becomes not simply what is causing fear, but what are the 
potential negative consequences of fear.’121 The main consequence for Furedi is that 
the existence of such an objectified fear has led to a society characterized by a ‘culture 
of fear’ that is constantly ‘at risk’.122 This perspective creates a society that sees 
individuals as passive and vulnerable.123 And because it sees individuals as vulnerable, 
it treats them as vulnerable. According to Furedi, this leads to a situation where (1) 
everybody else is deemed governable by those who know best on a particular issue; 
(2) fear, not vision, is seen as something positive within politics as it helps govern 
those who are vulnerable, passive and unknowing; (3) those who know best are often 
so convinced of their cause that they are not afraid of using half-truths and ‘good 
lie[s for] the greater truth’; and (4) with new issues constantly emerging everyone 
can become an expert – thereby reinforcing the culture of public fear as nobody can 
“know” everything.124 Burgess describes this inability to understand all the security 
concerns that are affecting us at once, in terms of a ‘fundamental asymmetry of 
security politics.’125
When following Massumi and Furedi, the cause of fear is of little importance 
anymore. The autonomous existence of political fear implies that it cannot be proven 
wrong. While it only works when called upon, the above makes clear that almost 
everybody calls upon it. What is more, contrary to an individual’s private experience 
of fear, where the undesired future and desired future are identified simultaneously 
in response to bodily reactions, in the case of public fear there is a more intentional 
logic at work as the particular desired futures are identified before their current state 
is publicized as undesirable and something to be feared. 
This brings this chapter back to where it started, with security as a way to govern 
the present based on the imagination of the future. Even a primal emotion like fear 
turns out to be open to (mis)use based on political choices over which futures are 
desirable or not. Unfortunately, the discussion on fear did not help to understand why 
120 Furedi 2005, chap. 7.
121 Furedi 2007.
122 Ibid.
123 Furedi 2008; Furedi 2005; Furedi 2007.
124 Furedi 2005, chap. 7, in particular 137 and 139.
125 Burgess 2011, 62.
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some futures are feared or desired, only how they become so. This is not necessarily 
wrong as the contextual nature of security makes any answer to such a question a 
relative answer. This chapter instead highlighted the normative judgements of 
individuals who react to their bodily status and public figures when governing through 
public fear. These judgements together make security a form of ethics. In fact, there 
are multiple ethical positions towards security, also within the literature itself, and 
choosing one of them is already a normative act. More importantly, the normativity 
of security is often dispelled from awareness through the urgency and necessity that 
is inherent in the logic of security. Taking all of this into account means that the 
challenge becomes to ‘explore the meaning attached to fear and the rules and customs 
that govern the way in which fear is experienced and expressed.’126 Fortunately, CSS 
has two theoretical approaches that do this. On the one hand, Securitization Theory, 
focusing mainly on the manner in which public fears are called upon. On the other 
hand, Governmentality approaches to risk, which offer a particular lens to study how 
vulnerability is translated into risks in order to govern society.
5.4 securing exceptional Threats
5.4.1 Securitization Theory
One way of studying the meaning, experience and expressions of fear is through 
an analysis of ‘the “security” label [, which] conveys urgency, public attention, and 
resources.’127 A theory that deals with such a shift from normal politics to security, 
to that heightened sense of urgency and a justification to spend resources on it, is 
Securitization Theory. This theory is part of the framework for analysis of the 
Copenhagen School introduced by Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde in Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis.128 The theory focusses on existential threats and the way 
these are perceived and constituted by agents through speech acts. Instead of focusing 
on the objects of fear or the subjective feeling of fear, the Copenhagen School focusses 
on the perception of threats (in the generic sense). For the Copenhagen School threats 
are intersubjective, meaning that they originate socially in-between actors, instead 
of objective (e.g. that the threat is real and unavoidable) or subjective (that the threat 
originates in the fears of one or more persons). This implies that the theory excludes 
the material content of threats, as it claims that the importance and meaning of a 
threat – or public fears – are primarily provided by its social context.129 Basically, the 
126 Furedi 2007.
127 Booth 2007, 325.
128 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998. The Securitization Framework also contains a level of analysis focus, 
a sectorial focus and the Regional Security Theory.
129 This argument on materiality will be taken up in chapter 7.
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theory poses that, until the actual explosion of a natural gas well the fears for such a 
possible explosion do not originate from the reality of an explosion, but from a shared 
imagination that it might explode (e.g. a security concern). The following chapters will 
discuss this theory further, respectively, by introducing its main theoretical claims; 
by discussing four points of critique; by offering an illustration on the EU-Russia gas 
relations; and, lastly, by following more recent literature that moves beyond the claim 
of exceptionality. 
First, the theory divides issues on a shifting non-political, political or security 
scale. The focus is thus on those exceptional security issues that are so important that 
they overrule all regular political considerations, in terms of (legal) rules, time and 
resources.130 Based on these three distinct scales, the theory argues that issues can shift 
from one level to another. Non-issues can become political, just as political issues can 
become security issues, and vice versa. The last move, from the political to security, 
is of particular interest for the theory, as it focusses on a decision of exceptionality 
depending on whether the agents deem a certain issue existentially threatening or 
not. In line with Carl Schmitt’s claim that ‘[t]he sovereign is he who decides upon the 
exception,’ this decision is often made by traditional sovereign institutions like the 
government, although the theory explicitly states that this does not have to be the 
case.131 Instead, Schmitt’s claim is interpreted broadly and includes all who are able 
to reframe a non-political or political issue into a security issue.
Second, these ‘securitizing actors’, the agents who are able to reframe an issue, 
make this move through the use of speech acts: moments in time when speaking about 
a certain topic, in a certain time, in a certain manner implies a(n) (call to) action and 
not just the mouthing of the words.132 The frequently used example is saying “I do” 
during a wedding ceremony, when you do not just say the words, but “act” in making 
a promise for life and engage in a contract. In instances like these, speaking is more 
than just mouthing the words. For the theory, arguing that something is a threat and 
in need of a security solution is an act itself, because it shifts the issue from a political 
debate into a security issue and thereby is able to overrule normal (democratic) 
political procedures. Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde refer to this act when they argue that 
securitization is ‘the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be 
considered and collectively responded to as a threat.’133 More crudely, Securitization 
130 See also: Latour 2004.
131 Schmitt 1985, 5; see also Neal 2006.
132 Austin 1975. Austin differentiates within a speech act between: Locutionary acts that are the utterances; 
Illocutionary acts or that what is done in saying (shifting discourse to exceptionality); and perlocutionary 
acts or that what is done by saying (effects on target audience). Balzacq 2005, 175 quotes Habermas: ‘To 
say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in saying something.’ 
133 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 27.
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Theory concentrates a scholars’ analysis on those agents that are most persuasive in 
voicing their concern over the situation of a particular referent object. 
Third, such a securitization move needs to be accepted by the intended audience 
for the securitizing actor to be able, with his call for action, to put in place overriding 
stringent measures against regular political procedures. For the theory, ‘[a] successful 
speech act is a combination of language and society, of both intrinsic features of 
speech and the group that authorizes and recognizes that speech […].’134 Just as 
the speech actor can be anybody, so too the audience is not a pre-given entity but 
context dependent. It could be the parliament if a minister is speaking or the media 
if an environmentalist is campaigning, but it could also be the prime minister when 
parliament is voicing its concern or a whole neighborhood when the fire department 
orders them to stay indoors after a gas leak. Not only do the audiences shift per issue, 
but frequently there are multiple audiences crossing formal government institutions, 
informal communities, or media organizations.135 Important, however, is that it is 
only after the audience acceptance of a securitization move and the inherent need 
to protect the referent object (the objects that are threatened) that the theory claims 
there to be a case of successful securitization.136 All other speech acts that call on 
the logic of security are theoretically unsuccessful securitizing moves, and hence are 
instances of politicization instead of securitization.137
5.4.2 Critique on Securitization Theory
The Securitization Theory that emerges from these three points offers an easy to grasp 
and original alternative to the study of security, but is not without its shortcomings. 
The theory has faced much debate on four aspects in particular. These include the 
relation between the political and exceptionality, the role of the context of security, 
the normative position of the theory, and the analytics of the theory. 
First, the discussion of multiple audiences above already indicates a certain 
inflexibility within the theory. By offering the criteria of exceptionality as the 
benchmark for success, the theory is inherently driven to one act, one speaker and 
one audience. However, not only are there multiple audiences, there are also multiple 
actors who either speak on the same topic or in favor of other topics, climate change 
to name but one, which means that often the same audience has to weigh a multitude 
of differing, sometimes contrasting securitizing moves; making security first and 
foremost a political contestation. This explains why, contrary to Furedi’s “culture of 
134 Ibid., 32.
135 Roe 2008; Vuori 2008; Balzacq 2005.
136 Besides the securitizing actors, referent objects and the audiences that accept the securitization move, 
the theory also mentions functional agents, actors not actively involved in the securitization process but 
profoundly influencing the issue nevertheless. 
137 Compare with Latour 2004 on matters of fact (non-political) and matters of concern (political/security).
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fear” – which implies that security is all around us – the number of truly successful 
cases of securitization is rather limited for Securitization Theory.138 
This divergence results from the theory’s main assumption that successful 
securitization only follows after truly extraordinary measures have been taken. 
Moments when the law and normal political procedures are put aside to quickly 
counter the undesirable future.139 However, the exceptionality and the conditions 
behind it are not explained further, making it hard to sketch the successfulness of a 
securitization move, let alone whether it is the speech actor or the observing scholar 
who is defining the success of a securitizing move and its subsequent measures as 
securitization. Moreover, the focus on the exception contrasts with Furedi’s and Ciuta’s 
earlier assumption that the exception has become the routine; that fear and a desire for 
security are totalizing. According to Booth, this focus and its resulting “inflexibility” 
results from the theory’s primary definition of security in terms of survival, which 
keeps up with a traditional threat logic and stems from its initial opposition to 
traditional military security ideas. In his own work, Booth also understands security 
in terms of exceptionality. However, whereas Securitization Theory assumes security 
as having no choice, Booth instead defines security teleological as ‘the choice that 
comes from (relative) freedom from existential threats’.140 This leads Booth to argue 
that ‘the more an individual’s life is determined by insecurity, the more the space for 
choice, and acting effectively, is closed down.’141 Booth regards security as something 
positive, because to be secure for him means that a person has already conquered 
questions of survival and has a predefined plan (‘a prior political programme’) on 
how to increase security further.142 
Securitization Theory, on the other hand, considers security negatively.143 This 
follows from the inherent claim behind speech acts that there is no choice except 
to act and instantiate extraordinary measures, which would not have been possible 
otherwise. Security breaks with the normal state of affairs when it shifts to a ‘logic 
of war’ mode.144 Within this logic, security orders society in a particular way, 
geared towards the protection of us, through ‘fast-track’ ‘practices [which] buttress 
institutional arrangements and legitimize forms of domination and exclusion.’145 
Interpreting security in such a manner implies that security always excludes. Buzan, 
138 However, see the extensive debate on when something actually is ‘successfully’ securitized (see below).
139 On speed and silence, see Roe 2012. However, see the earlier discussion on Neocleous 2008.
140 Booth 2007, 106.
141 Ibid., 107. For a similar discussion in relation to scarcity as the absence of choice, see Mullainathan and 
Shafir 2013.
142 Wæver 2011, 467. 
143 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 29; Roe 2012; De Wilde 2012.
144 Wæver 1995, 54. Compare with Ciuta 2009 in chapter 4.
145 Aradau 2008, 72.
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Wæver & De Wilde are aware of this and argue as such, for example, when stating 
that ‘[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition ….’146 
The theory notes how security silences politics when dictators decide on threats, but 
also, especially, in democracies, where, for example, advocates of privacy are silenced 
during the implementation of the extraordinary security measures against terrorism. 
This leads them to argue that ‘[b]assically, security should be seen as a negative, 
as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.’147 This negative definition often 
leads to claims that the theory is geared towards developed Western democracies, 
but this is not the case. First, because Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde explicitly write 
about the logic of securitization in the abstract to make it applicable in a range of 
political environments. Second, because by now multiple scholars have shown ways to 
contextualize the Securitization logics in non-democratic, non-Western countries.148 
And third, because Neocleous rightly argues that the shift from normal politics to 
the exception is actually one of the most highly regulated affairs within Western 
democracies.149 
Simultaneously, these extraordinary measures are always aimed towards ‘the 
optimal outcome’, namely a negation of the threat.150 The moment when somebody says 
“We are safe now; security has been achieved” – a speech act echoing a past threat.’151 
In other words, counter to the political decision to shift to a security logic (of war) is 
a logic of desecuritization: the counter move that proposes that actors should strive 
for truly securitized topics to be politicized once more. To bring the exception back 
into the routine of politics. De Wilde highlights four different ways through which 
issues can be desecuritized: one can successfully counter the undesirable future, 
accept the undesirable future and adapt, find other more pressing concerns or fail to 
do anything and succumb to the undesired future.152 For De Wilde, desecuritization, 
like securitization, is a logic that on its own ‘is not right or wrong; it simply happens 
or not.’153 What makes the logics of securitization and desecuritization morally 
acceptable or not is their context. It is this folding into context that makes Wæver 
assert that ‘desecuritization is preferable in the abstract, but concrete situations might 
call for securitization.’154
146 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 29.
147 Ibid.
148 Vuori 2008; Christou and Adamides 2013.
149 Neocleous 2008, chaps 1 & 2, resists the view of security being the exception, he argues instead that most 
of the ‘exceptions’, like the Iraq War, are actually constructed within the confines of the law as the law has 
rules on when the exceptions can be granted.
150 De Wilde 2012, 213; De Wilde 2008. 
151 De Wilde 2012, 213.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Wæver 2011, 469; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 29.
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The normative dimension of securitization is heavily debated in most of the 
theoretical reflections on Securitization Theory, which in general share the concern 
that the theory is elitist, realist and statist.155 Elitist, owing to its focus on securitizing 
actors, often people in positions of authority from governmental and commercial elites, 
and realist and statist due to the threat logic that remains close to its military origins. 
For instance, Stritzel studies a ‘hidden’ realist take inherent to Securitization Theory 
and argues that this excludes extraordinary security measures that do not derive from 
perceived threats to the state but from institutionalized bureaucratic structures (e.g. 
risk analysis).156 More critical, Hansen claims that the initial survivalist and thus 
realist origin of securitization also influences desecuritization by preventing a critical 
stance towards both the manner in which agents themselves desecuritize events 
and how observers implicitly assume that a security issue will become political.157 
Hansen gives the example of female soldiers in post-conflict situations who are simply 
forgotten after the conflict and shows how issues like these are overlooked by both 
the local agents and observers as they are not considered important enough or do not 
fit the ‘normal’ discourse of security and its focus on male soldiers.158 Subsequently, 
these and comparable issues are transformed from security to the non-political and 
skip the political contestation level altogether. Hansens’ critique thus highlights that 
the theory is only equipped to study speech acts, moments when people are able to 
voice their concerns, not silences or other (accepted) dominant power structures. 
Lastly, Huysmans raises the reflexive implication that observers cannot write about a 
certain security issue or a securitizing move, without further securitizing those issues 
themselves.159 It is impossible to write about the security or insecurity of an issue 
without drawing attention to the dialectic other, which returns the debate towards the 
question of ethics, as acknowledged by Wæver: 
The securitization approach points to the inherently political nature of any 
designation of security issues and thus it puts an ethical question at the feet of 
analysts, decision-makers and activists alike: why do you call this a security 
issue? What are the implications of doing this – or of not doing it?160
On a methodological level, the distinction between a securitizing move (the speech 
act) and successful securitization (a speech act that leads to extraordinary measures) 
155 Ciuta 2009; McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007; Balzacq 2005.
156 Stritzel 2007.
157 Hansen 2000; Hansen 2012b.
158 Hansen 2012a. She actually identifies four options of desecuritization: stabilization, replacement, 
rearticulation and silencing.
159 Huysmans 1998b.
160 Wæver 1999, 334.
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has two other consequences. First, it enables the Schmittian understanding of 
security as the exception to normal politics that is ascribed to Securitization by its 
commentators, even though the theory itself in reality takes its view on politics from 
Arendt and argues that both aspects take place ‘in-between the actors’.161 Secondly, 
in line with Huysmans above, it opens the f loor to a methodological hermeneutic 
critique: that between a “strict” observer who observes what actors themselves see as 
a security practice and a more “judgmental” observer who decides when something 
truly is a successful security speech act – in this case, when extraordinary measures 
are adopted.162 This is a split, which, according to Ciuta, originates from a double 
definition of the term security in the original theory where security is described, 
first, as intersubjectively defined by and in-between the agents themselves in the 
sense of “security-in-the-making” and, second, as defined by the security analyst 
in terms of survival, extraordinarity and existentialism.163 Huysmans generalizes 
these two arguments when he criticizes Securitization Theory on the issue of 
successfulness, as the idea of successful securitization turns it from a method into 
a model, a static one that could blind scholars to the other logics of security at work 
in their case studies.164
5.4.3 EU-Russian Gas Relations
Irrespective these critical comments on exception, context, normativity and analytical 
consequences, it is hard not to notice how applicable this theory is to read energy 
security debates. With Securitization Theory, it becomes clear that many of the energy 
security debates follow a similar pattern. Often “energy security specialists” or other 
proponents (the securitizing actors) try to convince IGO’s, governments, or specific 
key individuals (the audience) that energy security needs additional attention based 
on the claim that international developments are threatening the future delivery 
of energy supplies, which, in turn threatens the wellbeing of the economy (the 
referent object). Without much effort, one can identify other securitizing actors like 
companies, government departments, consumer organizations, etc. And even though 
energy is not a main concern for the theory itself, it does link all the five of sectors 
that Buzan, Wæver, & De Wilde discuss in their work.165 This has not gone unnoticed 
and a number of studies have tried to use Securitization Theory to analyze energy 
security, including a small number that study the security relations between European 
161 Williams 2003, 517; Wæver 2011, 470; De Wilde 2012, 214; Roe 2012, 255.
162 Roe 2008; Salter 2008b; Stritzel 2007.
163 Ciuta 2009; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998, 27.
164 Huysmans 1998b, 501; Wæver 2011, 469.
165 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998.
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countries and Russia on natural gas supplies, of which especially the working paper 
by Trombetta deserves close reading.166
Within these studies, especially in relation to the Russia-Ukraine Gas Crises in 
2006, 2007, 2009 and 2014, it is possible to differ between studies with an historic 
attitude and those that have a future oriented perspective. The latter highlight 
the increasing insecurity that follows from a dependency of European countries 
on Russian gas – with Russian gas averaging 30% of European imports (in 2014), 
down from almost 40% in 2006, and some Eastern European countries completely 
dependent on Russian gas.167 These numbers are aggravated by the position of transit 
countries, Ukraine in particular, and an increasing (re)politicization of Russian 
oil and gas exports by the Russian government. This contrast with the historically 
oriented perspectives that, on the one hand, weaken this insecurity frame by pointing 
towards the historic role of the Soviet Union as a steady supplier during the Cold 
War.168 However, on the other hand, they also describe how post-Cold War Russia 
has used its oil and gas exports to influence former Soviet republics, through price 
differentiation and supply regulation. McGowan, for example, traces four cases of 
active, albeit circumstantial, exertion of influence ranging from a reduction in exports 
to the Baltic States in 1992/3, to the disruptions in both Georgia and Lithuania in the 
1990s and 2006, and, lastly, the 2009 cut-offs to Ukraine after a price disagreement 
that coincided with the stationing of the Black Fleet.169
These and the more recent repeated price-conflicts over Ukraine’s gas prices, 
including the 2009 reduction in supplies that left a number of Balkan countries without 
gas supplies in the middle of winter, have fueled the perception of dependency and 
insecurity within Europe. Both Russia and the transit countries are perceived to be 
threatening the European economy and the health of its inhabitants. Whether Europe 
and the EU really are (inter)dependent on Russia, as well as the question whether this 
dependency should be seen in terms of an asymmetrical dependency (short term gas 
supplies versus medium term gas income) is of course of no concern to Securitization 
Theory.170 For the theory, the perception of a threat as voiced by the range of differing 
speech actors – including the European Council, Commission, think tanks, European 
166 First, on Securitization Theory and the Russia - EU relationship, see: Natorski and Herranz Surrallés 
2008; Stoddard 2012b; Khrushcheva 2011; Radoman 2007; Boersma 2013; McGowan 2011; Trombetta 
2012. Second, for general security reflections on the EU-Russia gas relation see: Aalto 2008; Aalto and 
Korkmaz Temel 2014; Casier 2011a; Goldthau 2008; Högselius 2012; Stern 2006a. Third, for use of 
Securitization Theory, albeit in relation to China, see: Nyman 2014; Christou and Adamides 2013; Leung 
et al. 2014. Lastly, for more interesting work on Securitization Theory in relation to Israel and its gas 
and renewable energy sources: Fischhendler, Boymel, and Boykoff 2014; Fischhendler and Nathan 2014.
167 Stern 2006a.





Parliament - is what matters. From a securitization perspective neither the lack 
of direct evidence for the four cases of active political involvement nor the strong 
market oriented discourse in which the Russian – Ukraine conflicts are debated by all 
parties involved, negate the perceived uncertainty so much as reinforce it. This is, for 
example, visible in the way the European Commission introduced the 2014 European 
Energy Security Strategy: 
The EU’s energy dependence is of course not new. But it did gain an added 
dimension in the light of recent geopolitical events, i.e. the crisis in Ukraine. 
Temporary disruptions of gas supplies in the winters of 2006 and 2009 already 
provided a wake-up call for the EU, underlining the need of infrastructure 
development, increased cooperation and of a common European energy policy.171
Or by former European Commission president Barroso who stated at a conference in 
the run-up to this Strategy that:
With the events in Ukraine, Europe is facing a threat to its peace, stability and 
security the likes of which we have not seen since the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
The ‘Great Game’ of geopolitics has made an unwelcome return and this is 
being particularly felt in the area of energy. […] In fact the Ukraine crisis once 
again shows that for Europe energy independence is crucial.172
In both cases, the Ukraine crises are used by the speech actors not to securitize a new 
issue – they are not even put forward as new ‘threats’ – but are voiced as self-evident: 
as threats for which the audience acceptance is taken for granted. In these high-level 
notifications, the crises are used to reinforce or build on the existing securitized 
issue of energy dependency to legitimize existing and new political and institutional 
arrangements. As Barroso argued:
There were many times in which we, […] were pleading for a truly European 
energy policy. The reality is that because there were probably other priorities 
at the time, [] minds were not sufficiently focused on the urgency of a real 
energy policy for the EU. But because of these recent developments, I believe 
now minds are focused and we could now make more progress than in the 
years before.173





In line with the strict perspective on speech acts in Securitization Theory, this form 
of bureaucratic agenda setting can be regarded as a securitizing move (as it lacks the 
extraordinarity of securitization). This is similar to earlier conclusions by other scholars 
on the applicability of the theory to the 2006 and 2009 Ukraine-Russia gas crises.174 In 
both cases, scholars note numerous securitizing moves but not securitization as such. 
Primarily, because it is difficult to observe whether the measures enacted in response 
are truly exceptional. More integration, backup capacity, strategic reserves, or a 
diversification of suppliers and resources, are not exceptional because these measures 
have been in place even before Churchill’s famous statement in 1913 that ‘[s]afety and 
certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.’175 The events and their interpretations 
therefore do not break with the already accepted routine security measures. The 
events are integrated into an existing perception of insecurity and subsequently used 
to reinforce the underlying social-material dynamics of a fossil fuel system and the 
community that lies at its core – in this case a European community as favored by the 
European Commission.176 
Still, this is not black and white. Within these routine security measures, the 
“wake-up calls” do enable additional institutional and financial measures that 
might not have been possible otherwise. “Minds focus once more” and the urgency 
of insecurity pushes other items from the agenda, open up additional budget, and 
enable a stretching of the original mandate. In response to the 2006 and 2009 
interruptions, the EU pushed for preventive action plans, further integration of the 
EU internal gas and energy markets and introduced the Third Energy Package, which 
includes a clause that inhibits international parties (read Gazprom) from buying 
into European upstream markets without reciprocity on its own markets. Especially 
the first two measures, through which the European Commission is encroaching on 
the energy security mandate of the member states, had little institutional backing 
before these interruptions.177 These initiatives were followed by an extensive EU 
program on infrastructure priorities and added the concept of energy solidarity to 
the Lisbon Treaty. Similarly, in response to the early 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict 
the European Council tasked the Commission to come up with a revised European 
Energy Security Strategy before June 2014 (similar strategies normally take upwards 
to a couple of years to come into fruition). For Trombetta, this requests and the time 
pressure behind them enabled the Commission to put forward its own community 
building project by combining the specific supply risks with broader environmental 
and social-economic concerns, thereby strengthening the Commission’s claim for a 






stronger mandate on European energy policy.178 In contrast, Natorski and Surrallés 
have argued that this initial communitarian call on security in effect undermines 
the Commissions position, because a successful framing of the events in a particular 
neorealist geopolitical security frame reinforces the intergovernmental mandate of 
the member states themselves.179
The tension between, on the one hand, a neorealist geopolitical security perspective 
on energy supplies and, on the other hand, the depoliticized measures proposed to 
deal with energy security threats fits well with the theory’s normative position that 
securitized issues should be approached from a desecuritization logic. The problem 
being that Securitization is only helpful in analyzing (and thereby reifying) these 
and other geopolitical aspects of security and not the wide range of uncertainties 
found elsewhere in energy politics. Only these explicit threats allow theoretically for 
successful securitization based on extraordinary measures, whereas for oil and gas 
it is so far only possible to conclude that ‘threats are successfully constructed, that 
construction has been accepted by a relevant audience and often policy changes have 
followed.’180 Hardly ever are these policy changes extraordinary. Is it extraordinary 
that the gas pipeline from Ukraine to Slovakia is refitted for two-way transport 
enabling the supply of gas to Ukraine from Europe if needed? One can argue that 
without the perception of supply risks this investment would not have been made as 
the market would not have made this investment. On the other hand, it is a technical 
solution to resolve the Ukraine plight temporarily by increasing the flexibility of the 
grid; it does not tackle the root cause – dependency and political intervention from 
Russia – at all.
A last aspect of the use of Securitization Theory to explain the EU-Russian natural 
gas relations has to do with the “other” and the referent object. The “other” in the case 
above, for many is self-evident. But is it? At first glance, the idea of supply disruption 
due to Russia’s political control of its gas exports merits seeing Russian political 
elites as “the other”. However, such a perspective excludes the role played by the 
Ukraine government, which decided to tap its share from European deliveries. It also 
excludes the role played by European member states, for example Germany, and their 
bilateral agreements with Russia. In other words, the “other” is made to be Russia. In 
addition, while the above is written from the idea of a securitizing move on supply 
disruptions, from the implicit undesired future of scarcity, Trombetta argues that, 
while important, this was not the main referent object in the securitizing move for 
the European Commission. For the Commission ‘[t]he threat was posed not directly 
by Russia or by the scarcity issue but by what Russia represented and by the reaction 
178 Trombetta 2012; for the theoretical argument see Huysmans 1998a.
179 Natorski and Herranz Surrallés 2008, 84.
180 Trombetta 2012, 9.
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to the possibility of a return of geopolitics.’181 The threat for the Commission, besides 
the supply disruptions, relates to the geopolitical realist approach to international 
relations behind Russia’s position that threatened EU’s neoliberal normative approach 
to trade and international relations, and thus the position of the European Union. 
From this argument, it is a threat both to what we need as well as who we are. If one 
pushes this point, than the claim would be that without the geopolitical realist policies 
of Russia the commission has no “other” to justify a “self” (on this issue at least).182
This brief reflection on the EU-Russian natural gas relations through the lens 
of Securitization Theory highlights the theories workings as well as its strengths 
and weaknesses. On the one hand, the EU-Russia gas illustration shows the reason 
why Securitization Theory is considered elitist, realist and statist. It is most easily 
applicable to cases like traditional energy security of supply concerns where the 
debate is structured and organized on a national level by governments. A discussion 
on food security would paint a radically different picture with its household focus. 
Similarly, the above clearly shows the difficulties in categorizing the counter measures 
in terms of exceptionality. Especially, as the proposed counter-measures are market 
oriented and hence “non-political”, thereby desecuritising the issue the moment it is 
securitized. On the other hand, the theory helps pinpoint at least part of the politics 
of security. Including the active production of security issues and the analysis and 
definition of the threat in line with the history and language it builds on by naming of 
the other, while fixating the referent object and binding the self.
5.4.4 Moving beyond the Exception
The example of the EU-Russia natural gas relations, a most likely case if ever there 
was one, opens up Securitization Theory away from exceptionality towards a politics 
of security and agenda-setting and the routine of threats and counter-measures. Even 
if one would take a broad definition of speech acts – one that moves away from a 
static event to processes over time and one that would include the acts of not acting 
(e.g. silence) – the theory offers few tools to analyze these routines, nor does it 
provide for ways to include the broader intersubjective historical and social context 
in which these speech acts find their relevance.183 Especially this last part, the lack 
of contextualization, is problematic. Butler is most succinct when she writes that the 
‘realities brought into being depend upon a speech act, but the speech act is a reiterated 
form of discourse, so we would be mistaken to overvalue the subject who speaks.’184 
Neal, in turn, posits that Securitization Theory seems to forget that any theory that 
181 Ibid., 21.
182 Huysmans 1998b, 239. 
183 Ciuta 2009.
184 Butler 2010, 149 [emphasis added].
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builds upon understandings of ‘urgency, extraordinary circumstances and exceptional 
measures’ inherently takes on board the ‘structural, institutional and ethic-political 
implications’ that ‘are already implicit’ in these concepts.185 Similarly, Patomäki goes 
so far as to argue that in the absence of any political-economic contextualization, 
‘[Securitization Theory] is no more than an ideal-typical model of a limited-scale 
social mechanism.’186 In short, Securitization Theory explains how security comes to 
be, but only for a few very limited cases of truly exceptional circumstances. It neglects 
the large range of security debates that are political in orientation and discussed on 
a daily basis. 
This is also the position advocated by scholars like Bigo and Balzacq, who are 
working on alternative theory of security that is based on practice theory.187 The main 
insight of this alternative is that security practitioners, like border guards or terrorism 
and energy security experts, in their daily routines ‘enact a governmentality of fear 
and unease’ by constantly reminding others and themselves of the undesirable future 
that needs to be countered, in addition to interpreting and approaching new events 
through the routines that have helped them in the past.188 First, Bigo assumes that 
securitization explains these routines ‘ex post facto’, as for him, securitization is not 
the act of asking for new extraordinary measures but a justification of the extension 
of those measures already in place.189 Balzacq, in turn, shifts the focus to the agents 
themselves and the routine daily acts performed by the agents, because he believes 
that successful securitization depends, not only on the logics of securitization, but 
on the strategic links to an external reality (context/environment) to be witnessed 
in the acts performed by the actors involved. When analyzing agents, Balzacq 
therefore looks at the relative power positions of securitizing agents, the shared social 
identity of agents involved, and, above all, the capacity and nature of the audience(s), 
including the enemy and other actors involved, for example, on whether an audience 
provides formal or moral support. Within his practice theory he analyses the acts 
from both an illocutionary threat text level (the logic or grammar of securitization) 
and from a contextual level where the attentions shifts to the strategic (perlocutionary 
or performative) use of language in persuading the audience.190 
185 Neal 2006, 34.
186 Patomäki 2015, 133.
187 Balzacq 2005, 178–179. Interestingly in this article Balzacq also argues, with numerous disclaimers, that 
there are non-social, ‘brute’ threats that affect humans ‘regardless of the use of language’ (181). He argues 
that these external effects/threats should stand central in any constructivist analysis of security (181) 
as these are used by the audience as evidence in weighing securitization claims thereby reducing the 
importance of the speaker (191, 193); Bigo 2002; Bigo 2014.
188 Bigo 2014, 211; Bourbeau 2014, 196.
189 Bigo 2014.
190 See footnote 132.
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Besides practice theories, there have been other attempts to build upon 
Securitization Theory. Promising is the work of Vuori, who broadens the application 
of security speech acts by showing that security speech acts, with their inherent claims 
and warnings, are not only aimed at gaining legitimation for certain exceptional 
measures (we need to do this because…), but could also include agenda setting (this 
is more important than…), declarations of deterrence (if you do this then I will…), a 
struggle for control (this is mine), or the reproduction of previous securitizations (we 
are not safe yet).191 In phrasing speech acts like this, Vuori comes closer to theories 
of agenda setting and framing. In other words, to how the speech act logic is not 
only used to shift something outside the political but also to shift topics within the 
political through a dramatization of sorts. However, while Vuori on the one hand 
broadens security speech acts by opening them to four other purposes besides an 
upfront legitimation of the exception, he simultaneously narrows the theory by seeing 
security speech acts as the political use of the threat logic only. Vuori thus opens the 
door by offering multiple classifications of speech acts but then closes it again by 
limiting these classifications to a single security logic.
Whereas Vuori opens the speech acts themselves to other effects, Huysmans 
and Stritzel take an alternative linguistic approach. Like Vuori, Huysmans also 
returned to the speech act literature itself, but he champions an even broader 
interpretation of speech acts, one where the actual “act” consist out of people who 
‘politically invest’ in ‘creat[ing] a scene in which actors and things are brought into 
a relation that challenges a given way of doing things.’192 For Huysmans, security 
is an open-ended form of politics that follows the meaning of security within the 
daily language of the agents themselves. In such a daily language use, each new 
iteration is signified by the creation of a rupture and the assembly of a new set of 
relations based on claims for urgency. With such an understanding, Huysmans opens 
the speech act to other logics besides the strict (realist, statist and elitist) war logic 
with its focus on security as the legitimation for extraordinary measures. Elsewhere, 
Stritzel takes a similar linguistic avenue by comparing the idea of speech acts with 
the sociological concept of translation.193 Instead of deepening our understanding 
of securitization in more detail, this approach ‘suggests an understanding of security 
that is historical, local, non-essentialist, empirical-reconstructive and reflectivist.’194 
It builds on the understanding that in each situation the meaning of security is 
translated locally through a rupture from a specific old historic meaning into a new 
open-ended meaning. Stritzel here is closer to Huysmans’ notion of politics, although 
191 Vuori 2008, 76; Stritzel 2012.





he approaches the issue from knowledge production in general. On the one hand, 
this implies a total contextualization and thus a break with any form of predicative 
theorizing. On the other hand, it opens up security by allowing that a new meaning of 
security can conflict with older global notions of security through its local translation. 
In the words of Neal:
When one describes “exceptionalism”, the aim should not be to describe 
a special category, but to describe a dispersed regularity, an assemblage of 
practices, an already existing archive of statements, an array of competing 
subject positions, a body of tactics and strategies, a formation of historical 
conditions of possibility, the limits of which can never be distilled and 
formalized, only problematized.195
Such a linguistic contextualized understanding helps explain why the same 
illocutionary speech act can have different perlocutionary consequences for different 
audiences.196 For example, it explains why the US security claims for the most recent 
Iraq War were interpreted differently in the US and in parts of Europe. The “exception” 
in these cases is always local and relative, a form of politics that plays out at the same 
time, in different places for different people. 
In closing, Securitization Theory offers an analysis of how security works as a 
social mechanism through the speech act of moving something out of the regular 
political debate into the exceptionality of security. The theory is questioned from 
two directions: first, in terms of the meaning of exceptionality (vs politics) and the 
absence of any contextualization, and, second, in relation to the theory’s double 
methodological positions and the normativity of these positions and assumptions. 
By taking on the same questions that Securitization Theory has introduced and has 
been openly struggling with, Huysmans, Vuori, Stritzel and Balzacq offer interesting 
additions and alternatives to the speech act theory that opens the focus of the theory 
to broader social contexts and to comparable logics that do not depend on the word 
security as such. This broader approach fits the field of energy security better, as 
energy security sees a lot of securitizing moves but hardly any strict securitization 
in terms of exceptionality. It is hard to find exceptionality, because there are very 
few crises in energy (and other fields) that, one way or another, have not seen any 
preparation. These preparations, which are based on imaginations and an abstraction 
of scarcity and shortages, lead to a politics of energy security and not securitization. 
Security in energy is not the moment of crisis itself, but the prevention of the next one 
195 Neal 2006, 44.
196 Stritzel 2011, 350.
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and therefore a form of politics where security arguments are used to dramatize an 
issue to justify spending for one course of action over another. 
Nevertheless, without the broader framework and the focus on successfulness, 
Securitization Theory remains one of the more interesting perspectives on security 
due to its focus on the securitizing moves and the speech acts behind those moves. 
Speech acts are an interesting method to highlight how, within the political domain, 
actors are dramatizing issues through a call on security logics and claim scarce 
resources and the time to tackle their issue instead of others. It bears reminding that 
although the theory helps to explain how security comes to be, it does not provide 
reasons why it does. It only shows the politics of security, the construction of a (self-
evident) need to counter an undesirable future. A future that is not self-evident and 
not bound to particular issues. Simultaneously, by using the insights of Securitization 
Theory it becomes a lens to help analyze both routine practices and moments of 
rupture. Instead of putting one before the other, Bourbeau is correct when he argues 
that ‘[t]he social world we live in is a world of feedback’ which means that both speech 
acts and routine security practices are acting together ‘in a complex and wider range 
of ways.’197
5.5 risk as a security instrument
5.5.1 Risk as an Ordering Principle
Continuing the move away from a focus on the exception, a second critical security 
theory discusses the security practice and logic of risk. Traditionally, when people 
consider risk they often think in terms of a future threat that is estimated in terms of 
likelihood and its possible impact, leading to a decision to act upon this risk or not.198 
Within CSS, risk instead is seen as an ordering principle based upon (statistical) 
calculative principles. It is seen as ‘a means of making an uncertain and unknowable 
future amenable to intervention and management.’199 In other words, as translating 
dangers and threats into probabilities and, subsequently, into financial losses and 
profits.200 Such a reading of risk builds in large part on the work of the philosopher 
Foucault.201 While the discussion below is written from the risk literature that is 
present in Critical Security Studies, the insights it offers derive from Foucault’s line 
197 Bourbeau 2014, 197.
198 Salter 2008a, 233 explicitly mentions scarce resource management: ‘Risk management as a governance 
framework seeks to focus scarce resources on risks that are ranked according to frequency and impact’.
199 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 9. Dean 2010, 206–207 argues, contra Beck, that because risks is about 
making future threats calculable, there is no such thing as incalculable risks. If something is incalculable 
it cannot be a risk.
200 Ewald 1991, 199.
201 Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008.
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of thought on security as a form of governmentality (see chapter 8).202 The current 
chapter starts with a brief overview of the concept of risk as a performative knowledge 
practice, it then takes a step back and looks at the uncertainty and unknowability 
that risks try to make knowledgeable. After describing risk itself, the chapter 
focusses on the way risks are written and how this is changing. First by looking at 
the accountability and political decision-making processes that are hidden behind 
a calculable risk rationality. Then by highlighting a number of trends within the use 
of risk. To be followed by a reflection on the manner in which a zero-risk approach 
and computation are transforming the logics of risk itself from a calculative to a 
correlational logic. 
Seeing risk as an instrument of governing populations has at least six implications 
on how risk is defined. First, as Ewald has put it: ‘Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no 
risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one 
analyses the danger, considers the event.’203 Second, following the notion that nothing 
is a risk in itself, risks need to be seen as performative: in the process of naming them, 
they constitute their effects.204 In other words, when people have identified something 
in terms of risk they already behave differently towards it, it is impossible to think of a 
risk without also thinking about ways of levelling it. Third, it follows that risks should 
not be seen as pre-given entities to be studied independently. Instead, Amoore & De 
Goede highlight Foucault’s attention towards ‘“differential risks,’ ‘risk zones’, [and] 
‘different curves of normality’”.’205 What they refer to is Foucault’s insight that there 
are no absolute risks. Risk assessments differentiate between and within populations 
on a continuum that ranges from higher to lower risks, with the goal to ‘normalize’ 
the abnormal high risk individuals within a population through identification and 
targeted policies.206 This often means that individuals are ‘broken up’, compared 
and excluded based on one aspect of their behavior, but which one differs as the 
‘measurable risk factors’ are constantly shifting.207 In other words, risks are mobile 
and as a result, fourthly, the idea of actually “securing” these risks is a utopia: while 
individuals can take action to minimize risks and insure against them, the population 
as a whole will always remain at risk.208 From a Foucauldian perspective, therefore, 
‘what matters instead is that the appearance of securability and manageability is 
202 Luhmann 1993, 13; C.A.S.E Collective 2006, 468.
203 Ewald 1991, 199.
204 Butler 2010; Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 9.
205 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 11 quote: Foucault 2007, 68 and 91.
206 See also Ewald 1993, 221.
207 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 9 quote Valverde, M., & Mopas, M. 2004. Insecurity and the dream of 
targeted governance. In W. Larner & W. Walters. eds. Global governmentality: Governing international 
spaces (pp. 233-250). London: Routledge; De Goede 2012.
208 As Dean argues: ‘Risk is a continuum rather than a clear break. Risk, in this sense, never completely 
evaporates. It can be minimized, localized and avoided, but never dissipated.’  2010, 195.
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sustained.’209 Risk does this quite effective, as it gives the appearance of control.210 
Five, Foucauldian inspired scholars argue that to really understand risk one should 
move away from the risks themselves towards the ‘forms of knowledge that make 
[them] thinkable’ by which they mean the practices in those sectors and techniques 
that ‘make the incalculable calculable’.211 
Finally, six, one of the most important aspects of risk is the fact that once the 
uncertain has become calculable it becomes tradable as well.212 Insurance schemes 
make it possible for risks to be bought and sold, thereby spreading the possible costs 
of risky decisions, activities or events while making a profit doing so. Most of the 
insights on risk and insurance ultimately derive from Ewald’s seminal and aptly titled 
article Insurance and Risk.213 It is in this article that Ewald concludes that insurance 
has no ‘special field of operations’, but that it should be seen as a ‘general principle for 
the objectification of things, people, and their relations.’ 214 Because risk has no object 
to which it can be attached, ‘[n]ew elements are constantly drawn into its concern 
(…).’215 Ewald therefore focusses on the practice of risk and its main characteristics, 
which he identifies as calculability, collectivism and financialization.216 Risk is 
calculable, because it combines a statistical defined ‘regularity of events’ with 
subsequent probability calculations. This implies a radical shift away from more 
legal discourses of faults and responsibilities: for rationalities of risk, accidents 
happen, no matter who is to blame.217 Risk is collective, as the regularity of events 
is calculated statistically over a population. In the process it makes individuals part 
of a population by ascribing a shared identity or norm (thus excluding those not 
part of this population), and it judges whether they fit high or low risk profiles in 
relation towards this shared norm. Lastly, risk is a form of capital because it covers 
the monetary losses and damages after an event, never the actual life or limb that is 
lost. In fact, the insurer writes these financial compensations beforehand and thus 
never in relation to a specific event. These characteristics lead Ewald to conclude that 
risk is not just an economic and financial technique, but also a moral technique that 
forces individuals to take up responsibility for their own future and, in addition, that 
it is a technique for ‘administering justice’ by spreading out the costs for damages and 
loss from the individual over the population. He concludes, in the words of Dean, 
209 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 9.
210 See also footnote 105.
211 Dean 2010, 206–207.
212 Lobo-Guerrero 2012, 10.
213 Ewald 1991. Also Ewald 1993; Ewald 2002; Ewald 2012.
214 Ewald 1991, 206.
215 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 281.




that insurance is ‘a political technology in that it is a way of combining and using 
social forces in a specific fashion, one in which the possibility of the optimization of 
individual responsibility is combined with a maximization of social solidarity.’218 In 
short, with Ewald’s analysis of insurance we can see risk as an ordering principle by 
which people are governed. 
5.5.2 The Commodification of Contingent Events
Risk is a form of knowledge that translates uncertainty into contingency. But what 
is this uncertainty that risk translates into tradable monetary products? To be 
clear, the risk identified is not the identification of the uncertainty, it is only one 
of many forms of taming the future.219 Theoretically, the uncertainty itself cannot 
be identified or known. It cannot be known, because every attempt to understand 
uncertain futures uses pre-given forms of knowledge.220 Lobo-Guerrero argues that 
even to think in terms of uncertainty itself, already implies that one relies up on a 
specific understanding of the world that is certain. However, what exactly is certain 
often ‘relates to centuries-long discussions on the determination of what is from what 
is not, what is to become the matter of the empirical, the observable and thinkable 
phenomena.’221 In other words, discussions on certainty and uncertainty highlight 
the politics of ontology or ontopolitics where ‘[r]isk management, [and other forms 
of security] becomes then a continuous problematisation of the order of being in the 
world, a problematisation that makes the political a contingent matter.’222 In other 
words, what enables thinking in terms of uncertainty is a shift from ‘traditional 
security discourses’ like danger (live with it) or the will of the Gods (divine/sovereign 
intervention) towards perceiving life in terms of a sequence of contingent events.223
This interpretation is not unproblematic, as a discussion of ontopolitics in terms 
of an event or number of events can be problematized from both a historic and 
philosophical perspective. ‘The event’ is often defined by ‘the surprise’ or that which 
‘disrupts the knowledge resources and expertise available to practices of governance 
(…).’224 Foucault, when thinking on a procedure of ‘eventualization’, describes this as 
‘a breach of self-evidence [which] means making visible a singularity at places where 
there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant (…).’225 Foucault notes, however, 
that immediately in witnessing the surprise of the event the singular is ‘rediscovered’ 
218 Dean 2010, 214.
219 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 25–26.
220 Dillon 2007b, 45.
221 Lobo-Guerrero 2012, 128–129.
222 Ibid., 18.
223 Dillon 2008, 327; Foucault 2007, 20.
224 Lobo-Guerrero 2012, 128; Nancy 2000.
225 Foucault 1991b, 76.
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as being part of a whole, deemed ‘self-evident, universal and necessary.’226 Lundborg, 
in turn, follows the work of Deleuze when he differentiates such a historical event 
from a pure event.227 The historical event is based on a separation of ‘before’ and 
‘after’, which Lundborg sees simultaneously as a result and assumption of a temporal 
delineation of boundaries between events. However, as delineations are always decided 
upon by someone in authority (often historians), the process of producing a historical 
chronology of separate events implies a particular political practice. In contrast, a 
pure event does not have ascribed boundaries but builds on the idea of paradoxical 
processes of becoming (instead of being). Meaning that without a clear referent object 
pure events can only be studied by focusing on the paradoxes that they create. In a 
way, Foucault’s first aspect, the surprise, might be said to relate to the pure event or 
that part of an event that cannot be pinned down. His second aspect, of an historical 
constant, relates more to a process that Deleuze calls the actualization of a pure event 
and which Lundborg describes as a political practice of historical eventualization; as 
writing history as we know it.228 
Nevertheless, risk presupposes a sequence of contingent events and approaches 
this through an epistemology based on a commodification of contingency. It uses 
mathematical techniques to calculate the chance and impact of separate events and 
in doing so steers how the real (ontology) is defined.229 It is a practice of ontopolitics 
that works by making the contingency calculable, or rephrased, by giving ‘presence 
to that which is nevertheless only probable.’230 That what is unknown is imagined and 
subsequently calculated and visualized, “made real”, repeated in speeches and used 
as an argument in decision-making processes for people to act on. The contingency 
becomes real, based on particular systems of thought of uncertainty, eventualisation 
and risk.
This process of riskification comes with its own normative considerations. For 
example, such an eventual thinking contains assumptions on biological life. The 
understanding of life that it forwards centers around protection through ‘strategies 
of resilience, self-repair and regeneration’, and the ‘instigation [of] new life forms.’231 
It understands life as something in need of change and emergence.232 Contingency 
therefore needs to be monitored and softened but should never be “killed” by closing 
226 Ibid.
227 Lundborg 2012, 1–7.
228 Ibid., 7.
229 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 280–281; Dillon 2008, 320.
230 Ewald 1993, 227.
231 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 287. Elsewhere, Dillon describes how biopolitical security builds 
upon biological complex systems theories, a la Kauffman, to describe life as being about circulation 
(autocatalys), connectivity (radical relationality) and complexity (non-linear). See: Dillon 2008, 312.
232 Dillon 2008, 314–315; Dillon 2007b; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 280 & 283.
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the possibility for new events, for example through over-regulation. This contrasts 
with processes of security, which often try to fixate and hold on to the way life is 
governed at a particular moment. Where security fixates, the (bio)politics of risk lets 
live. This assumption, in all its innocence, defines the Foucauldian shift from fixed 
referent objects to the fluid referent processes of circulation (of goods, energy, people, 
etc.) that enable life itself, as well as particular lifestyles.233 
For Foucault, risk is one of the security instruments that helps ‘organiz[e] 
circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and 
bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad.’234 
Circulation is protected on at least five dimensions. The first dimension is focused on 
the direct separation of good from bad elements within a certain circulatory process, 
as in the case of food safety where bad foodstuff is excluded from the supply chain. 
Second, in addition to this direct form of governing circulation Foucault highlights 
an indirect form of governing circulation, through the milieu, which is discussed in 
detail in chapter 8.4. A third dimension concentrates on the protection of circulation 
itself from ‘outside’ disruptions by other decisions, as in the case of security of supply 
concerns, or (circulatory) processes, e.g. the electricity grid or the free circulation of 
grain (see Foucault’s insights on scarcity in chapter 6.5). There is a fourth dimension 
to the quote of Foucault which could be witnessed during the 2008 financial crisis 
where particular forms of neoliberal governmentality protected their capitalist idea 
of circulation from alternative organizational patterns, among which Occupy Wall 
Street (comparable to the Commission’s position on resource nationalism in chapter 
5.4). A last dimension can be identified if one describes governmentality itself in terms 
of circulation. Amoore & De Goede make this point when they argue that risk and 
security themselves are circular, as they build on a process where the failure to protect 
life does not lead to questions on the overall worth of security and risk, but instead 
leads to the urge to do “better” next time, thereby constantly renewing itself.235 
5.5.3 Writing Risks and Unaccountable Power
Risk is an instrument to govern populations, but official public authorities do not always 
write them. Instead, risks are composed by so-called underwriters. Underwriters are 
those persons who produce risks by seeing individuals as part of a population. Those 
who identify the risk by imagining it and who calculate and commodify such a risk 
by weighing the likelihood of an event with the impact it might have. But also those 
who decide on the level of financial compensation and put that down in contractual 
agreements with pre-defined categories and profiles of individuals, who trade those 
233 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 268; Lobo-Guerrero 2012, 18.
234 Foucault 2007, 18.
235 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 38–39.
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contractual insurance agreements with others as a risk in itself, and so on. These 
underwriters are frequently situated in financial institutions, but could also include 
a mother warning her child before crossing the street, a system operator analyzing 
the chance of a blackout or a dietician calling for a better diet. Amoore and Butler 
respectively describe these underwriters in terms of ‘proxy sovereignty’ or ‘petty 
sovereigns.’236 Thereby referring to what Dean calls ‘a government without a centre, a 
form of administration in which there is no longer a centrally directing intelligence.’237 
In other words, a form of governmentality without direct accountability. 
With risk being decided upon in the back offices of large financial institutions, the 
question is whether this is problematic. On the one hand, this lack of accountability 
and the technicality of risk is used in politics to avoid accountable decision-making 
on topics ranging from ethical questions to climate change. The use of the technicality 
of risk to postpone difficult political decisions is something Amoore notes in respect 
to the increasing use of consultation practices by policy makers. She argues, following 
Derrida, that this is not a political choice but a ‘redeploy[ment of] calculative practices’ 
and therefore ‘a decision that is not a decision’, just the application of pre-decided 
upon rules of calculation.238 There is no decision being made when something is 
subjected to a risk calculation, because the algorithm already contains the decisions 
on the weight of the variables involved. In other words, risk in this sense is neutral. 
It is both political useful and a hiding of accountability. On the other hand, risks do 
not exists by the grace of the insurer alone. Risks exist by the grace of the population 
that is its target.239 Ewald, for example, argues that the reason why some risks become 
accepted and seen as something to behave accordingly, depends ‘on the shared 
values of the threatened group.’240 This implies that what is deemed an acceptable 
risk does not automatically follow from the level of danger or the level of certainty 
involved. Whatever the material reality behind risks, it depends on the shared values 
of the population whether a risk is accepted. Amoore’s example of the accountants 
in the UK during World War 2 and how they wrote the norms around food supplies 
(discussed in chapter 8.4), argues that they did not invent these norms out of thin 
air; they based them on earlier small scale practices and understandings of what was 
deemed appropriate behavior. Similarly, an explosion of Yellowstone Park is a real 
material possibility but one that people try to forget, while GMO’s are an accepted risk 
for the Americans and other countries that introduce them in their agriculture, but 
not for most European countries that oppose them fervently. 
236 Butler 2004; Amoore 2013, 6. As also discussed in De Goede 2008b, 101. Compare with Shannon 2014, 
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The security instrument of risk is thus political in three ways. First, risk is political 
because insurers and accountants take upon themselves some of the sovereignty of 
security that originally was only contributed to heads of state, diplomats and the 
military.241 Second, risk is political also in the sense that a risk needs to be accepted 
for it to exist. This in turn makes ‘the political a contingent matter’.242 Lastly, risk 
is political in the sense that risks can be used politically. Dean argues that this 
is an overlooked but fundamental aspect of Foucault’s argument that risk is a 
security instrument and as such can be attached to different political programs and 
strategies.243 Indeed Dean shows that there are multiple forms of risk assessments 
and that an epidemiological risk, which studies rates of morbidity and health, is more 
preventive than a form of risk inspired on insurance and capital, while both are more 
quantitatively oriented compared to what Dean calls individual ‘case-management 
risk’, which also uses qualitative tools like expert diagnostics and interviews to decide 
on the risk posed by an individual.244 Choosing what risk assessment to take is a 
political choice as well.
5.5.4 Broadening the use of Risk Calculation
The politics becomes obvious when looking at the history of risk and insurance. 
From dangers to individual risk, insurance and other actuarially tools have helped 
transform risk into a collective phenomenon, which slowly developed into the 
collective welfare states of the 20th century.245 During this time, risks have been 
socialized with the collective covering the misfortune of the individual financially. 
Three trends are drastically turning this 20th century collectivism around. These 
include individualization, an extension to include systems, and a scientific move from 
extrapolation to correlation.
First, the collectivism of insurance is reversed with the withdrawal of the state 
in line with individualization. As Dean concludes: ‘[r]isk has been to some extent 
desocialized, privatized and individualized.’246 Aradau & van Munster agree and 
highlight an important aspect of this trend, namely how insurance transformed from 
the early industrial society, where it was seen as a positive force to counter some of 
the ‘latent side-effects of industrialization’, into a more negative conception that 
focused mainly on ‘the prevention of “bad’s”.’247 No longer are events accepted and 
individuals protected through financial compensation that cover the damages. Risk 
241 Lobo-Guerrero 2012, 18.
242 Ibid.
243 Dean 2010, 220.
244 Ibid., 218–219.
245 See for example Lobo-Guerrero 2012.
246 Dean 2010, 221.
247 Aradau and van Munster 2007, 92.
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has increasingly been interpreted in terms of risk minimization. Together with the 
shift from collective insurance to practices of risk profiling, this means that risk has 
become an instrument of governance that is increasingly focused on the identification 
and exclusion of possible future bad’s (behavior, events or ideas).248 
Second, it is possible to see an extension in risk analysis from accidents and 
individual (mis)behavior towards the security of critical infrastructure and climate 
systems. This trend, identified for example by Collier & Lakoff, combines the modern 
reflexive focus towards potential future events with a shift away from individuals and 
populations towards ‘vital systems security.’249 Collier & Lakoff describe how this shift 
from persons to systems started after the Second World War in relation to the threat 
of nuclear attacks. Exercises, mapping and scenarios quickly showed the growing 
importance of a wide range of infrastructure systems (electricity, communications 
and transport) and their material components to protect the people and their way of 
life. The focus shifted when analysts started to think in terms of and gathered data on 
systems, their material and human components, and the interdependencies between 
systems. Besides the human-material interaction, another important consequence of 
a systems perspective is the evolution and introduction of complex systems theory 
and the idea of resilience (discussed below). 
Third, Amoore & De Goede reflect on the changing role of the rationality of 
scientific knowledge in relation to insurance and risk.250 They follow Ewald, who 
notes the growing time spent by risk assessments on ‘the infinitely small-scale’ 
and the ‘infinitely large-scale’.251 While Beck once claimed that neither of these are 
insurable,252 in reality they are, although with more complex financial products, 
higher risk premiums and more stringent insurance terms and conditions. More 
important, from a risk calculation perspective, is the fact that the analyses are not 
able to provide a level of ‘certainty’ for the ‘infinitely large-scale’ disasters like climate 
change and nuclear war. They have never happened and are therefore not based 
on historic events but on intellectual imaginations. This shifts risk analysis from 
statistical extrapolation, which needs at least some fixed parameters, to practices of 
(capital market) speculation grounded on a monetarily translation of the expectations 
of the markets.253 The scientific uncertainty of precautionary issues coupled with a 
need to anticipate future risks, leads to forms of objective knowledge that start to 
include ‘emotional, affective, and speculative domains.’254 
248 Rose 2001, 11; Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 27.
249 Collier and Lakoff 2015; Collier and Lakoff 2008b; Collier and Lakoff 2008a.
250 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 27–28.
251 Ewald 1993, 222; Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 27.
252 Beck 1992.
253 Aradau and van Munster 2007, 106–107.
254 Amoore 2013, 9–10. In respect to information, Amoore (p85) also discusses how risk analysis, for 
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5.5.5 From Calculable to Derivative Risk
Following these trends, it is possible to identify three approaches to risk that play a 
role in modern day security policies. Besides the management of known risks through 
insurance and prevention, the trends highlight the management of unknown risks 
through practices of precaution. Insurance is still one of the main instruments to 
minimize the costs of an undesired future. In turn, prevention is a form of risk-
minimization that limits as much of the consequences as possible of a known course 
of action, for example through contingency planning and training.255 The logic of 
precaution, however, which was mentioned above, is a different logic that tackles the 
unknowability of risks itself, by assuming a worst-case scenario and pushing for action 
even if the risks are only virtual.256 For Amoore & De Goede, the first two deal with 
“known knowns” (insurance) and “known unknowns” (prevention), while precaution 
instead deals with “unknown unknowns” and touches upon those instances where 
statistics and computation alone cannot provide an answer.257 As a consequence, any 
decision made to counter a worst-case scenario has to assume this particular future 
as real and in so doing makes this unknown future an actual reality. However, these 
futures cannot be known at the same time and because we cannot know the future, it 
becomes very hard to account for the decisions that are made on its behalf.258 Aradau 
& Van Munster elsewhere call for ‘precautions against precautionary politics’ as they 
argue we are witnessing ‘arbitrary sovereign decision[s]’ at ‘the limit of knowledge’ 
based on ‘“objective” socio-economic configurations’ that make it very hard to 
challenge these decisions.259
The extent and practical consequences of such an approach to risk, only become 
clear when considering the role that the precautionary logic plays in relation to the 
War on Terror. Here pre-emptive strikes and precautionary measures are witnessed 
continuously in practices of global surveillance, the constant drawing of boundaries 
and the hidden decisions on
[t]he arrest and detention of travelers at the border, the freezing of financial 
transactions, the pre-emptive disruption of plots and indictment of suspects, 
the stopping and searching of young Muslim men in the city subway, the 
example during border control, increasingly use information to act upon by rejecting people entry that 
would not have been acceptable in court. Thereby effectively judging people outside the law.
255 Prevention is acting without imminent threat (in conflict a preventive war is legally deemed an act of 
aggression). Pre-emption is acting before an imminent threat materializes and as such is seen as a more 
justifiable tactic. See also Massumi 2009, 168.
256 Aradau and van Munster 2007, 103; Amoore 2013, 9.
257 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 29.
258 Aradau and van Munster 2008, 35.
259 Aradau and van Munster 2007, 109.
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entry of a name onto a selectee list [, or the kill orders for a drone attack] 
– all advance an invisible political violence, taking unaccountable and often 
unchallengeable decisions.260 
Moreover, these decisions are made by connecting as many databases as possible, 
ranging from financial data to telecommunications, travel, biometrics, health, judicial, 
educational, internet and consumption data. These are linked for ‘scenario planning, 
risk profiling, algorithmic modelling, information integration, and data analysis’, not 
to find evidence of previous unwanted behavior, but to find associations and other 
signs for imagined unwanted behavior in the future.261 In these cases of ‘derivative 
risk,’ Amoore convincingly argues that what is sought are no longer ‘risk probabilities’ 
but ‘risk possibilities’: no longer the chance that a particular probable risk might occur 
based upon particular historical patterns, but instead a focus on multiple possible 
risky futures and how to identify them before they occur.262 To prevent these possible 
futures, Big Data is used to find clues for possible feared events by associating pieces 
of information that are not related but nonetheless offer a certain ‘precision as a basis 
for decision.’263 Decisions are made irrespective the non-causally related nature of 
the information and reported in such a way that the increasingly more ‘obscure’ and 
complicated algorithms and assumptions that make these connections are hidden 
behind simple ‘objective’ visual representations (e.g. a green or red light).264 In the 
move from probabilities to possibilities, it has become even harder to question the 
decisions and assumptions behind these risk logics.
A precautionary dispositif linked with the War on Terror highlights two aspects 
that add a troubling note towards the unaccountability of power discussed above. 
First, it highlights the mobility of the norms behind those who or what are deemed 
a risk factor. Research on practices initiated in counter-terrorism show that what is 
considered to be normal behavior, or, vice versa, what is seen as unwanted behavior, 
is not based on a clearly defined norm. Instead, such considerations are derived from 
a norm that is mobile over place and time.265 By behaving correctly today, one can 
still be found lacking on a later moment in time. This clearly collides with criminal 
law where one cannot be punished for an action that was not against the law at the 
time that it was committed. Secondly, Amoore shows how use of fully automatic 
analysis of Big Data means that public authorities increasingly need to rely on outside 
260 Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 14.
261 Amoore 2013, 9; Amoore and de Goede 2008b; Aradau and van Munster 2007; Aradau and van Munster 
2008; De Goede 2008b.
262 Amoore 2013, 67–68 [emphasis in original].
263 Ibid.




commercial expert knowledge (for ICT and mathematics), in order to identify, imagine 
and measure possible future threats, not to mention that these experts play a vital role 
in helping to interpret and explain crises that have occurred. This influential position 
should be considered carefully as these same experts and consultancies have a vested 
economic interest in offering ways to counter these threats, advising on surveillance 
equipment, data algorithms and protocols, etcetera.266 For these companies, risk is 
truly a way to commodify and capitalize on insecurity. 
In short, it is possible to summarize risk as a performative practice that identifies 
and problematizes uncertainty in terms of contingency based on mobile norms that 
cannot be conquered but only managed and traded. To understand risks and the 
different risk logics this section followed the focus of the literature on the knowledge 
practices that lie behind risk calculations. More specific, it showed that the translation 
from uncertainty to contingency is always based on existing systems of knowledge, 
which are reified by each articulation and calculation of risk. For risk logics to work 
one needs to be able to think in terms of certainty and uncertainty, to separate and 
identify events as particulars, and to understand life as something to be kept “open”. 
Based on these underlying systems, risks works through its statistical methods to 
make real that what is unknown by imagining a particular future and then calculate 
and visualize it. These commodified “facts” are repeated in speeches and used as an 
argument in decision-making processes, to be acted upon through insurance and 
prevention schemes and to be traded for profit. 
In turn, risk was problematized itself by questioning the unaccountable power 
distribution that results when those who define the past and imagine the future are just 
as important as official sovereign decision-makers. In particular, as the role of these 
underwriters and other commercial security experts is growing as they increasingly 
decide on the importance of variables and the connections between variables, 
thereby identifying what we should fear, how bad the situation is and what should be 
done to make it better. Through risk and financial insurance schemes aimed at risk 
minimization, these underwriters actively shape how individuals organize and live 
their lives. Moreover, it is their way of seeing the world that is coded in the risk logics 
and algorithms themselves, making an apolitical technical instrument suddenly quite 
political. Most troubling in this respect is the shift from probable risk to possible risk. 
A shift towards the wish to act upon multiple possible futures instead of the most 
probable future, based on only indirectly associated and non-causally related data 
points from everyday life connected through increasingly complex algorithms that 





The goal of this chapter was to unpack the notion of security in order to problematize 
its use in the field of energy security and to give a potential explanation for the 
proliferation of energy security concerns. The subsequent sections offered insights 
into the multiple logics of security, the ethics of security, the manner in which security 
is called upon, and the exercise of power inherent to the calculation of risk. Together 
these sections offer an interpretation of security as a form of governing the present 
based on an imagination of undesired futures. 
In pushing the recent literature on security, this chapter started by approaching 
security in its broadest sense as dealing with and deciding upon undesired futures. 
A logical consequence of such a broad definition is the possibility to observe a more 
extensive range of different insecurities or undesirable futures, the techniques used 
to imagine and decide on that undesirability and the logics of security that drive 
the application of these techniques and search for counter-measures. Together, 
these techniques and logics help make sense of the future and make people act 
performatively in the here-and-now. The security logics are both inclusionary and 
exclusionary. They are inclusionary as there is always another unknown potentially 
threatening future, just as failed counter-measures only inspire to do better. While 
these logics are inclusionary and help make sense of events, they do not define the 
issues at stake. Instead, interpretations shift and depend on the agent’s position and 
relation to the referent object. Hence, security is exclusionary as the identification 
of an undesired future always builds on a politics that excludes those not part of 
the security arrangement. Such normative judgements create ruptures, which are 
reinforced by the countermeasures that are enacted. Security was reasoned to be a 
form of ethics itself, shaping and reinforcing the interpretation of an event, the image 
of the other, the referent object and oneself. The security of undesirable futures is thus 
not only epistemological but strongly ontological as well. It is the choice of what to 
protect and what not to protect, the choice between what to see as a threat and what 
not to see as a threat. Simultaneously, the urgency of security dispels any thought 
about the inherent normativity of security. 
Security is something that is made; it does not exist out there but is called 
upon or written by politicians, concerned citizens, security experts, insurers, etc. 
To understand the identification of undesired futures, this chapter focused on the 
emotion of fear (and desire) as well as the explicit use of fear in political contexts. 
Through a separation of private and public fears, it becomes possible to see the emotive 
and political use fear. More specific, how public fears build upon a depoliticized idea 
of private fear by linking the individual to the collective, while decoupling the private 
experience of fear from the social call upon fear. Together with an increasing epistemic 
and ontic uncertainty that triggers an autopoietic fear for fear itself, this leads to a 
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situation where the existence of political fears cannot be proven wrong. Besides, while 
it only works when called upon, the above makes clear that almost everybody calls 
upon it. Clearly, not all calls are successful, but in today’s culture of fear that seems to 
be of less importance as the calls always already succeed in reinforcing the desire for 
more security. Moreover, contrary to an individual private experience of fear, where 
the undesirable future and its opposite (the desired future) are identified in response 
to a bodily reaction, in the case of public fear there is a more intentional logic at work 
where particular desired futures are identified before their current state is publicized 
as undesirable and something to be feared.
The call upon security was analyzed more closely through a study of the insights 
provided by Securitization Theory and its singular focus on the exceptionality of 
security over normal politics. With the concepts of speech acts, securitizing moves and 
securitization, this theory helps to understand and study how people call on security. 
While the theory highlights the process of how something becomes a security issue, 
it does not provide the reasons why particular issues are called on and hence should 
not be used as such. More in general there are questions on the conflation of the 
theory and methodology of securitization, its normativity, its focus on exceptionality 
and lack of context. Still, the theory, as well as its different critiques, highlight the 
politics behind security instead of the outcome of such processes. Behind the self-
evident threats lies the active politics of multiple audiences, multiple speech actors 
and multiple issues that are securitized. In addition, besides showing the activity 
that goes into making something into a security issue, the theory also opens up the 
relationality of the other as part of the self. 
The reflection on risk with its focus on routine security practices of insurance 
and its underlying risk calculations offered an alternative to the exceptionality of 
Securitization Theory. Risk was described as a performative practice that identifies 
and problematizes uncertainty in terms of contingency based on mobile norms that 
cannot be conquered but only managed and traded. Through its statistical methods, 
risk makes the unknown a reality by first imagining and then calculating and 
visualizing the future. These commodified “facts” are repeated in speeches and used 
as an argument in decision-making processes, to be acted upon through insurance 
and prevention schemes and to be traded for profit. Financial insurance schemes 
aimed at risk minimization thus actively shape how individuals organize their daily 
lives: what they buy, say and do. The use of risk calculation was problematized by 
highlighting the growing political role of risk underwriters and ICT experts and the 
shifting accountability that follows recent changes in risk calculation from probable 
risks to possible (correlated) risks.
Both theories discuss a particular logic of security, respectively a threat rationality 
and a logic and technique of risk, and agree that security is an exercise of power that is 
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called upon by people who decide on its boundaries. Still, they differ as risk accepts an 
increasing level of contingency that a threat logic actively resists. They contrast, but at 
the same time the risk literature can only ascribe probability to the undesired future 
on which the risk is based and cannot explain how something becomes a threat, nor 
how particular thresholds of risk are set. In turn, the speech act inspired security 
literature is unable to move away from the exceptional threat itself to the routine of 
everyday security and safety practices that are also inherent to these threats. Clearly, 
we need to understand the normative and instrumental characteristics of security 
and risk, as both security and risk ‘do […] things rather than merely name things’.267 
They both approach events from a how question, with neither offering reasons or 
generalized conclusions to be used for predictions.
What this chapter means for energy security is manifold. At the beginning, this 
chapter stated that it is very well possible to read this chapter by just adding the word 
energy whenever it spoke of security. While that might push it, this chapter makes 
a clear case for moving away from a “simple” theological goal oriented definition 
of energy security to an understanding of energy security that is called upon every 
time it is used. This chapter thus supports the initial reflections in Part I on energy 
security to move beyond the search for a better understanding of the content of 
energy security, to the actual political work that is done to get particular forms of 
energy security accepted as a security concern. Energy security is made to be, by 
elites, companies, academia (including observing energy security scholars) and the 
public – even at kitchen tables as chapter 9 will argue. It is not some natural state of 
affairs that is given and in need of protection. Many of the issues raised in Part I, on 
the proliferation of the concept, the geopolitical and state-centric focus, the uncritical 
and lacking theorization can be placed in context now. At the same time, this chapter 
also shows that energy security does exist. In line with Ciuta, (energy) security is not a 
banal process; it is very much the opposite. While everything is constantly performed, 
there are concerns, like Russian gas, that can be called on much easier and with a 
much larger backing and audience than others, because they fit historical insecurities 
or because they are materialized in such a way that they could affect many. The 
difference between traditional theories of energy security and the theories on security 
that are discussed in this chapter is that the latter acknowledge that they themselves 
play a role in the process of securing energy while analyzing these processes and the 
conditions behind them. Thereby they open themselves and the concept of energy 
security to an understanding of energy security that is socially performed and never 
the same, yet made to be so, while functioning as an exercise of power with strong 
normative consequences.
267 Dillon 1996, 34.
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‘Scarcity seems to be the most unobserved starting point of modern society.’1
6.1 introduction
The previous chapter discussed the security aspect of the assemblage of energy and 
security. It provided a problematization of security by highlighting its inclusive 
and proliferating nature and by broadening the definition to one of identifying and 
dealing with undesired futures. A core undesired future in relation to energy security 
is, of course, a situation of scarcity. Of all the threats identified in Part I of this thesis, 
underneath them was the constant looming presence of a (potential) scarcity of energy. 
As the World Energy Council states: ‘[t]he scarcity of fossil fuel resources and lack 
of capacity to develop other resources define the vulnerability of Europe to potential 
energy crises.’2 Arguably, scarcity is the glue in the energy and security assemblage, as 
it combines the physical natural resources, the economic markets and the security logics. 
This chapter takes a similar approach as the chapter on security and will first identify 
what scarcity is, and then slowly move on to discuss what it does. However, where the 
previous chapter primarily discussed fear, this chapter focusses on desire and makes 
three main arguments when problematizing scarcity and its use in energy security 
discourses. First, it breaks with a simplistic understanding of scarcity by identifying four 
different scarcity logics that together offer an alternative to security for the proliferation 
of energy security. In particularly, it builds on an understanding of relative scarcity and 
the subsequent relative desire that describes an unlimited social demand, including an 
unlimited demand for energy. Second, the latter sections of this chapter offer a strong 
problematization of both a geopolitical neorealist and a neoliberal free market reading 
of energy security. Third, the debates on scarcity highlight a line of thought that was 
visible in the earlier discussions on energy and food security by pointing towards neo-
Malthusian, Ricardian and Distributionists modes of reasoning that radically disagree 
on core assumptions behind natural resources, technology and economic markets.
Unlike concepts as security, power or sovereignty, scarcity is not seen as an 
essentially contested concept in International Relations (IR) and International 
Political Economy (IPE) literature.3 Nor could it, as it is hardly commented on 
1 Achterhuis 1988, 12 [author’s translation].
2 WEC 2008, 85.
3 Without making any claims on the exact borders of the field of IR, and only by looking at ranking journals, 
the underlying problem of scarcity itself has so far received only limited attention. In fact, there is only 
one extensive discussion of scarcity in a special issue of the International Studies Quarterly from 1977. 
See Pirages 1977; with contributions from North 1977; and Orr 1977. For one of the few other individual 
contributions in IR, see Kemp 1978.
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at all. That is not to say that the term is not used a lot, only that scarcity is one of those 
facts of life that we seem to take-for-granted. It is precisely this “clarity” that is so 
remarkable, especially when one considers the (renewed) attention to scarce natural 
resources following recent events ranging from the food crisis in 2008, the Russian-
Ukraine gas crises, the Chinese export restrictions on rare-earth metals in 2010 and 
tensions in the South Chinese Sea or the recent volatility of crude oil prices. Instead, 
within IR and IPE attention is often paid to individual resources, in particular energy, 
food, water and rare earth minerals.4 In addition, any attention that is paid to scarcity 
focusses on the relation between scarce natural resources and the international 
security and conflict dimension of these resources, including their institutional 
governance aspects and the consequences of environmental degradation.5 IR is not 
alone in this. Scarcity and scarce natural resources are discussed within a multitude 
of fields and disciplines. Be it economics (distribution), environmental studies 
(effects), geology (reserves), geopolitics (control), law (ownership), or more applied 
studies like logistics, agriculture and engineering (production and efficiency). In 
each of these fields, scarcity is taken as a starting point, as a problem that is in need 
of solutions, but hardly ever as a subject of study itself. This is remarkable as even 
a short glance reveals two inherent paradoxes and dilemmas in our dealings with 
scarcity and its counterpart abundance. First, the dialectical relationship between 
scarcity and abundance results in the situation where an abundance for person A 
often implies that person B is facing scarcity, which in turn is regularly perceived 
in terms of a security threat that leads to a security paradox.6 Second, many of the 
solutions offered for scarcity are not solving anything; they only shift (substitute) the 
problem to another time or another resource, making the latter scarce in the process 
– as if we are unable to genuinely overcome scarcity itself. 
Instead of studying this inherent complexity, scarcity often is simply defined as 
a mismatch between limited supplies and unlimited demand. The Oxford English 
Dictionary, for example, defines scarcity as ‘[i]nsufficiency of supply; smallness of 
4 On energy see: Bahgat 2011; Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005; Luft and Korin 2009; Klare 2008; Klare 2012; 
Yergin 1991; Yergin 2006; Yergin 2012. On food: Hopkins and Puchala 1978. On water: Gleick 1993; 
Theisen, Holtermann, and Buhaug 2011. On minerals: Bateman 1952; HCSS 2010; Humphreys 2010.
5 Especially in the late 1970s, with an upturn late 1990s. See for example: Collier 2000; Dietz, Ostrom, and 
Stern 2003; Evans 2009; Orr 1977; Le Billon 2001; Le Billon 2005b; Orme 1997; North 1977; Pirages 
1983. On environmental degradation: Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon 1995; Dalby 2002; Dalby 2006; 
Kaplan 1994; Kennan 1970; Gleick 1991; Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2014; Raleigh and Urdal 2007.
6 A classical security paradox takes place when security measures taken by A lead to a downgrading of the 
overall perceived insecurity of B who feels threatened and responds in kind. The security paradox should 
not be confused with the security dilemma: the latter containing two levels of uncertainty on, firstly, 
the interpretation of motives, and, secondly, the response to be followed. It is only when the response 
leads to a downward (more insecure) spiral that we speak of a security paradox. See: Booth and Wheeler 
2008, 5.
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available quantity, number, or amount, in proportion to the need or demand.’ This 
broadly accepted basic definition of scarcity can be expanded upon, but remains based 
on this supply-demand interaction. For instance, North followed Aures & Stedman 
in defining scarcity as ‘a situation in which “future apparent demands exceeds future 
apparent supply”, […] “a condition which is commonly associated with “a mismatch 
between apparent rates of change of supply and demand [sic]”.7 By adding a time 
dimension to the definition, these authors also open the definition to subjective 
understandings of expectations about future changes. A large interdepartmental 
study by the Dutch government entitled Scarcity and Transition made this subjectivity 
more apparent when it defined scarcity as ‘not only an observed shortage of natural 
resources, but also a perceived dependency on natural resources and fear of their global 
depletion.’8 In doing so, this study shifts the definition from an (objectively) observed 
shortage to the (subjectively) perceived dependencies and the fear of doing without.9 
Continuing the extension of this concept over and above a supply-demand 
equation, scarcity is problematized by a wide range of literature that, on the one hand, 
and perhaps counter-intuitively, includes the field of (neoclassical) economics10 
and, on the other hand, builds on a number of studies that have recently been 
combined by Daoud under the call sign of the Scarcity, Abundance and Sufficiency 
(SAS) literature.11 Originating from ecology, development studies, philosophy and 
(economic) sociology, these studies open up the concept of scarcity and analyze it 
within a wider social context and in its relation to abundance. An increasing number 
of these studies argue that scarcity is socially constructed, that it is something that 
humans have created themselves intersubjectively (see chapters 5 and 7) instead of it 
being a state of affairs stemming from nature.12 In these studies, scarcity is analyzed 
7 North 1977, 569–570 quotes Aures, R.U. & N. Stedman (n.d.) ‘Material Scarcity and Substitutions’ in 
Essential Resources, International Industrial Conference Board (Washington D.C.: Industrial Research 
and Technology Corporation). This measurement of supply and demand is portrayed by the HCSS 
as either a static or a dynamic scarcity ‘paradigm’. Whereas the static perception of scarcity looks at 
fixed (but not necessarily known) supply and demand ratios and calculates the remaining years of 
consumption, the dynamic scarcity ‘paradigm’ takes into account that reserves are calculated based on 
whether or not extraction is, or will be in the near future, economic viable and technological feasible, 
just as demand can be influenced by a range of factors. See: HCSS 2010, 23–26.
8 Passenier and Lak 2009, 17.
9 Kemp 1978 defines subjective scarcity broadly, from a fear for dependency of ‘essential’ resources up 
to a fear of losing expected supply levels of culturally induced consumption patterns (Japan – fish). 
North 1977, 574 makes a similar argument: ‘But beyond the minimal requirements for basic survival, the 
concepts of abundance and scarcity tend to be elusive, subjective, relative and controversial’.
10 Barbier 1989; Barbier 2010; Barnet and Morse 1963; Krautkraemer 2005; Neumayer 2002; Stiglitz 1979.
11 Daoud 2010, 1207; Achterhuis 1988; Achterhuis 1993; Alatout 2008; Bataille 1988; Baumgärtner et al. 
2006; Claassen 2004; Claassen 2009; Ciobanu 2006; Daoud 2011a; Dumouchel 2014; Matthaei 1984; 
Mehta 2003; Mehta 2010a; Möhring 2011; Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Perelman 1979; Panayotakis 
2011; Princen 2005; Sachs 1993; Xenos 1989; Xenos 1987; Xenos 2010; Yapa 1996a.
12 Achterhuis 1988; Claassen 2004; Hirsch 1976; Xenos 1989.
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not through a focus on the material availability and access to natural resources, but 
through a focus on the social (power) relations behind these material circumstances. 
Some, especially from development studies and philosophy, take a strong critical 
position and deconstruct current scarcity policies and responses, thereby pointing 
towards “the other side” of current power relations and showing how certain negative 
effects are not inherent to the phenomenon of scarcity per sé, but that they are in fact 
a result of historical events.13 In other words, these studies focus on the manner in 
which the taken-for-granted nature of scarcity acts performatively as it influences and 
naturalizes our thinking and subsequent actions.
This chapter turns towards insights from this critical literature to problematize 
the taken-for-granted nature of scarcity in IR and IPE.14 First, chapter 6.2 will 
introduce scarcity by providing some basic distinctions that one can encounter when 
studying scarce natural resources.15 Second, chapter 6.3 conceptualizes scarcity by 
introducing and discussing four different positions and interpretations on scarcity. 
Starting from shortages it follows neo-classical economics and the development of the 
idea of relative scarcity. This relative scarcity is then opposed to absolute scarcity as it is 
championed by environmental neo-Malthusians. Lastly, the concept of scarcification 
is introduced to discuss a Distributionist and Marxist interpretation of scarcity. Third, 
chapter 6.4 moves the discussion to the idea of relative desire that forms the basis of an 
understanding of relative scarcity. It starts with a discussion on the elasticity of needs 
but then uses philosophy to reflect upon the origin of relative scarcity and its key point 
of unlimited relative desires. From these relative desires, it follows that deprivation 
is relative as well. This chapter ends therefore with a brief discussion of the security 
dimension of scarcity by looking at the violence and conflict potential of scarcity 
and scarce natural resources, only to conclude that the organization of scarcity is of 
principal importance (in line with Distributionists). This is taken up in chapter 6.5, 
which combines many of the insights of the previous sections by turning towards 
the work of Foucault and Luhmann and their insights on scarcity. Here Foucault is 
used to indicate the governing and normalization that is done through scarcity based 
on his historic example of food scarcity. Luhmann in turn questions the taken-for-
granted nature of scarcity by highlighting the paradoxical self-referentiality within 
the concept of scarcity itself. Lastly, chapter 6.6 concludes and reflects.
13 Matthaei 1984; Mehta 2003; Mehta 2010a; Stillman 1983; Alatout 2008; Aguilera-Klink, Pérez-Moriana, 
and Sánchez-Garcia 2000; Ciobanu 2006.
14 As such, this chapter does not deal, excluding some small remarks and Luhmann’s negative conclusion, 
with an in-depth discussion of the literature on sufficiency, asceticism, steady-state economics and other 
ways to overcome scarcity.
15 Where the unspecified concept ‘scarcity’ is used in this text, it refers to the general summation of all four 
forms of scarcity.
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6.2 scarcity of natural resources
Before turning to the different approaches that are used to study the phenomenon of 
scarcity, a short overview of several often made distinctions and observations with 
respect to scarcity and natural resources will help to better comprehend the complex 
nature of both. These observations include, first, the different scarcity debates that 
follow from the distinct characteristics of natural resources as well as the realization 
that scarcity refers to other things besides natural resources. Second, they include the 
multiple positions and backgrounds of observers, which lead to different reflections 
on scarcity. Third, on a more abstract level, these observations need to be aware of 
the three main discourses behind scarce natural resources that also structure the 
positions and debates on scarce natural resources. 
First, any singular understanding of scarcity needs to deal with the different 
characteristics of the resources in question. In fact, the range of interpretations 
below is only an indication of the range of different scarcity debates. A scholar can 
differentiate between the scarcity of finite, mostly non-renewable resources (e.g., oil, 
minerals and phosphates) and the scarcity of infinite renewable resources (e.g., air and 
food). Subsequently, renewable resources are divided in renewable goods (i.e., timber 
and fish) and renewable services (i.e., the ozone layer or hydrological cycle).16 These 
distinctions are not as clear-cut as they seem. For instance, the resource nexus blurs any 
sharp distinction, as in the case of contemporary production levels of grain or other 
food sources (renewable), which largely depend on the use of energy and phosphates 
(finite) for their production and transport. Other, often made, distinctions based on 
the characteristics of resources include the distinction between geographically fixed 
pool resources (e.g. gas fields) and transboundary mobile resources (e.g. river water, 
wildlife). This comes close to a more general distinction between stock resources (oil) 
and flow resources (sunshine).17 Likewise, the differentiation between rival and non-
rival resources is comparable with a distinction between excludable, private resources 
(timber, water) versus common pool (shared resources) or public resources (wind). 
This range of distinctions might indicate that scarcity only equates with natural 
resources. This is obviously not the case. Besides the first-order scarcity of the natural 
resources themselves, this thesis argues that people can also face second-order scarcity, 
which refers to a lack of knowledge, technology or capital to prevent (or lighten) 
scarcity of natural resources.18 In addition, time is a resource that is often considered 
16 Homer-Dixon 1999, 47.
17 Stock resources have fixed amounts, in theory to be used up at once, while flow resources regenerate and 
can only be used incrementally. Non-renewable resources have stocks, while renewable resources have 
both flows (solar energy is not a fixed total amount but a continuous flow of energy) and a combination 
of flows and stock (fish, other wildlife). On flows and stocks see ibid.
18 An example are pesticides: the development of chemical pesticides reduced the research and investment in 
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in short supply. Even more removed from natural resources, but also considered 
lacking are social relationships, like friendship and love, and conditions of happiness. 
While further removed, these are considered lacking because they are desired and at 
one moment translated into commodities that could be gained and lost. In fact, only 
when something is “needed” or “wanted” by society does it become scarce. The key 
term here is the verb “to become”, in line with De Gregori who argues that: ‘resources 
are not; they become.’19 This implies that “resources” are nothing but the ‘property 
of things – a property that is a result of human capability.’20 Resources in this view 
derive from human knowledge (e.g. technological prowess) and the ascription of 
function to desired material and immaterial objects. 
Second, within discussions on scarcity a number of observer-relevant distinctions 
play an important role. First, scarcity is analyzed from different levels of analysis 
that cross individual, household, local, national, regional or global perspectives.21 
The manner in which people on a local level, live, perceive and measure scarcity is 
different from the aggregated numbers on a national, let alone on an international 
scale. The choice for a level of analysis thus has strong ethical implications, which 
are often not incorporated in the results. Second, scarcity is analyzed from a range 
of academic perspectives. Each of these perspectives favors its own assumptions and 
goals that pre-structure its conclusions, whether physical (availability), economic 
(affordability), political (accessibility) or social/cultural (desirability). Lastly, scarce 
natural resources are increasingly observed from the position of other natural 
resources, as in the discussion on biofuels between energy and food communities. 
The increasing number of interconnections between the different natural resources 
and their shared drivers and feedback mechanisms make this inevitable.22 
Third, crossing all these levels of analysis and different approaches to the study of 
scarcity and scarce natural resources are three grand narratives on the human-nature 
relationship and the origin and urgency of the problem of scarcity.23 First, in both 
traditional positivist and constructivist approaches to scarcity it is possible to find 
neo-Malthusians, often environmentalist and peak-oil/gas supporters, who argue that 
there are limits to growth and that people need to accept that resources are finite 
biological/organic pesticides. Another example is the knowledge and technology behind the utilization 
and large-scale production of “green” energy. This relates to Homer-Dixon’s ‘ingenuity gap’ –see below- 
but should be seen wider, including the future geo-political implications of different knowledge/
technology regimes. (compare with global differences in ability to counter the consequences of climate 
change or the patent practices on modern medicines by pharmaceutical companies)
19 De Gregori 1987b, 1241; Zimmermann 1951; Le Billon 2007, 176.
20 De Gregori 1987b, 1243.
21 See for example Jarosz 2011.
22 For an overview of the inter-linkages of the ‘global resource nexus’ see the scheme and discussion in 
Evans 2010, 10, 17–21.
23 Mehta 2010a.
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and the biosphere is limited.24 Second, Ricardians, often neoclassical economists and 
engineers, who argue that growth is in fact limitless, because technological innovation 
and markets will always provide for new solutions that increase efficiency or lead to 
substitution.25 Third, in between these extremes Distributionists argue for a more 
social perspective as they claim that scarcity, including its causes and effects, mainly 
results from unequal power and wealth distributions.26 These positions, including the 
(geopolitical) security dimension will be discussed in detail throughout this chapter. 
Fourth, one cannot understand scarcity without attention to abundance, its 
dialectical other. Just as security compares to insecurity, so one cannot think 
about scarcity without thinking about abundance. Mullainathan & Shafir offer an 
interesting description of abundance in this respect when they argue that abundance 
should be seen as the ability not to care.27 People who experience abundance have 
what they call “slack” or the breathing room to make mistakes and skip corners. This 
contrasts with people who experience scarcity and have to live and make decisions 
under the constant strain of having to choose between necessary alternatives and the 
constant stress of making costly mistakes. For Mullainathan & Shafir it is this stress 
and the need to care for each and every of their actions that distinguishes a scarcity 
mind-set from an abundance mind-set. For these authors there is a discrepancy 
between thinking about abundance when experiencing scarcity, or in thinking about 
potential new scarcities when experiencing abundance. One is more immediate (a 
scarcity mind-set) and the other more future oriented (an abundance mind-set). In 
line with Booth (chapter 5.3), they see abundance/security positively. However, this 
chapter will discuss below how (economic) abundance itself is cause for concern as 
it is often directly related to civil conflict. Just as for security, abundance is both the 
end-goal and a source of trouble on its own.
6.3 Problematizing the concept of scarcity
6.3.1 From Shortages to Relative Scarcity and the Supply of 
Economic Growth
As noted, scarcity is studied in a multitude of academic disciplines ranging from 
development studies, geopolitics, political ecology and philosophy, up to economics, 
the discipline that is said to have scarcity as its cornerstone (although the discipline 
of political science when defined as ‘who gets what, when, and how’ clearly starts from 
24 Daly 1974; Daly 1997; Meadows et al. 1972; Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 2004.
25 Gowdy 1984; De Gregori 1987b; De Gregori 1987a; Zimmermann 1951.
26 Sen 1983; Mehta 2010a.
27 Mullainathan and Shafir 2013.
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the same premise).28 Defined in terms of the supply and demand of limited resources 
against unlimited desires, it is almost impossible not to start an analysis of scarcity 
from economics and in particular neoclassic economics. As Luks argues: 
The economic discourse, with its focus on scarcity, has had an influence on 
how we think, speak and argue about nature, the environment, resources 
and sustainability. It has had a profound impact beyond economics. Even 
when ‘non-economic’ issues are debated, economics is with us and scarcity is 
all-pervasive.29 
Remarkably, the first time economics was explicitly defined in terms of scarcity was 
in 1935 when the economist Robbins argued that: ‘[e]conomics is the science which 
studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses.’30 While heavily contested and refuted as being too narrow and 
deterministic, even by Robbins himself, the definition quickly gained in popularity.31 
In fact, most studies into natural resources, from both economic and (geo)political 
perspectives seem to take this mismatch between supply and demand as a naturally 
given starting point in their analyses.32
In the economic literature, scarcity gained its central role through the development 
of the marginal utility theory by Jevons, Walras, Menger and others.33 While the 
early Marginalist revolution of the 1870s still acknowledged that utility should be seen 
as something broader than the pure consumption of economic goods, ‘the pursuit of 
utility maximization pas[sed] from a broad notion of welfare to […] a simple and 
deterministic logic of choice between alternatives bound by scarcity interpreted as 
resource constraints.’34 Nowadays, this relative scarcity is taken as the fundamental 
assumption of economics. Daoud concludes in this respect, from a sample of 
economic handbooks, that scarcity is explained within neoclassical economics as a 
problem of efficient allocation of resources, because neoclassical economics speaks 
of scarcity whenever consumers have to choose between desires.35 In fact, scarcity 
stems from an ontic assumption of unlimited desires and limited resources (implying 
that individuals need to weigh their desires), which implies that scarcity is seen as 
universal (and thus that the ideal of abundance does not-exists). For neoclassical 
economics, scarcity is a logic of choice. It is this logic and its underlying assumptions 
28 Lasswell 2011, 3.
29 Luks 2010, 94.
30 Robbins 1935, 16.
31 Fine 2010, 77.
32 Also Luks 2010.
33 Jevons 1866; Menger 2007. For an overview see: Fine 2010; Matthaei 1984; Daoud 2011a; Neumayer 2002.
34 Fine 2010, 75.
35 Daoud 2011a, 13–16.
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on universality and unlimited desires, which in time has not only been applied to 
individual consumers but also to organizations, societies and economies at large, in 
line with Luks’ quote above. 
An interesting aspect of the spread of this narrow economic interpretation 
of scarcity is the role played by the technical assumptions of rational choice and 
utility maximization that came with the shift towards a macro-level general 
equilibrium economics. In particular, how these techniques with their focus on 
homo-oeconomicus have made the concept of scarcity dwindle to the background of 
economic thought.36 This was not automatic and there have been moments when this 
process was questioned. One such a moment was the economic crisis in the 1930s 
with its massive unemployment figures. In his analysis of the crisis, Keynes argued 
that the crisis showed that aggregated demand or unlimited desire was in fact limited. 
For Keynes, the drop in consumption was equally problematic as a constraint on 
economic growth as potential supply shortages. However, as Fine and Daoud argue 
above, Keynes’ macro-economic critique did not halt the expansion of this type of 
micro-economic thinking towards other topics in the social sciences.37 Instead, the 
field moved further away from scarcity considerations and focused increasingly on 
imperfect information and market policy failures. In this line of thought, scarcity is 
no longer a problematic restraint as markets and their invisible hand will correct and 
balance any shortages that might erupt. Consequently, the notion of scarcity is put on 
hold in economic considerations. As Fine summarizes:
So, rather than being central to its methodology, scarcity has, from Robbins 
onwards, served as a legitimizing device for the general application of the 
technical apparatus and formal deductive methods of mainstream economics 
by appeal to the scarcity/needs and wants dualism in the totally rarefied context 
of isolated individual or general equilibrium.38  
This does not mean that scarcity is never discussed in economic analyses. In fact, 
neoclassical economists are quick to point out that there is a difference between 
absolute scarcity, which problematizes the physical limits of resources, and relative 
scarcity, which does not see this as problematic.39 
The following chapter will discuss this in detail. It will show, for example, how 
Barnett & Morse in their seminal work Scarcity and Growth distinguish between 
a Malthusian (absolute) and a Ricardian (relative) form of scarcity, while claiming 
that ‘the possibility of technological progress clearly cuts the ground under the 
36 See also: Xenos 1989, 68; Matthaei 1984, 88; Fine 2010, 74.
37 Fine 2010, 77–79.
38 Ibid., 81.
39 Raiklin and Uyar 1996, 49; Daoud 2010.
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concept of Malthusian scarcity [, as r]esources can only be defined in terms of known 
technology.’40 Simplistically put, neoclassical economics puts its trust in substitution, 
recycling, efficiency, technological creativity and the institutions that are necessary 
for these solutions to thrive.41 For neoclassical economics any shortages that do 
effect, result from failing institutions, be they markets or policies.42 Without such 
failures, the markets are believed to solve the problem of scarcity. Striking, however, is 
that all these solutions are supply side solutions; none of them question the demand-
side of the equation. It seems as if most of the attention from neoclassical economics 
focusses on the solutions it offers to the problem of scarcity. Solutions, which, in short, 
entail the supply of further economic growth. 
In doing so, these solutions have become something more than solutions: they 
have become goals in themselves. Goals that, ironically, can only be achieved if 
the necessary pre-requisite of scarcity is met first.43 As economic growth is hard 
to come by without “sufficient” aggregated demand and neoclassical economics 
subsequently problematizes measures that aim to reduce desire and consumption 
as market disturbances that hinder its production-oriented solutions, it follows that 
the study of economics takes the underlying assumption of the infinity of human 
desire as something taken-for-granted.44 This is especially relevant, as most applied 
disciplines, like agriculture or transport, often approach the issue of scarce natural 
resources with an even more simplistic economic understanding based on costs 
reduction, production increases and efficiency targets. In short, neoclassical economics 
(1) openly disregards absolute scarcity in favor of relative scarcity, (2) seems to be 
biased towards supply side solutions and (3) in doing so hides and naturalizes scarcity 
and excludes ideas and consequences of abundance in its theoretical considerations.
6.3.2 Absolute Scarcity and the Limits of Abundance
The relative scarcity of neoclassical economists and other Ricardians clearly 
contrasts with notions of absolute scarcity that are championed by neo-Malthusian 
environmentalists and peak oil/gas supporters. Where Ricardians focus on adaptation, 
unlimited desire and economic growth, neo-Malthusians focus on environmental, 
planetary and geological limits. Neo-Malthusian thought was boosted in the 1970s 
when both the Club of Rome report Limits to Growth and the two oil crises spurred 
40 Barnet and Morse 1963, 6–7; Stiglitz 1979. See also: De Gregori 1987a; Gowdy 1986; Solow 1974; Barbier 
1989.
41 Neumayer 2002; Matthaei 1986, 106.
42 This is one of the issues between environmental economics and a stronger sustainable oriented ecological 
economics. See Van den Bergh 2001.
43 For example, Xenos 1989, 75; Fine 2010.
44 Matthaei 1984, 90.
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attention towards the environment in general and the absolute scarcity of natural 
resources in particular.45 
Thinking in terms of absolute limits is principally associated with the writings 
of Thomas Malthus. In his Essay, Malthus argues that geometric population growth 
is halted by the limits of subsistence, which in Malthus’ case entails the total 
amount of acreage available for the arithmetic production of food.46 This results 
in a diminishing marginal return on the production of food, as population growth 
exceeds the fixed available acreage and each additional person is able to grow less 
food. Hunger, sickness and conflict would be the result. Or as Pirages quotes Ashley: 
‘[h]umans struggle to subordinate the environment and when “finally the limits to 
growth are reached, they have only to subjugate one another”.’47 From a Ricardian 
perspective, Barnett & Morse note that Malthus’ warning was (a) not new as Adam 
Smith also noted the tendency of (animal) populations to multiply up and over the 
available means of subsistence; (b) is less about scarcity, which he assumes as a given 
in his research, and more about the effects of population growth; and (c) that Malthus 
did not take other natural resources and possible substitution effects into account.48 
For neoclassical economics, absolute limits in terms of natural resource reserves or 
physical geography do not matter in economic terms. As Barnet & Morse conclude: 
A limit may exist, but it can be neither defined nor specified in economic 
terms. Flexibility, not rigidity, characterizes the relationship of modern man 
to the physical universe in which he lives. Nature imposes particular scarcities, 
not an inescapable general scarcity. Man is therefore able, and free, to choose 
among an indefinitely large number of alternatives.49 
The added “in economic terms” and “modern man” are important, as economists do 
not deny that there are physical limits to natural resources in the absolute long run 
(general/absolute scarcity) but reject the importance of these in the short to medium 
term and instead address shortages or ‘particular scarcities’.50 
45 Meadows et al. 1972; Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 2004. This threshold is sometimes dubbed the 
‘new scarcity’ as opposed to the above mentioned ‘old’ scarcity – further conflating and confusing the 
definition of scarcity. See Simpson, Toman, and Ayres 2004, 29.
46 Malthus 1798.
47 Pirages 1983, 252 quotes Ashley 1980, 287. Pirages describes, in accordance with, among others, 
Wallerstein the drive to expansion and conquer resulting from a limited resource base, rising population 
and rising (cultural) demands as ‘lateral pressure’.
48 Barnet and Morse 1963, 53–54.
49 Ibid., 11.
50 Stiglitz 1979, 37. In fact, Stiglitz takes this argument to its absurdity by noting that he is not concerned 
with absolute limits like when the population mass exceeds the mass of the planet.
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Irrespective the economic critique, Malthus’ ideas are still widely available and 
seem to have been extended from the effects of food scarcity to the consequences of both 
population growth and the limits of economic growth on environmental degradation 
and political conflict. Nowadays, this line of thinking by neo-Malthusians is mainly 
attached to the environmentalist movement, which received an enormous impulse in 
the early 1960s after the publication of a number of studies, among which the before 
mentioned Limits to Growth.51 The core of the current environmentalist ideas and 
concerns, however, dates back to the American Conservation Movement of the 1890-
1920s. This movement was already concerned with a broad range of natural resources 
and their interconnections. Moreover, it rejected commercial and private interest 
motivated solutions for the conservation of natural resources for future generations. 
Instead this movement focused on efficiency and the ‘scientific management [of 
resources] in the public interests’, not unlike the line of discussion a century later.52 
What has changed is that current debates often fuse arguments from environmental 
(conservation) and ecological (preservation) perspectives. In its extreme, an ecologist 
sees limits everywhere but perceives them as thresholds that can be crossed after which 
the ecosystem will always correct itself and shift into a new trajectory. For ecologists, 
therefore, it is the actual intervention in the current ecosystem that matters as every 
intervention, even small ones, can drastically affect the habitability of the system for 
all living creatures. Environmentalists, in turn, take this same ecosystem but place 
human existence and, more important, her necessary future resource use at the center 
of it. As a result, environmentalists focus on the limits that will hinder the prosperity 
of current and future generations. The limits of environmentalists often refer to the 
absolute amount of non-renewable natural resources to be found on the planet, which 
in the case of resources like oil and gas is fairly easy to imagine.53 The ecological 
thresholds instead focus on the effects of natural resource use on the “carrying 
capacity” of our planet: the limit where the ecosystem can no longer support human 
intervention and resource use.54 
In response to the neo-Malthusian position on peak resources and absolute 
scarcity, neoclassical economics quickly pointed out the fallacies of extracting 
past trends from static data in dynamic (economic) systems, arguing that the only 
51 Hartmann 2010 argues that most ‘neo-Malthusian’ arguments nowadays are used strategically. She argues 
specifically that scarcity is mobilized to further political goals: fear sells.
52 Krautkraemer 2005, 7–8. Two main parties in this movement where the preservationist Sierra Club led 
by John Muir (the intrinsic value of nature) and the Conservationists of which Theodore Roosevelt was 
an important spokesperson (conserving for future use).
53 Bridge 2010; Friedrichs 2010; Smith 2012.
54 At stake here is not the ecosystem itself (an ecological/preservationist perspective), but the continuous 
and future use of resources for human benefit (an environmentalist/conservationist perspective).
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historical trend is one of successful substitution and technological innovation.55 
This claim is not without critique either. Norgaard argues that from a theoretical 
perspective neoclassical economists cannot in fact reject neo-Malthusian claims of 
absolute scarcity. Their sole focus on prices to determine whether something is scarce 
or abundant does not reflect material shortages, but only the people’s concerns about 
scarcity.56 With his empirical argument, Mitchell provides an even stronger case 
against Ricardian rejections of peak resources.57 While Mitchell does not dispute the 
historic trends of falling prices and substitution, his claim is that the shift to relative 
scarcity would not have been possible without the development of fossil fuels in the 
first place. He argues that the discovery and utilization of a seemingly unending supply 
of carbon fuels at a price not worth counting, in particularly oil, did not only have 
major social impacts but also enabled the substitutability mind-set of neoclassical 
economics and hence made possible a whole new form of economic government. 
Substitution sees resources as limited, but energy in general as unlimited. It thereby 
overlooks the intimate connection between this mode of reasoning and a particular 
group of (fossil) energy sources that is characterized by a high (although slowly 
declining) energy density. Renewable energy sources might be truly unlimited, but 
their Energy Return on Investment (EROI) is still debated, and their energy density 
is much lower: it costs more (installations, space, etc.) to gain the same amount of 
energy from renewable sources as compared to fossil fuels.58
The debate therefore is not about the existence of absolute limits or thresholds, 
but about the importance of them. Shifting the debate from a discussion of scarcity to 
liminality highlights that neoclassical economics is actually afraid of a limit: the limit 
of economic stagnation. As De Gregori argues: ‘Rarely, if ever, can a people abandon a 
technology and its resources and return to an older pattern without loss of life (...) and 
living standard.’59 In the words of Simpson et al.: ‘Halting economic development is 
simply not an option.’60 This creed is so strong that Sachs remarked in respect to the 
concept of sustainable development and many of its policies that these are failing, 
because, for example in case of the construction of CO2 markets, it is not nature 
that is conserved but further economic development.61 In other words, theoretically 
55 Stiglitz 1979; Solow 1974; Simpson, Toman, and Ayres 2004; Hirsch 1976, 19.
56 Neumayer 2002, 309; Norgaard 1990; Norgaard 1991.
57 Mitchell 2013, 231–255.
58 Hall, Lambert, and Balogh 2014.
59 De Gregori 1987b, 1245. Then again, on p1253 De Gregori also defends the economic narrative by stating 
that environmentalist take ‘A concept of fixed, finite resources [which] provides the mindset that allows 
people to refuse to accept evidence of decreasing resource scarcity’.
60 Simpson, Toman, and Ayres 2004, 31.
61 Sachs 1993; Escobar 1996. See also De Gregori 1987b, 1257 who argues that ‘...the technologies [that] 
the prophets offered as resource-conserving [would] in fact (...) create the problem they claimed to 
be solving. Living within limits is inherently self-defeating, [... (see entropy)]’. Or Matthaei 1984 who 
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speaking a concept like sustainable development is paradoxical for we are doomed if 
we do (absolute limits) and doomed if we do not (loss of life and living standard).62
There are three conclusions that can be drawn from this debate between neo-
Malthusians and Ricardians. First, besides a fundamental disagreement on the 
importance of absolute geophysical limits, economic stagnation, environmental 
limits and ecological thresholds, neoclassical economics seems mistakenly to copy 
their supply measures in response to absolute limited resources onto the question 
of environmental thresholds. These two problems, however, cannot be compared, 
because the latter cannot be acted upon retroactively through substitution and other 
supply mechanisms. Second, while it would be easy to argue for an insolvable deadlock 
between neo-Malthusians and neoclassical economics, both have technological 
innovation as a main pillar in their responses (but value costs versus environmental 
impacts differently) and both actively influence current policies through policy 
prescriptions that are based on their respective future outlooks.63 Third, this last 
point on policy prescriptions shows that how we see the world helps give shape to the 
world. This, as Luks claims, implies that ‘finiteness, limits and “absolute scarcity” are 
just as much social constructions as the […] markets, prices and “relative scarcity”.’64 
Not because limits do not exist (they are real), but because it is only possible to 
define the maximum reserve of resources, the limit to economic development or the 
ecological thresholds and their relative importance by agreeing on them in order to act 
upon those agreed limits. To rephrase Dumouchel: ‘What makes scarcity [and limits] 
arise and become real in our social life […] depend[s] on what people think [as well 
as] what they do.’65 
6.3.3 Towards Scarcification and a Conceptualization of Scarcity
There is another conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion so far. Ricardians 
and neo-Malthusians do not only discuss different forms of scarcity and have 
different ideas on liminality, but they differ fundamentally on their underlying 
claims that: ‘Capitalist production does not find its limit in nature’s scarcity, but rather in the internal 
contradictions of capital accumulation.’ (p90) and ‘Since the essential limit to firms in monopoly 
capitalism is the extent of the market, firms are led to work to maximize the production of sal[e]able 
output by creating products that will be discarded rapidly due to deterioration or changes in fashions.’ 
(p91).
62 See: Matthaei 1984, 84; Neumayer 2002; Homer-Dixon 1999, 28–35. An interesting counter is provided 
by Lomborg 2012, a scholar criticizing the focus, even alarmist ways of thinking of environmentalists, 
on climate change. Not because climate change does not exist, but, as he argues, because there are 
other equally pressing problems in the world that we already experience now, like poverty. See also 
Krautkraemer 2005, 5; Daly 1974; Daly 1997.
63 Tilton 1996, 96.
64 Luks 2010, 99. See also De Gregori 1987b, 1247 who claims that ‘Resources are not fixed and finite because 
they are not natural’; and Simpson, Toman, and Ayres 2004, 27–28 on terms like efficiency and optima.
65 Dumouchel 2013, 5.
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ontology. Neo-Malthusians and their limited absolute scarcity approach the world in 
terms of a fixed status (state of being), whereas Ricardians approach it in terms of a 
process (state of becoming). This implies furthermore that neither of them actually 
discuss shortages, whose immediacy contrasts with the abstract and long-term 
oriented logics of both relative and absolute scarcity. By contrasting shortages with 
absolute and relative forms of scarcity, it becomes possible to create Table 1 with its 
two axels. Immediately, the absence of a processual and immediate form of scarcity 
presents itself. A form of scarcity that does not deal with theoretically infinite or finite 
resources and equally finite or infinite desires/wants, but with the actual supply and 
demand of products. This form of scarcity is dubbed scarcification by Klein, but is 
based on a long Marxist line of thought.66
Together with neoclassical economists, Marx rejects the Malthusian logic. However, 
where neoclassical economics rejects absolute scarcity in favor of a logic of choice and 
relative scarcity, Marx rejects Malthus’ population law on other grounds. Through his 
concept of an ‘industrial reserve army’, Marx argues that overpopulation is not a threat 
but a necessity for capitalist accumulation.67 In terms of the subsequent scarcity, 
Perelman argues that Marx ‘does not treat scarcity as an independent category, but 
in relation to the mode of production, i.e., to the historically specific set of relations 
and forces of production, distribution, consumption, and so forth.’68 In particular, 
Marx contrasts the early development stage of a natural resource (cheap and easy) 
with later stages when the supply becomes harder and more difficult to extract. For 
Marx this means that both labor and capital are needed to fulfil the rising demand 
of ever harder acquired resources. In line with neoclassic economics, Marx argues 
that it is the inability or unwillingness to use labor or capital to increase the efficient 
usage of natural resource that leads to situations of scarcity.69 Simultaneously, Marx 
steps away from neoclassical economics and argues that scarcity cannot be conquered 
through economic growth and the promise of abundance, because of the underlying 
social inequalities between capital and labor within current economic systems. For 
Marx, any solution to scarcity would favor capital and thereby reinforce the capitalist 
form of domination with its inherent inequalities and shortages.70 In other words, 
Marx sees scarcity as the result of a historical process (a la Distributionists), not the 
end stage of a world of limits (neo-Malthusians) nor the taken for granted starting 
point of one’s analysis (Ricardians). He is therefore able to deal with both absolute and 
relative scarcity by blurring them in a process of scarcification.
66 Klein 2011, 12; Galbraith 2001, 31–39. See also Homer-Dixon 1999; Mitchell 2013 (for an example); or 
Huber 2011a on the role of the Seven Sisters in the Oil industry.
67 Perelman 1979, 83.
68 Ibid., 84.
69 Ibid.
70 Stillman 1983, 304–306. For a recent discussion see: Panayotakis 2011.
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This perspective of scarcification builds on the insight that scarcities are created 
in markets that are flawed and constantly manipulated for the betterment of some. 
Hoeschele, in his work Economics of Abundance, analyses the range of mechanisms in 
modern economic systems and society that create scarcity. These ‘scarcity-generating 
institutions’ work in either of three ways: supply can be reduced, people can be barred 
from supplies and additional demand can be created.71 This includes, for example, 
companies buying oil fields, technologies or ideas from start-ups without developing 
them. It includes direct legal and political entitlements to goods, but also more 
indirect, and hence more powerful, ideological and religious ways of organizing social 
life. It includes monopolized positions in economic markets along a supply chain, 
channeling capital, knowledge and power through a select few companies (the food 
regime in chapter 3). It also comprises of the artificial creation of demand through 
advertisement or other plays on emotions, including fear and security (see chapter 5). 
Hoeschele, himself returns the discussion to security when he argues that: 
Implicated in all of the above modes of scarcity generation—as well as in 
others, such as property—that are to be discussed later, is violence. […] 
Throughout history, whoever controlled the means of violence could use it to 
create a bottleneck between people and the fruits of their own labor, making 
the latter scarce. […] The “scarce” commodity in the case of violence is most 
often security.72
Hoeschele does not discuss this relation further other than to distinguish between 
‘oppressive scarcities’ and ‘exploitative scarcities’, or respectively, between scarcities 
that result from wider social and cultural settings or scarcities that result from the 
way markets are organized. The latter are different as they ‘do not explicitly forbid 
or demand certain types of behaviour, but constrain human actions by making 
some resources abundant and others scarce’.73 Important constraints, which will be 
discussed further below, include property (whether private, public or intellectual) and 
money (in particular debt and interest). 
Marx and Hoeschele are both critical about scarcity and the performative politics 
that surround it. This does not have to be the case. Like security, scarcity is highly 
normative but neither positive nor negative of its own. In his book Carbon Democracy, 
which reflects upon the history of the global oil industry, Mitchell analyses how the 
political choices within the oil, gas and coal industry at the introduction of a new 
technology or new infrastructure have long lasting social and political effects.74 
71 Hoeschele 2010, 10.
72 Ibid., 28.
73 Ibid., 31.
74 Mitchell 2013; Mitchell 2009.
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Mitchell discusses the intentionally created distance between oil production facilities 
and refineries, often across international borders, to minimize the political power of 
laborers to disrupt supply lines. He describes this as an intentional process aimed to 
prevent political strikes, like the ones witnessed in the coal industry in both the mines 
and the transport by rail and canal. From a democratic perspective, however, these 
initial coal strikes contributed strongly to an elite acceptance of initial democratization 
processes. In other words, Mitchell describes how scarcity and the threat of it have 
been used as a political instrument for the spread of democracy itself, and how these 
have been countered through the introduction of new scarcity-mechanisms. 
With scarcification, Table 1 provides four different types of scarcity that 
problematize any simplistic understanding of scarcity and the relation between 
people and their environment.75 First, what is often described and feared in popular 
language as scarcity of natural resources, especially in energy and food, are in fact 
acute shortages or hiccups in supply due to bad weather, technical failures, political 
disruptions or natural disasters that lead to ‘a shortage of supply in relation to the 
normal state of affairs.’76 Second, in neo-Malthusian terms, more long term forms 
of absolute scarcity follow when there is a general limit on the availability of natural 
resources that forces people to choose and engage in tradeoffs. The difference between 
shortages and absolute scarcity is a difference in time and abstraction with one 
focusing on supply/demand and the other on resources/wants, but both are ontic 
end-states that detail their origin. Third, the presence of shortages and a processual 
75 Daoud 2011b, 34 lists 14 different descriptions of scarcity, including absolute, relative, anti-, social, 
external, internal, post-, scarcity-, subjective, objective, artificial, general, universal, and natural. He 
then adds another by himself (quasi-scarcity) and misses at least five; static and dynamic, see HCSS 
2010, 25; concrete scarcity, see Claassen 2004; operational, actual, projective and scarcification, see Klein 
2011, 12.
76 Claassen 2004, 39 [author’s translation]; Klein 2011.
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interpretation of relative scarcity introduced political and economic induced forms 
of shortages that can be described in terms of scarcification: the process of making 
things scarce by either keeping supplies low or creating demand.77 Lastly, it becomes 
possible to make a distinction between absolute scarcity and relative scarcity. The 
difference between these two stems from, on the one hand, the above mentioned 
perceived objective limit of absolute scarcity, and, on the other hand, a social process 
wherein humans, for different reasons, constantly strive for new things and thus also 
(re)produce new relative scarcities.78 It is this last shift and its underlying assumption 
of unlimited desire that will be discussed below, as it is the (con)fusion of these 
different meanings within debates on scarcity that lead to, among others, the policy 
consequence that often technical supply oriented solutions are offered to deal with a 
form of scarcity that is in essence social in origin.79
6.4 from relative scarcity to the relativity of unlimited 
desire
6.4.1 Elasticity of Needs and Wants
Short as the above descriptions on the position of neoclassical economics on absolute 
scarcity and shortages may be, it already shows the evolution in economic thinking in 
simultaneously dealing with and moving away from absolute scarcity and shortages by 
focusing on supply oriented technological solutions and the workings of the market. 
Relative scarcity contains a paradox, however, one that Hoeschele describes as 
[t]he most basic paradox of our times, the times that we call modern and the 
mode of social organization we call capitalist, is that, no matter how many 
resources we consume, we never seem to have enough.80
This is not to say that neoclassical economics is completely blind to the demand side. 
For instance, in the discussion on scarcity people often separate basic needs from 
more luxurious wants. The field of economics incorporates this by ascribing a lower 
elasticity to resources like food, water and shelter that are ‘basic to human survival’, 
over luxurious products like perfume, muscle cars and so forth.81 People are willing 
to pay higher prices for longer for those products that they see as essential, whereas 
for other non-essential products their demand is more flexible in line with their 
77 Klein 2011, 12; Galbraith 2001, 31–39; See also Homer-Dixon 1999; and for an example see Mitchell 2013; 
or Huber 2011a on the role of the Seven Sisters in the Oil industry.
78 Claassen 2004; Achterhuis 1988; Xenos 1989.
79 Claassen 2004, 39–41.
80 Hoeschele 2010, 1.
81 Pimentel and Pimentel 2008, 1.
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income. The question of basic needs is difficult to settle on two accounts. First, as the 
discussions on energy security and food security have shown, what is a basic need 
changes over time. The example of food security highlights how the basic need for 
food in the 1970s initially was based on the quantity of calories, but these days also 
includes the quality of food, the nutritional value and the social acceptance. Another 
example comes from the transport sector, with cars a luxury item a century ago but 
these days a necessity as societies are organized around them (especially the US) and 
the absence of a car means that one is disadvantaged in finding and working a job, and 
thus to provide for oneself.82 Second, basic needs are relative. All people need water, 
but at the same time, persons from Western Europe are advised not to drink the 
tap water in underdeveloped countries. Similarly, whereas car ownership and driving 
skills are almost a basic need in the US, in Western Europe the car is decreasing in 
popularity among starters, especially among those working and living in cities.
There is nothing new about the conflating line between basic needs and other 
desires. Economics tries to solve this by defining demand as a combination of desire 
and the willingness to pay. The elasticity highlights the willingness to pay, but it 
does not explain the needs, let alone the unrelenting desire of modern societies. In 
other words, it seems to take the underlying desire for different and evermore goods 
as an ontological given.83 This is problematic in line with Keynes’ observations on 
the 1930s economic crisis, the critique of neo-Malthusians on ecological thresholds 
and the observations from Hoeschele and Marx on scarcification and the creation 
of needs and wants. Theoretically, however, it is a necessity for without unlimited 
desires, relative scarcities would not exist and the constant search for solutions to 
those relative scarcities would halt. This could potentially mean that people are also 
no longer able to tackle those limited subsistence demands that they do need. 
6.4.2 The Relativity of Desire
Not much is written on the origin of relative scarcity and the infinite needs and wants 
of the public at large, nor on the relation with abundance and sufficiency.84 Sociology 
and philosophy are filling this lacuna by analyzing the origins of the ‘paradoxical 
scarcity of abundance’ or the fact that even in abundance there is scarcity.85 Below 
this section focusses on the work of Claassen, Achterhuis and Xenos and the social 
mechanisms at work behind the unlimited relative desire that underpins relative 
82 Illich 1974; Campbell 2005.
83 Yapa 1996b, 715 notes that in so doing economics is unable to differentiate between basic needs and other 
non-essential demands.
84 However, heterodox economics (including evolutionary and ecological economics) questions the 
universality of scarcity by broadening the initial assumptions of economics towards questions of both 
the economics of scarcity and the economics of abundance. See Daoud 2011a.
85 On the term ‘paradoxical scarcity of abundance’ see Raiklin and Uyar 1996, 54.
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scarcity. These authors explain scarcity by focusing on the origins of the infinity of 
humankind’s desires and wants. They share that scarcity is not an objective fact of 
our world, but that it is a consequence and invention of modernity following Sahlins’ 
pre-modern counterfactual.86 Together these authors build and move beyond the 
perspective of scarcification and argue that relative scarcity is a product of modernity 
that naturalizes an unlimited relative desire. In the words of Dolphijn & Tuin: ‘[d]
esire is never a given. Rather, like a long shadow projected from the past, it is a 
forward-moving horizon that lies ahead and towards which one moves. Between the 
“no longer” and the “not yet,” desire traces the possible patterns of becoming.’87 
In his 2004 Dutch work Het Eeuwige Tekort [The Eternal Shortage], Claassen starts 
with a discussion of scarcity similar to the one above and concludes that in modern 
day language use relative scarcity is often discussed in terms of absolute scarcity and 
shortages, which leads him to argue for the inherent incompatibility of the loud and 
frequent calls for productionist technological fixes for an inherently social problem.88 
Claassen then visits classic liberal authors like Rawls and Hume, and shows how 
these, similar to neoclassical economics, take relative scarcity as their starting 
point. More specific, Claassen (as well as the authors below) argues that somewhere 
between the 17th and 18th century liberals, like Locke, Rawls and Hume, naturalized 
scarcity by placing it outside humans and describing it as a natural law, as a fact 
of nature.89 In other words, by accepting relative scarcity and then hide it behind 
shortages and absolute scarcity. Then again, contra most modern-day geopolitical 
neorealist discussions on absolute scarce resources, these early liberal scholars argued 
that scarcity does not automatically result in competition. Instead, they claimed that 
scarcity forces people to cooperate even if they are selfish, as humans are inherently 
driven to further their personal development and cooperation is beneficial to this on 
the long-term.90 After discussing this exemplary liberal standpoint, Claassen turns to 
social philosophy and in particular the works of Achterhuis and Xenos.91 
Like Claassen, Achterhuis reflects on scarcity with the writings from classic authors, 
like Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Marx and Foucault. Contra Claassen, Achterhuis uses 
this literature to deduce several social constructions that have made relative scarcity 
possible (e.g. comparable to Hoeschele’s scarcity mechanisms). The first of these has 
86 Sahlins 1972.
87 Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 32.
88 Claassen 2004, 40–41.
89 Achterhuis 1993, 107 describes Locke as the author who hid scarcity in full sight by blaming nature for 
not providing enough resources and tasking humankind to manage and improve it with labour. Locke, 
in Achterhuis’ view, provided us with the ‘modern images of nature and the idea of unlimited progress 
and growth’.
90 Claassen 2004, 47–72.
91 Achterhuis 1988; Xenos 1989.
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been the shift from common forms of ownership to private ownership. This shift enabled 
the exclusion of ‘rivals’ from natural resources in both the present and future, even 
without actual physical control of the good.92 The second construction is money, which 
strengthened ideas of accumulation as it enabled people to gain wealth independent of 
the storage life of natural products. Money makes it possible to produce more than what 
people consume themselves, it enables production for profit. Money also offers a relative 
objective way to compare people and hence strengthens social ideas of equality.93 
Achterhuis builds on this, thirdly, through Girard’s concept of mimetic contagion, which 
describes the drive of humans to mimic their peers, to want what other people want so 
that they are not left behind.94 As Dumouchel, a student of Girard, states: ‘[a]n agent’s 
preferences are always under the influence of other agents’ preferences.’95 By mimicking 
others, individuals strive for the same goods. Where the realist Hobbes sees a triangular 
struggle between two persons based on the characteristics (quantity/quality) of the 
good in question, Girard argues that the good itself does not matter much, but that 
the other person is seen as a model to be emulated. The other can either be a positive 
model that people copy in admiration, or s/he can be a negative model from which 
people distance themselves by refusing anything that is connected to those persons.96 
This, Achterhuis remarks, leads to a situation where those not involved in the initial 
mimetic struggle become victim to it nevertheless. The mimeses of two agents results 
in a situation where the goods become scarce for all involved, but relatively instead of 
absolute.97 Together the mechanisms of money, property and mimetic contagion make 
scarcity into a comparative or relative form of scarcity. They also lead to the conclusion 
that an increase in a particular good, i.e. through mass production or efficiency, may 
enlighten a logic of choice but will not solve the phenomenon of scarcity itself.98 
Where Achterhuis explains relative scarcity with Girard’s mimetic contagion, Xenos, 
writing at roughly the same time, explains the phenomenon of scarcity through Hirsch 
and his ideas on the social limits to growth and the difference between a material and 
positional economy.99 For Hirsch, goods are not only scarce because of physical limits, 
but because of their role in society.100 In a material economy of consumer goods, an 
92 Achterhuis 1988, 185–212.
93 Ibid., 58, 131–136, 256–259.
94 Ibid., 39–59. 
95 Dumouchel 2013, 10.
96 Achterhuis 1993, 113; Claassen 2004, 77. Dumouchel 2013 argues that negative mimetics results from 
mimicking the other without actually copying. Instead, one chooses a radical alternative: not blue but 
red just because it is the other.
97 Achterhuis 1988, 59.
98 See for another critique Bataille 1988; Baudrillard 2013.
99 Xenos 1989, 5; Hirsch 1976.
100 Hirsch 1976, 1, 21. Importantly, Hirsch analysis starts from the stage after biological needs have been met 
(food, shelter and clothing).
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increase in the number of goods or the number of people with access to that good does 
not downgrade the product in question. This contrasts with a positional economy, which 
builds on the status of a good. In such an economy, the perceived quality is negatively 
correlated to the number of products or people that have access to them.101 An education 
at Harvard, a Lamborghini or a highway decrease in worth with more people enjoying 
them, just as the position of a general or president becomes useless if shared. Hirsch 
points here to the social limits to growth, as more economic growth in a positional 
economy will only lead to more competition for these positional products; in fact, even 
the ability to compete for positional goods becomes a commercialized activity itself (as 
we see with university degrees).102 Xenos provides the example of clothing and fashion 
to conclude that even when material goods are available in abundance (e.g. clothing), 
scarcity will remain present because humans have an inherent drive to seek recognition 
and prestige (e.g. fashion).103 Where Girard’s mimesis describes a general never ending 
process, Hirsch’s ideas explain the insatiability of desire that neoclassical economist 
and liberals like Hume and Rawls take-for-granted. What they share is the idea of 
recognition, which leads Claassen to argue that a desire for recognition is the ultimate 
positional good that drives the constant desire for more goods themselves, whether in 
terms of goods, services, abilities or positions. 104  
As stated above, all three authors agree that scarcity, as we know it today, is a 
product of modernity and unknown in pre-modern hunter-gatherer societies.105 This 
does not mean that pre-modern societies were unfamiliar with shortages (or absolute 
scarcity for that matter). They lived through them on a daily basis and depended on 
their ability to move to overcome these situations.106 However, the argument is that 
they were not familiar with the individualistic form of relative scarcity and infinity of 
needs that people experience today.107 From this, it follows that the solution to scarcity 
101 Ibid., 27.
102 Ibid., 6; Claassen 2004, 110–111.
103 Xenos 1989, 5. Xenos puts fashion, a material good that follows social scarcity, as an alternative to 
paintings and other positional goods.
104 Claassen 2004, 121–122.
105 Sahlins 1972, 1–39. For a recent discussion see: Panayotakis 2011, 41–44.
106 In relation to this argument, in personal communication Professor Lobo-Guerrero reflected on an 
anecdote from Colombia, where Western aid-workers and the government tried to help Amazon Indians, 
who were forced to remain within a small-protected enclave, by providing them with foodstuff. When 
they later returned they found all the animals slaughtered and the excess food eaten. The Indians had no 
idea of accumulation or savings. Their whole lives they had instead relied on movement as an answer to 
shortages. This contrast heavily with a settlement mind-set where one is dependent on ‘externalities’ to 
get the resources one needs / is addicted to.
107 See Matthaei 1984, 86. This distinction explains what Mehta 2010b, 21 means when she rejects a pre-
modern counterfactual. Instead, she argues that: ‘interpretivists would reject Polanyi’s and Shalins’ 
primitive versus market society dichotomy since all ‘actors’, be they in ‘capitalist’ or ‘primitive’ societies, 
would constantly be interpreting the phenomenon of scarcity (as rooted in locally and historically specific 
meaning, belief systems and culture) and developing social practises and institutions accordingly’.
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lies not in an increase in production and supply, nor is it a return to a pre-modern 
practice of resource use. While theoretically the answer to scarcity sounds quite 
simple, the long and marginalized history of (religious) asceticism, which argues for 
an extreme form of material abstinence and which dates back to Aristotle, displays the 
difficulty of reducing the wants and needs of “modern” human consumers.108 Recent 
research on the concepts of needs, sufficiency, abundance and affluence confirms the 
difficulties encountered when analysts try to focus on the demand side of scarcity, 
when they try to introduce more equal forms of scarcity-mechanisms, or when people 
want to pursue a non-growth or steady state model of economics, so different from 
our current economic model based upon growth oriented neo-liberal capitalism.109 
6.4.3 Allocation, Conflict, and Relative Deprivation
In the absence of any clear resolution, scarcity will remain all pervasive. With relative 
scarcity based on relative desires, what follows are feelings of relative deprivation: 
that people feel deprived from something they know others possess. However, it 
is only when people compare themselves with others and know that others have it 
‘better’ that they feel deprived. The resulting temporal and geographic disparity 
between haves and have-nots opens the floor to strife, poverty, social inequality, etc. 
As Le Billon describes the relation between scarcity and abundance: ‘if it is scarcity 
that creates value, it is abundance that creates wealth.’110 These conflictual relations 
between haves and have-nots are mainly analyzed from a Distributionists perspective, 
especially in the development literature. Distributionists focus on the social power 
and wealth relationships between (future) haves and (future) have-nots. For scholars 
working from these assumptions, the quantity and quality of natural resources are 
not the actual problem. The problem for these scholars is to be found in the socially 
organized judicial, political and economic access (entitlements) to the resources.111 
This paragraph will not study the entitlements themselves, but shifts the attention 
to the role that scarcity plays in the organization of social relations, in particular, its 
conflict potential. 
While the many practices of cooperation on interstate and local levels indicate 
that Hardin, when writing his Tragedy of the Commons, might have been wrong in 
arguing that the collective action problem on natural resources can only lead to 
environmental degradation and more scarcity, the potential for conflict remains a 
108 See Claassen 2004 for an extensive discussion on possible ways out of scarcity.
109 Daoud 2011b; Soper 2007; Princen 2005; Galbraith 2001; Panayotakis 2011; Hoeschele 2010. On 
economic no-growth or steady-state models see Daly 1972; Daly 1993. Daly is now considered one of 
the frontrunners of the sub-discipline of ecological economics, see Van den Bergh 2001.
110 Le Billon 2001, 565.
111 Sen 1983; Sen 1993; Homer-Dixon 1999, 35–37; Devereux 2001; Sen 2013; Gasper 2007; Robeyns 2005.
165
6Chapter 6
captivating argument.112 Consequently, most geopolitical research within IR and 
policy reports on natural resources still start from a realist perspective, emphasizing 
and prioritizing the risks and security dimension of these resources in terms of 
resource nationalism, land-grabbing or dependency. Yet, a quick overview of the 
conflict literature shows that conflict and natural resources are closely connected, 
but that the evidence is inconclusive on any specific relationships.113 Much depends 
on the definition of conflict, what is considered to be the main onset motivation, 
and whether one includes conflicts over territory (e.g. land) under the definition of 
a natural resources (often excluded). Even more important is whether one studies 
interstate conflicts or intrastate (civil) conflicts and whether one studies the relation 
between conflicts and scarce natural resources or the relation between conflict and 
abundant resources. 
On an interstate level a possible correlation between scarce natural resources and 
conflict remains unclear, partly indicating that it is unlikely that international wars 
have been fought purely based on the scarcity of natural resources.114 At the same 
time, abundant resources are correlated to interstate conflicts, oil in particular.115 Yet, 
while they are correlated, the direct causal relationships remain unclear.116 Abundant 
resources could for example play a role in fueling the instruments of war, function 
as a strategic military target or act as a motive for the onset of the conflict. These 
motives are most interesting but also most difficult to argue for, as they are often 
hidden behind other nationalistic, sovereign, democratic or terrorist intentions and 
justification, which play a defining role and without which the wars are not fought. 
A case in point is the Iraq War (2003-2011) where publicly and legally oil and gas 
did not play a role in the run up to the conflict, regardless of the consensus on their 
112 Wolf et al. 2005, 84; Lappe 2003; Mehta 2003. Including international treaties (the Energy Charter, 
UNCLOS or one of the thousands of water conventions - see Wolf et al 2005), information sharing 
initiatives (the JODI program), and on a local level initiatives like the Landless Workers Movement 
(Brazil), Green Belt Movement (Kenia) and water sharing practices (India). On common pool resources 
see: Hardin 1968; Agrawal 2001; Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003.
113 Conflict can be read in multiple ways: it can either be violent or non-violent, if violent it can be physically 
violence (incl. oppression/forced labour), cultural violence (racism, religion) or structural violence 
(inequality). However, most often conflict is only distinguished from wars and clashes based on the 
number of fatalities following the UCDP/PRIO dataset: (civil) war [>1000 fatalities], (civil) conflict [>25 
fatalities] and clashes [material damage and fatalities <25]. See Gleditsch et al. 2002. In fact, during the 
food crisis in 2008 most conflict was not described as conflict, but instead as violent social unrest, see: 
Evans 2010, 23.
114 Dalby 1998; Dalby 2004; Dalby 2010; Ross 2004b; Le Billon 2001; Le Billon 2007; Fearon 2005; Fairhead 
2001; Gleditsch 1998, 394; Wolf et al. 2005.
115 Caselli, Morelli, and Rohner 2013, 5; de Soysa, Gartzke, and Lie 2009.
116 Le Billon and Cervantes 2009; Homer-Dixon 1994, 18–19 quotes Arthur Westing (ed.). 1986. Global 
Resources and International Conflict: Environmental Factors in Strategic Policy and Action. Oxford: New 
York. P204-210.
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importance and Greenspan’s affirmative remarks post facto.117 Even the most-likely 
case of the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor can be questioned on whether 
the Japanese petroleum supply concerns alone initiated it.118 In respect to other 
abundant resources, the links are even less clear, as highlighted by the research into 
fresh (river) water and fish.119 Wolf et al. identify only one interstate war fought over 
water dating back to early Greek civilization. Similarly, a recent database on water 
conflicts by Gleick shows that there have been 24 interstate conflicts (out of the 343 
entries between 3000 BC to 2014) and all of them are classified as clashes instead of 
actual wars or conflicts.120 
All of the other entries from Gleick’s Water Conflict Chronology List take place 
on a local level within states. Indeed, statistical research shows a stronger correlation 
between natural resources and civil conflict.121 Theoretically, natural resources 
play an important role in relation to civil conflicts via a variety of mechanisms 
that are frequently summarized in terms of greed versus grievance explanations, 
but also include resource curse explanations and weak-state mechanisms of failing 
government.122 On the one hand, scarce renewable resources are said to create social 
unrest and grievances on a local scale. For example, a population increase could lead 
to competition over resources, just as climate change could lead to a degradation of 
the local environment and thus to more competition over the remaining sources of 
food and water. Both of these result in lower and disruptive economic trade and a 
further unequal distribution of the remaining renewable resources.123 However, 
empirical research has been unable to find strong correlations between scarce 
renewable resources (including environmental degradation) and civil conflict.124 On 
117 Woodward 2007.
118 Smil 2008, 355–356.
119 Wolf et al. 2005; Gleick 1993; Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano 2003; Wolf 2011; Gleditsch et al. 2006; Kemp 
1978, 405–406.
120 Wolf et al. 2005, 84; Gleick 2014. Selection based on violence between two or more states and with water 
as a development dispute or military target.
121 For a recent discussion, see Koubi et al. 2014.
122 For an excellent overview of this multitude of mechanisms: Humphreys 2005; Le Billon 2007. On the 
resource curse thesis: Ross 1999. For a more critical perspective on the resource curse: Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte 2008.
123 Homer-Dixon 1994; Homer-Dixon 1995; Homer-Dixon 1999 argues strongly in favour of this mechanism 
and argues that scarcity doesn’t always lead to more innovation as people could fall into an ingenuity gap 
as social relations break down (contra economics). In other words, scarcity could take forms that make 
it extremely hard to develop alternatives.
124 Koubi et al. 2014, 229; Theisen 2008, 810; Raleigh and Urdal 2007. Some even argue that fighting a conflict 
over scarce resources alone is irrational. The suffering party, often the weakest as they lack the resource 
in question, is not likely to attack its stronger neighbour as only a total, but unlikely, victory could make 
it worthwhile. Salehyan 2008, 317. Saleyhyn builds his argument in part on Fearon 1995. However, for 




the other hand, greedy mechanisms based on the earnings derived from the export 
of (lootable) non-renewable resources, like oil, diamonds and minerals are correlated 
to civil conflicts.125 Sometimes as a prize to be won, but more often as an important 
factor to finance and prolong ongoing conflicts.126 In other words, pending the specific 
characteristics of the resource and conflict, there seems to be a correlation between 
abundant natural resources and civil conflict.127 A correlation that is as much or 
even more due to failed governance structures than it is to ‘greed’ explanations. In 
short, while scarce natural resources are not strongly correlated to conflict, it can be 
concluded that abundant non-renewable natural resources are, on both a civil and 
interstate level. 
The difficulty in showing a correlation, let alone a direct causal relationship, 
indicates the complexity of the link between conf licts and scarce or abundant 
natural resources. The focus on the potentiality of conf lict also obscures research 
that focusses on practices of cooperation and the aversion of conf licts. Clearly, 
it is erroneous to reduce natural resources and conf lict to each other: conf licts 
often involve multiple dimensions (environment, politics, history, culture etc.), 
its mechanisms are multiple and intertwined, and the resources themselves are 
always more than a simple source of income and economic growth, as can be 
witnessed by the cultural and religious importance of the Ganges in India.128 
While natural resources play an important role in conf licts, the conf lict 
potential of either shortages or abundance depends in large part on the specific 
historical extraction and ownership patterns.129 As Le Billon argues, perceptions 
of insecurity and dependency can only come about in the wider context of ‘the 
[historical] creation of markets and associated commodity chains, predicated 
upon the social construction of desirable resources.’130 Mehta makes a similar 
argument by arguing that: ‘Whether markets, innovation, rights, institutional 
fixes or bits of all of the above are evoked to deal with resource scarcity, they 
are all socio-political choices governed by the politics of allocation and decision-
making and contestations about what meanings are embodied in resources.’131 She 
too draws the attention away from material and technical aspects to the choices 
made within the ‘politics of allocation’. No more silver-bullets or a reference to 
125 Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; 
Dalby 2004.
126 Collier 2007 also discusses this in terms of ‘feasibility’. Ross 2004a; and Ross 2004b confirm this duration 
effect, but reject any onset effects.
127 For an overview see Koubi et al. 2014, 232–237. Although Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2009 question this.
128 Le Billon 2007, 164; Mehta 2010b; Bavinck, Pellegrini, and Mostert 2014.
129 For the weak-state thesis, see Fearon 2005. For the resource curse thesis, see Ross 1999; Ross 2006; Van 
der Ploeg 2011.
130 Le Billon 2001, 576.
131 Mehta 2010b, 12.
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scarcity as a pre-defined problem, but a critical ref lection on the manner in which 
the production, distribution and consumption of natural resources are organized 
and governed. 
In addition to these empirical and critical analyses, the Hobbesian inspired work 
of Achterhuis is useful to reflect on a theoretical level about how scarcity relates to 
conflict. Counterintuitively, Achterhuis’ argument centers not on the Hobbesian 
perspective of fear, envy or conflict, but instead turns towards Rousseau and the 
norm of human equality.132 The Enlightenment claim that all humans are equal, has, 
according to Achterhuis, if not “created”, then at least enhanced feelings of relative 
deprivation by enabling people to compare themselves with one another on the 
quantity and quality of the goods they possess – often in terms of money. Whereas 
pre-modern societies were organized around constant movement and strong family 
or clan ties with their hierarchical structures and solidarity obligations in times 
of shortages, modern society is built around a Hobbesian individualism and the 
(perceived) separation of economics and politics.133 Achterhuis posits himself here 
against liberal thinkers like Rawls, who, by way of his ‘veil-of-ignorance’, argues that 
this individualism forces people to cooperate.134 Instead, Achterhuis explains scarcity 
by combining a Hobbesian triangular relationship (two persons struggling over a 
good) with the insights of Girard and Dumouchel (not the good itself but mimesis). 
In doing so, he concedes to Adam Smith that economics occupies a middle ground 
between cooperation and competition as it offers trade and the ‘invisible hand’ of the 
market as a peaceful solution to the distribution of resources and goods.135 In other 
words, for Achterhuis the market and the individual experience of scarcity offer the 
inherent competition between people a way out for the best of society, without having 
to result to physical conflict. 
While modern economic society might have found a way to contain the strive 
between social groups and agents mimicking each other based on individualization, 
chapter 6.3.2 showed that there are still people who (unintentional) end up as victims 
of this struggle.136 In their mimetic and social strive for goods, (rich) agents can either 
privatize previously common resources, completely exhaust certain goods, or, by their 
increasing and changing demand, make previously “luxuriously” goods a necessity 
for others to partake in society (cars, internet, etc.).137 As a result, victims can be 
found in the third world, following the global extraction patters of natural resources, 
132 Achterhuis 1988, 116–182.
133 Dumouchel 2014; Dumouchel 2013; Achterhuis 1988, 47–54.
134 Claassen 2004, 49.
135 Achterhuis 1988, 57; Dumouchel 2014.
136 Achterhuis 1988, 217; Claassen 2004, 77–80; Mehta 2010b, 16; Ross 1996.
137 Gibbons 1991, 269.
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but also within Western societies based on an unequal distribution of wealth.138 As 
Hoeschele argues: 
In many social contexts, certain levels of consumption are considered 
obligatory in order to “belong.” Thus, constantly escalating consumption is 
enforced. This represents a loss of freedom for those people who either do not 
want to buy these things, or cannot afford them.139
These processes are so deeply ingrained in our modern society that Achterhuis 
concludes, comparable to Sachs, that any solution based on sustainable development, 
is still a ‘rush forward, precipitated by the fear of scarcity […] and the destruction of 
nature, [which] would only be accelerated as the world’s rich would continue to raise 
their own consumption levels.140 This negative consequence turns relative scarcity 
into a savior and a structural source of violence at the same time. A savior, because it 
reduces actual conflict through practices of trade and innovation that lead to economic 
growth. And at the same time a structural source of violence, which could very well 
lead to conflicts but often is simply accepted as inevitable and the responsibility of the 
individual in question. Dumouchel calls this the ‘ambivalence of scarcity’ and argues 
that ‘[s]carcity does not seek to protect agents from violence or hardship by making 
them reciprocally responsible, but to prevent the spread of violence by removing each 
person’s incentive to participate in the conflicts of others’.141 Violent conflict is thus 
not an automatic consequence of scarcity, yet scarcity is a form of violence itself.142 
6.5 The self-reinforcing nature of scarcity
6.5.1 Normalizing Scarcity
So far, scarcity is discussed in this chapter from two different levels of abstraction.143 First, 
the most obvious and recognizable level is the one that is studied extensively elsewhere 
and which regards the uninterrupted access to and competitive ownership of a set of 
given scarce and abundant natural resources. Second, scarcity is discussed from a more 
ethical and critical position regarding a fair allocation of resources as well as strategic 
use of scarcity (arguments) to favor existing power relations and ownership positions 
within ‘the historically constructed political economy of resources’ and ‘geographies 
138 Gibbons 1991. See also Mullainathan and Shafir 2013.
139 Hoeschele 2010, 10.
140 Achterhuis 1993, 113.
141 Dumouchel 2013, 4; Dumouchel 2014; Achterhuis 1988; Claassen 2004, 78–79.
142 Evans 2010; Galtung 1990.
143 See also Mehta 2010b, 22.
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of war’.144 Here the argument is that natural resources mean different things to different 
people at different locations in different times. Arguing otherwise is to push for a 
particular understanding of scarcity and its inherent material effects and power claims. 
Within this second branch, a range of post-structural scholars increasingly studies the 
structuring effects of language; or how not only the strategic use of arguments but the 
meaning and everyday language on scarcity itself – through subsequent practices – 
structures particular ownership and allocation regimes.145 This aspect will be discussed 
in more detail below with the historic work of Foucault and the systemic work of 
Luhmann, in order to find out what scarcity “does” by being what it “is”.
Foucault’s main reflection on scarcity can be found in Security, Territory and 
Population, a lecture series given at the Collège de France in 1977 and 1978.146 For 
Foucault scarcity is an example that captures the shift in thought around the 17th 
and 18th century from sovereign and disciplinary forms of power to what he calls 
governmentality (discussed in detail in chapter 8). For now, what matters is that Foucault 
studies how people govern shortages, which he defines as ‘a state of food shortage that 
has the property of engendering a process that renews it and, in the absence of another 
mechanism halting it, tends to extend it and make it more acute.”147 In particular, 
Foucault notes how a group of scholars and policy makers, the Physiocrats, transformed 
how food shortages were governed in France in the second half of the 18th century by 
following and extending the British ‘Corn Laws’ of the 17th century.
Foucault describes how food shortages originally were seen in France either as an 
unlucky event caused by bad weather or as a consequence of ‘man’s evil nature’, by 
which people referred to his incessant desires and his unwillingness to share.148 Based 
on these conceptualizations of the causes of scarcity,
scarcity was countered by […] a system of legality and a system of regulations, 
which was basically intended to prevent food shortage, that is to say, not just to 
halt it or eradicate it when it occurs, but literally to prevent it and ensure that 
it cannot take place at all.149 
144 Le Billon 2001, 575; Le Billon 2007. See also: Mehta 2010b, 15; Ciobanu 2006; Aguilera-Klink, Pérez-
Moriana, and Sánchez-Garcia 2000; Hildyard 1996; Alatout 2008. For example, solutions to scarcity 
are often framed in terms of ‘managing’ scarcity, putting the focus on technical fixes instead of cultural 
adaptation.
145 Ciobanu 2006; Aguilera-Klink, Pérez-Moriana, and Sánchez-Garcia 2000; Hildyard 1996; Alatout 2008; 
Huber 2011a.
146 Foucault 2007.
147 Ibid., 30. Foucault refers to the practices of hoarding and monopolization, which occur when goods are seen 
as being in short supply, thereby increasing prices and reinforcing the initial shortage and idea of scarcity. 





In other words, an ‘anti-scarcity system’ that tried to prevent the fear of scarcity 
by controlling all economic and trade related aspects of it, through price controls, 
hoarding prohibitions, export restrictions, import diversification and the stockpiling 
of reserves.150 The Physiocrats remarked, however, that this also reduces the incentives 
and financial options for farmers to increase production, thereby initiating higher 
prices and a desire to govern this aspect of the supply chain as well, which in turn 
leads to production quotas, and so on in a continuous spiral of failing management 
and a desire for more meticulous control. 
Foucault identifies this latter reflection as the main economic argument used by 
the Physiocrats to shift the governance of food shortages away from ‘the obsessive 
fear of scarcity’ to ‘the reality of grain’.151 Instead of a policy aimed at the prevention 
of scarcity by intervening on the market, the Physiocrats focused on all the things 
that influenced the production and trade of grain, and argued that all of these 
needed to be understood and supported through an apparatus that governs them 
favorably.152 They replaced the system of sovereign and disciplinary regulation with 
an economic system based on market mechanisms and an acceptance of scarcity. As 
Foucault paraphrases the physiocrat Abeille: ‘[scarcity] is never the pure and simple 
total absence of the means of subsistence necessary for a population, because if that 
were the case the population would quite simply die. It would die in days or weeks, 
he says, and we have never seen a population disappear due to the absence of food.’153 
Why? Because before all the food is eaten, measures are enacted to cope with the 
anticipated situation. 
Such a political economic acceptance of scarcity transforms the fear for 
shortages and its subsequent ‘anti-scarcity’ measures (which actually create 
them) into a market that relies on relative scarcity. Instead of a whole population 
suffering from food shortages this results in ‘some scarcity, some dearness, some 
difficulty […] and consequently some hunger’ for some individuals.154 This has 
two consequences. First and perhaps counter-intuitive, for such a market system 
to work scarcity is a prerequisite. Rephrased more bluntly, some individuals, even a 
multitude of individuals, need to go hungry so that the population as a whole does 
not suffer from scarcity.155 This leads to a situation where, as Nally argues, ‘the old 
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of “hunger amidst abundance”.’156 As Nally concludes after ref lecting on modern 
agricultural practices: 
The conviction that further production gains will seamlessly translate into 
more calories for the poor is empirically shaky and ideologically driven. So 
long as the world’s hungry remain poor consumers, they are unlikely to reap 
the benefits of a food system hinged on the cash nexus. Calories will continue 
to flow up the food chain, reappearing as meat or fuel, available at a price.157
Secondly, the market in this perspective ‘is at once an analysis of what happens and 
a program for what should happen.’158 It is both a way to interpret scarcity and a way 
to deal with it. In other words, somewhere in this discussion scarcity transformed 
from an exogenous variable in need of a solution into a norm on which people can 
be judged. Inevitably, with people able to break the norm, there is cause to protect 
the norm from those people who, under the threat of shortages and ideas of absolute 
scarcity, do not behave “rationally”, who do not wait for prices to drop but start 
hoarding in the expectation that prices will increase even more.159 The argument put 
forward here is that the shift initiated by the Physiocrats is itself a particular way 
of dealing with scarcity that is based on a particular understanding of scarcity. A 
way that is secured against those who try to play faulty (smugglers, hoarders, raiders, 
etc.) by using sovereign and disciplinary regulatory mechanisms to protect itself 
from alternative ways of dealing with scarcity. Nally, for example, describes how 
international intellectual property rights on genetically modified seeds are used to 
criminalize (non-Western) local anti-scarcity measures like local redistribution 
practices and practices of seed sharing and saving.160 
Within this short analysis from Foucault, everything discussed so far comes 
together. In the shift from the fear of scarcity to the reality of grain, it shows a 
glimpse of the origins of neoclassical economics and their theoretical shift from 
shortages to relative scarcity. In the idea that the current economic system is built on 
a geographical and chronological dispersion of shortages over a population, one finds 
an early indication of the relativity of desire and the theoretical depressing conclusion 
that some people always will need to go hungry because the market does not function 
without scarcity and price differences. This is the real limit of abundance: if goods 
156 Nally 2011, 40 quotes Araghi F. 2000 The Great Global Enclosure of Our Times: Peasants and the Agrarian 
Question at the end of the Twentieth Century, in Magdoff F., Foster J. B. and Buttel F. H. eds. Hungry for 
Profit: the Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment, Monthly Review Press: New York, 
145–60, 155.
157 Ibid., 49.





are truly abundant, markets break down. This implies that the economic solutions 
to scarcity can only be achieved at all if scarcity is prerequisite. It also means that 
markets do not have real incentives to deliver abundance systemically, as Nally shows 
in the quote above.161 In fact, following Hirsch, they cannot even deliver abundance 
because the norm of scarcity, relative scarcity, has shifted into the social domain onto 
social goods. Moreover, as Achterhuis argues, ‘while within the economic space every 
redistribution of ownership reinforces scarcity,’ Foucault teaches that in respect to the 
social norm ‘every form of resistance reinforces the rule of scarcity.’162 We can decide 
not to trade, but it is impossible to break away from the norm of scarcity and not to 
think in terms of it: ‘scarcity [truly] is all-pervasive.’163
6.5.2 Structuring Scarcity
What Nally and Achterhuis allude to here is something that Luhmann has studied in-
depth, namely the systemic self-referential paradox inherent to scarcity. Interestingly, 
this returns this chapter to the initial paradoxes in its introduction and to the earlier 
conclusions that neoclassical economics “hides scarcity” or that violent conflict is 
not an automatic consequence of scarcity, but that scarcity is a structural form of 
violence itself. For the German scholar Luhmann scarcity is not a natural state of 
affairs, but a concept that is organized primarily through the way it is organizing us. 
But how is it organizing us? For Luhmann the answer lies in the coding of scarcity. 
People talk about scarcity or abundance, have or have not, secure or not secure in a 
constant repetition of distinctions. Luhmann argues that without distinctions and 
their communicative use these concepts, including scarcity, would not exist (see also 
chapter 7.4). It is in their constant use that these distinctions are reinforced and that 
the inherent paradox of scarcity is hidden within an increasingly complex social 
system that tries to tackle it.
Luhmann studies scarcity in depth on at least two occasions: first, in a chapter 
in Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft from 1988 and, second, as a case in his work Risk: 
A Sociological Theory from 1993.164 As a scholar renowned for his work on social 
systems of communication, Luhmann offers a systemic perspective on the activity 
of using a concept, like scarcity, when communicating. For Luhmann, scarcity is a 
self-referential problem based on a distinction between scarce and not-scarce. The 
communicative use of the concept of scarcity is self-referential because the social 
observation of scarce or not-scarce results in the operation of the distinction between 
access and no-access. As Luhmann notes: ‘scarcity means that access (the classical 
161 See also: Huber 2011a; Mitchell 2013.
162 Achterhuis 1988, 274 [author’s translation].
163 Luks 2010, 94.
164 Luhmann 1988, chap. 6; Luhmann 1993, chap. 3.
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term is occupation) for one is at the cost of access for others.’165 When one person 
gains access to a resource, s/he actively excludes others from its use. This is well 
known. However, by approaching it from his systems perspective (as opposed to 
individual events) Luhmann concludes that scarcity, as it operates through access, 
is a self-referential paradox: ‘Der Zugriff erzeugt mithin Knappheit, wärend zugleich 
Knappheit als Motiv für den Zugriff fungiert.’166 By excluding others based on a social 
observation of scarcity, scarcity becomes manifest and presents itself as the main 
motif for excluding those others in the first place. 
This paradox, Luhmann argues, is continuously repackaged and hidden in other 
new distinctions. The paradox of access leads to a code based on the distinction 
between haves and have-nots, which transforms the issue of exclusion into one of 
allocation and distribution through two specific media: property and trade. The first, 
property, came into being the moment when access to a good became the possession 
of a good.167 The strength of this medium stems from repetition: once you have access 
to a good and ‘own’ it, you keep having it. In fact, Luhmann argues, in line with 
De Gregori above, that something does not become a ‘good’ until it can be owned. 
The original paradox is hidden within the idea of property, which legally is defined 
as ‘[d]er “Genuβ” (fruitio) des Eigentums’.168 This is another paradox as enjoyment 
can only come about after ownership, but simultaneously is also the justification for 
it. What interests Luhmann at this point is once more the coding of this problem, 
in this case that of property and non-property. He wonders, especially, why some 
people allow others to own anything at all? His answer is that once ownership was 
settled as an institution (by force?), it became tradable.169 People allow ownership 
because they have a chance to acquire (and lose) it in exchange. Importantly, after a 
while the ability to trade and exchange has become more important than the actual 
property. In this shift to financialization, scarcity turned from an object into a risk, 
as it endangered a person’s ability to trade and gain wealth.170 In this transformation, 
the paradox of scarcity is hidden once more.
Luhmann continues by noting how, with the conversion of property towards the 
importance of trade and exchange, the enjoyment of property changed as well. The 
rationality of enjoyment shifted from the enjoyment of the good itself towards the 
enjoyment of the good in relation to other goods and/or the potential enjoyment to be 
gained by spending one’s money elsewhere. In other words, the first conversion from 
access into property was taken up within a second conversion from property into 
165 Luhmann 1993, 62.
166 Luhmann 1988, 179.
167 Ibid., 188–194.
168 Ibid., 193.
169 Luhmann 1993, 63.
170 Luhmann 1988, 191, 207.
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money. This second coding has two consequences. First, by shifting to the institution 
of money, the world (e.g. the economy), loses its stability as it moves away from the 
“real” economy, based on property, towards a “virtual” economy with its principal 
focus on money. The economy becomes a dynamic system based on distinctions (with 
help of quantification) and the search for an imagined equilibrium.171 What Luhmann 
identifies here, by referring to Locke, is the theoretical shift from absolute scarcity to 
relative scarcity. Second, in this shift to relative scarcity, scarcity itself is ‘duplicated’ 
on to money.172 No longer are people witness to scarce goods alone. They face the 
constant struggle to gain money, money that banks and countries actively regulate to 
keep it scarce (and thus valuable).173 Essentially, the only way people can gain money 
is through payments. They can buy, sell or invest, which, in line with Hirsch can 
now also be done for social reasons (status) instead of the actual need for a good 
(hunger).174 Another possibility is to gain money through saving. By saving, money is 
withdrawn from the system effectively making it even scarcer. Here Luhmann touches 
upon another distinction, between those who can save and those who cannot save. In 
other words, between those with capital and those without capital.175
In relation to capital, there is one last concept that Luhmann identifies as playing an 
important role from a communicative systems perspective. Just as money transcends 
the distinction of property, so labor is the last option that reinforces and enables 
individuals to move up in the world. It is through labor and the production of value 
that those without can earn the money and later buy the property that they do not 
have. Nowadays everybody is encouraged to work in order to earn one’s ‘freedom’ in 
terms of social and economic independence. According to Luhmann, this makes labor 
the ‘parasite’ within the paradox of have and have-nots as it works on the contingency 
between property and no-property.176 Then again, it also reproduces the initial code 
because labor is scarce too. It has a price, to be paid by those who can afford to do 
so. Luhmann pushes this argument as far as to claim that nowadays the distinction 
capital/labor is built on the moral claim towards capitalists and the economic system 
to provide for additional demand for labor, or as he concludes: ‘Die Paradoxie der 
Knappheit erscheint als Forderung an das “kapitalistische System“.‘177
All other institutions, like sovereign wealth funds and national banks but also 
explanations like Socialism and Capitalism, are operations and extensions of this 
171 Ibid., 196.
172 Ibid., 197.
173 Compare with Mullainathan and Shafir 2013 on the impact of this constant struggle.
174 Hirsch 1976; Xenos 1989.
175 See Hoeschele 2010, 119 for a discussion of debts as a scarcity-mechanism.
176 Luhmann 1988, 210–223.
177 Ibid., 222; For a more critical / Marxist analysis of the Capitalist system’s use of scarcity, see Panayotakis 
2011.
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self-referentiality of scarcity.178 To clarify this, Luhmann reflects a bit more at the 
mimetic contagion argument of Girard. Where Girard sees imitation between two 
persons as the source of conflict over a good, Luhmann, from his self-referential 
coding perspective, sees a continuing process of imitators being imitated leading to 
a situation where a person is ultimately in conflict with himself.179 Or as Luhmann 
summarizes his response: whereas Girard sees imitation as a characteristic of human 
beings, Luhmann sees it as a result of the double contingency of imitation and imitator 
inherent in the bivalent logic of the system itself: in this case based on the paradox 
created by exclusion.180 Moreover, he argues that it is impossible to see such codes, 
except by becoming an observer who steps outside the code and logic of scarcity 
itself. ‘Nur für einen Beobachter ist es noch möglich, das zu sehen, was das System 
selbst nicht sehen kann: die konstituierende Paradoxie. Das System selbst vertraut der 
unsichtbaren Hand.’181 Unfortunately, the importance of observation of these highly 
political distinctions at all levels of the scarcity paradox, is, in practice, eroded by the 
increasing referral to experts, as expert do not decide on issues but manage them.182 
They manage the affairs of the system from within the system and thus reinforce the 
particular socio, ethical and moral dimensions to which the system references.
So besides continuously highlighting the bifurcation by becoming aware of the 
other side of the distinction on which these forms are based, what does Luhmann 
offer as a way out? The short answer: there is no easy way out. The paradox will 
continue to reproduce itself in new and more complex distinctions. In line with 
chapter 6.4 Luhmann agrees that only a better understanding of people’s limited 
needs and desires has any hope of changing the course of the current system.183 This 
can be done as ‘[s]carcity, basically, is nothing but information. It tells us about the 
availability of something. In its societal context […] it tells us about possibilities and 
impossibilities.’184 By using scarcity in Luhmannian terms as a source of information 
to observe the world, scarcity, like security, is effectively a form of time binding. 
It provides individual ‘events structural value’ by creating codes that work in an 
autopoietic process of self-referencing. These autopoietic self-referential operations 
connect disparate events and provide them with meaning, in the process altering both 
the material and social world. For scarcity, Luhmann argues, this primarily implies 
the introduction and governing of strong social tensions.185 
178 Luhmann 1988, 210.
179 Ibid., 182–184.
180 Ibid., 183–184.
181 Ibid., 182 [emphasis added].
182 Klein 2011, 23–24.
183 Luhmann 1988, 202.
184 Klein 2011, 17.
185 Luhmann 1993, 52–53, 63.
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For scarcity in society is a social problem. Although we experience it in the 
material dimension as a limitation of the quantity of available goods, we would 
certainly be able to reach some basis for understanding – if it were not for 
the possibility of unequal distribution and were it not rational (as theories of 
property have maintained since antiquity) to enhance inequality because this 
provides better opportunities to discover and exploit the economic potential 
of a society. Much more so than in the case of the law, time binding in the case 
of scarcity is at the cost of social tensions; it is a binding of time that serves to 
construct a complex, efficient social order rational in its own terms.’186
In short, where Foucault describes the historical transformation of the idea of scarcity 
from absolute scarcity and shortages to relative scarcity and the governing of a 
constant circulation of supplies with scarcity as the necessary norm for the system to 
work, Luhmann describes the inherent self-referentiality of scarcity as something that 
can never be “solved” but will only get more complex. Neither Foucault nor Luhmann 
reflect on the fairness of scarcity or the current political-economic system, as they 
see fairness as a way to organize the governance of scarcity (Foucault) or a further 
hiding of the initial paradox of scarcity (Luhmann). What both share, however, is the 
understanding that the ongoing identification of scarcity is just as much the temporal 
closure of a long political and systemic process as it is the start of others. Scarcity is 
a social fact par excellence and, enhanced by its material dimensions, one hard to get 
away form. 
6.6 reflection
If there is one lesson to be taken from this chapter, it is that scarcity should not to be 
taken-for-granted. On the contrary, this chapter argued for four different logics of 
scarcity (shortages, absolute scarcity, scarcification and relative scarcity) each referring 
to different aspects and stages of human resource use. What is more, these four types 
of scarcity are influenced by three discourses (neo-Malthusianism, Ricardians and 
Distributionists) and they are studied by a wide range of disciplines, from multiple 
levels of analysis and in relation to a wide range of resources. Together these aspects 
show that scarcity is more than a supply and demand equation. Instead, what can be 
concluded is that the form of scarcity that is experienced today in well-to-do societies 
is a particular modern form of relative scarcity, which has been institutionalized 
and systemized, and thereby influences the outcome of those who do struggle with 
shortages and absolute scarcity. 
186 Ibid., 63.
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This chapter argued that neoclassical economics has shifted its focus from 
shortages to relative scarcity through a technical apparatus that focusses on supply 
side solutions. This has two consequences. First, such an approach excludes economies 
of abundance and fixates the materiality and especially the social dimensions behind 
scarcity, which results in technological inspired solutions for socially created issues. 
Second, these Ricardians are questioned by neo-Malthusians for abandoning the 
issue of limits, whether in the form of limited resources or the threshold of the 
carrying capacity of earth. By juxtaposing these two against the Ricardian limit 
of economic stagnation following abundance, it became clear that limits and their 
relative importance, like scarcity, are not pre-given but depend heavily upon shared 
understandings. In addition, scarcity was concluded not to be a direct source for 
conflict, although scarce and, in particular, abundant resources do play an important 
role in conflicts. This conclusion was supported by the theoretical argument that 
markets and price-setting systems allow struggles between individuals over resources 
a non-violent way out, in part by making the struggles an individual responsibility. 
Simultaneously however, relative scarcity is itself a form of violence towards the 
victims of the constant struggle between agents over goods. Based upon ideas of 
property, money, equality and mimetic contagion together with a constant search 
for status, it was shown that the unlimited desires behind scarcity have a clear social 
origin and, with economics, indeed no ending. Unfortunately, without an end there 
is also no escaping relative scarcity. Whether this is positive or negative is open for 
interpretation. What is not open to interpretation is that this shift in conceptualization 
of scarcity has led to new forms of governance. These new forms have dispersed 
shortages geographically and temporally over a population: on the one hand 
conquering shortages but on the other hand enforcing a system of relative scarcity 
upon those who, individually, still struggle with those shortages. Unfortunately, 
scarcity is an absolute necessity for these forms of governance and markets to work, 
up to the point that abundance has become the main threat. Somewhere in this 
process, relative scarcity has become the norm that people cannot evade. A norm, 
whose violence is hidden within a self-referential paradox of increasing complexity. 
The scarcity paradox started with scarcity and the code of access, but moved to 
similar paradoxes in property, trade, money, savings and capital. Undoubtedly, when 
the communicative use of scarcity activates its self-referentiality and fighting the 
norm results in a re-acknowledgement, then the only thing that should be taken-for-
granted should be the breaking away from the social and material effects of scarcity. 
For the conceptualization of energy security, this chapter offers four points of 
thought. First, in addition to the logic of security, which provides some understanding 
into the proliferation of energy security, the logic of scarcity offers an alternative 
explanation for the proliferation of energy itself. It points to the constant desire for 
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more energy and highlights the search for technical and productivist solutions that 
are indeed prevalent in energy. Secondly, it questions the geopolitical realist reading 
of immanent conflict over natural resources, by proclaiming not the resources but 
scarcity itself as the main source of violence. Simultaneously, however, it questions a 
neoliberal market reading of energy security that (while offering a conflict free way 
of distributing resources) is fundamentally flawed and will never truly solve scarcity 
because it needs it to work in the first place. Third, what this analysis also highlights 
is the importance of the three discursive positions of Ricardians, neo-Malthusians 
and Distributionists, which are available in natural resource debates. In discussing 
different aspects of natural resource use, these positions pre-structure any debate: they 
talk past each other and principally cannot be reconciled. Lastly, in reflecting upon 
this debate on scarcity and abundance from a security perspective, what is noticeable 
is the confusion that results from incorporating the security dimension of those who 
try to secure abundance (what they already have) and those that try to secure scarcity 
(that what they do not have) within the same concept, like energy security. In fact, the 
confusion is deliberate as it results from the strategic use of scarcity, the securitization 
of scarcity, by those who work form a security of abundance. Energy security in this 
sense, like scarcity, is often used as a closure, as a politics of ontology that defines what 
is problematic and in need of a solution. This chapter however shows that nothing ever 
just is problematic; there is always a social and material becoming. 
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‘We do not obtain knowledge by standing outside of the world; 
we know because “we” are of the world.’1
7.1 introduction
The discussion on energy security and its drivers security and scarcity, so far hint 
at a primarily social and linguistically oriented understanding of energy security. 
Part I discussed energy security in terms of its conceptual evolution, its comparison 
with food security, and its analytical approaches and logics. In Part II, security was 
described as an ordering principle in society, with one theory focusing on speech acts 
and rejecting the material aspect of security as of no consequence at all. Likewise, 
scarcity was described as a social practice based on the mimesis of relative desire and 
as a norm that supports current modes of reasoning behind our modern-day political 
economy. What seems to be drifting out of focus in the chapters so far is any attention 
to the different material aspects underlying the questions of food and energy security. 
This includes the actual supplies of energy and food that dissuade security concerns; it 
includes the shortages that are still prevalent, even though scarcity no longer touches 
upon this solely; and it includes the rigid and durable material infrastructure of 
energy and food systems, which handles its production, transport and consumption. 
In the case of oil, this infrastructure ranges from the sulfur and nitrogen content to 
the overall quality of the resources, the depth of the wells, the size of the reserves, 
the distance to the markets, the infrastructure in place to refine and transport it, 
and so on.2 
This chapter focusses on the social literature that discusses the relationship 
between knowledge (over energy systems) and materiality (of energy systems). It 
does not argue that either material or social explanations are better, but it tries to 
question and understand their relationship. Based on a discussion of both the critical 
constructivist literature and an analysis of different “new” materialist theories, 
this chapter puts forward four arguments. First, that the dialectical representation 
of matter and thought (mind-body/nature-society) is an artificial understanding 
that is simultaneously overblown in theoretical discussions on post-structural and 
constructivist research, and yet still a necessary distinction to better understand 
processes of becoming (performativity). Second, when the material and social are 
able to perform each other, they are open to a virtuality and eventfulness on both 
sides. Such an eventfulness calls for a politics of ontology: the politics dealing with 




the identification of what the event is. Based on the epistemological argument that it is 
impossible to know what is “out there”, this calls for a relational understanding of the 
world devoid of substance and objects except those that are created relational. Third, 
such a relational identification is based on distinctions. With these distinctions come 
exclusions and the subsequent need to be aware of the ethics of observation. In short, 
fourth, while new materialist theories argue for additional attention to matter, they 
ultimately also discuss knowledge gathering practices, like linguistic post-positivists, 
albeit in terms of durability and materialization. In other words, they offer an account 
based on the materialization of potentiality, but have to concede that this only matters 
because of human driven politics.
Unfortunately, this means that the already abstract discussion on energy security 
will turn even more abstract as discussions on materialism and discourse cannot be 
separated from commentaries on, for example, the forms of agency or the dualisms 
between object-subject and nature-culture. The easiest way to introduce these 
theoretical discussions is by categorizing the different positions into three distinct 
positions: between positivist scholars, post-positivists scholars, and new materialist 
or post-human scholars. Where positivist inspired research includes realist and 
liberalist theories with their assumption of a material world-out-there that can be 
studied objectively, post-positivism consists out of a range of post-structuralist and 
constructivist theories that disagrees with this and favor the (structured) social 
knowledge people have of the world over the material world itself. Lastly, recent 
theoretical developments outside IR gathered  under the heading of “new materialism”, 
in fields as diverse as sociology (Actor-Network Theory (ANT)), feminism (Agential 
Realism), philosophy (Object Oriented Ontology (OOO)), anthropology and history 
(material culture), introduce a post-humanist view. A perspective that is geared 
towards the ability to analyze the material world in its becoming, instead of an 
exclusive focus on human social interaction (as post-positivist).3 Within IR, a small 
but growing number of articles takes up these insights.4 
3 Some of the main works are: on Actor-Network Theory Latour 2005b; Law 1992; Law 2007; On Vital 
Materialism Bennett 2010b; Coole and Frost 2010b; On Agential Realism see Barad 2003; Barad 2007; 
On Object Oriented Ontology Harman 2009; Bryant, Srnicek, and Harman 2011; On Material Culture 
see Miller 2005. General work includes: Coole and Frost 2010b; Braun and Whatmore 2010a; Cudworth 
and Hobden 2011. These authors depart from the old definition of “materialism”, a term used to describe 
a theoretical framework that depicts the world to exist out of matter, energy and material interactions 
whereby all social interactions can be explained by material processes. Also note that there is quite some 
resistance against the use of the term of ‘a material turn’ as it is claimed that the material has never left 
(how could it?), and as such cannot ‘(re)turn’. Interestingly, it is a similar argument that can be made 
against the concept of the ‘linguistic turn’.
4 Aradau 2010; Schouten 2014; Cudworth and Hobden 2011; Voelkner 2011; See also the special issue by 
Millennium: Srnicek, Fotou, and Arghand 2013; including the article by Connolly 2013. Recent articles 
in IR with an explicit but more traditional focus on ‘the material’ include: Sorensen 2008; Aradau 2010; 
Meyer and Strickmann 2011; McCarthy 2011; McCarthy 2013. On Historical Materialism and Neo-
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The chapter is constructed as follows. Chapter 7.2 will analyze the post-
positivist rejections of positivism. It will briefly describe the main epistemological 
argument and discuss the differences of opinion between critical realists and radical 
constructivists on the role of scientific knowledge within such an epistemological 
position. It closes with a brief discussion of two highly abstract linguistic and social 
structural scholars to see whether these really do reject the material world as argued 
by some new materialist scholars. Chapter 7.3 moves to the new materialist critique 
on post-positivist theories and discusses why new materialist believe a focus on the 
material is important, what matter is, and how this can be approached by offering 
a performative understanding of the interaction between matter and knowledge. 
Chapter 7.4 delves into new materialist theory by introducing a relational ontology 
as proposed by Actor-Network Theory; it then pushes the new materialist literature 
by following the critique on ANT, in particular, its difficulty to discuss the virtuality 
and actuality of its relations (change and stability). This is taken up by discussing the 
vibrancy of the material in terms of a politics of ontology through an eventful folding 
and the politics of closure. Chapter 7.5 introduces the work of Barad on Agential 
Realism to discuss the observational ethics of such a materialdiscursive folding. The 
reflection summarizes and reflects on the theoretical debates by setting the stage for 
the next chapter. 
7.2 knowing of objects
7.2.1 Observing “The World”
Discussions on the role of the material are often phrased in terms of the ability of 
people to know the outside material world. While this is self-evident for positivist 
scholars, there is more to it for post-positivist scholars. This chapter takes up this 
debate by first exploring how the social-material divide is discussed within IR theory 
as a preamble to the subsequent sections on new materialism. It will subsequently 
introduce the post-positivist argument on the importance of the role of language/
knowledge/discourses in structuring the behavior and actions of society and its 
agents. It introduces the epistemological argument that it is impossible to gain neutral 
knowledge over the (outside) world because all knowledge one gains is mediated 
by previous historic decisions on what constitutes “good” knowledge. After briefly 
describing the differences between positivism and post-positivism and the underlying 
Cartesian dualist dilemma in discussions on the social-material problématique, this 
chapter, thirdly, contrasts the two main post-positivistic positions within IR theory, 
namely critical realism and radical constructivists. In contrasting these two positions, 
Gramscian Cox 1981; Cox 1983; Bieler and Morton 2004.
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and by pushing the radical constructivists position through a short discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s language games and Luhmann’s communicative systems, it becomes 
possible to question the social essentialism of which radical constructivists are 
accused by scholars from the ‘new materialist turn’. 
Foremost, however, it is important to note that even to ask the question how the 
material world can be known, means that one already has to presuppose ontologically 
that there is a distinction between knowledge and matter. The question itself is not 
neutral and presupposes a specific dualist world where matter is separated from 
knowledge. This dualism is most famously known as the Cartesian mind-body 
dualism. It is based on the epistemological insight that we can know, for certain, 
that we are able to think and thus that our mind exists, but that we cannot know 
whether our bodies exists.5 The ontological dualist position of Descartes is not the 
only dualist (or monist) ontological choice possible, but one that is very common in 
everyday language use. Importantly, it leads to the question of causality between the 
mind and the body. In a mind-body dualism: (1) the mind could be an independent 
non-bodily phenomenon, (2) the mind and body could be causally linked (either 
through minds or through bodies), or (3) the physical is an independent causally 
closed phenomenon. All three options are plausible, but the Bieri trilemma states that 
only two can ever be consistent with one another.6 
The philosopher Searle, for example, argues for a form of physicalism (a 
combination of 2 and 3) that is based on an ontological differentiation of ‘brute facts’ 
and social ‘institutional facts’.7 Where the rocks and pebbles on the ground are 
brute material facts, he argues that ‘there are portions of the real world, objective 
facts in the world, which are only facts by human agreement. In a sense there are 
things that exist only because we believe them to exist.’8 The money in your wallet or 
the government people pay taxes to both are a fact of life and exist in reality, but only 
because we all agree on them. If, for some reason or another, people stop believing 
in these ‘social facts’ they cease to exist.9 Between brute and social facts, Searle 
identifies four categories, which he distinguishes on the relative importance of the 
collective assignment of function. In other words, to what extent humans create 
those facts by assigning a function to it. The first two categories are: (1) natural and 
5 Robinson 2012.
6 Kessler 2007; Bieri 1981. For example, when combining (1) and (2) one enters a classic dualist position 
described as interactionism where mind and body can interact freely; similarly, a combination of (2) and 
(3) is described as physicalism and stands for an approach where the mind is seen as part of the body 
but not reducible to it; and, lastly, a combination of (1) and (3) results in epiphenomenalism, where the 
mental is seen as a by-product of the physical without any causal effects at all.
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biological systems that continue whether humans interpret them correctly or not; and 
(2) material products or artefacts that are “real” but need human interpretation to 
function, for example, chairs and hammers. The last two categories are ‘institutional 
facts’: facts that do not exist without human interpretation. Searle divides these into 
(3) non-linguistic facts like money and (4) linguistic facts based on written or spoken 
language, for example business contracts.10 According to Searle, these brute and 
social facts are erected iteratively on top of each other, meaning that all institutional 
facts can be traced to some brute factual origin. He describes this in terms of the 
formula X counts as Y in C: every institutional fact Y is built in a certain context C 
upon a previous social fact X, which in turn is built upon another previous social fact 
Y-1 in Context C-1, all the way down to some brute fact X.11 
Within the social sciences, including IR, these questions and positions on whether 
people can observe the outside world return in debates between positivist and post-
positivist approaches to research.12 Positivism and post-positivism are epistemological 
positions (e.g. ‘how do we know’) that always already include ontological assumptions 
(e.g. on ‘what exists’). On the one hand, the positivism of realist and liberalist theories 
(chapter 4) is often presented in combination with an ontological belief of naturalism. 
That there is a given, pre-determined natural/physical reality ‘out there’ that can be 
experienced and explained through the senses of the observer (the human subject, 
whether academic or participant) who is clearly separated from the observed object.13 
This epistemological claim, that it is possible to study the outside world by creating a 
true representation based upon humankind’s experiences, is called empiricism.14 The 
latter should not be confused with positivism itself, which calls for a scientific method 
consisting of law-like-generalizations and causal facts to analyses these experiences. 
Positivism hence rest upon a clear dualist ontology that assumes that the mind, in time, 
can mirror the material world it observes. On the other hand, post-positivist scholars 
reject this dualist epistemological position based upon a critique on the separation 
between observers and observed. Scholars from constructivist, critical, feminist and 
post-structural approaches all argue that reality (which they do not reject), or, to be 
precise, the experiences of reality, can only be “witnessed” by interpreting the events 
through the knowledge that humans already possess. These scholars view knowledge, 
10 Ibid., 121.
11 Ibid., 55–56.
12 Not everybody accepts this distinction. In security studies for example, Booth prefers to discuss the 
distinction between these two approaches in terms of ‘naturalism’ (the positivist idea that the methods 
used to study nature can be applied to human society as well) and ‘postnaturalism’ (a post-positivist 
position that rejects such a one on one copying of methods). See Booth 2005, 10.
13 Patomäki and Wight 2000, 216–218. Naturalism is sometimes also described as realism, which, in turn, 
is not the same as materialism.
14 Jackson 2008, 132–133 also describes this position as ‘classical objectivity’, meaning before quantum 
mechanics, before post-structuralism and before the linguistic turn.
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in other words, as something that is inherently social (not an individual or factual 
experience) and can only be shared through language in describing, defining and 
categorizing the world around us. This implies that all new knowledge is filtered by 
that what we already know. New knowledge is therefore not an actual representation 
of the world ‘out there’, but a consequence of historically developed and socially 
agreed constructions of what the world is and how it should look like. From this, it 
logically follows that no research is value free and that researchers should focus on the 
consequences of these linguistic structures and their constant performativity. 
7.2.2 Critical Realism
Cox famously describes the distinction between positivist and post-positivist theories 
as one between (positivist) problem-solving theories and (post-positivist) critical 
theories.15 Where the former accepts the world as a given and tries to improve upon it, 
the latter ‘attempts to stand outside the framework of analysis or action it is exploring and 
seeks to appraise it in terms of its origins, development, institutions, and its potentiality 
for change.’16 Within post-positivist IR research, there are currently two meta-
philosophical positions that struggle with the above ontic-epistemological questions. 
While both critical realism and radical constructivism agree on the intersubjectivity of 
knowledge and the role of linguistic structures, they disagree on the consequences of 
such a position and the role that scientific knowledge plays in this. This section discusses 
critical realism whereas the next section will discuss radical constructivism.
Critical realism is a meta-philosophical position originally developed by Bhaskar, 
which resembles the ontology of Searle to some extent.17 In the last decade, it has 
been reinvigorated in IR with contributions from Wight and Patomäki, amongst 
others.18 Critical realists hold that while a true representation of the world (e.g., 
empiricism and the so-called correspondence theory of truth) is indeed impossible, it 
is nonetheless possible to use a scientific method to study objectively the experiences 
people have of the world. Although it is impossible to know for sure that our images 
of reality are an exact representation of the world out there, critical realist believe that 
scholars should at least try to improve the theories they have. For them, falsification 
and verification are still the best methods to gain knowledge, ask new questions and 
reject less plausible answers. This argument is supported by two claims: first, by the 
‘practical success of scientific knowledge,’ which is demonstrated when scientists 
manipulate otherwise unobservable entities.19 Second, with reference to an ‘ordinary 
15 Cox 1981.
16 Booth 2005, 11.
17 Bhaskar 2005.
18 Wight 2007b; Wight 2007a; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Wight 2012; Joseph and Wight 2010.
19 Wight 2007b, 383. Here Wight also rejects an absolute correspondence theory of truth but does see merit 
in an ‘approximate truth’.
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language use’ argument, as ‘scientific practice itself assumes a depth to reality 
that it investigates in order to provide explanations of empirical phenomena.’20 By 
combining these arguments with the epistemological lesson that ‘knowledge itself is 
a social product’, one that is ‘dynamically produced by means of prior knowledge’, 
Wight claims that knowledge itself is an ‘inherently fallibilist enterprise’ based upon 
‘rational choices between competing knowledge claims.’21 In other words, critical 
realist believe that it is in the nature of human beings to constantly strive for “better” 
theories and descriptions, and hence that research should be based on a method 
of trial and error following observations and rational assessment. This focus on 
‘ontological realism’ (a reality that can be experienced independently of the mind), 
‘epistemological relativism’ (that this reality can only be described with ‘potentially 
fallible socially produced beliefs) and ‘judgemental rationalism’ instead of empiricism 
(that it is possible to judge between social theories), describes more or less the position 
currently taken by (soft or thin) social constructivists in IR.22 
Based on the meta-philosophy of critical realism, (thin) social constructivism 
is an IR theory that Adler once described as taking a ‘middle ground’ between 
positivist and post-positivist research.23 There are many authors working on social 
constructivism, but the theory most attentive to the material world and nearest to 
Searle’s brute and social facts is the one proposed by Wendt.24 With his concept of 
‘rump materialism’ Wendt is one of the few IR scholars who explicitly tries to take both 
the material and the social into account.25 For Wendt’s social constructivist theory, 
the material plays a role following bodily differences, technological differences and 
geographical and natural characteristics.26 More specific, Wendt’s rump materialism 
rests upon a distinction between two different needs. On the one hand, biologically 
prescribed needs for food, water, shelter, etc., and, on the other hand, socially induced 
interests.27 As discussed in the chapter on scarcity, this distinction between needs/
wants is questionable. This is confirmed by Wendt in the end as well when he claims 
that the core shared assumptions within constructivist approaches are that ‘(1) the 
structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather 
than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are 
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 386.
22 The terms in brackets are from Patomäki and Wight 2000, 224; compare with Jackson 2008. Other 
scholars working from this position include Wendt 1999; Adler 2002; Wight 2007b.
23 Adler 1997. The term constructivism, might in fact been wrongly chosen as constructivism (as opposed 
to constructionism) was a term already in use in mathematics.
24 Wendt 1999.
25 Ibid., 111. Real does not imply materiality as explained above.
26 Ibid., 110; Sorensen 2008, 10.
27 Wendt 1999, 110–113, 130–136.
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constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.’28 Thus, while Wendt’s 
social constructivism shifts the attention away from the use of language towards the 
relationship between ideas and (material) interests, he too places the social over the 
material by claiming that the meaning objects have for people are more important 
than the objects themselves.29
While critical realism and (thin) social constructivism seem coherent theories at 
first, Jackson, in a recent article, argues that many of these critical realists, while 
adhering to the epistemological logic that it is impossible to have an objective 
representation of the world actually only pay lip service to it and betray this logic at 
a later stage in their argument. As Jackson argues, not because they secretly refer to 
some form of representationalism between the social and the natural, but because 
these scholars with their focus on hypothesis testing and the constraining effects 
of the ‘outside’ world reinstall a dualism between an object and observer.30 They 
artificially create a distance to fulfil their desire to observe objectively. 
7.2.3 Radical Constructivism
Radical post-positivists reject this distinction and the resulting scientific method, 
because they claim that the social, the intersubjective knowledge that people have 
in-between themselves, cannot be explained by it in any meaningful way. To these 
scholars, the “social world” consists out of intersubjective knowledge (whether called 
social facts, discourses, practices, fields or a similar concept) and does not have the 
same characteristics as the “natural world”. The staunchest proponents of this position 
even go so far as to argue that, while reality might exist, we can never know about it 
and as such should forgo the search for this holy grail and instead focus on the use 
and misuse of knowledge, whether in the form of language, discourse or practices.31 
A linguistic oriented post-positivist scholar could very well argue that there is no role 
at a linguistic level for the inclusion of a passive but changing material world, because 
to them it is not important whether it is nature or society that “acts”. Not that radical 
constructivism rejects the event itself, only that it believes that it is more important 
who interprets these events, at what moment and for what reasons. When a volcano 
erupts in the South Pacific or in Northern Italy the last is seen (e.g. interpreted) as 
more important because it endangers human life. A similar eruption on Iceland 
would matter less in terms of human life, where it not that all air traffic across the 
28 Ibid., 1.
29 Wendt 1999.Sorensen 2008, 10. Wendt is not alone on this, other social constructivist scholars take a 
similar position, see: Hopf 1998; Tannenwald 2005; Guzzini 2000; Adler 2002; Checkel 1998; Reus-Smit 
1996.
30 Jackson 2008, 134–135, 139.
31 See for example the illustrative, perhaps even ironic, subtitle of Kessler 2012b.
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Atlantic could be hindered by it.32 People interpret events with the knowledge that 
they have and the importance that they attach to it in terms of the hopes and fears 
they have for the future. 
The position that the material only matters through the knowledge people have of it 
and that one cannot separate objects from subject, is favored by radical constructivists 
as well as post-structuralists, and, to a lesser extent, critical theorists.33 Such a 
radical constructivist position within IR has a broad grounding in the work of French 
post-structuralism and the Frankfurter Schule.34 For reasons of space and argument, 
this section will reflect upon the role of language by briefly discussing two other 
strongly linguistic oriented scholars, neither of them part of the above traditions. 
After discussing Wittgenstein’s language games and Luhmann’s communicative 
Social Systems, this section moves to IR and the response of Kratochwil and other 
radical constructivist IR scholars to critical realism. Through these discussions 
this section highlights how meaning is ascribed, how observations should be seen 
as the production of distinctions, and how these two arguments together make all 
judgements ultimately value judgements and a matter of politics.
To understand how meaning is ascribed to events based on the knowledge that 
people possess, it is helpful to turn to the later writings of Wittgenstein on language 
games and his understanding of the grammar that enables the interactive and 
iterative meaning as use.35 Simplistically, people describe the world using concepts 
and words. The meaning of these concepts stems from its use and its (family) 
relationship with other concepts within a shared “grammar” or set of rules that 
clarify acceptable combinations. These combinations and their shared “grammar” 
mark different language games. For example, the concept of energy shifts meaning for 
a physicist (joules), a consumer (light/heath) or an oil trader (demand/supply) as each 
of these take place within a particular language game: respectively, natural science, 
bodily experience/survival and markets. Consequently, it is only in their constant 
use and with repeated reference to other words that concepts gain and are able to 
keep a particular meaning.36 Even when people object to a meaning, they still use 
that concept and thereby reinforce the overarching language game. Language games 
thus presume multiplicity, a world where a concept means different things within 
different contexts. As long as they are continuously interpreted in their ongoing use, 
these worlds are never entirely defined and cannot be closed off from other agents. 
In fact, agents constantly participate in multiple, sometimes even contrasting worlds 
32 Adey, Anderson, and Lobo-Guerrero 2011.
33 Kratochwil 2000; Kratochwil 2007b; Kessler 2012b; Fierke 2002; Milliken 1999.
34 Derrida 2005; Foucault 1977; Adorno 1973; Habermas 1984.
35 Wittgenstein 1958.
36 See for instance Derrida 2005.
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simultaneously. A physicist working on energy is also a consumer of energy at home. 
It follows that agents are able to reflect on and compare between language games. 
However, they can only do so from within a third language game. A person can only 
observe a phenomenon from another set of rules, never from within the language 
game itself. 
A similar, even more radical argument can be found in Luhmann’s Systems 
Theory.37 Luhmann offers a theory that perceives the world as divided into physical 
systems, psychic systems and social systems. Of these three, Luhmann has written 
most extensively on social systems and, in particular, on the role of communication 
in and between social systems.38 According to Luhmann all communication 
between two humans, or more precise between two Ego’s (psychic systems of 
cognition), takes place within social systems made up of modes of communication. 
Luhmann sees social systems as self-regulating entities that are based on a distinction 
between the system (inside) and the environment (outside). These distinctions are 
autopoietic: each system is based on a self-referential distinction that (re)produces 
or constitutes the meaning that a system attaches to itself and its environment.39 
Each system closes itself off from its complex ‘environment’ by constantly (re)drawing 
its boundaries through a reconfiguration of its own specific identity (designed to 
reduce the outside complexity). From this ontology it follows that all communication 
between systems should, according to Luhmann, be seen as an internal debate 
within a particular system over the interpretation of the stimulus witnessed in its 
environment. Because language “stores” meaning, new communications between 
systems can only be incorporated in a system if it fits or builds upon the already 
existing autopoietic constituted distinction (something Luhmann calls operational 
closure).40 For Luhmann, observation is thus a constant process of producing and 
37 Luhmann 1993; Luhmann 2006; Luhmann 1995; Also Arnoldi 2001; Guzzini 2001; Kessler 2009; Kessler 
2012a.
38 Luhmann defines communication broadly: language, writing, art, silence, gestures, etc., everything that 
has or contains meaning for the entities using it to communicate.
39 In the act of observing or constituting a distinction, a system thus creates an observer (e.g. subject-
object distinction). This implies that Luhmann’s systems can never by analysed from within, but only 
in its comparison (making new distinctions) with other social (sub) systems or from inside a third 
overarching social system. See also the discussion on Barad later in this chapter.
40 In addition, he identifies a number of social subsystems based upon the recursively used, and therefore 
structured or ‘codified’, processing of meaning that leads to functional differentiation between subsystems 
based upon a particular bivalent code and a medium. The economic subsystem, for example, has as 
a code payment/non-payment and uses as a medium, logically, money. Other by Luhmann identified 
subsystems are the political, the judicial, art, media, ecology, society, etc. In switching to these social 
systems of communication, Luhmann tries to move away from the Cartesian dualism by excluding the 
human and the material as a primary focus of analysis and by placing the agency, as such, on a different 
level altogether, on that of systems of communication. That said, it is hard to escape the impression that 
Luhmann, with his explicit attention to social systems of communication, still approaches the world 
mainly from a holistic, but nevertheless, humanistic perspective. 
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reproducing distinctions. Something that can be compared with a map: whatever 
map you use or make, whether it is a topographic map, a satellite image, or a street 
map: different distinctions show different aspects of the world depending on what 
the observer needs. To be able to make this claim Luhmann identifies two levels of 
observation. Luhmann separates first-order observations, where time plays no role 
for decision makers as everything is happening simultaneously and people are ‘in’ the 
moment, from second-order observations where the observer is able to actually reflect 
on an event. In reflecting on an event, a second-order observer also makes multiple 
distinctions on, for example, before and after, good and bad, etc.41
Radical constructivists share with Wittgenstein and Luhmann the concern over 
observers and their objects. It is a concern that also returns in other important 
concepts in the literature. In line with the iterative linguistic idea of meaning in use, 
the concept of a hermeneutic circle, for example, deals with the continuous theoretical 
and contextual enforced interpretation of texts by observers: that all knowledge is 
always already situated in other knowledge. Likewise, debates on agents and structures 
and their mutual interaction deal with the position of the individual (agent) in relation 
to society (structure) and that neither can be seen as separate from the other.42 If 
one accepts this epistemological argument than these concepts draw the attention 
towards the impossibility to separate facts and values.43 Or in other words, that those 
able to claim “facts” in effect engage in a power struggle (by claiming legitimacy and 
authority) over the shared knowledge (e.g. values) that defines, on the one hand, what 
is considered to be “normal”, and on the other hand, what is considered to be outside 
of language and thus “real”. 
This is the main argument made by radical constructivists in IR against critical 
realism, especially with the latter’s focus on rationality and the scientific method.44 
Kratochwil argues that the epistemological argument about the constant interpretation 
of the senses should not be solved by putting ontology firsts, as critical realist do 
by starting from the material impact of science, but instead should be bracketed by 
‘pragmatically’ focusing on methodology and methods to ‘provid[e] the necessary 
warrants’ against claims of voluntarity and ‘anything goes’ arguments.45 More 
specific, Kratochwil argues for a pragmatic social objectivity that is achieved through 
41 Luhmann 1993, 34–35.
42 Giddens 1986; Carlsnaes 1992; Carlsnaes 2008; Doty 1997; Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989; Sewell 1992; Wight 
1999. Trying to find a way to go beyond this chicken-and-egg situation asks for a mediation of two 
inherently opposing positions that has been, and still is, a core theoretical challenge within IR and the 
wider social sciences. For possible alternatives, see, for example, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘Habitus’ 
or George H. Mead’s distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’.
43 Foucault 1977, 27.
44 Kratochwil 2000. See also: Der Derian and Shapiro 1989; Ashley and Walker 1990; Der Derian 2009; 
Onuf 2013.
45 Kratochwil 2000, 73. See Herborth 2012 on the ‘quest for certainty’.
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a consensus ‘courtroom ethics’ (e.g. a consensus theory of truth).46 When all matter 
and social relations are interpreted through language and social knowledge, the only 
‘truth’ available is a social one, and this implies that meaning-giving structures can 
only be achieved by social agreement. Wight replies by posing the question why these 
scholars offer an alternative explanation of current phenomena in the first place, if 
not because they believe them – in whatever sense – to be “better”?47 In fact, it is not 
so much that radical constructivists reject the scientific logic Wight criticizes them to 
be following as well (they do indeed), but that they question, on an higher abstraction 
level, the scientific logic itself as being one of many logics or discourse that can be 
used to find the “truth”.48 In other words, these scholars take fault with the meaning 
of the term “better” as this is inherently a value judgement.49 For these scholars, what 
should be asked instead is the critical question of better for who? Whose interests are 
aided by proclaiming something as “better” or “progress”?50
7.2.4 Social Essentialism
There are two popular arguments against the post-positivist approaches discussed so 
far. Both of these are strongly influenced by decontextualized quotations from, on 
the one hand, the early Wittgenstein who once wrote that ‘[t]he limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world’ and, on the other, Derrida’s famous ‘[t]here is no outside-
text’.51 The first argument is made by positivists who misread the positions above and 
succumb to a ‘fear of relativism.’52 This is the ‘anything goes’ or voluntarity argument, 
which states that if all that exists is based on language and communication, why not 
just speak and think differently to change the world? In a sense, this argument is 
correct. Language and knowledge are pliable to an extent that matter is not. However, 
the above already indicates the force and stability of social practices, thought patterns 
(discourses) and communicative structures: while they change, people constantly and 
with each iteration work hard to preserve and stabilize them. Moreover, as discussed 
below, people act on them and in doing so materialize the social structures and norms.
A second argument represents the basic assumption behind a relatively new 
strand of literature called ‘new materialism’. It is an assumption that builds on claims 
like Patomäki and Wight’s argument that ‘for positivists, sense-experience is real; for 
post-positivists, discourses or intersubjectivity is real.’53 The problem for many new 
46 Kratochwil 2000; Kratochwil 2007b; Kratochwil 2007a.
47 Wight 2007a. See also Wight 2000; or more abstract: Suganami 2013.
48 Compare with Wittgenstein’s Language games. God, or religion is another logic.
49 See the excellent discussion in Jackson 2008, 136–142.
50 If placed in discussions about energy security and scarcity, or any other political-economic system behind 
natural resources, this implies white middle-aged Western males. 
51 Wittgenstein 1922, para. 5.6; Derrida 1976, 158–159.
52 Jackson 2012.
53 Patomäki and Wight 2000, 218.
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materialist is that if this is the case, if language is all that we can study, as for example 
argued in Securitization Theory, would that not imply that one has simply shifted 
a representation of the world in positivism towards a representation of linguistic 
structures instead?54 As Dolphijn & Tuin quote De Landa: 
[…] general categories do not refer to anything in the real world and […] 
to believe they do (i.e. to reify them) leads directly to essentialism. Social 
constructivism is supposed to be an antidote to this, in the sense that by showing 
that general categories are mere stereotypes it blocks the move towards their 
reification. But by coupling the idea that perception is intrinsically linguistic 
with the ontological assumption that only the contents of experience really 
exist, this position leads directly to a form of social essentialism.55
Following a similar line of thought, Barad argues:
Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic 
turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately 
every “thing” – even materiality – is turned into a matter of language or some 
other form of cultural representation.56
Where De Landa and Barad focus on the ontological and epistemological preposition 
of language over materiality in these quotes, Latour, one of the driving scholars 
behind Actor-Network Theory (ANT), questions the use of the category of the 
“social” as distinct from the natural. For Latour, what happens when people designate 
something as social (as a social fact/phenomenon), is that they are diverting attention 
away from the process of actual association between the different elements of such 
a phenomenon.57 In other words, he focusses on the act of defining something as 
“social” and sees this as a form of politics that performs a closure of an on-going 
process of association between different elements that exist and originate in the space 
in-between humans (e.g. chapter 5.4 on speech act literature).
Both De Landa, Barad and Latour find fault with many post-positivists who, 
according to them, have simply shifted their representational position within the 
54 Wight 2007a; as well as Jackson 2008; Jackson 2010.
55 Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 98 quote De Landa’s 2006 book A New Philosophy of Society (p45-46) [original 
Emphasis]; Compare with Lemke 2002, 61 who argues that scholars ‘should prevent [...] a very serious 
flaw that dominates much contemporary critique: the “essentialization of the critique of essentialism.” 
What do I mean by this? When social and political scientists increasingly claim the importance of 
categories like “invention,” “fiction,” and “construction” for their work, they often double the theoretical 
attitude they initially set out to criticize: they hold that the “poststructuralist” or “anti-essentialist” 
stance they adopt does signal a “right” or “true” knowledge’.




material-social dichotomy from the material towards the social. The core of their 
critique focusses on the idea that post-positivist scholars still uphold a Cartesian 
dualistic worldview, based on the observer who a priori assumes that language and 
the world are separated to begin with.58 It is only in a Cartesian dualism where mind 
and body can represent each other that the above critique makes sense. This, however, 
might be phrased too strongly. On the one hand, yes, it is easy to over essentialize 
language in post-positivist theories as highlighted by the quotes of Wittgenstein 
and Derrida above. Then again, most of the post-positivist work, including the work 
of Wittgenstein and Luhmann, acknowledges objects and materiality. As Hekman 
(herself working on materiality) reflects on Wittgenstein: ‘His discussion of language 
games as activities, of general facts of nature, form of life, and many other concepts 
suggests an interactive understanding of the relationship between the discursive and 
the material.’59 Similarly, Derrida’s quote on text above, which is often combined with 
the understanding that all knowledge is ‘always already’ situated in other knowledge, 
is quite easily reinterpreted in a broader sense of ‘ongoing historicity.’60 A narrow 
theoretical focus on linguistic structures therefore does not automatically imply that 
scholars claim that language is all that exist.61 
In short, it can be argued that the Cartesian dualism that separates matter 
and discourse permeates much of contemporary IR research. This section shows, 
however, that by starting from a dualist worldview tensions arise on both a meta-
philosophical, theoretical and methodological level; especially for those who accept 
the epistemological insight that we can only know of things through discourse and 
other linguistic structures. For these post-positivist scholars, all that we know are 
discourses and the concepts that gain meaning in use by their differentiation form other 
concepts. These differences have a history that is based on previous understandings 
and distinctions. This makes it impossible to see or experience something new 
without first being structured by the rules of society hidden in an intersubjective 
understanding of the world and the linguistic structures that enable (or inhibit) 
possible routes of thought and action. Each of these understandings and distinctions 
is based on a judgement made by an observer on an object of study. This translates 
facts into shared distinctions, which are based on shared values of judgement. It is 
here that we see a difference between critical realists, for whom the better argument is 
always based on something because we can act on things (we cannot know the world, 
58 Jackson 2008; Jackson 2010.
59 Hekman 2010, 32.
60 Van der Tuin 2011, 285–287 quotes Barad 2003, 821 on ‘ongoing historicity’.
61 See also Hekman 2010, 30–31 or the discussion in Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2014. For 
example, Luhmann 1995 of course starts from three systems, only one of which is the social system 
of communication. Similarly, Cheah 2008 discusses the nondialectical materialism that is present in 
Derrida’s focus on ‘text’.
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but it exist), and radical constructivists who instead argue for a pragmatic argument 
(we agree on the world). Nevertheless, both share that the material world exists and 
that it cannot be understood independently of shared social understandings. 
7.3 leaving humans behind
7.3.1 New Materialism
Irrespective the broader ontological context of post-positivist studies, the focus on 
language, knowledge and social structures does limit the research parameters of 
post-positivism. If only for the pragmatic reason that it is hard to study everything. 
The subsequent inattention to matter is something that sits ill with a rising number 
of scholars in IR and the wider social sciences, driven in part by the complexity 
and (perceived) urgency to understand phenomena like climate change, GMO’s 
and nanotechnology. This discomfort is often illustrated with an argument in 
line with Pickering’s claim that one way or the other the world actively resists and 
accommodates human activity.62 Whatever meaning we attach to the world, the 
world is believed to be able to act of itself and on itself, and is therefore capable of 
surprising humans by altering the conditions of possibility. What these scholars 
question is the predominantly human centered approach in current social theories, 
from both positivist and post-positivist theoretical perspectives. As an alternative, 
they argue in favor of a post-humanist meta-theory: a meta-theory that shifts the 
scholarly focus away from the overwhelming attention on human agency towards 
an entangled material and human agency (hence not anti-humanist).63 In this way, 
these authors, instead of entering the matter-social discussion from the side by way 
of a post-positivist focus on shared language, a positivist focus on representation or 
a focus on materialism, tackle the debate head on by questioning how matter and the 
social inter-, some would say, intra-act.64 As Dolphijn & Van der Tuin describe this 
intra-action: ‘the material and the discursive are only taken apart in the authoritative 
gesture of the scholar or by the common-sensical thinker; while in the event, in life 
itself, the two seeming layers are by all means indiscernible.’65
New Materialist scholars thus argue that what is missing is an approach that tries ‘to 
provide an account of how both materiality and language matter.’66 What is missing 
is what Jackson elsewhere has called a ‘monist’ approach, by which he refers to a way 
62 Pickering 1993; Pickering 1999.
63 Coole and Frost 2010a, 27.
64 For the term intra-action, see the explanation of Barad below in chapter 7.5.
65 Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 92–93. Likewise, Latour states that ’There exists no relation whatsoever between 
‘the material’ and ‘the social world’, because it is this very division which is a complete artefact.’ Latour 
2005b, 75–76.
66 Aradau 2010, 497.
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of thinking that studies the practices that create both thought and things.67 A key 
concept in such a monist approach is entanglement, which states that the mind – body, 
society – nature, matter – social, and object – subject distinctions are all posterior 
distinctions made by human observers while in reality the world itself is not as clear-
cut.68 The next sections will therefore build upon new materialist insights to offer 
an entangled materialdiscursive ontology instead of a dualist material and discursive 
ontology.69 An ontology that still builds on important post-positivist epistemological 
insights on the importance of linguistic structures, but simultaneously incorporates a 
constantly changing materiality. This section, in particular, will introduce the shared 
premises of new materialism, discuss materiality itself in terms of what it is and how it 
is analyzed, and will introduce Butler’s ideas on performativity as a general approach 
to mitigate the dialectic understanding of matter and discourse.
The question of how to approach an entangled and active materiality is studied by 
an agglomeration of scholars working from a range of different disciplines, including 
philosophy, feminist studies, geography, Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
performance studies, history and IR. For convenience sake, these are all branded as 
‘new materialist’ even though none of the scholars seems to support this label.70 As 
broad as the underlying disciplines are, so wide ranging are the perspectives on how 
to answer the question posted above. Below this chapter’s main influences are Latour 
and other STS scholars working on Actor-Network Theory, Harman and Bryant on 
Object-Oriented Philosophy, and Bennett and Barad on the phenomena of entangled 
agency and the ethics behind materiality.71 
While these theories differ in their ontology and approach this entanglement from 
very different angles, these authors do share a range of understandings. First, they 
share a certain understanding of the non-human world “out there”. This understanding 
is severely influenced by the natural sciences, in particular, by the insights gained 
from particle physics, chaos theory and complex systems theories.72 They take from 
particle physics the instability of objects, as all objects consist of smaller entities, 
which in turn depend on even smaller entities, all the way to sub-atomic particles 
and smaller, and the idea that all objects are in a constant state of flux in response to 
the movement of like entities. In addition, these theories take their lead from chaos 
and complexity theories (most famous for their role in climate change analyses and 
the so-called butterfly effect), which depict the world as a constant dynamic process 
of ‘an intricate filigree of relationships’ that is described as self-organizing (with both 
67 Jackson 2010.
68 Jackson 2002; Barad 2007.
69 Barad 2007.
70 Whatmore 2006 talks about ‘material re-turns’ as ‘new materialism’ for her objectifies the issues at hand.
71 The phenomenological ontology of Barad will be discussed in chapter 7.5.
72 Coole and Frost 2010a, 11–14.
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positive/reinforcing and negative/adapting feedback mechanisms), intersectional, 
multi-scalar and, in the case of chaos theory, as non-linear.73 In other words, new 
materialism moves past “fixed” objects to constantly interacting, shifting and mobile 
objects and their relative durability. 
Second, they all share a move from epistemology to ontology, not so much to the 
question of what is but instead to the question of how things become.74 The focus 
lies not on matter as such, but on how things materialize. New materialists approach 
this by assuming that materialization takes place through self-organization, in a 
pluri-potential, multi-scalar and multi-dimensional form of immanent and virtual 
agency.75 Third, this ‘more-than-human mode of enquiry’ rejects any totalizing 
‘overly theoretical, formal approaches.’76 For new materialist everything is local. 
Hence, they not only reject radical constructivist theories, with their focus on social 
structures, norms and rules, but also deterministic positivist research, like statistical 
analyses, where everything is subsumed under the logics of theory and methodology.77 
Fourth, to study such an ontology these scholars shift their epistemology from a focus 
on discourse and material objects towards practices and relational affects in order 
to highlight the relationality between more-than-human entities.78 They position 
themselves thus in-between discourse and material objects by studying the practices 
and relations that enable the existence of both. To repeat, these shifts together do 
not mean that new materialism scholars reject the main critique of constructivists 
on positivist materialist studies.79 On the contrary, fifth, they build on it in what 
Whatmore calls the shift from a ‘politics of identity to a politics of knowledge’80 and 
Mol introduced as ‘ontological politics’, which she describes by arguing that: 
If the term ‘ontology’ is combined with that of ‘politics’ then this suggests that 
the conditions of possibility are not given. That reality does not precede the 
mundane practices in which we interact with it, but is rather shaped within 
these practices. So the term politics works to underline this active mode, this 
process of shaping, and the fact that its character is both open and contested.81
This fifth move draws attention to the idea that in a more-than-human world the 
question on what something is and who exactly acts (and through what) become a 
73 Ibid.
74 Hekman 2010, 68.
75 Coole 2013.
76 Whatmore 2006; Coole 2013, 454.
77 Coole 2013, 454.
78 Whatmore 2006.
79 Walters 2014, 103; Coole and Frost 2010a, 26; Bourne 2012, 155.
80 Whatmore 2006, 604.
81 Mol 1999, 75.
197
7Chapter 7
very political question with strong ethical connotations as they touch upon questions 
of responsibility and accountability. Every explanation (knowledge) of an event 
becomes a closure that fixates particular material and social subjectivities, structures 
and power relations, and hence is debatable. 
New materialism is not the only theoretical work that derives from these insights 
an understanding of the world as an open and dynamic system devoid of inert objects. 
For example, the chapter on security already described risk and resilience with their 
sense of vulnerability, just as the chapter on scarcity discussed ecological thresholds. 
In addition, much of the literature on natural resources has shifted towards system 
approaches (e.g. energy systems or food systems) based on infrastructure, logistics or 
(political) ecological understandings of anthropocentrism (the geological term for 
the age of man). In a time when humankind is dominating its environment, many 
of the theories in question reflect upon its exposure by highlighting that humans are 
a part, but only a part of the total system. Dillon & Reid describe this post-human 
shift as a shift in understanding from a world that is complicated into a world that is 
complex: where complicated worlds can be ‘reduced’ and ‘simplified’, complex worlds 
can only be ‘embraced’ and ‘orchestrated’.82 In such a complex relational perspective, 
agency and causality are dispersed, mediated and no longer as predictable as 
once imagined.83 
7.3.2 When Matter Matters
Before discussing the insights of new materialism, it is useful to take a closer look at 
what we mean by matter or the material. Not because it will miraculously solve these 
longstanding debates but, as Dolphijn & Van der Tuin make clear above, because the 
nature-culture dualism itself is something that is formed in and through people’s 
everyday use.84 Consequently, we should be aware of how the use of these terms like 
materiality actually constitutes such differences. This is taken up by following four 
different inroads into the meaning of matter, ranging from a negative definition, 
via a substantive meaning of matter, towards an interpretation of matter as a verb 
and finally a brief reflection on the instrumentalist and deterministic approaches 
to artefacts.
82 Dillon and Reid 2001, 46–47.
83 Bryant 2014, 4. For Massumi there is an important difference between systems and processes: where 
a system is self-referential for its existence and only varies to adapt, processes do not feedback on 
themselves but produce variation first. Processes are ‘difference-referenced’ whereas systems are ‘self-
referenced’. See Massumi 2009, 168–169. Within new materialism, this separation is often convoluted.
84 See Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 92–93 above; as well as Barad 2003, 828. See also Woolgar 2002, 269 who 
states that: ‘Yet in our explication of this duality we remain prisoners of the language conventions that 
both support and derive from just this duality. So the duality endures’.
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First, an easy way to circumvent any discussion on the precise meaning of matter 
is to turn the question around and define the material by claiming that it is everything 
non-social. But then, is there anything like that? And what precisely is meant by the 
social? Dolwick, a maritime archaeologist, clearly struggled with similar questions 
on the relations between matter (in particular human constructed artefacts) and 
the social, and approached them from sociology. In his overview of social theories, 
Dolwick starts with a brief description of three broad, inherently limited and heavily 
contested categories of ‘the social’.85 The first and broadest definition describes the 
social as associations between relational objects (e.g. ANT’s heterogeneous networks of 
relations; Pickering’s mangles of practice; Barad’s materialdiscursive entanglements). 
More limited is the definition of the social seen purely as ‘humans-among-themselves’, 
thus entering the Cartesian dualism with its agent-structure debates and focus on 
the creation of meaning. Lastly, and most narrow, is a definition focused on social 
structures or social facts. In this definition, the social is bereft of agency (a position 
most often taken in empirical post-positivist IR research).86 What becomes clear from 
Dolwick’s overview is that the distinction is not natural and that a negative definition 
does not work. The different explanations of the social indicate that the observer 
ultimately defines what is social and what is not social. It also highlights that only an 
interpretation of the social in terms of associations allows new materialist to escape 
this fallacy.
Secondly, a similar discussion on the concept of matter leads to a differentiation 
between a substantive definition of matter and a socially engaged value judgment of 
what matters. The substantive definition of matter builds upon a difference between 
the interchangeably used terms matter, the material, materiality and materialization. 
Matter can be defined as something that occupies space and consists out of mass 
(atoms, particles, energy). The material is a term used to describe something made out 
of matter, when matter is reworked in different substances or elements. In turn, the 
verb materialization describes the process of turning, shaping, enacting or creating 
material objects from social practices and ideas. Lastly, the concept of materiality 
stands for the theoretical and ontological position that claims that matter exists 
outside of human sensory observation. These different aspects of matter clearly show 
the complexity of matter, one that is further confused by the shifting links between 
materiality and, respectively, foundationalism (e.g., unquestioned basic beliefs that 
justify other beliefs, whether defined as brute material facts or social facts), essentialism 
85 Dolwick 2009.
86 Pouliot 2004, 329 discusses this in terms of essentialization: ‘acts of essentialzation [...] are commonplace 
in social life. They lie at the foundation of the social construction of reality [...] Repeated acts of 
essentialization result in the generation of “social facts”, the portions of the world that are treated as if 
they were real by social agents [...] Once reified, social facts confront agents’ everyday life as “objective” 
facts that cannot be ignored’.
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(that all entities, social or material, contain a specific set of attributes) or naturalism 
(that everything can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws), which are all 
part of the philosophy of materialism but are frequently used on their own.87
Third, in addition to these meanings of matter, what matters as well is an 
understanding of mattering: the value judgment that some things are more important 
than other things. Of course, mattering can be explained anthropocentrically, when 
for instance things matter because people desire them (scarce resources) or because 
they give cause for concern and are undesired (security). However, such a social 
explanation only tells half of the story. It neglects whether the material matters 
because it cannot be influenced as it exists independently and lies outside of “us 
humans” (a Cartesian argument) or whether it matters because the material is more 
durable, because it is too hard to change (a relational or relative argument). New 
materialist combine exactly these two points, for example, when Ahmed describes 
matter by arguing that ‘[w]hat matters is itself an effect of proximities: we are touched 
by what comes near, just as what comes near is affected by directions we have already 
taken.’88 These scholars thus study those things that matter based on a combination 
of the matter outside of humans and how it matters relationally for the object in 
question. How it inhibits and structures action, threatens ones existence or contains 
desirable qualities worth obtaining. More than that, with the attention to nearness 
new materialist scholars argue in line with Deleuze that what matters ‘is always a 
practical problem, never a universal problem mattering for everybody.’89 For new 
materialists everything is local, always.
A last aspect worth mentioning in this respect is the role of technology and 
artefacts as the materialized bridge between the social and matter. As a bridge, Winner 
described technology or artefacts already in the 1980s as being ‘by their very nature 
political in a specific way.’90 Winner was one of the first to write about the active 
politics of artefacts (including infrastructure), which he described in two ways: either 
artefacts matter because of the explicit political effects of technology, or artefacts 
matter due to the particular ingrained political organization that is necessary for 
the technology in question to come into existence. Winner highlighted the explicit 
political effects of technology with the example of the bridges to Long Island, New 
York.91 Designed at a specific height and width these bridges prevented busses to 
87 Also, materialism is not identical to physicalism, the latter also includes non-matter (e.g. gravity). 
Elsewhere, Harman 2009, 74 & 141–143 notes that Latour sees materialism actually as a covert form of 
idealism because it shifts the attention away from actors and agency towards the physical world (instead 
of the social) to explain everything. See also Wendt 2005.
88 Ahmed 2010, 234.
89 Stengers 2010, 28.
90 Winner 1980, 124, 129.
91 Ibid., 123–126.
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reach the island. With personal automobile ownership and use prevalent under 
whites, these bridges, through their design in that socio-economic context, prevented 
non-whites from reaching the island. They were designed with a political effect in 
mind. Other examples discussed by Winner include the neglected access to transport 
and other facilities for people with a disability or the deliberate construction of labor 
replacing machinery to limit the influence of labor unions. As he summarizes: 
Consciously or not, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose structures 
for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, 
travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time.92
While these examples rest on a (conscious) political choice at the initiation of the 
technology, Winner explains the ingrained political organization of artifacts 
by highlighting the pre-required political and social relations necessary for the 
technology to exist in the first place. He explains, for example, how nuclear energy 
requires a knowledgeable and capital-intensive elite as well as an administrative 
hierarchy to be able to build and steer a nuclear infrastructure in the first place. 
Of course, once constructed these elites are reinforced in their position due to the 
existence of the infrastructure itself.
Contra Winner’s argument, technology today is mainly discussed in non-
political terms as either substantive (deterministic) or instrumental.93 Of these two 
perspectives, Bourne argues that the instrumental view on technology ‘predominate[s] 
in western political and social thought’ where it is seen as a ‘neutral tool.’94 As a 
tool, its use and social impact is determined not by the technology itself, but by the 
people that use it within their social relations. A deterministic perspective disagrees 
with this instrumentality and views technology as the determining independent 
factor that shapes social relations and sets the context of human action.95 On its own 
a deterministic argument is clearly overstated, as technology is designed and thus 
political. However, for McCarthy a small nuance makes technological determinism 
more viable than instrumentalism because for him ‘[i]t is not that technology develops 
outside of human agency, but that it develops out side of some humans’ agencies.’96 
What McCarthy argues is that technological determinism exist the moment one looks 
at the relations between societies spread over time and space.97 The European use of 
gunpowder and navigation techniques are an obvious example, just as drone warfare 
92 Ibid., 127.
93 McCarthy 2013; Bourne 2012.
94 Bourne 2012, 142; McCarthy 2013, 473–474.
95 Bourne 2012, 143; McCarthy 2013, 472–473.
96 McCarthy 2013, 476.
97 Ibid., 478–479, 481.
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is both an American political choice on the use of an instrumental technique and a 
determining factor in the life of many in Central Asia. 
7.3.3 Towards the Performativity of New Materialism
The deterministic perspective is not only viable based on the plain technological 
dominance of one group over another. McCarthy also discusses the social and 
institutional norms that come with such a material dominance and discusses these as a 
major source of power that determine the life of those distanced from the technological 
innovation and its decision-making process itself.98 With gunpowder and navigation 
came perceptions and norms on mathematics, accounting and investment, just as the 
American drones are accompanied with rules of proper non-terrorist behavior and 
(debatable) ideas of justice and security. 
It is possible to return from the politics of technology to the politics of matter with 
the help of Butler, who makes a similar claim as McCarthy on a very individual and 
bodily level when she writes: 
Of course, persons use technological instruments, but instruments surely 
also use persons (position them, endow them with perspective, establish the 
trajectory of their action); they frame and form anyone who enters into the 
visual or audible field, and, accordingly, those who do not.99
In a way, both McCarthy and Butler highlight that it is not a neutral affair to describe 
technology in terms of determinism or instrumentalism. Any analysis starting from 
these positions becomes pre-structured and directs the focus of the scholar involved. 
Importantly, these pre-determined positions close off any potential analysis of the 
actual interaction of matter and social.100 This is a similar point to the general criticism 
of Barad on positivist and post-positivist studies, when she argues that ‘… the nature/
culture dualism foreclose[s] the understanding of how “nature” and “culture” are 
formed …’ in the first place.101 In other words, for Barad the driving question is not 
so much whether the social or the material matter, in fact, not even whether the social 
and the material matter, but ‘how matter comes to matter’.102 
This question opens the analysis to both sides of the mind-body dialectic. It 
studies how matter changes and sediments social understandings, but it also studies 
how language plays a role in making sense of matter. Simultaneously, it moves away 
from post-positivist understandings of de-construction and construction. For new 
98 Ibid., 488.
99 Butler 2009, xii. Also in Holmqvist 2013, 545.
100 Bourne 2012, 143.
101 Barad 2003, 828.
102 Barad 2003; Barad 2007. See also Latour 2004; Latour 2005b.
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materialists the goal is not to deconstruct issues and open them to critique and 
reconstruction.103 Instead, they move the speech act literature back to its original 
starting point on acts (in line with the critique on Securitization Theory in chapter 
5.4). This understanding still includes speech acts, but opens them from explicit 
and exceptional speech acts to ordinary language use and the distinctions and 
delimitations implicit in speech.104 In addition, the act is extended to include non-
speech acts like human behavior, bodily actions and cause and effect relationships. 
The concept developed by Butler to describe this focus on ‘how matter comes to 
matter’ is performativity. 
Importantly, in Butler’s original introduction to performativity in 1993, the 
concept is not taken to include non-linguistic acts. For Butler, performativity ‘must 
be understood not as a singular or deliberate “act,” but, rather, as the reiterative and 
citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names.’105 The act 
that Butler describes is one based on discourse that produces an ontological effect as 
it materializes and brings into reality the social effects that follow from the discursive 
delimitations behind the repetition and reiteration of previous practices; it ‘decides, 
as it were, what will and will not be the stuff of the object to which we then refer.’106 
Performativity is the ‘process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce 
the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter.’107 For Butler, performativity 
highlights what discourse does to the non-discursive. At the same time, its 
constant reiteration unlocks the potential failure that is inherent to performativity 
by highlighting a contextualized process where things only exist in the moment. 
Performativity is inherently incomplete, even when materialized or codified (in 
contrast to theoretical explanations of society).108 Part of this incompleteness stems 
from the materiality itself, as bodies and matter resist the ascription of discourse.109 
A body is never shaped by discourse, but it is normalized by it and forms itself in 
line with its historical social and material evolution. This productive normalization 
is something Butler takes from Foucault and which leads her to define materiality 
as ‘designat[ing] a certain effect of power or, rather, is power in its formative or 
constituting effects.’110
Where Butler remains focused on discourse and the materialization it initiates, 
others, including Latour and his colleagues from Actor-Network Theory as well as 
103 Bialasiewicz et al. 2007; De Goede 2012, 32.
104 Butler 2010.
105 Butler 1993, 2.
106 Butler 2010; Butler 1993, 11.
107 Butler 1993, 9 [emphasis in original].
108 Ibid., 2; Butler 2010, 153.
109 Loxley 2007, 135.
110 Butler 1993, 34.
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Barad, broaden this idea of performativity. These scholars try to move away from 
a human centered approach by opening up their ontology to the actions of matter 
itself. They do so by building on the relationality that is inherent in Butler’s (and 
Foucault’s) performativity. Contrary to Butler, however, these authors push the 
argument by officially moving away from a preference of discourse to the relations 
that shape objects. These relations include the relation between humans, between 
minds and bodies (discourse-non-discursive), but also the interactions or cause-
effect relationships between material “nodes” (who themselves exist out of relations). 
In allowing for interaction outside discourse, but in addition to discourse, these new 
materialists claim to move beyond Butler’s understanding of performativity. 
An interesting performative example that details such a relational understanding 
is Bennett’s analysis of the August 2003 Northeast American electricity blackout.111 
Her discussion of this massive black-out that affected over 50 million people 
highlights not only a – quite literal – relational analysis, but also discusses the 
manageability of such assemblages and the ingrained ethical questions that such 
an approach calls for. Bennet herself describes the blackout as ‘the end point of a 
cascade—of voltage collapses, self-protective withdrawals from the grid, and human 
decisions and omissions.’112 While she concludes that the investigators tasked with 
studying the blackout had no idea what stopped the cascade,113 she analyses in detail 
their conclusions on the accumulation of (unrelated) factors that contributed to it. As 
Bennett summarizes the official report:
The U.S.-Canada Task Force report was more confident about how the cascade 
began, insisting that there were a variety of agential loci. These include 
electricity, with its internal differentiation into “active” and “reactive” power 
(…); the power plants, which are understaffed by humans but overprotective 
in their mechanisms; the wires of transmission lines, which tolerate only so 
much heat before they refuse to transmit the electron flow; the brush fire in 
Ohio underneath a transmission line; FirstEnergy and other energy-trading 
corporations, who, by legal and illegal means, had been milking the grid without 
maintaining its infrastructure; consumers, whose demand for electricity is 
encouraged to grow without concern for consequences; and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, whose Energy Policy Act of 1992 deregulated the grid, 
separated the generation of electricity from its transmission and distribution, 
and advanced the privatization of electricity.114
111 Bennett 2005.
112 Ibid., 448.
113 Thereby acknowledging Grove’s point on the incapability of network inspired analyses to analyse 
creativity, or in this case non-existing agentic traces. See Grove 2014.
114 Bennett 2005, 449.
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This assemblage of factors led to a situation where the stress on the grid increased in 
a matter of minutes and kept increasing with each of the power plants that withdrew 
from the grid, as each of them further increased the strain and in turn set the alarms 
of other power plants. In total, this cascade led more than one hundred power plants 
to initiate their automatic safety and shutdown procedures. 
Most interesting for Bennett about this cascade is the fact that it is impossible to 
account it to human agency alone. This is not to say that humans played no role at 
all. In fact, Bennett is quite adamant that humans most definitely played a role in the 
blackout through their capitalist behavior in the – in hindsight – faulty regulated and 
liberalized electricity markets. However, in addition to the automatic safety systems, 
Bennett also highlights the agentic capacity of the electricity flow itself; a flow which 
spontaneously shifted its direction after several transmission lines broke down and 
thereby strained the grid in ways it had not experienced before.115 For Bennett such 
a distributed agency calls for an equally distributed accountability, and hence for 
an ethics that is ‘detached from moralism’ and a ‘politics of blame’ as both of these 
are human focused.116 In fact, Bennett argues that responsibility and accountability 
in events like the blackout should be approached in terms of a choice. Pending the 
political or social need, it becomes a judgement to either acknowledge a distributed 
accountability or hold only humans accountable. 
In sum, in the rejection of a sole focus on language and discourse, new materialist 
scholars are trying to study the actual relationship between “mind” and “body”, by 
moving away from a human centered analysis and asking how matter comes to matter. 
In their post-human approach, these scholars use a local and relational ontology 
that allows them to study the materialization of relationships between humans, 
matter, discourse and so forth. They study the becoming or enactment of new sets 
of relationships, by taking a performative approach that looks at these relationships 
irrespective whether their origin is social or material. In other words, they place the 
material side of the relationships on an equal footing with the discursive, as in Bennet’s 
example or in the technological determinism of McCarthy and Winner. Interestingly, 
they still separate the material and social analytically, and they still seem unable 
to study these ontological politics without referring to knowledge. In addition, as 
discussed below, while new materialism has the tools to describe and observe new 
relationships from both “sides” of the materialdiscursive assemblage, that is all they 
can do. They cannot explain where these new relationships come from without again 





7.4 The virtuality of relations
7.4.1 A Relational Ontology of Actor-Networks
Three elements of Bennett’s example touch upon the question where change comes 
from: the relationality of the different interacting nodes of the electricity grid, the 
surprise of unintended material effects and the ethical impact of deciding on the 
accountability of such a relationality. This first section will introduce a Latourian 
version of Actor-Network Theory to further study the relationality of new 
materialism. The second section discusses the critique that is levied against ANT in 
relation to the source of change and the last section will translate this back to the 
broader new materialist literature by focusing on the unintended material effects. 
Chapter 7.5 will continue with an ethical reflection on new materialism by discussing 
materialdiscursive relations in terms of observation practices.
Actor-Network Theory stems from the work of Latour, Law, Callon and Mol within 
Science and Technology Studies (STS).117 ANT is arguably the most popular of the new 
materialist approaches within the social sciences, due to its highly empirical framework 
around a network metaphor that highlights the complexity of the world as it studies 
the relations and traces between nodes, while offering explanations for the network’s 
durability and a warning for its strong inherent political effects. The core reason behind 
ANT’s rejection of a sole focus on language rests upon the broadly shared observation 
that the material is vital as an ordering principle for society. In other words, that it is the 
material that helps order societies. Latour gives the example of a group of chimpanzees 
that is constantly touching, de-fleaing and performing other niceties, not because they 
like it, but because they lack the use of materials and, as a result, are constantly in need 
to (re)constitute their ‘decaying’ society and its hierarchical relations.118 
The sedimentation of social effects in durable material artefacts is not unique to 
ANT. Miller, working from an (historic) anthropologic orientation on the theory of 
Material Culture, combines precisely this insight with, what he calls, an ‘humility 
of things’ and what Latour calls ‘black boxing’, namely the argument that artefacts 
constantly shift in and out of focus and that the most unobserved artefact is, in fact, 
the one that influences humans the most.119 However, before things can shift in and 
117 Latour 2005b; Law 1992; Law and Mol 1995; Callon 1986; Mol 1999. In his later works, Latour takes his 
distance from his early driving contributions to an ANT approach.
118 Latour 2005b, 70, 198. See also Law 1992, 3 on ‘material durability’; or Pels, Hetherington, and 
Vandenberghe 2002, 11 who claim that: ‘Objects need symbolic framings, storylines and human 
spokespersons in order to acquire social lives; social relationships and practices in turn need to be 
materially grounded in order to gain temporal and spatial endurance’.
119 Miller 2005, 2–8, esp. 3. Material Culture is particularly interested in the relation between the material 
and the anti-material, for example, when it comes to religion, or, more recently, the current economic 
society based upon consumption.
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out of focus, Miller claims that these objects (and subjects) should have gone through 
a process of ‘objectification’.120 This is based upon Hegel’s insight that, in the words of 
Miller, ‘[…] everything that we are and do arises out of the reflection upon ourselves 
given by the mirror image of the process by which we create form and are created 
by this same process’.121 In other words, he argues that humans can only know 
themselves when they look in the ‘material mirror’ of ‘the historical world created by 
those who lived before us’.122 A mirror that comes to us in the form of material culture. 
For Miller, historical ideas and intentions (social agency) are sedimented through 
an objectification in the material, after which the “material object” shifts in and out 
of focus, and, through its connections with other objects is able to extend a limited 
agency of its own.123 While Latour agrees with Miller that the social is inscribed into 
the material and that ideas need materialization, he questions the assumption of 
Material Culture that only humans can be agents. From an ANT perspective ‘objects, 
in this case, would be simply connected to one another so as to form a homogeneous 
layer, a configuration that is even less likely than one which imagines humans linked 
to one another by nothing else than social ties.’124 Instead, he sees people witnessing 
a wide range of hybrid quasi-objects – objects both material, social, human and non-
human – doing things that are often overlooked and fluctuating depending on the 
phenomena in question.125 
This realization, that scholars will never really know ‘who or what’ is acting if they 
do not first question this explicitly, is the basic premise of Actor-Network Theory.126 
Latour argues in this respect that: 
The task of defining and ordering the social should be left to the actors 
themselves, not taken up by the analyst. This is why, to regain some sense 
120 Latour 2005b.
121 Miller 2005, 4.
122 Ibid., 5.
123 Ibid., 17–18 This material culture perspective questions the bivalent logic of reification (the material 
framing of social relations) or fetishism (the symbolic framing of material objects) as it does both. See 
also Le Billon 2007, 176 on commodification versus fetishisation.
124 Latour 2005b, 84–85 [emphasis in original]. See also: Bourne 2012, 161.
125 Latour 2005b, 72 argues, for example, that ‘there might exist many metaphysical shades between full 
causality and sheer inexistence’. On page 84-85 he identifies four: historical materialism (a material 
infrastructure like Marx’s that determines social relations); a material world that ‘mirrors’ the social 
distinctions (Bourdieu and other more critical oriented theories); and the material as a stage for human 
interaction (instrumentalist perspective); and lastly, those who put a heterogeneously layer atop the 
material and social (Material Culture). Elsewhere Woolgar 2002, 265 claims that: ‘The relationship 
between the material and the social is thus a boundary problem’ is something to which Latour and the 
other authors behind ANT would object strongly, as it focusses on hybrid forms that picture a mix of two 
pure forms. Thus actually negating this sentence!
126 Latour 2005b; Law 1992; Law and Mol 1995; Callon 1986.
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of order, the best solution is to trace connections between the controversies 
themselves rather than try to decide how to settle any given controversy.’127
In order to trace the connections, ANT envisions (1) a relational network of nodes 
that exhibits heterogeneous and rhizomatic qualities.128 Each of these nodes are 
agent-networks in themselves and made up out of subsequent nodes and relations, 
which in turn are networks of shifting associations, and so on. To be able to study 
these sets of actor-networks without any a priori assumptions on how the relations 
look like ANT (2) assumes them to be irreducible and f lat.129 All actor-networks 
are irreducible or different from any other actor-network. And because the nodes 
can never be explained by something larger (because then they would be vertically 
reducible), the ontology of these networks is f lat in Whitehead’s sense that all 
entities have an identical (horizontal) ontological standing, which in practice 
means that the smallest atom can be as important as the largest set of human 
economic relations.130 
While ANT talks about actor-networks, it does not envision these nodes as “actors”, 
but instead (3) prefers the post-human term ‘actants’. For ANT, the term “actor” is 
not only too human centered, but it also hides the real set of relations that make the 
action possible in the first place.131 An actor never acts alone or, as Tuana describes it, 
‘[a]gency in all these instances emerges out of such interactions; it is not antecedent 
to them.’132 To get behind the figurehead of the actor and get to the action itself, 
ANT introduces the term actant, which ‘… are simply different ways to make actors 
do things’ irrespective whether they are social or material, human or non-human, 
micro or macro.133 An actant does not need motivation, willpower or rationality 
(on which humans are differentiated from animals), it is neither object nor subject, 
instead an actant ‘is that which does something, has sufficient coherence to perform 
actions, produce effects, and alter situations.’134 Like the overall network, each actant 
in turn is an assemblage of a range of associations in itself. These assemblages are 
constantly shifting, one moment closing old relations and the next entering into new 
ones. While ANT sees actants as irreducible and flat to begin with, it does allow for 
127 Latour 2005b, 23 [emphasis added].
128 On rhizomatic networks see: Deleuze and Guattari 1987.
129 Bourne 2012, 154. Of course, this goes both ways. While it might be perceived as more real, in fact all 
actants are real. They only differ in the number / strength of their associations, see Fine 2005, 96.
130 Harman 2009, 773; Bourne 2012, 154. For a more critical discussion, see Fine 2005.
131 Latour 2005b, 46.
132 Tuana 2008, 9; Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 54.
133 Latour 2005b, 55. Bennett 2005, 446–447 discusses actants as both coherent entities (e.g. a tree) and 
forces (e.g. gravity or mineralization), depending on how they appear to us humans.
134 Bennett 2004, 355. In general, Bennett refers to this with her concept of ‘thing-power’.
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differences in power: the more associations an actant upholds, the stronger it can 
affect its surroundings and the more “real” it appears.135 
However, an observer can only witness the effects and strength of an actant if (4) 
the actant accounts for itself by leaving a mark or trace upon another actor-network. 
Here ANT (5) differentiates between mediators and intermediaries. On the one 
hand, an intermediary is an actant who offers a highly predictable causal relation 
as it ‘transports meaning or force without transformation.’136 For example, writing 
a paper depends on many factors, most of which the author is not aware as these 
factors (6) have withdrawn from sight and are black boxed. These intermediaries do 
not make a difference. That is, until they break down, as all heterogeneous networks 
inherently fail at some point. Then suddenly an unobserved object becomes a thing: 
the computer could break down due to a power surge, a software glitch or a corrupt 
hard drive; or the author could develop RSI as the result from a cheap office chair, 
etc. In each case, the “black box” of the intermediary normally working components 
(relata) are opened up and matters of fact become matters of concern.137 For ANT, all 
intermediaries can transform into mediators, which do ‘transform, translate, distort, 
and modify the meaning or the elements they are supposed to carry.’138 At that moment 
of translation from input to output, mediators leave traces. More important, ‘[t]hey 
make each other be’.139 However, mediators can only transform into intermediaries 
when they are transformed or translated by the effects of other mediators. Humans 
too, as actants (e.g. based upon both human and non-human relations), often use 
particular mediators (e.g. tools of observation) to get intermediaries “to talk”.140 ANT 
searches for these translations, as these, no matter how big or small, hint at the actual 
associations and agency that make up the (social) world.141 
In an early reflection on ANT, Law summarizes these traces into three different 
strategies. The first strategy deals with ordering through time with practices of 
inscription and sedimentation (durability). The second strategy deals with ordering 
through space by enabling action and communication at a distance (ANT’s ‘immutable 
mobiles’ – letters, ships, etc.). Third, Law discusses a strategy of translation based 
on practices of anticipation, an anticipation of future relations, which he primarily 
135 Latour 2005b, 180.
136 Ibid., 39.
137 Latour 2004. Things are continuously (re)produced relata, a continuous ‘gathering’ of relations as fact 
or concern, while Latour describes objects as failed ‘things’, as taken-for-granted end-products of 
observation.
138 Latour 2005b, 39.
139 Dolwick 2009, 45 [emphasis in original].
140 Latour 2005b, 79.
141 Hence ‘flattening the social’ and ‘localizing the global’ – i.e. the social does not stand above the material, 
and the macro is not more important than the micro/local, thereby removing the level-of-analyses 
problem. See ibid., 165.
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describes in terms of calculative practices (compare to chapters 5 and 8).142 For ANT, 
all these traces are material. Even knowledge is considered a collection of material 
traces in this perspective because ‘[i]t comes as talk, or conference presentations. 
Or it appears in papers, preprints or patents. Or again, it appears in the form of 
skills embodied in scientists and technicians...’143 Simultaneously, Latour enforces 
that all ANT scholarly work comes as a textual account of a set of relations of a 
heterogeneous network.144 Where ANT differs from other accounts in the social 
sciences, is, however, in the accuracy it provides by accepting a greater level of 
uncertainty: 
an account which accepts to be ‘just a story’ is an account that has lost its main 
source of uncertainty: it does not fret any longer at being accurate, faithful, 
interesting, or objective. … In a bad text only a handful of actors will be 
designated as the causes of all the others.145
Latour refers here to the idea of capitalism. He does not deny that capitalism exists, 
but argues that one can only truly study it by tracing its local relations, which in 
this case means starting with the Wall Street trading rooms and household budgets 
decided on at kitchen tables.146 
In other words, for ANT scholars, the idea of society or social explanations like 
norms, social facts or a concept as scarcity do more harm than good because they 
close off an understanding of what is really going on. Latour is quite strong on this 
and criticizes social scientist, who, instead of providing ‘powerful explanations’, 
are partaking in a power play that freezes ‘the entities already mobilized to render 
asymmetries longer lasting.’147 Instead of closing off these asymmetries from their 
reality by proposing explanations that are always valid, Latour and ANT argue 
in favor of a better examination of the actual construction of social events while 
acknowledging that things can always fail.148 With everything made up of inherently 
fragile heterogeneous networks and their mediators, ‘the dichotomy between the 
real and the constructed is, like all dichotomies, a false one.’149 Instead, the question 
becomes how well things are constructed and performed.150 
142 Law 1992, 6–7.
143 Ibid., 2.
144 Latour 2005b, 122–130.
145 Ibid., 127, 130.
146 Ibid., 178–179, 192. For similar arguments on security and the economy/market, see: Schouten 2014, 27; 
MacKenzie 2008; Caliskan and Callon 2010.
147 Latour 2005b, 5, 8, 23, 68, 85, 260.
148 Ibid., 249.
149 Hekman 2010, 110.
150 Mol 2002, 7; Hekman 2010, 110; Latour 2005b, 89–90.
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7.4.2 Towards Virtuality and Actuality
One of the most interesting and thorough arguments against this Latourian version 
of ANT is made by the philosopher Harman in his argument for an object-oriented-
philosophy (OOP), which basically states that ANT is unable to explain the origin of 
change.151 By placing ANT in perspective with other post-humanist philosophers, 
Harman identifies a renewed attention to the classic problem of ‘isolation and 
interbleeding of individual things.’152 In particular, he questions Latour’s paradoxical 
claim of ‘action at a distance’: that actants are simultaneously irreducible to other 
actants, both large and small, but nonetheless able to act and affect each other. For 
Harman, to be irreducible is to have distance, while to affect something requires a 
sense of nearness, a connection of sorts.153 As described above, Latour and ANT 
offer translation (by mediators) and abstraction (black boxing) as an answer to this 
dilemma. According to Harman, however, such a networked position results in 
actants who are always public and cannot hide. It offers a ‘realism of relations’ that 
rejects any form of essence and consequentially prevents the actants from having 
closed qualities.154
By denying actants any form of essence, ANT consequently faces ‘an infinite regress 
of actors’ as each network consists of actants, consisting of networks, consisting of 
actants, etc.155 In this respect, Fine questions the observational arbitrariness of the 
inclusions and exclusions of what counts as part of an heterogeneous network. If there 
is always a larger or smaller network, then the observer takes position when s/he 
decides to stop studying the rest of the network.156 In turn, for Harman this lack of 
closed qualities of actants means that ANT only studies actual states of affairs and 
that Latour is unable to account for change as he rejects any form of potentiality: all 
relations that can take place, do take place.157 Latour is unable to account for that 
moment when an actant’s ‘alliances shift’, because at that same moment ‘by definition 
the actor has changed.’158 One consequence of such an actuality of present actants 
is a tendency within ANT and other network approaches to favor those relations 
that can be observed and measured most easily and thereby offer the illusion of 
manageability.159 In line with this, Harman argues that Latour is unable to explain 
the reality of ‘buffered causation’; that not all relations are entered the moment that 
151 Harman 2009.
152 Ibid., 6, also 99–107.
153 Ibid., 34–35.
154 Ibid., 72 & 75.
155 Ibid., 106.
156 Fine 2005, 96. However, compare Bennett 2012, 228.
157 Harman 2009, 130–134.
158 Ibid., 105.
159 Grove 2011, 1–2, 6. Later on, Grove discusses the use of the network metaphor to analyze terrorist groups. 
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they can be made.160 Similarly, Harman finds Latour unable to differentiate between 
symmetrical and asymmetrical relations and to account for uni- or bidirectional 
relations. He argues that ANT theorizes all relations as two-sided and evenly matched, 
with nodes only differing in strength based on the number of associations.161 
To counter the infinite regress in ANT Harman proposes a perspective that builds 
on ‘an absolute distinction between the domestic relations that a thing needs to some 
extent in order to exist, and the external alliances that it does not need. But the actor 
itself cannot be identified with either.’162 When matter is depicted as something firm 
and hard, people do not refer to an essential characteristic of the object but to its 
relational qualities: something is hard or intelligent only in relation to that which 
is not. In Harman’s view, most of his points could be answered by taking Latour’s 
meta-physics of actor-networks and adding the distinction between internal relations 
and external relational qualities to the insight that actants are able to enter a relation 
through the core of a mediator.163 
The precise argumentation of Herman is dense and will not be reproduced here. 
Of interest here is the fact that in his more recent work Latour accepts Harman’s 
argument and steps away from his earlier claims of irreduction, that no actant is 
reducible to another, while admitting that ANT has no way to study trajectories.164 To 
incorporate and allow for change and potentiality Latour offers his view of networks 
against a background of unarticulated plasma.165 This plasma is the potentiality 
of the network that fills the empty spaces between the nodes and the connections. 
Farías criticizes this move in a similar fashion as Latour criticizes social sciences: in 
shifting to a base plasma of virtuality that is ‘interrupted’ by the actual relations that 
take effect, Latour creates an a priori asymmetry that only explains where change 
comes from and not how the virtual becomes actual.166 To solve this, Farías turns 
to Luhmann’s systems of communication, which he describes as irreducible par 
excellence and thus comparable to Latour’s actor-networks.167 What Farías likes in 
particular, is the self-referentiality of Luhmann’s systems and how they make sense 
of their own environment (their virtuality according to Farías) and subsequently 
differentiate themselves from that environment and make themselves actual. He sees 
160 Harman 2009, 147. However, Latour does mention overflow. See Latour 2005b, 166.
161 Harman 2009, 147.
162 Ibid., 135.
163 Ibid., 145–146 To read his specific treatise: p151-228, in particular p207-211. Also p187: ‘The potential 
can only mean a potential for future relations, and the actual can only mean what is in and of itself actual 
apart from any relations’ .
164 Farías 2014, 28–29; Latour, Harman, and Erdelyi 2011.
165 Latour 2005b, 244.
166 Farías 2014, 28–29.
167 Ibid., 31.
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each node (actant) as a system of relations (actant-networks) that observes the other 
nodes (actant-networks) and differentiates itself from it.
In this respect, the philosopher Bryant makes differences the starting point of his 
object-oriented-ontology (OOO).168 What he proposes, in order to have ‘a foundation 
for knowledge’ in answer to the epistemic argument, is an ontic principle that states 
that ‘there is no difference that does not make a difference’ and ‘to be is to make 
or produce differences.’169 If everything results from difference, if  ‘beings are and 
become through their differences’, than, on the one hand, nothing can be traced back 
to a pure origin and, on the other hand, one has an ontological position that forces 
one into an epistemology where you can only be sure of your knowledge if you engage 
with the differences.170 Bryant argues that such an ontic but testable starting point, 
which is comparable to ANT, leads to a post-human (all beings differ), irreducible 
(because beings differ they are irreducible) and flat ontology (all beings differ, hence 
are on equal footing) where scholars have to trace translations (that relations are 
actively made) but need to be careful in providing ‘hegemonic’ explanations (that 
one difference explains all).171 Contrary to a Latourian ANT however, Bryant agrees 
with Harman on the problem of durability over time as he observes that ‘objects 
persist through time while nonetheless undergoing change at the level of their 
qualities.’172 Like Harmann, he separates the endogenous relations of an object from 
its exogenous relations. In contrast to Harmann, Bryant also looks at topologies of 
inter-ontic relations that set constraints on individual actants, irrespective their 
direct relations.173 With inter-ontic relations, Bryant refers to the observation that 
beings often share endogenous relations, independent of the actual relations between 
objects that make them be. These inter-ontic relations are forced upon objects by a 
larger topology, like gravity that creates a shared need for skeletons. He explains this 
by allowing for unilateral relations and by arguing that objects need to be able to act 
on other objects, but also need to be open to be acted on by others.174 
Together these assumptions mark the relational, but differences based objects that 
allow Bryant to account for a shift from virtuality to actuality and back – without 
separating them a priori as ANT does. For Bryant the virtual is limited to the space 
between the inter-ontic topology and the capacity to act or be acted upon. The virtual 
for Bryant needs to be activated through translation in order to actualize a new state 
of affairs that brings into being new, potentially unknown, types of effects, which are 
168 A focus on differences is shared by Derrida and Luhmann, some of the strongest post-positivists. 





174 Ibid., 282 [emphasis added].
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already pre-structured by a broader topology. Change, for Bryant, stems from the idea 
that not all effects are always actualized nor that all actualizations bring new effects, 
but that the material conditions of possibility are pre-structured by the virtual and 
actual relations between actants and their topologies.
7.4.3 An Eventful Folding
In a less abstract form and without the discussion on where change comes from, this 
virtual ontology is more generally known in new materialism as the ‘vibrancy of 
matter’:175 
materiality is always something more than “mere” matter: an excess,  force, 
vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self- creative, 
productive, unpredictable.176
Neither mechanistic nor reducible, this vibrant materialism envisions a world of 
becoming.177 In a relational ontology this points to the ‘uncertain exchanges between 
stabilized formations and mobile forces that subsist within and below them.’178 
This is something that a more traditional Cartesian understanding of matter would 
never be able to tackle. Matter in a Cartesian dualist world-view is, according to 
Coole, ‘sheer exteriority’ and as such ‘devoid of interiority or ontological depth. It is 
without qualities like color or smell … without dark recesses, crevices, or hollows … 
unaffected by time or negativity… It is inert stuff emptied of all immanent vitality.’179 
A Cartesian matter is observable in its causality as it ‘tends to determination; it gives 
itself up to calculation, precision, and spatizalization.’180 Of course, by now it should 
be clear that matter is not Cartesian. Moreover, even though matter is durable and 
observable, matter and ‘things are not just simultaneously material and meaningful; 
they are also eventful.’181 
New materialists interpret the event as that what interrupts the habits and routines 
that make up subjects as well as the withdrawal of objects from its active relations.182 
An event is the break with habit. That what starts mattering, not because of any a 
priori socially provided interests but because ‘it gives to that something a power it 
does not generally possess: the power to cause us to think, feel and wonder, the power 
to have us wondering how practically to relate to it, how to pose relevant questions 
175 Bennett 2010b.
176 Coole and Frost 2010a, 9.
177 Connolly 2010.
178 Ibid., 179.
179 Coole 2010, 94.
180 Grosz 2010, 150.
181 Braun and Whatmore 2010b, xxi [emphasis added]. Later in the chapter they also call it ‘originary’ (xvii).
182 Braidotti 2010, 213; Stengers 2010, 27; Latour 2002, 251.
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about it.’183 On the one hand, an event is thus the surprise or something in need of 
interpretation. Connolly describes an event in this respect as something that:
happens rather rapidly; it throws some regular institutions and role defini tions 
into turmoil or disarray; its antecedents often seem insufficient to explain its 
emer gence and amplifications; its settlement, when under way, is uncertain; 
and it makes a real difference in the world, for good or ill.184 
An event often comes as a failure or a breakdown that transforms a matter of fact into 
a matter of concern.185 Barry, for example, is interested in the manner in which the 
corrosion of the metals of an oil pipeline ignites a political debate, sometimes even 
constituting a public that was not there before.186 On the other hand, Latour also talks 
about the event in terms of an achievement. In this interpretation, events are seen as 
successful practices of observation. As the achievement to observe those phenomena 
that have never been observed before.187 For Latour this is an event because it achieves 
to connect two previously unlinked objects, thereby creating ‘new possibilities and 
new questions for the concerned parties.’188 Defining events in terms of surprise 
and achievement thus very much depends on one’s perspective. The breakdown of a 
pipeline through corrosion is an achievement of the elements involved but a surprise 
for the people who depend on the pipeline.
Another way to indicate both the surprise and the achievement is by describing 
objects, including (post)humans, as folded entities. A fold refers to the manner in 
which an object bridges moments in space and time as well as opens up additional 
actions for the user. Latour, when not discussing the withdrawal or black boxing 
of objects, uses the example of a hammer to show how such an object folds time 
(the history of iron, wood, production, transport and use), space (mines, forests, 
factories, markets, homes) and the ‘flux of possibilities’ that the hammer offers to its 
wielder (construction, weapon, ornament).189 These folds are never static and always 
hide their own negative, simply because something that can be folded can also be 
stretched, broken and opened up.190 The surprise of the inherent failure is countered 
by the achievement of the folding itself. Brassett & Vaughan Williams draw on Butler 
183 Stengers 2011, 374; Deleuze 1994; Grove 2014, 366; Bennett 2005, 457–458.
184 Connolly 2013, 404.
185 Latour 2004.
186 Barry 2013a; Marres 2005.
187 Stengers 2010, 12.
188 Ibid., 25.
189 Latour 2002, 249–250.
190 Coole 2010, 107. Compare with Adorno 1973 who discusses this in terms of a ‘non-identity’: the difference 
between concept and thing, with something in the ‘thing’ always resisting the concept. For a discussion 
see: Bennett 2004, 349, 361–362.
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when they describe this as ‘the performative politics of … attempted closures, which 
are nevertheless already in excess of their own logic and give rise to unexpected, 
unforeseen, and disruptive effects.’191 This separates new materialism once more 
from strict constructivist approaches. According to new materialism, the habitual 
and repetitive folding of sets of relations is based on practices instead of social norms 
or rules as the latter do not allow for their own negative, for the hesitation that could 
break them open.192 Where norms are resisted from the outside by another norm, 
performative practices are inherently fragile. In addition, these practices enact or 
perform the actual reality of the folding itself, they ‘co-constitut[e] ‘subjects’, ‘objects’ 
and ‘environments’.’193 This means that folds, and the practices that create them, 
cannot be studied from a distance because any observation is an act itself and affects 
the folded object.194 
In short, this chapter offered an example of a new materialist, post-human and 
relational theory by introducing Latour’s actor-network theory. While discussing 
this theory and its assumptions two things became clear. First, that the flat ontology 
and irreducibility of the objects (e.g. actor-networks) prevents this theory to explain 
change and instead perceives a constant regress of actants. This follows, second, 
in part because the theory is biased towards observable (traceable) relations and 
provides no guidance to observers on where to limit their research. The work of 
Ferias (on Luhmann) and Bryant points towards a focus on differences as the answer 
to this problem of virtuality in relational theories. Both argue that these differences 
are performatively given shape in and by the relations themselves, as these observe 
their own distinctions in a constant folding that constitutes themselves and their 
environment. This close connection between observation, acts and objects is taken 
up below.
7.4.4 The Politics of Observing with Things 
While the analysis above of a relational ontology paints a very technocratic and 
descriptive picture of relations being entered and disrupted, such a perspective runs 
the risk of forgetting the politics behind such disruptions, especially when humans 
are involved.195 As soon as humans are involved, either as affected or affecting party, 
‘a host of ethical and political issues’ opens up.196 A good example of a situation of 
ontological uncertainty and the collapse of observation and practice can be found 
in the many necessary real-life experimentations when introducing or transforming 
191 Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015, 4; Butler 2010. On closure, see Luhmann 2006.
192 Stengers 2010, 16; Connolly 2013, 404–405.
193 Squire 2015, 153. The term enactment is introduced by Mol 2002.
194 Mol 2002, 5–6.
195 Walters 2014, 103; Squire 2015, 151.
196 Coole and Frost 2010a, 19.
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infrastructures and other technologies.197 The environmental impact of windmills 
or the social effects of smart meters, let alone the optimal configuration of a smart 
grid, can only be analyzed when they are build and utilized on scale. Meaning that 
people need to use them for others to get to know them. On the one hand, this implies 
that to analyze the materialdiscursive consequences of an artefact in its totality, it is 
necessary to take the risk to use it in its environmental and social context. And, on the 
other hand, such an experimentation not only deflates any social-material dualistic 
understanding, but also deflates the distinction between expertise and laypersons, 
as those who use the technology are as much experts as those who are experts in 
name.198 In other words, the excess potentiality of the materialdiscursive collapses the 
distinction between observation and objects and opens up to a politics of ontology, 
which deals with ‘the conditions of possibility [as] enacted’.199
Someone who explicitly studies ontological politics is Barry in his work on 
the BTC pipeline in the Caucasus.200 He focusses in particular on the knowledge 
disputes surrounding the construction, maintenance and possible (environmental) 
effects of this pipeline. While highlighting the materiality of the pipeline, its metal 
construction, landscape route and material/environmental impacts, Barry argues 
for a better understanding of the public knowledge controversies that ‘make things 
political.’201 Barry clearly agrees with the earlier claim of Barad that it is not 
about matter but about materialization and that what makes the material matter. 
While acknowledging the instability of matter (its vibrancy) and its ‘informational 
enrichment’ in case of alloys and metallurgy, matter is analyzed by Barry as something 
that enables and hinders, something that is represented, debated and made public or 
not by and for humans.202 In other words, for Barry matter is ultimately subject to 
human fears and desires. 
Then again, contra Barry’s gas pipeline, it is possible to find an ontological politics 
at work in cases without direct human involvement. For instance, Brassett & Vaughan-
Williams analyze a post-human informational enriched materiality by analyzing self-
learning sensors used in the protection of critical infrastructure, in their case, natural 
197 Whatmore 2006, 607; Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009; Mitchell 2013, 240–242.
198 Callon, Lascoumes, and Barthe 2009.
199 Hekman 2010, 82; Mol 2002. Braun and Whatmore 2010b, xxiii.
200 Barry 2013a; Barry 2013b. For another new materialist discussion on the politics of ontology (identifying 
the event, debating its solution), see Schouten 2014 for a discussion on the role of the body scanner at 
airports from a security perspective.
201 Barry 2013b, 7.
202 Ibid., 12–13. Star 1999 actually discusses nine characteristics of infrastructure: (1) its embeddedness in 
other (infra)structures); (2) its transparency (once build it is there in the open); (3) its temporal and 
spatial effects; (4) its effects on users, through skills; (5) its effects on social practices; (6) its embodiment 
of standards; (7) its fixation of (capital) investments and interests; (8) its modular qualities; and (9) its 
withdrawal or black-boxing effects.
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fresh water filtration areas.203 With the self-correcting and improving accuracy of the 
database behind the motion and audio sensors, Brassett & Vaughan-Williams argue 
that in this case it is the infrastructure itself (the sensors, databases, cables, etc.) that 
is performing its own – and our – security. The database raises the alarm not on an 
activation of the sensors, but on whether the activity that is measured falls outside 
the scope of its own historic irregular activities. It then adds that same measurement 
to the database to be used next time that the sensors are activated. The database and 
sensors act politically, based on the politics that is written into the program by its 
designers who allow the program to define its own normality curve (chapter 5.5.5). 
An alternative theory that allows for an active role of artefacts in relation to 
knowledge is the Agential Realist theory of the physicist and feminist philosopher 
Barad.204 What is remarkable regarding the theoretical perspectives so far, when 
looking at ANT and OOO, is that in their choice for objects and relations they all 
seem to start from continental philosophy. Barad, however, builds her argument on 
insights gained from quantum theory, especially the work of Niels Bohr, and the 
results of recent quantum experiments.205 Based on her combination of Bohr and 
post-positivist philosophy, brutally brief, Barad envisions the world to be made out 
of ‘entangled’ ‘materialdiscursive phenomena’ that ‘intra-act’ with each other and 
which exist by the grace of an ‘agential cut’ that creates differences as it delineates the 
phenomena from within by creating a clear object – subject distinction and defining 
what matters and what does not matter. In other words, contrary to the relational 
theories discussed so far, Barad’s theory starts from an ontology of phenomena. This 
helps her to open the definition of materiality to a politics of materialization and to 
argue for an extension of postmodern concerns on the inseparability of ontology, 
epistemology and ethics.206 By addressing ethics and arguing for an inseparability 
of these three concepts, Barad, firstly, introduces a politics of materialization, and, 
secondly, by linking ethics to the practices of observation introduces a radical 
different view on knowledge. In contrast to ANT and other new materialist offerings, 
Barad sees objects playing an important role in informing and determining what 
humans are capable of knowing in the first place. She thus argues in favor of a theory 
of performativity that includes not only how discourse moderates the non-discursive, 
but also how matter itself helps perform knowledge in a particular way. 
203 Brassett and Vaughan-Williams 2015, 39–42.
204 Barad 2007; Barad 2003; Barad 1996; Barad 1998; Barad 2011.
205 Within IR, Wendt 2005 is pursuing a similar quantum course in his more recent work where he 
focusses on humans as ‘walking wave particle dualities’ and consciousness as a ‘macroscopic quantum 
mechanical phenomenon’ based on ‘panpsychism’, this highly complex and ambitious work still retains 
a clear humanist preoccupation. 
206 Barad 1996; Barad 2003; Barad 2007.
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Barad’s work leans heavily on Bohr’s insights concerning the so-called ‘measurement 
problem’ in quantum theory. Physicists, after having shown that sub-atomic particles 
can behave both as a wave (showing diffraction patterns) and as a particle (taking up 
a particular position in space), concluded that it is impossible for an observer to study 
both at the same time.207 The focus of the observer, even retrospectively according to 
recent quantum research as described by Barad, determines whether s/he is witness 
to particle or wave-like behavior. The example used by Barad (and Bohr) to clarify 
this deals with the study of momentum and position: to study momentum (speed and 
direction) the observer has to use a movable camera, while if an observer wants to 
study the position of an object s/he can only do so from a fixed position. Momentum 
and position are thus mutually exclusive phenomena, it is impossible to study them 
both at the exact same time.208 Often this is described as Heisenberg’s uncertainty 
principle, which describes this measurement problem in terms of an epistemological 
uncertainty: that it is impossible to know whether something is a wave or a particle. 
Barad, however, shares Bohr’s understanding of the measurement problem in 
terms of indeterminacy. For Bohr the measurement problem does not results from 
epistemological uncertainty but from an ontological complementarity: that the world 
is ontologically inseparable, and that it is the observation and the theories behind 
the observation that determine which properties in fact exist in the world.209 Both 
wave and particle exist and we are simultaneously moving and in position, only the 
observer dictates what exactly we are. From this follows the main message that Barad 
tries to convene, that is to say Bohr’s lesson that ‘we are part of that nature that we seek 
to understand.’210
Barad rephrases this Bohrian insight by arguing that the practice of observation 
should therefore be seen as an agential cut, a becoming of reality. While the previous 
theories offered a range of core concepts like materialism, social structures, language, 
systems of communication, hybrid forms, or actor-networks of relations, Barad 
offers an ontology of phenomena as a solution to include all possible realities that 
are delineated by this agential cut. In fact, Barad argues that it is not so much the 
observer who makes the cut – this is still too humanist a perspective – but that the 
materialdiscursive practices that inhibit this cut create themselves. The cut originates 
207 However, see the very recent work of Rozema et al. 2012 and Piazza et al. 2015, which state that it is 
possible to observe both without influencing them. While this places question marks behind Barad’s 
indeterminacy argument, it simultaneously reinforces her argument about the role that matter plays in 
observing matter (as we could not confirm this with older equipment), and thus the boundaries that 
objects enact.
208 Barad 2007, 111–113. Another example given by Bohr (as described by Barad) is when a person holds 
a stick: you either feel the stick, or you feel through the stick, but never simultaneously. Compare to 
Heidegger’s tool-in-use.
209 Barad 2003; Barad 2007; Barad 2011.
210 Barad 2007, 26, 117–118 [emphasis in original].
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from the intra-action between all the ‘agencies of observation’: the observer, but 
also the tools, the social structures, and so on.211 Simultaneously, it creates its own 
agential separability, a separation between the ‘object’ and ‘agencies of observation’.212 
In the practice of observation a causal relationship is enacted between the object (a 
cause) and the effect or traces left on the agencies of observation (the subjects), which 
in turn enables a logic of objectivity resembling scientific realism.213 The origin of the 
cut is not a conscious choice but a result of a constant intra-acting between mutually 
constituting entangled agencies. (Barad prefers the concept of intra-acting to the 
concept of interacting, as the latter implies a relationship between two separate entities, 
while intra-acting refers to two entities within the same phenomena). These agencies 
or phenomena, are not attributes but ongoing enactments or reconfigurations of the 
world and only become distinct on a relational level: they never are and never will 
become individual entities (due to their ontological inseparability).214 Barad, however, 
does distinguish between different intra-actions that result in different phenomena, 
just as she sees that a phenomenon can be part of other larger phenomena. 
For Barad, these phenomena are real; what is more, she argues that they are 
physical.215 She comes to this assertion through her argument that ‘knowing does not 
come from standing at a distance and representing but rather from a direct material 
engagement with the world.’216 Claiming that either the discursive or the material 
comes prior to the other is nonsensical, because the ontological inseparability makes 
these concepts, like space and time, products of observation (a la Latour). Instead the 
world is entangled and ‘the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in the 
dynamics of intra-activity.’217 At this point Barad redefines what we understand as the 
discursive and material. In line with post-positivist scholars, she sees discourse losing 
its meaning without on-going use. However, contra those scholars she reinterprets 
discursive practices in line with Butler and Bryant as 
material (re)configurings of the world through which the determination of 
boundaries, properties, and meanings is differentially enacted.218 
With discourses interpreted as material differences, she continues by arguing that 
211 Ibid., 31.
212 Ibid., 140. Thus creating ‘exteriority-within-phenomena’.
213 Ibid., 120. Both Barad and Latour seem to agree that linguistic/semiotic interpretation can only occur if 
based on such a trace or mark.
214 Ibid., 33, 141.
215 Opening her argument to claims that she is a naturalist, which she is, but not in the normal sense of the 
term. See Rouse 2004.
216 Barad 2007, 49, also 55–56 & 180–181 [emphasis in original]; Barad 2003, 829.
217 Barad 2007, 152.
218 Ibid., 151, 335. On boundaries, see 154-156. 
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matter does not refer to a fixed substance; rather, matter is substance in its 
intra-active becoming – not a thing but a doing a congealing of agency. […] 
“matter” refers to phenomena in their ongoing materialization.219 
For Barad matter does not exist “out-there”, but it comes into being through its 
relations and observations. Clearly, this latter position, on coming to matter by 
hiding the cut, resembles the black-boxing of ANT and the ‘humility-of-things’ form 
Material Culture. This ontological inseparability of materialdiscursive practices leads 
Barad to a world made up of entangled phenomena. A world open to both sides of the 
ontological indeterminacy, wherein an iterative and intra-acting process of agential 
cuts enact particular materialdiscursive practices based upon agential separability, or 
the setting of boundaries which both define and give meaning to the phenomena itself. 
One of the main implications of Barad’s framework is that one can only study 
a phenomenon by comparing two complementary phenomena from within a third 
phenomenon. Comparable to Luhmann, it is not possible to study a system from 
within that system. Barad, like Luhmann and Bryant, thus searches for differences. 
To highlight the boundaries created through differences she proposes a method called 
diffractive reading. This method builds on diffraction (patterns), a term used in the 
natural sciences to explain the effects of the interaction between waves, to show how 
differences create difference.220 For example, when analyzing energy security this 
would mean that one reads it through both new materialist and security theories 
and in doing so find differences and new insights at the crossing of both approaches. 
Another important implication of her theory of entanglement are the inherent ethical 
consequences if observational cuts: ‘What is on the other side of the agential cut is 
not separate from us – agential separability is not individuation. Ethics is therefore 
not about right response to a radically exterior/ized other, but about responsibility 
and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming of which we are a part.’221 
With her example of the brittle star, a sea creature not to be confused with the 
more popular sea star (brittle stars have snakelike arms), Barad clarifies both the 
entanglement and ethics of observational ‘cuts’.222 First, there is the notion that a 
brittle star does not have eyes, nor does it have a brain. As such it does not have 
the capacity for language, nor can its body be separated from its mind (it has 
none). That said, a brittle star still reacts to differences in light intensity and, above 
all, it can f lee from its predators. Instead of eyes, brittle stars have an extensive 
nerve system that makes their entire body act as one big eye. Theoretically, this 
219 Ibid., 151, 336; Barad 2003, 828. Compare with Black-Boxing (Latour) and Heidegger’s presence-at-hand 
vs. ‘ready-at-hand’.





means that a brittle star is constantly intra-acting with its environment: it does not 
separate between what it sees or what it thinks, it just is. ‘For a brittle star, being and 
knowing, materiality and intelligibility, substance and form, entail one another…
’223 In other words, a brittle star does not face the Cartesian dualism intuitively 
ascribed to humans and (most other) animals. A second interesting lesson from the 
brittle star is that it can break off one of its arms when a brittle star is cornered by 
a predator. In terms of Barad’s theory, the moment a brittle star observes a predator 
it is thus able to discursively redraw the material boundary between itself and its 
environment. Sometimes these arms still wriggle; an event that is often interpreted 
by human observers as a survival technique. For Barad, such an interpretation 
would mean that the main body and arm are still part of the same phenomena, 
e.g., the original brittle star. However, she argues that one could also see the arm as 
becoming an autonomous living thing itself, especially in light of the observation 
that some brittle stars reproduce by cloning their arms. In the end, Barad therefore 
concludes that ‘[i]t’s all a matter of where we place the cut ’ that defines ‘what matters 
and what is excluded from mattering.’224
In other words, through the act of observation differences are cut, phenomena 
are enacted, ‘and knowledge is produced about “subjects’ and ‘objects’ (and 
‘environments’…).’225 First, these cuts are never definitive. Any observation, like 
ANT’s settlement of relations, is a simplification of a messy reality and therefore 
temporary, because it incorporates its own demise.226 Second, these cuts are not only 
human made. Barad in particular highlights the role instruments play when humans 
gain knowledge, as when she discusses the piezoelectric transducer, a scanning device 
used in ultrasonography.227 These and other observational devices often measure only 
one thing (e.g. sound, light, etc.) and a such play an active role in deciding what is 
observed or not, especially when they stutter or break-down completely. What is 
more, people need particular skills to use them.228 Tools are thus part of the agential 
cut that is made. While all theoretical insights from new materialism highlight 
their attentiveness to a “vibrant” material world, Barad, in ascribing this role to 
observational tools, is even more explicit in stating how tools and objects actively 
influence, not only other objects but our practices of knowledge gathering as well. 
Third, in line with Bryant, these cuts are ontological and not epistemological.229 They 
223 Ibid., 375.
224 Ibid., 348 & 394 [emphasis in original].
225 Squire 2015, 156.
226 Ibid., 157.
227 Barad 2007, 201–222; Aradau 2010, 499.
228 Preda 1999, 350–356. The skills people need to use these machineries result from the intra-action between 
the machine and the observer and hence are a folding of both.
229 Vint 2008, 316–317.
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shape the world(s) in which people and things live, because they engage and perform, 
not because they imagine. 
Together, these three observations about cuts create a theoretical approach that 
calls for a certain humility and perhaps even a sense of vulnerability of humans. 
For if everything is both affected and affecting, then, as Butler states, ‘one’s life is 
always in some sense in the hands of the other.’230 Together with Butler, Latour and 
other new materialist, Barad argues that we are responsible for each other. Not in the 
sense of a responsibility towards the other, as in a typical security relation, but in the 
sense of a responsibility for us both, comparable to the discussion on scarcity, which 
dealt with both you, me and an unseen third-party victim.231 Such an encompassing 
responsibility thus explicitly includes, according to Tuana, a responsibility for those 
‘practices that account for not knowing,’ those actively ‘ ignored or rationalized’ 
accounts of issues like food insecurity or energy poverty.232 As Latour writes on the 
morality behind technology: 
Between the gesture of switching on my computer and what I write on the 
screen, I can either ignore the nuclear industry which enables me to work 
this morning, or find myself immersed in the uncertain destiny of that same 
industry which forces me to take account of the burial in deep silos of the waste 
from its stations that the French do not support.233
To deal with this implicit choice, Hekman offers the concept of disclosure to approach 
these settlements (e.g. cuts, actants or assemblages). Based on a Baradian ontology 
of intra-action and a Critical Realist perspective on scientific research, Hekman 
proposes that the concept of disclosure can ‘bring to light’ a variety of aspects and 
perspectives of a settlement. None of these disclosed messy realities is more truthful 
than the other, but, in a critical realist sense, Hekman does see them as materially 
braced and hence comparable on objective grounds.234 Alternatively, Bellacasa 
introduces the ethical and more critical transformative duty for matters of care, which 
builds upon Latour’s matters of fact and matters of concern.235 As she would have it, 
to explain matters of fact or Barad’s agential cuts, one needs to explain them with care 
by respecting all those involved in the initial becoming by giving them a voice once 
more. In the obligation for observers to give those who are silenced a voice, to care 
for all those involved - even if that means that in each instance they actively choose 
230 Butler 2009, 14; as quoted by Holmqvist 2013, 549; Braun and Whatmore 2010b, xxv.
231 Dolphijn and Tuin 2012, 69.
232 Tuana 2008, 19 [emphasis in original].
233 Latour 2002, 255.




for whom to care more – scholars are not only part of what they study but also play a 
critical transformative role in a world of becoming.236 
In closing, Hekman argues that Barad’s agential realism shows promise as it is 
grounded in local experiences, collapses the material-social dichotomy, focusses on 
boundaries and boundary drawing practices, and draws ethical conclusions from 
practices of knowing/observation.237 This chapter can only confirm Hekman’s 
summary but adds that Barad, in pushing for a materialdiscursive entanglement, 
a subject-object-environmental enactment and a relational intra-action, challenges 
any and all dialectical understandings while favoring an understanding of the 
politics behind ‘materialisation and dematerialisation over a prioritisation of 
matter or materiality.’238 In other words, while it is impossible to separate the 
material from the discursive and to observe without acting (humans and non-
humans), Barad offers an understanding that one should be aware that it is mainly 
politics, broadly understood, that deals with the virtuality of matter. Here we touch 
upon a paradoxical claim in her argument, because while she acknowledges the 
activity of tools to an extent not seen elsewhere, she also discusses this ethical 
politics overwhelmingly in terms of observing scientists, as in the example of the 
brittle star. In the end, it seems that Barad too refers back to humans, although 
no longer masters of the universe, as willfully ref lecting and trying to shape the 
materialdiscursive to their preference.239
7.5 reflection
In response to the mostly sociolinguistic understandings of energy security, 
scarcity and security presented in the earlier chapters, this chapter started from the 
materiality of energy systems and examined the role and importance of matter in 
relation to the knowledge over matter. The chapter started with a discussion on the 
Cartesian material-social duality within IR by opposing critical realism and radical 
constructivism. This debate highlighted a strong theoretically induced epistemological 
argument against representational knowledge as favored by positivism. In other 
words, that it is impossible to know what we observe objectively and truthfully. For 
many this is not a new argument, and in fact, it lies at the core of the critical theoretical 
understandings of scarcity and security in earlier chapters against most current work 
on energy security. Still, chapter 7.2 discussed a matter of contention between these 
236 Ibid., 100.
237 Hekman 2010, 73.
238 Squire 2015, 151.
239 Not in the sense as feared by Grove: ‘Some will argue that we privilege the discursive because we have 
privileged access to the world of “our” making. The problem is that such a position often reifies the belief 
that the world is of our making.’ Grove 2014, 368.
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strands of theory, in particularly on whether the pursuit for scientific knowledge, 
even if never complete, nonetheless is worth pursuing as it might be possible to judge 
between knowledge claims in search for the better explanation. While this debate is 
ongoing in IR, chapter 7.2 ended with new materialists who questioned the absence 
of the non-discursive world in, especially, the radical constructivist theories dealing 
with meaning and discourse. Without the non-social, new materialist claim, one 
neglects alternative sources of change and order that drastically influence human 
life.240 Chapter 7.2 concluded, however, that the critique of an absence of anything 
material in critical and radical social theories was too strongly phrased, as original 
post-positivist theories were acutely aware of the interplay between knowledge and 
the material world but made the choice to focus on that interaction through a deeper 
understanding of the social aspects.241 On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
many one-sided attempts to translate these linguistic insights into empirical research 
do eschew anything material and hence validate part of the new materialist claim. 
In turn, the new materialist alternative seemed to have proceeded in two phases. 
The first phase was mainly focused on showing the relevance of the non-social world 
against linguistic-oriented post-positivist theories. Chapter 7.3 in this respect put 
forward the shared assumptions of new materialism, including its adherence to the 
epistemological critique of post-positivists, its trust in a world outside of humans, its 
focus on a local becoming of relations, and the ethical consequences inherent to it. 
This chapter also offered a partial reprise of the ways in which the material is used 
and spoken about. Besides the many meanings and different terms used to describe 
“the world-out-there”, the material was discussed, as something non-social, as objects 
outside of human influence or as objects with relational qualities (durable, hard, 
colorful, and so forth.), with a special reference for those technological artefacts that 
are made by humans. Based on the latter category questions were raised towards the 
traditional separation of matter as something passive or active and as instrumental 
or deterministic. Even without man-made artefacts breaking down the dialectics of 
this understanding, these logics where questioned from within, based on spatial and 
temporal variables. The chapter ended with a core approach that most new materialist 
use, namely an extended understanding of Butler’s performativity or the reiterative 
acts of materialization of discourse that create social effects. Bennet’s example of the 
Northeast blackout was used to highlight a performative approach that simultaneously 
introduced the core aspects of the next chapter: the relationality of the different 
interacting nodes of the electricity grid, the surprise of unintended and unanticipated 
material effects, and the ethical impact of the decision on accountability that follows 
such a relationality.
240 Sources of durability, resistance, sedimentation, triggers, etc.
241 See also Lemke 2015.
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In turn, chapter 7.4 offered a network inspired relational ontology by describing 
how one of the core approaches, namely a relational ontology like ANT, sees the 
world. In analyzing the ontological assumptions of ANT, what emerged was an 
empirical oriented methodology that assumes a network of relations, a network of 
actants (actor-networks) which are post-human and irreducible, which stand on 
equal footing in a flat ontology, and which relate with each other through traceable 
translation (action at a distance) and a withdrawal from their relations when made 
possible. However, just as social theories are questioned on their voluntarity, these 
networks are vulnerable to an infinite regress argument. Meaning that there is no 
end to one’s observation, while simultaneously scholars only observe fixed traceable 
relations, relations that are already engaged, never those that become. 
The story of new materialism as described in this chapter hence moved to a second 
phase and the discussion on how to incorporate the virtual or potentiality in already 
actualized networks of relations. In other words, how to explain the transformation of 
beings while still allowing for independent objects. This virtuality was later described 
in terms of the vibrancy of the materialdiscursive. This vibrancy in turn was described 
as eventful, with the event acting both as a surprise and as an achievement. On the 
one hand, there are things that make us think and react. On the other hand, there 
are the achievements when multiple relations and realities are folded together, when 
connections are made and analyzed in terms of its eventfulness.242 With events 
interpreted as either surprises or achievements, the virtual and actual were placed 
and found in the performative folding of practices. Earlier described as a withdrawal 
or black-boxing of agentic capacities, a fold is thus the closure of a phenomenon, but a 
closure that is always incomplete and incoherent as it contains a negativity or excess. 
In other words, a fold enacts the nodes of a network or the single object-like entities 
that we see as irreducible. 
Part of the fold is the practice of observation, both outward and inward. By defining 
successful observations as achievements, this turned observations into an activity. 
Meaning that, as an activity, knowledge gathering becomes a form of “manipulation”, 
a politics of knowledge on the ontology of an event.243 Chapter 7.5 discussed the 
politics that ensues from such a materialdiscursive interpretation of life. Following 
the phenomenological agential realist approach offered by Barad this chapter argued 
for a closer attention towards the ‘agential cut’ when observing a phenomena, object, 
practice or event. In connecting ontology, epistemology and ethics, these cuts, whether 
enacted by humans or non-humans, affect the observed event itself (thereby offering 
the only truly non-human active theory in new materialism). They create difference. 
242 While stated in a different language, this is the essence of security: both surprise and closure.
243 Mol 2002, 5.
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And as difference, these cuts call for a political awareness and ethical reflection on the 
cuts and where to place them. 
Barad and new materialist scholars therefore call for an ethics of responsibility 
and care for the relations that are observed and enacted and those that are excluded. 
Once observation is seen as the creation of difference, the practice of observation 
by an assembly of humans and non-humans becomes a performativity that creates 
its own reality. The practice of observation defines what comes to matter and what 
does not. As such, observation has long lasting ethical consequences for that what is 
not observed; that excess or negativity within the fold that will ultimately break it. 
Knowing this, new materialist scholars like Barad and Bryant – although a similar 
account of difference can be found in Luhmann or Derrida – argue for an ethical 
awareness towards the broader “us”. What new materialist theories thus add is a 
materialdiscursive understanding of the vibrancy of life and the politics of difference. 
This enables an understanding of creativity, durability and adaptability while 
disrupting understandings of the social and material, the future and the past, as well 
as expertise and laypersons. 
In the end, the direct link between energy and this chapter is strong but difficult to 
make clear. For one, the diverse array of materialist focused theories help to explain 
the underlying dynamics of the post-positivist argument in security and scarcity 
debates (as well as defuse any comments that the discussions in those chapters neglect 
the materiality of energy systems). They offer a fuller account of performativity, one 
that even pushes the practice theories within the security literature. They also help 
turn the focus towards the politics of ontology and, especially, the role of observation 
and knowledge in achieving closure. Moreover, they lead to a drastic ethical rereading 
of practices of observation and the role that knowledge gathering plays in shaping 
the world. In other words, they deflate the distinction between ontology and 
epistemology, between a politics of ontology and a politics of knowledge. In general, 
this chapter describes the potentiality and vitality of the endless set of relations of 
matter as life itself. However, to acknowledge a more-than-human world while 
keeping up with the epistemological critique of post-positivist scholars is a challenge 
all on its own. With Barad’s materialized discursivity and a substance-less materiality 
the chapter returned to the same questions of radical social constructivists: how to 
account for the actuality and virtuality that can be found in-between the discursive 
and non-discursive. In the end, while new materialist offer an account based on the 
materialization of potentiality, they also acknowledge that this only matters because 
of politics. The next chapter will therefore focus on how humans govern their world 
through a materialdiscursive environment.
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88.  governing wiTh bioPower Through 
The milieu 
‘The matter of politics and the politics of matter 
have never seemed so thoroughly entwined.’1
8.1 introduction
Whereas previous chapters described security, scarcity and materialization, this 
chapter tries to combine many of the insights that are gathered in these chapters by 
introducing the work of an author who seems to have written on all of them. In the 
security chapter, the risk literature discussed calculative metrics applied to populations 
to define the norm of acceptable behavior. In the scarcity chapter, the issue shifted 
from a securing of scarce supplies to the organization of the circulation of scarce 
supplies. In turn, the materiality chapter discussed materialization, the performativity 
through which reiterative discursive acts become material (and vice versa), and the 
role that knowledge gathering practices play within this materialization. In other 
words, this chapter will expand on the work of Michel Foucault (1926-1984), a French 
philosopher and “historian of ideas” who developed a theoretical framework to 
understand the power politics and knowledge structures that govern our lives.2 For 
Foucault, the relation between security, materiality and knowledge needs to be seen 
in its close connection to power. He draws attention to the power/knowledge nexus 
that enables discourse to materialize and security to act as a governance technique 
to make this happen. With the help of Foucault’s understanding of governmentality, 
it becomes possible to analyze the role of security by studying the techniques and 
social structures (the mentalities and rationalities) that are used to exercise power 
over a population within a political-economic knowledge base to organize, regulate 
and order human reality.3 
Through a discussion of the work of Foucault, this chapter makes four arguments. 
First, it explicitly understands security as a productive form of power. Productive 
security implies a performative understanding of security, meaning that ideas about 
energy security help govern and produce a specific way of life (e.g. high-energy 
consumption) through the creation of subjects, markets, and the materialization of 
its concerns. Second, it is not possible to secure something, through risk or other 
security practices, when people do not know what it is that needs securing. Security, 
here interpreted broadly as undesired futures, hence is a prime example of ontological 
1 Braun and Whatmore 2010b, x.
2 Foucault 2003; Foucault 2007; Foucault 2008.
3 See for example Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; Dillon 2008.
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politics: the identification of that what needs to be secured and the politics of knowledge 
and observation that guide it. Third, the way security works, is by governing bodies, 
minds, objects and the material world around us. More specific, security works 
increasingly in one of two ways. Either by governing the milieu of the humans or 
objects that need governing or else by letting the people involved govern themselves 
based on shared understandings of normal and acceptable behavior. The example of 
smart grids in chapter 10 details how people and their electricity consumption are 
formed and governed through the construction of a particular electricity grid. Fourth, 
based on Foucault’s theory, this chapter examines how security functions in relation 
to society, governments, the economy and nature, and how the boundaries between 
these fields are constantly performed and redefined through the rearticulation of 
these concepts, logics and modes of reasoning. 
This chapter proceeds by first introducing the concept of governmentality in 
chapter 8.2 as part of the theoretical framework behind Foucault’s notion of security 
and risk. To introduce governmentality, this chapter delves deeply into Foucault’s 
understanding of the conduct of conduct, his understanding of power and his 
concept of biopolitics. Following his identification of biopower as a new form of 
power in the early 18th century, and the active use of this form of power under the 
header of biopolitics, chapter 8.3 will continue the discussion of governmentality by 
studying the relation between government, markets and society. A particular form 
of governmentality that is discussed here is neoliberalism: how freedom is organized 
through security and how neoliberalism actively works to separate economics from 
politics and society. Chapter 8.4 will bring the different notions together, by focusing 
respectively on the relation between materiality and governmentality, between 
knowledge and materiality, and between security and materiality. This chapter ends 
with a brief summary and reflection.
8.2 Productive Power
8.2.1 Conduct of Conduct
To guide the reader through the rest of this chapter, five initial remarks can be made 
on Foucault’s overarching concept of governmentality. First, governmentality is said 
to link the French words gouverner and mentalité.4 By including the French term 
for governing, the concept of governmentality seems to refer to a modern definition 
of governing, as in the ‘management by the state or the administration’.5 Foucault, 
4 Lemke 2002, 50. However, see Michel Senellart’s Course Context discussion in Foucault 2007, 339, 
footnote 126 where Snellart argues that this contraction is a translation error and governmentality 
instead is the noun of governmental just as musicality derives from musical.
5 Lemke 2002, 50.
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however, uses governing more broadly by referring to its classical Greek use where it 
meant both the management of the household (oeconomia), one’s soul and oneself.6 
As will become clear below, for Foucault, governmentality or
[t]he art of government, […] is essentially concerned with answering the 
question of how to introduce economy – that is to say, the correct manner 
of managing individuals, goods and wealth […] and of making the family 
fortunes prosper – how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father 
towards his family into the management of the state.7
Second, Foucault captures this triple understanding of government with his ‘conduct 
of conduct’, a concept that he explains as the ‘activity of conducting’ and by which he 
refers to both the directing of someone and the ‘way in which one conducts oneself 
[and] lets oneself be conducted’.8 In his reflection on governmentality, Dean actually 
presents three forms of conduct that are captured with this concept. Dean separates 
the verb ‘to conduct,’ which describes the act of conducting, from the noun ‘conduct’ 
describing bad and proper behavior, and a third form of conduct that describes the 
ethical self-reflection of how one conducts oneself.9 In other words, governmentality 
is not just about a form of governing from above, by the state or someone in authority, 
but it is as much a form of governing by people themselves through a reflection on 
what they think is ‘appropriate’. Good examples of governing oneself are dieting or 
working out: whether for health or aesthetic reasons, people practice them because 
they are constantly confronted by pictures of beautiful models and warnings about 
unhealthy lifestyles: messages that structure how people think about themselves and 
thus how they behave in relation to their body, to the food they buy, and to others. 
Third, directing this reflexive behavior, this bombarding or nudging of people 
in a certain direction, is where the latter half of the term governmentality, namely 
mentalité, comes in. Better translated in its plural as rationalities of government, a 
mentality is described by Gordon as a ‘system of thinking about the nature of the 
practice of government (who can govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), 
capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its 
practitioners and to those upon whom it was practised.’10 It is only by questioning 
and becoming aware of these invisible and hidden forms of power that one can study 
6 Ibid.
7 Foucault 1991a, 91.
8 Foucault 2007, 193.
9 Dean 2010, 17.
10 Gordon 1991, 3. This thesis follows Dean 2010, 24 who defines rationality as: ‘[] any way of reasoning, or 
way of thinking about, calculating and responding to a problem, which is more or less systematic, and 
which might draw upon formal bodies of knowledge or expertise.’
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them.11 Fourth, for Foucault the connection between these two forms of governing, 
from above and from the self, is his main object of study. It is at this intersection 
where one can see resistance brewing, questions are asked and uncertainty is made 
certain again. Not as something tangible, because there is no physical place where 
these forms of power meet, but as a balance of forces that no person or organization 
can escape.12
Fifth, Foucault shunned polemics and deliberately focused on how questions.13 
His thinking on governmentality, therefore, does not provide guidance for future 
decisions nor does it provide a map to follow for those with a desire for “power”. His 
main argument for this position is that reasons are always provided ex post facto, after 
the event, and thus originate from within a system of thought and consequentially are 
always already polemic. Arguing that something is “good” means that one already has 
drawn a boundary that excludes the “bad”. Defining what the good and bad are thus 
depends on the rationality to which one adheres. For an economist, a core priority is 
often the organization of free markets to reduce overall transaction costs and improve 
efficiency and profits, but that is clearly not the priority or “good” for somebody who 
identifies primarily as a climate activist. These five points will be explained more 
extensively in the rest of chapter, but already it is possible to see how Foucault focusses 
on techniques of power and modes of thought to govern people, how the relationship 
between economics and politics is enacted, and, as we will see, what role security and 
risk play within this notion of governmentality.
8.2.2 Power
It is not just the concept of governing that Foucault sees differently. Another, closely 
related, concept is power. 
Foucault teaches that power is less a commodity that can be held than a force 
which comes into circulation when human beings - who he considers to be free 
beings - come into relation with one another. To be crude, power as a force that 
circulates is more like electricity than it is like a lever or a sword.14 
Power, for Foucault, is thus not something tangible nor is it intentional. It is not 
the light switch, but everything that lies behind one’s ability and desire to pull the 
switch. It has no source and no end, but it shifts and transforms. It is ‘located and 
exercised at the level of life’ and as such seems to resemble life.15 Moreover, because 
11 Lobo-Guerrero 2012, xvi–xvii.
12 Dean 2010, 19.
13 Gordon 1991, 7.
14 Dillon 2010, 63.
15 Lobo-Guerrero 2007, 330.
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it resembles life, Foucault argues that power is not only restrictive but productive 
as well. It produces subjects: individuals behaving within and conform a particular 
system of thought (a rationality of government).16 That said, while it is impossible 
to touch power, it is still possible to analyze it. Something that Foucault manages by 
differentiating between multiple forms of power, namely sovereignty, discipline and 
biopower.
The first form of power is sovereign power or the power of the prince. An often-
quoted description that captures Foucault’s understanding of sovereign power 
is ‘the right to take life or let live’.17 In the endorsed ability to order a death, the 
sovereign is able to govern life. As a form of power, sovereign power is aimed at the 
good of the prince against both internal and external opposition (other princes). The 
survival or “good” of the sovereign was seen in terms of strength of arms, which 
consequently was translated in the number and wellbeing of the population within 
his territory.18 In other words, on the number and wealth of his subjects.19 Sovereign 
power works through both judicial instruments (laws, degrees) and instruments of 
control (punishment). Such a feudal form of sovereign power is no longer applicable 
and Foucault noticed how, within a modern state, power is actually dispersed 
over state officials, mothers, teachers, bosses, generals, etc. In other words, lots of 
individuals and institutes have some form of sovereign power. This ‘plurality of forms 
of government’ or ‘the multiplicity and immanence of these activities distinguishes 
them radically from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli’s prince.’20 
A second form of power identified by Foucault is discipline. Foucault’s insight 
regarding discipline is that the training and conditioning of individuals in schools or 
armies, while being applied on the individual is in reality concentrated on the group as 
a whole.21 People are disciplined towards what is considered to be useful knowledge 
or correct behavior. ‘Discipline, of course, analyzes and breaks down; it breaks down 
individuals, places, time, movements, actions, and operations. It breaks them down 
into components such that they can be seen, on the one hand, and modified on the 
other.’22 In other words, discipline separates those that “behave” from those that do 
not and exercises itself on the latter. It does so by exercising its power on a micro-
level, meaning the individual body, by correcting towards a norm that applies to the 
whole group.23 Foucault for that reason argued in a later work that discipline is not 
16 Foucault 1982.
17 Foucault 2003, 241.
18 Foucault 1991a, 90.
19 Foucault 2003, 35.
20 Foucault 1991a, 91.
21 Foucault 2007, 12.
22 Ibid., 56.
23 Foucault 2003, 38.
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just about ‘normalization’ or the correction of the bad, but about ‘normation’ or the 
diffusion of the norm itself.24 As a form of power, discipline is of interest for Foucault 
because its shifts the focus from the prince and his subject to an individual body as 
part of a particular population.25 
Foucault’s third form of power is what he sometimes discusses as security but 
initially identified as biopower. Biopower, according to Foucault, is a form of power 
that combines aspects of both disciplinary and sovereign power, but is more than just 
a combination of the two. From discipline, it takes the focus on populations and the 
role of individuals. From sovereign power, it takes the focus on life and wellbeing. 
Importantly, however, is that in relation to life and wellbeing the focus of biopower 
shifts from ‘taking lives’ to ‘making live and letting die.’26 In other words, it differs 
from both in that biopower is mostly a productive form of power. Literally productive, 
as it deals with biological ‘matters of life and death’ and thus ‘with birth and 
propagation, with health and illness, […] and with the processes that sustain or retard 
the optimization of the life of a population’.27 Biopower is the power to increase life 
and decrease death through policies that are based on birth and mortality rates and 
explicitly aimed at influencing those rates. This is what Dean calls ‘the administration 
of life,’ or what Foucault in his earlier work described as ‘regulation’ and later called 
‘biopolitics’ (a concept that is taken up below).28 
These three forms of power differ. Discipline and biopower differ on the level at 
which their power is effected, with discipline focusing on the individual body while 
biopower concentrates on the level of populations.29 They differ as well in that 
biopower, by focusing on biological life, works on ‘a number of material givens’, while 
discipline instead first ‘determines a segment’ of the overall population by ‘isolat[ing] 
a space’ for itself to work on – those that are in need of disciplining.30 As a form of 
power, discipline only works within this site, but once set ‘allows nothing to escape.’31 
In contrast, biopower has no boundaries and constantly expands to new areas and 
spaces, depending on what is known about life and deemed necessary to enhance 
that life. Most of all, the forms of power differ on the level of the individual. Whereas 
discipline makes a normative judgement on the behavior of the individual and 
sovereignty subjugates the individual to the will of the sovereign, biopower instead 
takes the behavior of individuals for granted and acts only on those effects that are 
24 Foucault 2007, 57.
25 Foucault 1991a, 102.
26 Foucault 2003, 247.
27 Dean 2010, 119.
28 Ibid.; Foucault 2003; Foucault 2008.
29 Foucault 2003, 250.
30 Foucault 2007, 19, 44.
31 Ibid., 45.
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considered consequential for the population as a whole.32 While they differ, Foucault 
is explicit in arguing that they do not exclude one another and always return in on 
combination or another.33 In different combinations, these three forms of power 
make up particular forms of governmentality. 
8.2.3 Biopolitics
As a form of power, biopower quickly conflates with biopolitics: the actual 
administration of life, or, as the concept implies, the politics or strategies of biopower. 
While biopolitics is about the politics of life, it is neither a form of power nor a 
mode of governmentality. Instead Foucault sees it as a technology of power, Collier 
describes it as a ‘problem space to be analyzed’ (as does Foucault), while Dillon & 
Lobo-Guerrero argue that ‘there is no biopolitics which is not simultaneously also 
a security apparatus. There is no biopolitics of this, or a biopolitics of that. When 
one says biopolitics one says security, albeit in a certain way.’34 Biopolitics is all that 
because it administers biological life, not through the individual as with discipline, 
but by influencing the conditions or the milieu of individuals based on the knowledge 
it has gathered over the population that needs to be secured. Instead of feeding the 
hungry, biopolitics is about setting up the conditions for people to feed themselves by 
enabling and supporting a circulation of food. Ultimately, biopolitics tries to bring 
out the full potential of individuals, a ‘potential [which] is sought to be promoted, 
enhanced and, in the process, protected.’35 This full potential needs to be protected 
against the ‘random element inherent in a population of living beings.’36 Accidents 
happen and they are highly uncertain for individuals. Yet, accidents happen all the 
time, so statistically on the level of the population they are far from uncertain. In other 
words, to administer life and protect the wellbeing of a population what is needed are 
security apparatuses or techniques and mechanisms aimed at the ‘objects’ of ‘species 
life’ by gathering and acting upon the assessed numbers available on a population.37 
Even in this brief description of biopolitics, a number of terms stand out and call 
for further inquiry: population and statistics, prosperity and potentia, things and the 
milieu, and security. First, biopolitics is geared towards populations. Foucault identifies 
the advent of biopolitics in the shift when wars were no longer fought in ‘the defense 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 8. What Foucault 1991a, 102 has called the ‘sovereignty-discipline-government’ triangle.
34 Collier 2009, 94; Foucault 2007, 11–12; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 266; Watts 2004b. For a problem 
to be governable, it needs a problem space. Methmann describes how the earth’s carbon cycle has become 
such a problem space based on the technological ability to monitor carbon emissions and their effects. 
Within this problem space, the population is defined as those people and institutions that are related to 
the emission of carbon. See Methmann 2013, 78.
35 Lobo-Guerrero 2007, 331.
36 Foucault 2003, 246.
37 Collier 2009, 83; Foucault 2003; Foucault 2007; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008.
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of the sovereign’ but instead were aimed ‘to secur[e] the existence of a population’.38 
Before the idea and ability to think in terms of populations, government was aimed 
either at the level of the sovereign, as the head of the state, or at the level of the family, 
as the Greek did when describing the oeconomia as the management of the family. 
Combining both levels only became possible with the invention of statistics, through 
which it became possible to gain knowledge at the level of the population.39 When 
Malthus advanced his dilemma, it was based on his insight about the ‘bio-economic 
problem’ of a limited area for food production and a faster growing population.40 
Statistics, in Foucault’s argument, developed along two tracks. On the one 
hand, with the organization of the police and, on the other, with the evolution of 
mercantilism.41 Police, as a form of government that is internal to the state, is said by 
Foucault to be aimed at securing and increasing the domestic output of the state. It is 
concerned with the protection of active life, especially those activities that relate to the 
state. This implies that the number and safety of the population, their basic needs, their 
health and their productivity are all subject to this form of government. Importantly, 
before the police can secure all of this, it needs to know what to secure.42 In other 
words, to protect life it is necessary to know life. Foucault argues in this respect that 
‘[p]olice makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible.’43
Biopolitics, second, is thus aimed at the wellbeing of the state.44 In this modern 
form of power the focus shifted from the wellbeing of the prince and his tax revenue 
to the conditions for the wellbeing and potentia of the population. This wellbeing and 
‘making life proliferate’ has been interpreted, from the Greek household oeconomia 
onwards and especially since the 16th century physiocrats, as being first and foremost 
about ‘good economic government.’45 In chapter 6.5, Foucault was used to describe 
how the main idea behind the government of scarce food supplies shifted from one 
based on Mercantilism towards one based on Liberalism. Mercantilism tried to govern 
scarce food supplies by introducing ‘laws, decrees, regulations: that is to say, the 
traditional weapons of sovereignty.’46 It fixated prices and organized distribution, 
consequently stifling incentives to increase food production during periods of 
scarcity and thereby prolonging periods of shortages.47 Foucault noted how the 
38 Campbell 2005, 950.
39 Foucault 1991a, 99.
40 Foucault 2007, 77.
41 Gordon 1991, 11.
42 Foucault 2007, 323–326.
43 Ibid., 315.
44 Gordon 1991, 19.
45 Foucault 2003, 253. See also Massumi 2009, 157; Foucault 1991a, 92.
46 Foucault 1991a, 98.
47 Foucault sees Mercantilism as the first serious attempt to gather knowledge/data on an issue to help 
govern the problem of food shortages and economic growth in general. See Foucault 2007, 102.
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physiocrats instead argued for what now would be seen as a more liberal program: 
one that trusts markets to do their work, to follow the laws of the market, to let prices 
fluctuate and goods circulate so as to provide incentives to counter any shortages. 
Dean remarks that ‘[t]he discovery of the ontological reality of scarcity […] mean[t] 
that the administration of life must take into account the means of production for the 
subsistence of that life.’48 As these means cannot be controlled by the state directly, 
the government has to let go of its control for the well-being of the state.
Third, discovering the ‘reality of scarcity’ and the ‘means of production’ implies that 
what is governed through biopolitics are things, not men alone. Whereas sovereignty 
exercises its power on a particular territory, biopolitics exercises its power on the 
conditions that enable man to live freely; in other words on the things s/he relates 
to. Foucault takes a broad perspective on these “things”. He sees them as “material” 
things, e.g., things like resources or the weather. He also sees them as ‘men in their 
relationships with things’, by which he focusses on the ‘customs, habits, ways of acting 
and thinking’ through which men and things relate.49 Finally, Foucault describes 
these “things” as uncertain events, events like ‘accidents, misfortunes, famine, 
epidemics and death’ that effect from ‘men in their relationship with things.’50 In 
other words, the uncertainty inherent in life, which is discussed as undesired futures 
in chapter 5 and as surprising events in chapter 7. Biopolitics works on these things, 
it ‘disposes’ of them using different forms of power, to achieve the desired goal of an 
affluent population.51
Fourth, not only is biopolitics a governing of individuals through the things s/
he relates to, it is also a form of governing based on a certain ‘naturalness’.52 This 
disposing of things to increase the economic wellbeing of a population is based, since 
the physiocrats, on the laws of the market. While these laws are not part of nature 
as such – they stem from the interaction between people – they are seen as natural, 
as given (see chapter 6 on the naturalization of scarcity). This naturalness results, 
according to Foucault, in a separation of the state and the economy.53 Gordon in 
fact describes this ‘naturalized’ way of thinking in terms of a ‘transformation in the 
relationship between knowledge and government.’54 He sees it as an internalization 
at the side of the government, in particular the sovereign, of the liberal argument that 
it can never know “the” economy and therefore can never govern it.55
48 Dean 2010, 137.
49 Foucault 2007, 96.
50 Ibid.
51 Foucault 1991a, 95.
52 Foucault 2007, 354.
53 Ibid., 349, 354.




Fifth, just as the category population combines the state with the household, it also 
bridges the individual and his environment, a point Foucault takes from Darwin and 
his focus on the survival and evolution of the species within a particular milieu.56 
The milieu for Foucault is both a medium and an element. The milieu is a medium 
as it ‘is needed to account for action at a distance of one body on another’, while it is 
simultaneously the ‘element in which it circulates’.57 As both medium and element, 
the milieu offers a circular reasoning of cause and effect between those parts of the 
milieu that affect and those that are affected.58 In more general terms, the milieu, 
for Foucault is ‘a certain number of combined, overall effects’ of the above mentioned 
men in their relationship with things and each other. In recent commentaries, the 
milieu is often translated in terms of a horizontally organized network analogy, where 
everything is connected in constant circulation across time and space.59 Through 
such a relational analogy, discussed in chapter 7, the milieu becomes something 
that bridges the social environment of people with their material environment. It is 
something that is analyzed and acted upon, and something that is both knowledge 
and matter.
To govern such a milieu, filled with men, things, mentalities and uncertainties, 
biopolitics aims to administer the conditions of life while remaining open to life itself. 
In other words, to deal with the complexity and uncertainty inherent in the relations 
that make up life itself.60 Foucault describes biopolitics consequentially as a security 
dispositif (also security apparatus or mechanism). Such a security apparatus tries to 
manage the constant uncertainty of life by ‘plan[ning] a milieu in terms of events 
or series of events or [its] possible elements’.61 Biopolitics does not govern humans 
directly but focusses on their conduct by: 
Structuring the desires, proprieties and possibilities that shape the operation 
of life working on and through subjective freedoms, governmental rationalities 
typically develop around specific problematics, such as those of health, wealth, 
security, poverty, esteem, culture, sexuality or migration.62
Alternatively, as Renzi & Elmer state it:
At the same time, government is no longer exercised directly on the subjects 
but through interventions that both safeguard and actively produce the 
56 Foucault 2007, 78; Foucault 2003, 245.
57 Foucault 2007, 20–21.
58 Compare to the discussion of Bryant in chapter 7.4. 
59 Dillon and Reid 2001, 47; Campbell 2005, 951.
60 Foucault 2007, 296.
61 Ibid., 20.
62 Dillon and Reid 2001, 48. See also the quote by Mitchell Dean in Watts 2004a, 55.
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conditions for free exchange, circulation and competition, while expanding 
and intensifying mechanisms of social control and surveillance.63
While firmly driven by security considerations, biopolitics thus has a clear economic 
focus. A focus, which does not influence people by confining their (economic) freedom 
through laws, but by nudging what they desire and by what is seen as possible; in other 
words by administering the freedom that an individual experiences.64 Freedom in 
this perspective is something that is constantly constructed based on particular ways 
of how we understand a problem and what is deemed appropriate behavior. As Amoore 
concludes, connecting the two statements above: ‘[i]n contrast to a world in which 
biopolitics eclipses sovereign and disciplinary power, we see a security apparatus 
that mobilizes specific techniques for deploying the norm to govern uncertain and 
unfolding populations.’65
8.3 governing society and markets with security
8.3.1 Governmentality
Whereas biopolitics (security), sovereign power and discipline are techniques of 
power, Foucault sees governmentality as both a technique and more than a technique. 
Foucault writes that he sees governmentality in three ways: as an ensemble, as a 
mode of power (equating it with biopower), and as a process. Governmentality refers 
to the ensemble of ‘institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, 
and tactics’ that exercises itself as a form of power.66 In turn, as a form of power 
governmentality has overshadowed other types of power (sovereignty, discipline), 
which are now only active under governmentality. This follows the creation of the 
modern state based on the development of an evolving administrative process from 
the Middle Ages onward, which is the third meaning of governmentality. To be clear, 
the state itself is not driving this process. On the contrary, the state is an outcome, 
a tactic according to Lemke, of governmentality.67 Governmentality is ‘the tactics 
of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall 
within the state’s domain, what is public and what private, what is and is not within 
the state’s competence, and so on.’68 Within this constant judging of its domain, 
Dean remarks how a failure to govern has the peculiar effect of reinforcing the actual 
63 Renzi and Elmer 2013, 48.
64 Dillon 1996, 34.
65 Amoore 2013, 65.
66 Foucault 2007, 108. 
67 Foucault 1991a, 103; Lemke 2002, 58.
68 Foucault 2007, 109.
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governmentality process.69 In line with the discussion on security in chapter 5, 
governmentality as a mode of power continues even when its programs have failed.
Governmentality stems from what Foucault has identified as the pastoral 
mentalité and the mentalité of raison d’état. The pastoral mentalité, the Christian 
understanding of a shepherd herding a flock, is explained by Foucault as ‘a subtle 
economy of merit and fault’ where power is not applied on individuals, but through 
them.70 It is a subtle economy that creates obedient subjects or people who see 
themselves as sheep needing to be saved and are situated within a certain system 
of knowledge based on a particular truth, in this case the word of God that can be 
found in scripture. Within this rationality, the merits and faults of the individual 
are analyzed by the pastor, atonements are transferred and penance is offered for the 
individual to reach salvation. A pastoral mentalité is thus guiding, instead of forcing, 
individuals as part of the population for the good of the individual, instead of the 
state or the sovereign.71 
A more modern form of pastoral power can be found, according to Foucault, in 
the above discussed ‘police government’ as this has a similar economy of merit and 
faults.72 Of course, the economy of a police government is not driven by salvation 
and obedience to God, but by raison d’état or the survival of the state itself. Based on 
statistics and calculation, the state, by way of its authoritative subjects (police officers 
and other representatives of the state), learns of itself and acts on itself through its 
population. Ultimately, it tries to produce happy individuals by protecting processes 
of circulation (of people, goods, ideas) and by separating good from bad circulation. 
For the simple reason that happy citizens are also economic active and useful 
citizens who strengthen the state, especially in comparison to other states and their 
populations.73 
In building on both the pastoral economy of merits and faults and the calculation 
and statistics of raison d’état, governmentality introduces an even larger focus on 
economic reasoning and the enacted separation of economics and society.74 In each 
of the mentalité’s discussed so far, individuals are subjectivized as part of a population 
within a particular system of knowledge containing a particular truth. Foucault even 
argues that ‘[t]o become individual one must become subject’.75 In other words, while 
Western citizens consider themselves free individuals, they are only free because they 
have become subjects. Whether that is to a technology of the self (self-reflection), a 
69 Dean 2010, 220.
70 Foucault 2007, 173, 184–185.
71 Ibid., 129.
72 Gordon 1991, 12.
73 Dean 2010, 224.
74 Foucault 2007, 348.
75 Ibid., 231, footnote †.
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form of discipline, or a technology of the market (promoted circulation) is irrelevant. 
People are free because they are made to think and act as if they were free. They are 
only free, as Hayek’s argues, due ‘to restraints of freedom.’76 In other words, the only 
freedom people have is the freedom that is provided, organized and secured. 
This hints at the wider relations between the state, economy and society.77 
Governmentality builds on a Marxist inspired separation of political and non-political 
spheres, with society and the economy as clear examples. The early physiocrats have 
worked hard to make the economy into a non-political sphere by separating it from 
the sovereign, based on, firstly, the unknowability of the total economic process 
(ungovernable) and, secondly, the ‘naturalness’ of the economic relations between 
men (e.g. Smith’s invisible hand).78 Because the sovereign or government cannot 
know all the processes related to the economic circulation of men and things, it 
cannot act upon them. A liberal organized economy, according to Foucault, therefore 
always assumes that ‘one always governs too much’ and in reaction tries to organize 
government as cost-effective as possible.79 In more Foucauldian terms, the market, 
meaning the naturalness of economic processes that cumulate in and are visualized by 
prices, becomes ‘a standard of truth’ that is used to judge ‘governmental practices’.80 
Still, while government can only act indirectly (as described above), this does not 
mean that economics is the ‘science of government’ nor that it is the ‘governmental 
rationality itself ’.81 
For one, because society plays a role as well. What nowadays is known as 
society is explained by Foucault as ‘the juridical structure (économie juridique) of 
a governmentality pegged to the economic structure (économie économique).’82 He 
sees (civil) society as a wider and mainly judicial, sphere of government, which, on 
the one hand, offers the economic relations a space to be played out and, on the other 
hand, limits the government by offering another moment of self-reflection by asking 
the fundamental question ‘why must one govern’ in the first place?83 Besides limiting 
the government, society also interacts with the economy. This too is a double-edged 
76 Hayek 1979, 163. As quoted by Dean 2010, 182–183. See also Dillon 1996, 10.
77 And nature, see Mitchell 2013 on the manner in which economics creates nature as something outside 
of politics.
78 Foucault 2008, 280–282.
79 Ibid., 319. As Best 2007, 90 argues: ‘Paradoxically, while the economy is often the exception to politics 
as usual, it is an exception that simultaneously enables and constrains the possibility of exercising 
sovereignty itself ’.
80 Foucault 2008, 32. Dean 2010, 184 reflects on Hayek and notes that Hayek, contra Foucault’s naturalness, 
translates his non-natural state of freedom to the market, which he sees as neither ‘natural’ nor as an 
‘organized system’. Instead, Hayek sees markets as ‘spontaneous social order[s]’.
81 Foucault 2008, 286.
82 Ibid., 296.
83 Ibid., 296, 319. Aradau and van Munster 2008, 34 argue that ‘Rather than a formal guideline, law is part 
of the material reality of society’.
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relationship as markets are part of society and thus reinforce it, but at the same time 
also undermine the communitarian relations of society with their focus on self-
interest.84 Foucault describes this interaction by referring to his earlier food scarcity 
example:
When the economic subject sees that he can make a profit by buying wheat in 
Canada, for example, and selling it in England, he will do so. He does it because 
it is to his advantage, and furthermore it will benefit everyone. However, the 
bonds of civil society mean that one prefers to stay in one’s community, even if 
one finds abundance and security elsewhere.85
What this quote highlights is the fact that neither the economic nor the security 
rationalities are total. In other words, that there are options that “free” individuals 
are able to take which do not follow the forceful logics of either the market or security. 
In a sense, this is what Dean means when he argues that ‘while government gives 
shape to freedom, it is not constitutive of freedom.’86 Instead, Dean sees freedom as 
originating in the acting and thinking of both those who are being governed and those 
who are governing.87 Freedom is thus enacted or performed by all those involved, 
and as such, is open to change.
Nevertheless, the resulting uncertainty inherent to life that follows this openness 
is a form of freedom that is constantly secured. This desire to secure against the 
unexpected is something that Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero have identified as the 
‘fundamental paradox [behind] biopolitics’.88 To secure the living, life needs 
to be fixed. However, once secured it is no longer true life, as true life thrives on 
transformation and unfulfilled potential. ‘In order for a living thing […] to be secured 
it has to be allowed – indeed encouraged – to pass out of phase with itself and become 
something other than what it was in order to continue to live.’89 Foucault’s freedom, 
therefore, is not a freedom in terms of ‘exemptions and privileges’, but it is a particular 
‘freedom of circulation’ of goods, people and ideas, and it is this freedom of circulation 
that he sees secured in everyday practices.90 The consequence of such a practice is 
that it is not an actual threat that needs to be contained, but that the attention shifts 
to those parts of life that might become dangerous. The virtual.91 By shifting to the 
virtual, every fear and imagination can become a source for action. Everything can 
84 Foucault 2008, 301, 302.
85 Ibid., 303.
86 Dean 2010, 21.
87 Ibid., 24.
88 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 271.
89 Ibid.
90 Foucault 2007, 48; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 282.
91 Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011, 374; Foucault 2007, 315; Dillon 2008, 314.
242
8governing wiTh BioPower Through The milieu 
become dangerous and undesired, but Foucault argues that this all-embracing stance 
is limited by the ‘liberal’ cost-benefit analyses to which security is subject as well. 
Instead of prohibiting all soft-drugs, there is an increasing number of countries where 
it is regulated or tolerated, only to be acted upon when thresholds are crossed and the 
costs incurred by its usage warrant governmental intervention.92 
To be clear, the goal of governmentality or biopolitics is not security nor is it 
freedom, especially not liberal (democratic) freedom. In fact, Foucault argues that a 
liberal governmentality, as it builds on biopower, is and needs to be inherently racist 
in the sense that it constantly creates distinctions.93 It needs to be, because how else 
to identify and act on those parts of the population that weaken it? How else to decide 
‘between what must live and what must die.’94 Moving this argument to its extreme 
Dean argues that this is another aspect where sovereign power and biopower differ: 
contrary to sovereign power, biopolitics does not have a constraint on ‘the right to 
kill.’95 For the sovereign prince the ultimate exercise of power was to kill, but this 
would have left him one less person to govern. Biopolitics, however, seems to be driven 
by a Darwinian need to weed out the weak in order to strengthen the population as a 
whole. An additional non-democratic “violation” identified by Dean is found within 
the subjects themselves who, in the constant biopolitical struggle to behave ‘mature 
and responsible’ in effect repress any alternative desires to behave otherwise.96 If 
there is one conclusion to be drawn, than it is that security draws a boundary between 
forms of life that are valued and forms of life that are not.
These boundaries are akin to power, which in line with Foucault is a good thing. The 
reason being that a person can resist, however little, a form of power that is exercised 
over him or her. If a person cannot resist, if s/he cannot even think or whisper, then 
what is exercised according to Foucault is not power but brute force.97 Whereas 
brute force is applied on objects, power is meant to ‘guide’ individuals as subjects and 
can therefore be resisted. This resistance against the current ‘conduct’, whether by 
thinking, acting or speaking, is something Foucault has named ‘counter-conduct’.98 
With this term, Foucault refers not to opposition, dissidence or revolt. Each of these 
terms originate from within a system of biopolitics and are used to exclude those 
involved, to differentiate us from them. Indeed, active opposition to a particular 
system of thought and practices often reinforces that system, as direct opposition is an 
indirect form of acknowledgement. A system can reject and ridicule such opposition, 
92 Foucault 2007, 5–6.
93 Foucault 2003, 254–255. Compare with Luhmann in chapter 7.2 and Bryant in chapter 7.4.
94 Ibid., 254, 258.
95 Dean 2010, 164.
96 Ibid., 156.
97 Foucault 1988, 83–84; Selby 2007, 332.
98 Foucault 2007, 201–202.
243
8Chapter 8
for example in the case of Occupy Wall Street, but it can also incorporate the 
concerns. Liberalism is so prevalent because it incorporates socio-cultural concerns 
on natural resource use, climate change or privacy concerns within its own system 
of thought by translating them as “externalities” and attaching a price to them.99 In 
short, counter-conduct is not an act directly against a particular mentalité, but is 
to behave “well” from within another system of thought, one that counters some of 
the core assumptions of the former. In this sense, Evans & Reid as well as Lundborg 
& Vaughan-Williams question the resent interest in the concept of resilience (see 
chapters 5 and 10). They see resilience as a concept that, instead of offering a way out, 
is a solution that constantly reinforces the virtual uncertainty and vulnerability that 
is inherent in liberal systems.100 For Evans & Reid such resilient subjects are passive 
subjects: they no longer actively secure or change the world around them, they only 
adapt to ‘a series of dangerous events.’101 This in turn, as Foucault teaches, reinforces 
the initial assumption behind society, namely that individuals and their freedom are 
vulnerable and need to be governed.
8.3.2 (Neo) liberalism
A last aspect to mention in respect to the broader line of Foucault’s work is the clear 
and inseparable link between governmentality, biopolitics and (neo) liberalism.102 The 
organization and role of markets and economic relations is of principal importance 
in Foucault’s understanding of forms of governance. Burchell explains how, for 
Foucault, liberalism is not a ‘theoretical doctrine’, but a ‘rationalizing governmental 
practice.’103 It is a rationalizing governmental practice because it is ‘a political project 
that endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests already exists.’104 In turn, while 
it is a political project, it is not only a political project. Collier rightly remarks that it 
is first and foremost a system of thought that promotes its own mentalité and practices 
while it criticizes other modes of thinking. It is something that is pushed by certain 
thinkers in a certain time.105 In other words, ‘liberalism is a version of biopolitics,’ 
99 Dean 2010, 182.
100 Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2011, 375. Evans and Reid 2013, 84 actually argue that ‘[t]he underlying 
ontology of resilience, therefore, is actually vulnerability. To be able to become resilient, one must first 
accept that one is fundamentally vulnerable.’
101 Evans and Reid 2013, 87.
102 See also Collier 2009, 100 who argues that the overwhelming focus on the concept of Governmentality 
overshadows any critical readings of (neo)liberalism.
103 Burchell 1991, 143. See also Best 2007, 91.
104 Lemke 2002, 60.
105 Collier 2009, 100. Collier comments on the limited number of thinkers introduced and analysed by 
Foucault to make this point, and the lack of attention of current scholars towards the fact that this is 
actually a process (supported by Foucault).
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as well as a limit on the biopolitics of governmentality due to its dominance and 
principles.106 
That liberalism limits sovereign power based on both the unknowability of 
the total system and the naturalness of the economic relations has already been 
discussed. However, liberalism also limits governmentality by building ‘on the 
rational behaviour of those who are governed’, which it does by presupposing free 
and rational individuals who uphold a liberal calculative rationality instead of 
envisioning individuals with juridical rights and responsibilities.107 In shaping these 
rational individuals and the responding rational theories, a liberal governmentality 
is thus reliant on free individuals who also have the ability to resist that same 
liberal governmentality.108 There is, consequently, a certain restraint on liberal 
governmentality and the state. Yet, at the same time, the restraint supports the view of 
rational individuals and thereby upholds the liberal governmentality. In this respect, 
Lemke sees the shifting boundaries between state, society and markets ‘as element 
and effect’ of a neoliberal inspired governmentality.109 As he argues, ‘the so-called 
retreat of the state is in fact a prolongation of government: neoliberalism is not the 
end but a transformation […].’110 
This free individual is not only considered free and rational, s/he is also considered 
to be driven by desire. By translating desire into personal interests and by assuming 
that these personal interests, when given ‘free play’ on the market, become the 
collective interest, it is desire that links the individual to the population in liberal 
economic thought. Foucault argues that in this transformation to collective interests 
one can witness ‘both the naturalness of population and the possible artificiality of 
the means one adopts to manage it.’111 This implies that desire is something that 
is and can be managed, which makes it a technology of power.112 In other words, 
liberalism governs through the calculation of the collective interests of the population, 
which it secures by identifying conflicting desires or personal interests that endanger 
the population.113 It then works on these individual desires by manipulating the 
milieu, for which it needs to assume that these individual desires are “rational” (cost-
effective) and thus governable based on the conduct of conduct. (If these personal 
interests are deemed irrational, it is hard to act upon them through the market itself 
and liberalism needs to fall back on the state and more traditional forms of power by 
106 Dean 2010, 132.
107 Foucault 2008, 312; Dean 2010, 63. 
108 Best 2007, 92.
109 Lemke 2002, 59.
110 Ibid., 58; Foucault 2008, 112.
111 Foucault 2007, 72–73, 73.
112 Rose 1999, 85–89.
113 Foucault 2008, 65.
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actively intervening in the freedom of the individuals.) As Foucault summarizes this 
liberal line of thought from the perspective of security and governmentality: 
The problem of security is the protection of the collective interest against 
individual interests. Conversely, individual interests have to be protected 
against everything that could be seen as an encroachment of the collective 
interest. […] The game of freedom and security is at the very heart of this new 
governmental reason […].114 
The market and all of society are built around this game between freedom and 
security: between the protection from dangers to the game and the protection against 
dangers that stem from within the game itself.
The description of liberalism so far should not be interpreted as if there is a 
liberalism, as if it is a closed totalized system. It is not. Foucault’s main approach was 
to open up the naturalness of such central characteristics by showing how certain 
ideas have developed over time. In the case of liberal thought, Foucault differentiates 
for instance between classic liberals and two types of neo-liberals, including German 
ordoliberals and American liberals. Disregarding all his nuances, early liberals can 
be said to have introduced the ‘naturalness’ of the market through the principle of 
exchange and introduced the separation of market and state. Ordoliberals shifted 
the focus to the principle of competition and consequently looked at the twin 
organization of the state and the market, while striving for the optimum conditions 
for individuals to be able to live up to their potential. American liberals, in turn, 
exported the economic perspective of rational individuals to other social areas, 
introducing a broader economized society as a check on government action.115 Again, 
and following Dean, these forms of liberalism support the initial position of Foucault 
that one should not judge these different liberal rationalities, but instead be mindful 
of their different effects and implications.116 Dean, however, contradicts his own 
statement by concluding that both classic and neoliberalism are ‘naïve’, as they reduce 
the role of the state and thereby open the door to a return of sovereign power, but this 
time applied by the markets themselves: he gives the example of forced work projects 
for the unemployed.117
114 Ibid. Of interest here is Dean 2010, 184 who puts Foucault’s perspective in place: ‘For Hayek, by contrast, 
the market is neither a natural sphere of the relations between exchanging individuals [neoliberals] nor 
an artificial contrivance of appropriate policies [e.g. Foucault] but a spontaneous social order governed 
by customary rules selected by a complex cultural learning process.’
115 Foucault 2008; Dean 2010, chaps 2 & 8.
116 Dean 2010, 73.
117 Ibid., 259.
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Of course, this does not mean that scholars using Foucault’s ideas cannot be 
critical. Nally, for example, is highly critical when he discusses the influence of a 
liberal rationality on hunger from a systems perspective.118 His main conclusion is that 
the continuous struggle against hunger is not a ‘failure of the modern food regime’ 
as such, but instead a ‘logical expression of [the food system’s] central paradoxes, 
particularly its reliance on over-production in some places and under-production 
in others.’119 These paradoxes, Nally concludes, are a result of ‘[t]he neoliberal truth 
regime [which] presents global markets, agrarian biotechnologies and multinational 
corporate initiatives as the structural preconditions for alleviating world hunger.’120 
Nally shows how hunger in Europe steadily decreased with an increase in colonization. 
Not because the problem of hunger was solved, but because the problem was displaced 
from the poor in Europe to the people in the colonies where ‘the destruction of pre-
existing anti-scarcity programmes was rapid and severe as market mechanisms were 
frequently permitted to operate unchecked and with devastating consequences.’121 
Produced food was shipped to those who could afford it: creating abundance where 
there was scarcity and scarcity where there was abundance. By using a Foucauldian 
inspired critical approach to disclose these paradoxes, it becomes possible to argue 
that current solutions (often technical fixes or claims for more free markets) are 
‘empirically shaky and ideologically driven’ as they inherently disregard other 
alternative explanations, like Sen’s argument that the entitlements to food are more 
important than the actual amount of food.122 
8.3.3 Neoliberalism, Milieu and Risk
Nally’s example also highlights that (neo)liberalism not only has an effect on humans 
and how humans are governed. As a biopolitical rationality geared towards ‘man in 
their relation with things’ it governs through the milieu, implying that it also effects 
the milieu. For this reason, Massumi interprets governmentality as an ‘ecological 
theory of power’, which transforms nature, real physical nature, increasingly into a 
cultured nature.123 Nature becomes the
“environment” of the capitalist system. [Wherein] previously untapped areas 






123 Massumi 2009, 177.
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exploitation. Nature and life itself are being drawn into the economic [and 
technocratic] discourse of efficient resource management.124 
Nature thus becomes part of a capitalist system, which, like liberalism, is also not a 
“fixed” or “completed” way of doing things.125 Instead, Nitzan & Bichler describe 
it as a ‘forward-looking’ and ‘commodified’ mode of power.126 The financialization 
of nature, of the milieu itself, offers a search for and commodification of knowledge 
about the future. In other words, in the commodification of the milieu, ‘enterprising’ 
capitalist liberalism turns towards the practices of risk calculation to make sense of 
a ‘permanently uncertain environment, not to fight it, but, as Massumi claims, to 
‘ride’ it.127 
Risk calculation is discussed extensively in chapter 5.5, but in terms of 
neoliberalism and governmentality, there are some additional remarks to be made. 
First, in terms of its historic development, it is possible to say that modern risk has 
its origins in the collective insurance schemes installed with the organization of the 
early shipping expeditions to the Eastern and Western hemispheres. These schemes 
transformed individual risks into collective risk and ultimately evolved with and into 
the West-European welfare states, which took responsibility for social risks such as 
health and unemployment on a national level. More recently, with the ‘withdrawal of 
the state’, risk is once more turning into an individual responsibility; something the 
individual is expected to buy into (or not) depending on the individual’s personal risk 
analysis.128 Expected, firstly, because it is deemed cost-ineffective for governments 
to organize totalizing social insurance programs. And secondly, because, as Lemke 
argues, a neoliberal rationality ‘aspires to construct responsible subjects whose moral 
quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs and benefits of a certain 
act as opposed to other alternative acts.’129 Making a risk analysis, making the right 
risk analysis, and behaving accordingly to minimize risks, becomes a moral quality 
for people to uphold and on which they are judged and judge themselves.130 Risk thus 
works through the technologies of the market towards the state (and governmentality) 
and as a moral quality on the level of the self.
Not only is the meaning of risk changing over time, its contents are shifting as 
well. From the possibility of insuring oneself against well-known but uncertain events 
124 Lemke 2002, 56. Lemke remarks: ‘In view of today’s “global” perils, the main issue now is less the 
restrictive notion of the “limits of growth” than it is a dynamic growth of limits.’
125 Lobo-Guerrero 2012, 2; builds on: Thrift 2005, 1.
126 Renzi and Elmer 2013, 48; Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 280–282, 294; Bichler and Nitzan 2012.
127 Massumi 2009, 177.
128 Lemke 2002, 59.
129 Ibid.
130 Lupton 2006, 14; Amoore and de Goede 2008a, 12.
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(natural disasters, sickness, investments) neoliberal risk is increasingly focusing on 
the virtual. It is no longer enough to deal with events that most likely will happen, 
but these days everything needs to be analyzed and secured, from the infinitely 
small impact and high likelihood events to the infinitely large impact but low chance 
calamities.131 A neoliberal future is therefore described as ‘radically uncertain’ and 
it is in this uncertainty that security and economy meet.132 In this respect, Dillon 
concludes that 
“the aleatory”, arises for Foucault as one of those factical elements or ‘natural’ 
processes to which liberal governmentality must attend, with which it must 
deal and in relation to which it has to regulate and evaluate its own performance 
and effectiveness in its ambition to exercise power over life.133
He continues by concluding that this contingency, which a (neo)liberal governmentality 
takes as given, is actually a double contingency. It is the contingency of emergent life 
itself, as described above, but also the contingency of decision-making, on what is 
appropriate and/or the right course of action in relation to future developments.134 
Whatever the form of uncertainty, in dealing with the unknown, security and 
economics meet through risk and are played out in the milieu to govern the conduct of 
conduct. It is in the constant rearticulating of this balance, for example by the liberal 
argument of unknowability and hence uncontrollability of the economy, that economy 
and security meet. In the search for profit and the need for security, both seek to know 
the radical uncertain future the best they can. The practice of risk is what binds them 
and makes it possible that ‘[a]t the level of ontology, forms of economy offer forms of 
sovereignty a means to harness the productivity of possible futures and the capacity 
to reconcile openness, freedom, and mobility with the pursuit of security.’135
8.4 governing through the materialization of Power/
knowledge 
8.4.1 Governing through a Milieu
The insights from Foucault clearly resonate in the other theoretical chapters of this 
thesis. Although the brief discussion above does not do justice to his nuanced and 
extensive work, three aspects in particular deserve closer attention. These include the 
131 Ewald 1993, 222.
132 Aradau and van Munster 2008, 29.
133 Dillon 2007b, 45.
134 Dillon 2007a, 22. See also Luhmann 1993.
135 Amoore 2013, 5.
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governing of things through the milieu, the power/knowledge nexus and it relation 
to the materialization of calculation, and lastly the material security of circulation. 
Before moving on to discuss the governing of things through the milieu, it 
is interesting to note that all three of these aspects involve the relation between 
discourse and the material. Foucault himself, purposely, has never been clear in 
distinguishing these two, just as he never clearly defined what he meant by discourse 
and the non-discursive.136 On the one hand, Foucault describes discourse as 
based on statements and the ‘rule of repeatable materiality that characterizes these 
statements’ and simultaneously ‘as practices that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’.137 On the other hand, he offers the concept of the non-discursive 
as a ‘field of practices, appropriation, interests, and desires’ covering domains that 
include ‘institutions, political events, economic practices and processes.’138 Clearly, 
he sees them as different yet both focused on acts and practices, as well as on the 
materialization of thought through language. Switching from discourse to materiality 
itself, Foucault argues that materiality acts ‘as an instrument and vector of power’, in 
fact, he argues that ‘nothing is more material, physical, corporeal than the exercise of 
power’.139 It is this definition of the material (together with the reiterative nature of 
statements) and the realization that all matter that people see is always in some way 
materialized and subject to forms of power, which Butler uses to build her case for a 
performative approach.140 It closely connects with the argument in the chapter on 
scarcity that all resources must first be seen as commodities before they can be seen 
as resources.141 Together, these “definitions” from Foucault lead Hardy & Thomas to 
conclude that Foucault might differentiate epistemologically between the material, 
discourse and the non-discursive, but ontologically he ‘collapses the Cartesian 
dualism of mind/body’ and sees them as highly interconnected and made different 
per context.142
Foucault later describes his position on materiality with the help of La Perriere’s 
1567 definition of government as ‘the right disposition of things arranged so as to 
lead to a suitable end’.143 From the same text by La Perriere, Foucault takes his broad 
definition of “things” as described earlier in this chapter (material things, men in 
their relationship with discursive things, and man in their relationship with uncertain 
136 Lemke argues that Foucault also never ‘chose’ to discuss the connections between humans and non-
humans, see Lemke 2015, 5.
137 Foucault 2002, 114, 120–121, 54.
138 Ibid., 77, 179–180.
139 Foucault 1977, 30; Foucault 1980, 57–58.
140 Butler 1993, 10–11; Lemke 2015, 13.
141 See Hekman 2010, 120; De Gregori 1987b.
142 Hardy and Thomas 2015, 681, 682; Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 2014, 19.
143 Foucault 2007, 96.
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event like things). Lemke argues that the main lesson Foucault takes from this text, 
is the intricate relationship between humans and things, and how this relationship is 
made to be political: 
the art of government determines what is defined as subject and object, as 
human and non-human. It establishes and enacts the boundaries between 
socially relevant and politically recognized existence and ‘pure matter’, 
something that does not possess legal-moral protection and is ‘reduced’ to 
‘things’.144
Human-like things and thing-like humans (e.g. ANT’s hybrid human/things) are 
made to be subjects with discursive and non-discursive practices that are enacted 
through their milieus. Above it was already discussed that the “milieu” offers both 
the instrument to act on a distance and the element within which it is possible to 
do so. With this term, Foucault once more collapses any distinction between the 
material and the social as the concept itself already covers both social milieus and 
environmental milieus. In his original manuscript, Foucault actually describes the 
milieu as the relations between multiple humans and things ‘that act on them and 
on which they act in turn’.145 From this quote, Lemke rightly remarks that this 
implies that what today is described as agency, is not something that thing’s also have 
(contra Bennett), but something that follows from the actual relations and boundaries 
between humans and things (in line with ANT and Barad).146 
Together with Foucault’s insight that materiality acts as a vector of power, this 
latter insight of agency as an outcome of the relationality of humans and things 
enables the conduct of conduct or the government of humans and things through 
the governing of their actions, desires, and possibilities. A good example of this 
complexity between humans and things, and how they interrelate and shape each 
other, can again be found in the politics of food. Shannon, for instance, discusses the 
conduct of conduct over food on a local level of cities and municipalities where ‘the 
choice between a fried chicken and fruit salad is never simply a matter of nutrition.’147 
In describing how local governments are influencing the milieu of people for them 
to behave healthier, Shannon shows how the fight against obesity starts by defining 
obesity as something abnormal in respect to a ‘normal’ healthy way of life.148 This 
norm, broadly shared as it is and reiterated with each action that local municipalities 
take, triggers a governing of the self. Unfortunately, Shannon does not continue on 
144 Lemke 2015, 9. 
145 Foucault 2007, 22.
146 Lemke 2015, 10; Latour 2005b; Preda 1999, 358; Bennett 2010a.




this self-governance but focusses on the knowledge and risk practices of the state/
government alone. He highlights how the municipality programs often approach 
obesity by dividing their populations in clusters of high/low obesity and then map 
those clusters geographically. In this process, these programs identify geographic 
regions at risk, but also, simultaneously, transform particular geographic factors, like 
the number of fast-food restaurants and supermarkets, into the core problem.149 In so 
doing, these policymakers define obesity as a supply problem and focus on markets 
and consumers as they try to provide a broader range of healthier foodstuffs for lower 
prices.150 Consequently, they disregard the citizens behind the consumer and ‘close 
off a more systemic interrogation of both food production systems and processes of 
urban economic and racial segregation.’151 In other words, the wider questions that 
discuss why the obese live in the poorer down-town regions with lots of fast-food 
restaurants and the healthy non-obese people mainly live in the suburbs with plenty 
of supermarkets and very little fast-food restaurants.
Shannon’s article beautifully shows three important points discussed so far. First, 
that governing takes place through a physical milieu. The construction of healthier 
restaurants and shops, the promotion of healthier food, and the organization of 
healthier and cheaper food for those particular neighborhoods, indicate that it is not 
the obese people who are dealt with, but that their environment is re-organized in 
such a way that their possibilities in- and decrease. Second, Shannon’s article shows 
how the problem definition itself is not neutral. Initially, the problem is shifted from 
the behavior of the obese to the food itself. Later, food is approached in terms of 
availability, ease of access, and cost: all related to the organization of supply in concrete 
buildings (shops, restaurants). At every step, other potential issues are excluded, 
ranging from a lack of cooking courses to the supermarkets themselves, not as saviors 
and suppliers of healthy food, but as monopolists within the global food production 
system pressuring production prices and thereby decreasing actual production. Third, 
it shows that when things can act human-like then humans can be approached thing-
like.152 Initially, biopolitics implied just that: to study (human)populations with 
statistics, define the normal and abnormal and then govern the conduct of conduct of 
those behaving abnormally. The obese persons in Shannon’s article are aggregated as 
part of the overall city population and within that population are grouped together 
in degrees of obesity. During this process, ‘men … became calculable and measurable 
and could be conceived of as physical phenomena themselves’.153 Obese people in this 
149 Ibid., 250.
150 Ibid., 261, 258.
151 Ibid., 250, 259.
152 See also: Lemke 2015.
153 Ibid., 10.
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example are transformed into physical thing-like phenomena that are made visible as 
a governable problem as they are categorized and mapped.
8.4.2 Materialization through Calculation
The core problem shared by new materialists and those working on scarcity and energy 
security is that it is only possible to govern that what is known. The power/knowledge 
nexus is Foucault’s way of describing the close linkages between these two. It describes 
how knowledge, its systematic gathering, categorization and analysis, always already 
contains ways to structure and dominate.154 As Rouse argues ‘[a] more extensive and 
finer-grained knowledge enables a more continuous and pervasive control of what 
people do, which in turn offers further possibilities for more intrusive inquiry and 
disclosure.’155 The power/knowledge nexus describes the practice of governing a 
group of people (a population) by gaining knowledge over that group and by defining, 
during the gathering of knowledge, what is normal and abnormal. This subjectification 
of people, witnessed in the obesity example, is a necessity for people and things ‘to 
have an ontological existence at all’ in public life.156 Nothing material and no body 
or thing exists in public life that is not somehow structured by knowledge gathering 
practices. Two observations follow from this argument. First, while matter and reality 
are real, the ontology that people use to describe our reality is historically constructed 
and thus comes in multiple versions (multiplicity) and is open to change.157 Second, 
earlier in this chapter power was defined in terms of materialization, as the conflation 
of discourse, non-discursive practices and matter. This implies that all matter and 
bodies are imbued with power when they act relationally to other things and bodies. 
Energy and food in this reading are powerful things that enable us to live a particular 
lifestyle that would not have been possible without them. Simultaneously, they are 
part of “power struggles” as they are part of the milieu through which other humans 
and things are governed.158 Power is thus based on knowledge and knowledge is based 
on power; the two are not identical but relational, yet so intricately related that ‘there 
is no point of dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power.’159
The power/knowledge nexus was already briefly discussed in the example from 
Shannon above. An even better example of how calculative principles help identify 
and subjectify humans and things – and consequentially make something initially 
ungovernable and unproblematic into a problem that can be governed – can be 
found in Amoore’s book The Politics of Possibility. Amoore provides an interesting 
154 Foucault 1980.
155 Rouse 2005, 96–97.
156 Hekman 2010, 57.
157 Ibid., 58; Mol 2002.
158 Preda 1999, 358.
159 Foucault 1980, 52.
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Foucauldian inspired reflection on the role of accountants and their methods towards 
food scarcity in Great Britain during the Second World War.160 She starts by noting 
that the British government did not act on its domestic food supplies and commodities 
pricing during the first 18 months of the war. The reason, according to Amoore, was 
an ‘absence of a defined problem of scarcity.’161 It was not that the problem of food 
shortages and price increases were unknown, but that the controls to counter them 
were unavailable. Hence, the problem was not seen as a governable problem that 
could be acted on. Amoore then describes how the British Board of Trade during this 
period started to identify the problem not in terms of scarcity, but in terms of a lack of 
statistical knowledge and data about normal consumption patterns of its population. 
Without such data, it was deemed impossible to anticipate future consumption, let 
alone decide upon exceptional measures (like rationing).162 
In the absence of accurate census data, the board authorized accountants 
from the firm Price Waterhouse to devise techniques for accounting for the 
population and to administer new restrictions on supply: “The need to control 
and monitor the workings of an economy at war necessitated the recruitment of 
accountants as administrators and advisers, many being granted considerable 
executive authority”.163
Amoore returns to Foucault to analyze this moment. A moment when accountants 
helped open up the unknown world of food distribution through their methods 
of accounting and statistics. Thereby enabling the government to act upon it by 
steering the flows of commodities and acting upon ‘systems of exchange,’ as if they 
were known in full.164 In the process, Amoore argues that the accountants gained 
‘executive authority’ as they decided on what trade and consumption practices were 
allowed, meaning that they had ‘[t]he capacity to decide upon the norm’.165 Amoore 
concludes that this had two consequences: it helped “organize” a wartime economy 
centered on the army, and it reified the techniques and methods used for future 
government practices. The latter is the main result for Amoore, as ‘[a] changed system 
of accounting does not simply change the measure but also the world and how we 
see it, how we apportion it, how we differentiate and divide it.’166 In other words, it 
changes our ontology, helps identify new problems (by subjectification) and enables 
160 Amoore 2013, 32–39.
161 Ibid., 34.
162 Ibid., 35.
163 Ibid., 36 quotes: Edgar Jones (1995) True and Fair: A History of Price Waterhouse, London: Hamish 
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new ways of governing. With knowledge comes the ability to act, thereby making 
knowledge a goal in itself. To reach this goal a method is developed, statistical risk 
calculation, which promises to make the future known. This is such a strong promise 
in fact, that the absence of knowledge and the subsequent inability to act becomes a 
risk itself.167 
These calculative practices develop constantly. Foucault and Amoore highlight the 
use of statistics, while Shannon discusses geographical and visual mapping (GIS).168 
Elsewhere, Barry discusses the governing of geography and territory through 
common measurement systems, infrastructure standards and qualification standards 
(skills).169 All three of these practices are shared ways of gaining knowledge and not 
one of them is “fixed” as they are continuously adjusted and improved. Callon and 
MacKenzie discuss another calculative technique when they independently analyze 
the performativity of economic formulas.170 For these authors, economic formulas 
and models do not describe or represent the economic reality “out there”, but they 
see these formulas constituting that reality (in line with Searle’s social fact of money 
itself). 
Someone who pushes the argument that economic calculative practices shape 
reality even more is Mitchell. More so than Foucault, who sees neoliberal economics 
and its calculative practices as separating politics form economics, Mitchell argues 
that the main function of neoliberal economics lies in the artificial boundary that 
it creates to separate the political from the natural. According to Mitchell, in the 
shift towards governmentality and its focus on political economies, nature became 
something ‘excluded from politics by practices of calculation.’171 While the sciences 
define what nature is, economics defines how it is approached in socio-political life by 
creating ‘the large no-man’s land between the two’.172 Mitchell refers to the politics 
surrounding oil and gas reserves (also in chapter 4.2). In particular, to the distinction 
between above ground politicized relations and the belowground geological factual 
reserves. Mitchell argues that any discussion of oil and gas reserves needs to 
incorporate the ‘space of uncertainty, of economic possibility’ that economics (e.g. the 
oil industry) carves out in calculating the distinction between proven, probable and 
possible reserves.173 In short, for Mitchell ‘[t]he appeal to nature shortcuts political 
167 Luhmann 1993.
168 Related, Elden introduces the concept of geometrics and geopower as an alternative to biometrics and 
biopower, believing that biopower focusses too much on humans and not enough on territory and 
geography. My reading of Foucault’s biopolitics above is more material than Elden’s, so I do not follow 
along in his argument. Elden 2007; Elden 2013; Bridge 2014.
169 Barry 2006.
170 Callon 1998; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007; Fine 2005.





debate and contestation.’174 Then again, with a broader reading of Foucault and ANT 
in mind, so does any desire for factual knowledge and clear definitions on humans in 
their relationship with things. 
8.4.3 Securing Circulation
The combination of power/knowledge, the governing through the milieu and the 
desire to organize freedom of circulation for the benefit of the population, results in 
practices of security to identify and counter undesired futures. Foucault’s example 
of scarce food supplies in chapter 6 highlights this combination quite clearly. In the 
neoliberal acceptance of the ‘reality of grain’, Foucault argues, what is accepted is ‘the 
reality of fluctuations between abundance / scarcity, dearness / cheapness’, this is a 
reality that is governed ‘not by trying to prevent it in advance’, but by installing ‘an 
apparatus […], which is, I think, precisely an apparatus of security […].’175 
Such a security apparatus or security dispositif, is, like his concepts of discourse or 
non-discursive, never explicitly defined by Foucault. In one of the few broad descriptions 
of a security dispositive, Foucault discusses them as consisting of ‘discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions.’176 
Elsewhere, Foucault summarizes his study of security dispositifs as studying (1) 
‘spaces of security’, (2) ‘the treatment of the uncertain’ (what Nally describes in terms 
of ‘management of the uncertain or “aleatory”’), (3) ‘the form of normalization’, and 
(4) the ‘emergence’ and ‘reality’ of the population as ‘both the object and subject of 
these mechanisms of security.’177 Dillon describes these security dispositifs as a 
combination of different security technologies that assemble under a singular logic.178 
Schouten takes a similar approach, but combines insights from Foucault with ANT 
to define a security dispositif or assemblage as ‘the totality of relations structured 
by security apparatus, or the shifting – discursive, material, institutional, practical 
– ‘milieu’ upon which a security apparatus acts in order to render it secure.’179 In 
turn, he defines a security apparatus as ‘a set of ‘socio-technical’ arrangements that 
mediate relations and interactions within a specific sphere of activities, black-boxing 
some concerns and threats while foregrounding others’.180 Returning to Foucault, 
perhaps this concept is another one of his that should not be defined too narrowly and 
instead just be described by what it does. What a security dispositif does, according to 
174 Ibid., 246.
175 Foucault 2007, 37.
176 Foucault 1980, 194; Aradau and van Munster 2007, 97.
177 Foucault 2007, 11; Nally 2011, 38.
178 Dillon 2008, 311; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 266. 
179 Schouten 2014, 30.
180 Ibid.
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Foucault, is that it indicates the set of relations of a multiplicity of humans and things; 
it highlights the nature of these relations and its effects; and it highlights the strategic 
function of such a set of relations.181 In this sense, it is the identification of a specific 
network of relations based on its goal or strategy. It is within these networks that one 
can analyze the performativity of such a network (or the agentic distribution of the 
nodes in the network of relations).182 
The chapter on scarcity briefly discussed two such strategies or security dispositifs 
by examining the shift from mercantilism to liberalism and the subsequent shift 
in security apparatus from a direct management of things towards an indirect 
management via the observation and protection of circulation. It is from the latter 
that Foucault identifies the security apparatuses that work in-between abundance 
/ scarcity and which govern the mobility of individual things within these flows of 
circulation. 
As briefly discussed in chapter 3.2.5, circulation is secured from at least five 
directions. First, the critical security literature takes Foucault primarily as discussing 
the security of circulation in terms of directly separating good and bad products within 
the circulatory flow at specific points or gateways where a decision is made on the 
thing’s further mobility, as in the literature on airport security and migration policies 
(direct governing of circulation). Second, Foucault himself provides the scarcity 
example and describes how the supply and consumption within the circulation of 
food should not be governed directly, but indirectly through the neoliberal markets 
and the milieu (indirect securing of circulation). However, third, this example 
excludes the protection of the circulation itself and its potential total absence. Within 
energy security debates, the fear is not whether the oil is good or bad, but whether 
the supplies themselves are secure (the protection of circulation itself against outside 
influences). Instead, with the example of scarce food, Foucault himself reinforces the 
neoliberal separation of politics, economics and nature, while neglecting that scarce 
food could also have been organized differently, through diversification or other 
political alternative ways of organizing the circulation of food. While these options 
most likely cost more and therefore will never result from the markets, they do not fall 
back into a direct mercantilist governing of supply and demand. This enables a fourth 
form of protecting circulation, namely that the security of circulation also entails the 
protection of the idea of free circulation itself against alternative modes of organizing 
circulation (like La Via Campesina, Occupy Wall Street and communes). Lastly, the 
security chapter also briefly discussed how security and risk processes themselves are 
circular, with failure as an incentive to do better and move on. 
181 Foucault 1980.
182 Aradau, Coward, et al. 2015.
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Securing circulation thus entails more than separating good from bad or leaving 
the markets to its bidding. Energy security itself highlights how it is not just the 
product itself that is secured, or the nodes that enable the circulation of these products, 
but also the idea of free markets, the consequences of the form of circulation, the 
lifestyles that it enables, and so on. In other words, security needs to be problematized 
on multiple dimensions. This includes ‘refraining from making a priori assumptions 
about the ontology of (in)security, instead considering it as itself at stake in – and 
hence the outcome of – security governance efforts.’183 In short, after accepting and 
observing ‘the reality of the grain’, a set of relations of discursive and non-discursive 
humans and things is enacted that empowers or materializes a form of governance 
that is called security. Security in this sense is something that (1) accepts the in-
between of scarcity/abundance, (2) is part of the in-between of scarcity/abundance 
and (3) acts on the in-between of scarcity/abundance.
8.5 reflection 
The work of Foucault returned in all theoretical chapters, whether in relation to 
security, scarcity or materiality. This chapter focused solely on his later work in 
order to combine and deepen many of the insights in those previous chapters as a 
final theoretical unpacking of a critical performative approach with significance 
for the study of energy security. Chapter 8.2 showed that governmentality builds 
on techniques like the power/knowledge regimes as well as notions like biopolitics 
and security apparatuses to analyze a modern form of power that is aimed at the 
bio and everything behind that what ‘makes life live’, vis-à-vis the historic sovereign 
power ‘to kill or let live’ or the disciplinary power exercised over individuals. Power 
is key for Foucault, but he sees it as intangible, relational and affective (as electricity) 
instead of a property that can be owned (the light switch). Once administered this 
form of biopower becomes biopolitics. Biopolitics governs life as it regulates the 
circulations of people and things. It does so by influencing the desires of individuals 
through the milieu, which is only possible after knowledge has been gathered over 
populations. Without knowledge, there is no problematization and hence no ability 
to act. This turns biopolitics into a security apparatus that organizes and defends 
freedom. The freedom that allows circulation to take place, and which allows life and 
the relationships that constitute life to gather and splinter. 
The particular manner in which biopolitics is applied, through technologies of the 
self and the market (conduct of conduct), together with the gathering of knowledge 
about populations, is part of what Foucault describes as governmentality. Chapter 
8.3 describes another part by approaching governmentality as a practice that is 
183 Schouten 2014, 24. See also the discussion on observation in chapter 7.5.
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constantly balancing government regulatory practices with society and economy. 
An economy, in turn, which includes its own (neo) liberal biopolitics based on the 
freedom of consumers and producers to act within markets. It is in the constant 
rearticulating of this balance, for example by the liberal argument of unknowability 
and hence uncontrollability of the economy, that economy and security meet. 
In the search for profit and the need for security, both seek to know the radical 
uncertain future as best as they can. This turns risk into a core technique to rule 
the lives of identified populations by distributing “security” and the accompanying 
material benefits.184
Chapter 8.4 discussed in more detail how Foucault approaches the material world 
in relation to the milieu, power/knowledge and security. The goal of this chapter was 
not to differentiate Foucault from new materialist and modern security studies or 
alternative understandings of performativity. On the contrary, by reading Foucault 
through a material lens that focusses on materialization (of power), which looks 
at the close connection between calculation, politics of ontology, the governing of 
circulation and security dispositifs, what becomes obvious is how closely related all 
these different theoretical fields are. Foucault’s idea of productive security is strongly 
performative in nature. However, above all, his notion of the power/knowledge 
nexus bring out both the political role of calculations and knowledge gathering 
practices as simultaneously measuring, defining and differentiating, as well as the 
materialization of these discourses through non-discursive acts and their enactment 
in the milieu of the humans and things that are recognized and subjected to these 
knowledge practices. 
In terms of energy security, this chapter offers an alternative to the way in which 
energy security is studied in regular policy debates and academia. Simultaneously, 
it offers the theoretical grounding behind many of the conclusions and insights 
from the earlier theoretical chapters. Moreover, it adds to those theoretical chapters 
by seeing (energy) security as a security apparatus that is (1) productive, (2) based 
on knowledge gathering practices with their inherent differentiation, (3) a form of 
governing and materialization, and (4) facilitating in drawing boundaries on a social 
level between nature, economics, the political, and society. With these four, it is no 
longer possible to define energy security except as a set of relations with strategic 
intent that is constantly performed and disrupted. A set that is enacted by other sets 
of relations in and through a milieu. But also a set that acts on the milieu of other sets 
of relations. In short, each call for energy security is a performative act for a particular 
understanding of energy security and the work of Foucault helps to understand what 
happens with these calls in a broader context of governing. 
184 Dillon and Reid 2001; Dillon 2008; Amoore 2013.
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IV.  performIng energy SecurIty
P A R T  I I I

Where Part I of this thesis discussed current understandings of energy security and 
Part II problematized these understandings by unpacking some of the core theoretical 
concepts that are used in energy security analysis, this part will introduce two 
illustrations that highlight how such a performative understanding of energy security 
can be used. Before introducing the two illustrations below, a brief recap of Part II is 
useful to bring its many insights together. In short, Part II moved away from the topic 
of energy security towards a theoretical discussion of the practices behind it. In order 
to come to an understanding of the constant proliferation of energy and food security 
concepts and to rephrase energy security performatively it introduced four chapters 
dealing with respectively security, scarcity, materialization and biopower. 
Chapter 5 on security argued that security is not one thing or one logic, but that there 
are multiple ways in which security is approached, defined and practiced. Following 
its empty nature, security is a man-made process of boundary drawings based on a 
call for urgency by people who try to govern the present based on an imagined future. 
Security hence was regarded as the process of identifying and acting upon undesired 
futures. One such an undesired future, when it comes to energy security, is scarcity: 
the doing without, disruption or structural lack of energy. Chapter 6 on scarcity, too, 
found not one but four definitions. These include shortages, scarcification, absolute 
scarcity and relative scarcity. All of them describe different aspects of scarcity, both 
temporal and in abstraction levels. Besides separating these four types of scarcity 
this chapter identified a further three core modes of reasoning on natural resources 
in general: including neo-Malthusians, Ricardians and Distributionists. Through 
these four types of scarcity and these three modes of reasoning, this chapter further 
problematized energy security, and, especially, the current geopolitical realist and 
neoliberal free market ideas on how best to prevent a potential “scarcity” of energy. 
Chapter 7 discussed the relationship between materiality and knowledge with 
a focus on processes of becoming. It contains two parts. The first part studied the 
epistemological argument of linguistic oriented critical scholars, who argue that it 
is impossible to know whether anything exists outside of our knowledge, because 
everything is always already mediated by our previously socially shared knowledge. 
It then moved on to discuss the artificially created distinction between mind-body as 
a necessary distinction for humans to make sense of the relationality of the material-
social world of which people are part. Following the new materialist literature, the 
second part of this chapter shifted the focus to the role and importance of matter, only 
to conclude that matter and language can be both durable and eventful. To unpack 
the relationality of these events, they need to be known first, which returned the 
chapter to knowledge practices, including the ethics of observation and the politics of 
ontology. Chapter 8 introduced the later work of Foucault and his concepts of power/
knowledge, biopolitics, the milieu, and governmentality, to highlight the productive 
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nature of security in governing humans and things in a social-material milieu. How 
security (e.g. biopower) and security apparatuses combine discourse, nondiscursive 
practices and materiality in a specific strategically channeled set of relations of 
humans, things, knowledge, morality, practices, etc.
On their own, each of these chapters further problematized current understandings 
of the assemblage of energy and security that makes up energy security, and each of 
these chapters offers alternative insights and mechanisms to study energy security 
differently. At the same time, all of these chapters are connected through several core 
critical insights. All chapters deal with being (what is) and becoming (how something 
is enacted or performed) and highlight a strong ethical dimension of this becoming. 
They focus on the creation of boundaries and distinctions. Different ways of seeing 
the world and different logics through which to analyze and define issues. They all 
deal with the relation between knowledge and the material, and the ‘ethico-onto-
epistem-ology’ sets of relations that make up the durability and vibrancy of life.1 
All chapters deal with the relation between matter, economics, politics and ethics or 
morality by analyzing the political economies of (energy) security. 
Part III builds on these insights and illustrates their value through a performative 
analysis of two illustrations. From the start, a performative reading of energy security 
has two benefits. First, it allows scholars to focus on other aspects of the debates as 
it is able to escape the real-life ‘energy’ language of these debates by building on its 
own concepts. This implies, for example, a move away from state centrism and an 
escape from the security concerns themselves towards a reflection on how they evolve 
and what their impacts are. Second, it enables scholars to reflect on, for example, 
the energy security theories and core assumptions of policy makers, not to improve 
them, but to show the consequences of their assumptions. For many, the questions 
and deeper understandings on how humans act socially are enough to justify a critical 
performative approach. For others, the lack of modelling and theorization means that 
these understandings might be interesting but less than useful in real life. Clearly, 
this thesis argues for the first, if only for the awareness to exclusions that these 
performative studies offer citizens, consumers, policy-makers, economists, scientists 
and so forth. 
The two illustrations that follow are an attempt to offer such an awareness, in 
addition to the example of Securitization Theory in chapter 5.4. In fact, the two 
illustrations build on this latter example, not by applying Securitization theory, 
but by analyzing the politics of conflicting calls for energy security and how energy 
security evolves with each iterative use of the term. The first illustration in chapter 
9 discusses the Dutch debate on natural gas extraction, which over the last couple 
1 Barad 2007.
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of years has heated up with concerns about extraction induced earthquakes. While 
these earthquakes are not nearly as strong as the recent shale gas earthquakes in the 
US, they originate at a shallow depth and in populated areas. Subsequently, they have 
spurred a debate about the causality between the extracted volumes of natural gas and 
the earthquakes. By making use of some of the insights from Critical Security Studies 
under the header of ‘everyday insecurities’ (a focus on routine and local insecurities), 
this chapter discusses how the debate is structured by local citizens who try to 
securitize their safety concerns and national policy makers who use risk analysis 
to weigh these concerns with national energy security concerns. In this process, 
the realist and liberal understanding of a state centric energy security is reified and 
strengthened, even in its opposition. 
 The second illustration in chapter 10 moves away from a state centric 
understanding of energy security and the dominance of fossil fuels altogether to 
electricity grids and their evolution into smart grids. Climate change, a potential 
peaking of fossil fuels and the desire to incorporate renewable electricity sources 
all require a new modern grid that utilizes ICT infrastructure to optimize the 
transportation of intermittent electricity production and consumption. With the 
help of Foucault and his power/knowledge nexus, this chapter studies how energy 
security concerns for a stable and reliable grid push the development of these new 
smart grids, but simultaneously change the idea of energy security in that process. 
From a totalizing idea of energy security, the construction of smart grids is shifting 
energy security towards a resilience logic where the general idea of access and delivery 
for all is sacrificed in favor of the stability of the overall electricity grid. 
The two illustrations discuss two different aspects of the energy sector, with one 
discussing a traditional fossil fuel and the other dealing with renewable electricity 
production, transmission and consumption. They differ also in that one discusses a 
settled infrastructure of gas extraction while the other discusses the controversies 
around the construction of a new type of infrastructure. Simultaneously, they share a 
focus on knowledge politics and the relation with materiality. Where the Groningen 
gas example touches upon the risk versus security debate of locals and national 
officials, the smart grids example touches upon the governing of future smart grids. 
In both cases, the eventfulness of matter is problematized, interpreted and defined 
through a politics of ontology. In both cases, the issues are addressed by governing 
“man in its relationship with things” through the milieu. In the gas example, this 
shows in the reduction of gas extraction (in the hope of reducing the earthquakes) and 
the reinforcement of buildings. In the smart grid example, this is highlighted in the 
organized freedom of consumers who are actively directed through their economic 
and social milieu to behave in the best interest of the grid. 
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What the illustrations share most, however, is the underlying dominant discourse 
of energy security. Both examples offer a performative understanding of energy 
security, but it is an understanding that builds on the striking absence of energy 
security within these debates. The phenomenon of energy security is so dominant, 
and yet so openly defined, that it hardly leaves traces and acts as a black box that 
drives people to act on others in their relationship with things in order to fulfil their 
desire for energy. Only in the gas example is energy security, in its narrow security 
of supply definition, mentioned as an argument. It is also here that energy security 
is reified through its opposition, as the opposition focused on the costs/safety 
decision of a secure energy supply and not the supply of energy itself. In contrast, 
within the smart grid example energy security is the assumed naturalized driving 
force in the background. Hardly ever mentioned in texts and generally accepted, it 
drives the development of new technologies and security apparatuses that govern life. 
However, in this example it is possible to observe a shift from a traditional security 
logic towards a resilience logic and its alternative ethical consequences and changing 
understanding of energy security. This in turn hints at an understanding of energy 
security for which proliferation and change is not a problem but an actual strength as 
its shows adaptive capabilities. 
To repeat, the following part of this thesis does not offer the approach to energy 
security. Instead, it makes use of the full range of insights that the four previous 
chapters offer – from securitization to performativity, from risk to disclosure, from 
ANT to power/knowledge – to analyze two brief illustrations of modern energy 
security that break with state centric understandings of geopolitical realists and 
neoliberal free markets, and instead make these understandings part of the reasoning 




99.  shaking uP The everyday duTch 
naTural gas debaTe
‘Do you have any idea how it feels to constantly walk around your home to inspect, 
constantly inspecting if everything is as it was before the earthquake? To check 
whether you have indeed an accurate image of all the damage? It feels like you are not 
allowed to miss anything, always need to scrutinize, always be on your guard.’1 
9.1 introduction
The Netherlands has been developing natural gas fields since the discovery of a large 
field in the region of Groningen in the 1960s. This has resulted in over 265 billion of state 
revenue as well as an infrastructure that connects almost all of the Dutch households 
to these gas fields for heating and cooking purposes. Currently, the Groningen gas 
field is drained to roughly one-third of its original reserves (680 of its original 2800 
billion m3). Unfortunately, from the mid-1980s onwards the areas above the fields 
have experienced light earthquakes, which have been increasing in magnitude and 
frequency.2 For local residents, the everyday experience with, as well as the potential 
deadly consequences of these earthquakes is conflicting with long-standing national 
economic and energy security concerns of the Dutch government and European 
energy markets. For a long time, the concerns for earthquakes remained limited to a 
small number of Groningen inhabitants, mostly to those with direct experience with 
earthquake damages.3 This changed with the 2012 Huizinge earthquake, which, as 
the strongest and most heavily experienced earthquake in the Groningen area to date, 
led to a large public debate and a string of reports on all aspects of the Dutch natural 
gas extraction and ultimately to a cap on extraction as of 2014.4 
This begs the question why, after years of neglect, the security concerns of an 
initially small number of local residents suddenly supersedes the security concerns 
of policy makers and energy scholars working on the Dutch gas and energy supplies. 
This chapter thus studies the age-old security question why some issues become 
security issues and how to deal with conflicting security claims within such a 
process. This chapter uses insights from Critical Security Studies on Securitization 
Theory and Risk to analyze the debate on the Groningen gas field. More precise, this 
1 Local inhabitant quoted in Commissie Meijer 2013, 22 [translation by author].
2 See Figure 7 (Annex) for a map of the region and Figure 8 (Annex) for an overview of the magnitude and 
frequency of the earthquakes.
3 Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015.
4 This chapter was finished in July 2015, just after the decision of the Ministry of Economic Affairs to cap 
the total extraction for 2015 to 30 bn. Nm3. The debate and concerns are still ongoing.
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chapter utilizes the heading of the “everyday” to combine these security insights with 
insights on materiality and knowledge politics from the new materialism literature 
in order to highlight three aspects of the debate. It highlights, first, the materiality 
of the gas extraction and earthquakes as this both triggers and localizes the debate. 
Second, it focusses on the knowledge politics around the severity of the earthquakes 
and, in particular, the discrepancy between the risk analyses of officials and the 
everyday experience of the local residents in the east of Groningen. Third, it shows 
the exclusionary effects of traditional discourses through an analysis of how the state 
centric understandings behind national supply security and economic policy are 
resisted by the securitization moves of local residents. Together, these three indicate 
how energy security is constantly reiterated and reinforced by officials and lay persons 
alike. During this whole debate, the local residents questioned the energy security 
policy of the government. However, they questioned it, not in principle, but on its 
safety/cost decision. In line with Foucault, their “resistance” thus only reinforced the 
state centric prerogative of energy security. 
The analysis itself builds on a number of reports and media coverage, in particular 
the extensive 2015 report by the Dutch Safety Board (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid) 
on the role that security considerations played within the decision-making process 
on the Dutch natural gas extraction from 1959 until 2014.5 Its historical overview 
of the decision-making process has proven invaluable for this chapter. In line with 
this report, the current chapter is interested in the absence of local insecurity 
considerations in national energy security decision-making. However, where the 
report takes a historical factual approach, this chapter aims to offer a performative 
understanding of energy security and therefore analyzes this absence theoretically 
through a positioning of the modes of reasoning behind, on the one hand, the 
security considerations of the local residents and, on the other hand, the risk analyses 
of decision-makers. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Chapter 9.2 briefly touches 
upon the connections between security, new materialism and the literature on the 
everyday. Chapter 9.3 continues by introducing the “event” of the induced earthquake 
near Huizinge in 2012 and its impact on the debate on natural gas extraction in the 
Netherlands. Chapter 9.4 discusses the Dutch national position and policy on natural 
gas extraction in relation to the Groningen field by mapping its historic structured 
materiality, regulatory framework and discursive underpinnings. Chapter 9.5 turns 
to the area above the gas field and describes the everyday experiences of the local 
5 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015. Other key documents include: Muntendam-Bos and De Waal 
2013; SSM 2013; Begeleidingscommissie Onderzoek Aardbevingen 1993; Commissie Meijer 2013; 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2014 (and its underlying reports); as well as overviews and histories 
published in the media: Schouwman and van Kleef 2014; Van den Berg 2015; Havermans 2015.
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residents of Groningen with the earthquakes and the practices that enable the 
extraction of natural gas. Chapter 9.6 shifts from the everyday experiences towards 
the politics of knowledge behind the earthquakes and their risk assessments. The 
reflection brings these lines together and offers a reflection on the role played by 
traditional energy security considerations in this process. 
9.2 securing the everyday
Instead of seeing security as a goal to be achieved, chapter 5 described the discourses 
and practices of security as: (1) both an identification of a threat and the proposal 
of a particular future; (2) a future that is performed in the present; (3) and as such 
it emphasizes and urges; (4) while silencing and simplifying everything outside the 
threat and the solution. In defining an undesired future and calling for urgency and 
action, security silences doubts and alternative security concerns. While the chapter on 
security identified a number of rationalities, techniques and logics behind approaches 
to security and insecurity, it paid special attention to two core theories within CSS, 
namely Securitization Theory and the Governmentality approach to Risk.6 Where 
Securitization Theory approaches security from a clear exclusionary either-or logic 
with a threatening other, the Governmentality reading of risk focused instead on the 
identification of populations at risk and the subsequent security apparatus installed to 
govern those risks. In addition, while Securitization Theory is organized around the 
extraordinary – that an issue needs to fall outside normal political procedures for it to 
count as a security threat, risk theories instead focus more on the practices of policy 
makers and insurers, with risk methods as a way to govern pre-defined undesired 
futures within normal daily routines. 
Both theories can be used to help understand and explain the debate on the 
induced earthquakes, the gas quakes (gasbevingen) as locals call them, although 
they only exemplify parts of it and different parts at that. The local inhabitants, the 
Grunningers in their dialect, clearly have succeeded in securitizing the earthquakes as 
a threat to their livelihood. They have managed to put the earthquakes on the political 
agenda with a sense of urgency, while achieving a reduction in gas production and 
an increase in monetary compensation. Simultaneously, one can witness within 
government and industry a debate geared towards the risks of the earthquakes, in 
particular regarding the scientific uncertainty and economic implications. For these 
institutions, the debate itself has not changed as much as the numbers behind them. 
The only way these institutions are able to function is by weighing interests and 
governing through risk assessments. It should therefore come as no surprise that in 
addition to the event of the earthquake at Huizinge, these risk assessments lie at the 
6 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998; Huysmans 2011; Foucault 2007; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009.
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core of the struggle between the locals and the “gas building” (het gasgebouw): the 
small and closely connected group of companies and institutions in charge of the 
Dutch gas extraction. 
Instead of applying both of these theories onto the debate, this chapter tries to read 
them through a branch of social theory working on the ‘everyday’ of International 
Relations. The core argument in this literature is that ‘the mundane matters’.7 In line 
with ordinary language use, theories on practices and the literature on assemblages 
and networks, these authors argue that all international or ‘global’ explanations and 
theories ultimately stem from and are practiced out in the everyday: the ‘routine [, 
or that] what appears to be unexceptional. Devoid of decision-making. Seemingly 
pre-political.’8 It is the familiar or that what is unobserved, which for these authors 
inhibits both the most powerful structures that guide our lives and the resistance 
to break those structures. As Gardiner argues, the everyday is ‘organized passivity’ 
that ‘blinds us to differences’ and offers ‘a stable order’ (e.g. ontological security), but 
simultaneously the everyday is also ‘messy’, the impure, a ‘conjunction of habit, desire 
and accident’ and it ‘exhibits a certain strength and resilience that enables it to resist 
domination by identity-thinking’ and technocratic government.9 The idea of these 
theorists is to approach the ordinary and open it up as something extraordinary, to 
see something in all its complexity and potentiality.10 
Such a focus on the everyday fits the CSS literature in two ways. First, in relation 
to Securitization Theory and its explicit denial of the everyday. While the ‘non-
abstracted reality’ described by scholars working on the everyday clearly fits the 
category of the non-political in Securitization Theory, the theory itself builds on 
the distinction between the non-political, the political and the extraordinary and 
focusses in particular on the shift from the political to the extraordinary.11 Through 
its explanation of this latter shift, Securitization Theory sees security as a perceived 
necessity that silences alternative views. Security arguments thus silence the everyday. 
At the same time, this theory also allows for the possibility that new issues become 
problematized and turned into security issues. In other words, the theory allows for 
the everyday events and interpretations to become exceptional, meaning that the 
everyday is able to resists the silencing of overarching discourses, whether security 
related or not.12 
7 Enloe 2011; Acuto 2014; Kessler and Guillaume 2012; Guillaume 2011; Kallus 2004; Seabrooke 2011; de 
Certeau 1984; Davies and Niemann 2002; Lefebvre 1991; Gardiner 2000.
8 Enloe 2011, 447.
9 Gardiner 2000, 14, 13, 5, 16 (quoting Kaplan, A. and Ross, K., 1987, Introduction, Yale French Studies, 
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Second, this contrast with approaches that analyze security itself as an everyday, 
like risk and practice theories. Theories working on risks, for example, focus on the 
everyday politics of managing security concerns and governing populations through 
risk management techniques. For these theories, security is something routine and 
part of the everyday. The work from Bigo and Balzacq on security practices also 
clarifies that not only those suffering from the threats, but also those security analysts 
who try to govern the events have an everyday experience of their own.13 These 
scholars study the everyday of security experts, how their existence reifies the threats 
and how new events are interpreted based on the particular security practices and 
understandings already in place. 
In line with these theories, a focus on the everyday thus needs to consider two 
things. First, it leads to the question whether something that is problematized is 
still part of the everyday, for example, by stating that it is possible that one person’s 
exceptionality is another person’s everyday routine. Second, if one allows for multiple 
everydays then the question who’s everyday to analyze in the first place becomes of 
particular importance.14 In the case below, for instance, it matters whether one 
studies the everyday of the Grunningers or the officials of the “gas building”. This 
becomes an interesting political and ethical choice, for the people within the debates 
themselves, but clearly as well for outside observers criticizing the debates (in line 
with chapter 7.5). 
A focus on the everyday also touches upon insights from Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) and other new materialist theories on the role of the material and the 
localization of debates (see the chapter on materiality). Latour for instance builds on 
the insights of Tarde to argue that all social discourse and structure is ultimately a 
form of simplification, that there is nothing more complex than the localized material 
and social relations that make up life.15 For Latour, life does not take place ‘in the 
everyday’, but it takes place locally. Latour and those working on ANT do not observe 
the everyday; they study the traces of those multitudes of local relations that are 
black-boxed and withdrawn from observation. For ANT, these networks of relations 
are local, because they reject larger overarching explanations, like a theory or social 
structure. These overarching explanations are seen to close off the actual association 
that takes place and thereby prevent any possible way to understand potential changes 
in these relations. Instead, ANT believes one needs to do the work and really follow 
the associations between the relations to where they lead. The difficulty of such a 
framework, namely where to start and where to stop one’s analysis, is described by 
Latour himself (although in a context of morality) with a quote touched upon before:
13 Bigo 2014; Balzacq 2011.
14 Compare with the ‘agential cut’ of Barad 2007.
15 Latour 2005b, 13–16.
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Between the gesture of switching on my computer and what I write on the screen, 
I can either ignore the nuclear industry which enables me to work this morning, or 
find myself immersed in the uncertain destiny of that same industry which forces me 
to take account of the burial in deep silos of the waste from its stations that the French 
do not support.16
Here, Latour touches upon the moment of choice between the everyday of writing 
and the everyday of a particular aspect of electricity production. It is a choice he 
elsewhere describes with the terms matters of fact and matters of concern. The term 
matters of fact describes those instances that are closed, undiscussed, pre-political 
facts of life. In turn, the notion matters of concern describes those assemblages of 
things that become contested public and political concerns.17 This leads to two 
questions. First, how do some issues become matters of fact and are silenced, and 
second, is something that is problematized as a matter of concern still part of the non-
political everyday?18 
Irrespective how one answers these questions, what remains is the shift in attention 
to the unobserved everyday in general and a politics of knowledge in particular. With 
multiple everydays, this implies a process of ontological politics as initially proposed 
by Mol.19 In such a politics of multiplicity, ‘the very question of whether such 
controversies are framed as ‘political’ or not is commonly itself a vital element in the 
dynamics of the controversy.’20 It is this form of politics – the breaking open of the 
everyday, the conflicting security claims and the lived experience of longstanding 
compounding issues – that the illustration below tries to highlight. Because the politics 
itself is multiple and tangled, the illustration is not depicted as a neat chronological 
story and more as an assemblage of events, explanations, experiences and reflections. 
Moreover, a la Deleuze & Guattari, it starts in medias res with the event itself.21 
9.3 shaking up the everyday
Within the debate on the earthquakes in Groningen, the Huizinge earthquake of 16 
August 2012 is often described as a turning point. This event is said to have pushed 
the Grunningers to start protesting in earnest, while for officials it is in hindsight 
described as the turning point that made them acknowledge the need for a shift in 
their normal procedures. As the Dutch Safety Board concludes: ‘The earthquake in 
16 Latour 2002, 255.
17 Latour 2004; Latour 2005a.
18 On making things public, see: Barry 2013b; Marres 2005; Marres 2012.
19 Mol 1999; Mol 2002; Whatmore 2006, 604.
20 Barry 2013b, 8.
21 Deleuze and Guattari 1987.
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Huizinge was the beginning of a new reality for Northeast Groningen.’22 And indeed 
with a score of 3.6 on the Richter scale, the Huizinge earthquake was the strongest 
ever experienced in the Groningen area (although the Roermond 1992 earthquake 
was the strongest ever experienced in the Netherlands).23 Equally important to its 
magnitude were its scale and duration, which led people to flee their homes in panic. 
In addition, the Huizinge earthquake provided usable footage of the quake itself due 
to its duration, which enabled the panic to be captured by mobile phones and security 
cameras.24 More local than such an earthquake seems hardly possible. 
To understand its impact outside its local environment, however, one needs to 
place it in the everyday of the Grunningers. This includes the fact that this was not a 
natural earthquake (contrary to Roermond 1992) but one directly linked to the gas 
extraction in the Groningen natural gas field. It includes that the Grunningers have 
been experiencing an increasing number of such earthquakes and that these have 
been of steadily higher magnitude ever since the first one in 1986.25 And it includes 
the public pressure that resulted from the news that 2013 turned out to be a record 
year, both in terms of an all-time high extraction volume (up to 54 billion Nm3) and 
a record number of 119 tremors in the Groningen gas field of which about 20 could be 
felt by inhabitants (out of 133 total in the Netherlands).26 
The list goes one (see chapter 9.5) but most important in bridging the everyday of 
the Grunningers and the officials might be a report published by the State Supervision 
of Mines (SSM) in response to the Huizinge earthquake. As the official supervisory 
body, the SSM is responsible for ensuring that mining activities in the Netherlands 
are practiced in accordance with the mining law.27 Even though the Huizinge 
earthquake fell below the maximum of 3.9 on the Richter scale that was calculated in 
earlier risk assessments and therefore did not came as a surprise to the institutions 
involved, the SSM still initiated a new study in response to the growing unrest under 
the Grunningers.28 In this unsolicited report, the SSM, at that time still part of the 
22 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 27 [translation by author].
23 Ibid., 27, 29. The Richter scale is logarithmic meaning that an increase from 3.6 to 3.8 is a doubling of 
the experienced magnitude (the energy released). Everything below 3 on the Richter scale is hardly 
perceptible. That said, the actual experienced magnitude depends on multiple factors (magnitude/
energy released, speed of waves, ground conditions, force, duration, PE value, depth, etc.), not all of 
which relate one on one to the earthquakes in Groningen. In particular, the minimal depth between 1 
and 3 km, the ground conditions (clay, high ground water) and the fast speed of the ground waves mean 
that people experience them earlier than the Richter scale would indicate. Another complicating factor 
is the uncertainty within the Richter scale itself (+- 0,1) and the delay of about a year between the gas 
extraction and the earthquakes.
24 Ibid., 83–84.
25 See Figures 7 and 8 in the Annex.
26 KNMI 2015; NAM 2015a. See also Figures 8 and 9, and Table 4 in the Annex.
27 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2008.
28 SSM 2013; Muntendam-Bos and De Waal 2013; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 66.
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Ministry of Economic Affairs (and thus the gas building itself), openly and strongly 
questions the constant adjustments and increases in the maximum magnitude that 
risk assessments have put forward since the early 1990s. It comes to this conclusion in 
part by reviewing a simultaneously published interim report from the seismographic 
knowledge institute in the Netherlands, the Royal Netherlands Meteorological 
Institute (KNMI).29 
This interim report from the KNMI on the Huizinge earthquake contained 
two major arguments. First, it looked at the methodologies it used and analyzed 
the difficulties and uncertainties when trying to calculate statistically a definite 
maximum magnitude for possible future earthquakes in the region of Groningen. The 
SSM combined this with earlier discussions on methodological uncertainties and, 
for the first time, put these uncertainties upfront in its report. It concluded that it is 
impossible to estimate a possible maximum magnitude for the induced earthquakes 
in Groningen. In doing so it distanced itself from the rest of the interim report of 
the KNMI, which, secondly, proceeded with the by then regular practice to increase 
the maximum estimates once more. After an international comparison of induced 
earthquakes, which resulted in maximum measurements of anywhere between 
4.2 and 4.8, the KNMI decided to stay on the safe side and placed the maximum 
magnitude at 5.0 on the Richter scale, all the while repeating that the situation in 
Groningen, especially its underground and populous area, is quite different from 
these international cases. 
Noteworthy, while the SSM argued against this urge to find a new maximum, it 
did counterintuitively calculate that if one takes a magnitude of 5.0, which is about 
1000 times stronger than the Huizinge earthquake, the chance for an earthquake 
of 3.9 becomes 7%. Thereby implying that one in every fourteen earthquakes could 
be stronger than the Huizinge earthquake.30 Based on these two insights the SSM 
strongly advised the Minister of Economic Affairs, the ultimate responsible party for 
gas extraction in the Netherlands, to reduce the output of the Groningen gas field as 
quickly and drastically as possible in order to reduce the earthquakes on a short term 
base (with a delay of about a year). 
The SSM’s break with previous knowledge practices came as a surprise to the other 
parties within the “gas building”.31 Not surprisingly, the KNMI and the Nederlandse 
Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM) – a cooperation of Shell and ExxonMobil that is 
awarded the license to extract natural gas from the Groningen field – questioned these 
conclusions.32 However, what really enflamed the local experiences of neglect and 
29 Dost and Kraaijpoel 2013.
30 Muntendam-Bos and De Waal 2013; Van Hofslot 2015.
31 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 77.
32 NAM 2013.
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anger even more was the slow response of the Minister of Economic Affairs who did 
not immediately follow up on the SSM’s advice to reduce the gas extraction. Instead 
the minister called for more research on the relation and effects of the earthquakes and 
the gas extraction (11 studies initially and 15 in total), even though he acknowledged 
the chance for higher magnitude quakes. Instead, the ministry agreed with the NAM 
on a sum of 100 million euros for preventive construction measures.33 
On another front, the SSM report influenced the Province of Groningen to 
initiate its own study conducted by the commission Meijer.34 The commission 
repeated the main conclusions of the SSM and thereby confirmed the local concerns. 
However, the commission also reflected on the impact of the SSM report itself on the 
local residents and the sluggishness of the “gas building”. It is this impact that the 
commission Meijer summarized by stating that ‘inhabitants have the impression that 
the national government is giving prevalence to statistics over the experience of the 
people themselves.’35 Interestingly, besides a number of practical recommendations 
to ease the local unrest, among which a regular roundtable meeting of all the parties 
involved under Chatham House rules (de dialoogtafel), the commission also advised 
the Province of Groningen to hold the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Cabinet 
responsible with appeals on international human rights law and the Treaty of Aarhus 
on sustainable development.36 It clearly felt the need to protect the local citizens 
against national decision-making powers. 
Late 2013 the debate heated up once more, following five developments. First, the 
pressure that resulted from the debate above lingered on. For example, The Maatschap 
Groningen, the organization where the NAM and the state meet and which has 
overall legal responsibility for the gas extraction, conferred over 25 times that year, 
compared to 4 to 8 times in previous years, in order to discuss the proportionality of 
the risks and a possible output reduction versus the profits and other national (energy 
security) interests.37 Second, the debate heated up due to the obligatory deposit of an 
extraction plan by the NAM for the Minister of Economic Affairs to decide on. Third, 
together with this extraction plan, the first results of the batch of reports initiated 
by the ministry became public and confirmed most of the earlier concerns. Fourth, 
public pressure increased following the announcements that 2013 turned out to be 
a record year in terms of the extracted volume and the frequency of earthquakes. 
Lastly, the debate received another push with a new report by the SSM, which advised 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs not to agree to the proposed extraction plan of the 
33 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2013a; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2013b; Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken 2013c; Commissie Meijer 2013.
34 Provincie Groningen 2013; Commissie Meijer 2013.
35 Commissie Meijer 2013, 24 [translation by author].
36 Ibid., 25.
37 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015.
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NAM and instead to reduce the output in some of the most vulnerable areas (mainly 
the clusters around Loppersum). It supported this advice with a new reflection on the 
risks of the inhabitants, arguing that, while acceptable, the risk levels of inhabitants 
were comparable to the highest level of flood risk in the Netherlands.38 Although 
contested, this study was quickly picked up by Grunningers, especially as the SSM 
continued its number game (while simultaneously arguing that the risks cannot be 
known) and calculated that the risk of 100 fatalities near Groningen (between 0,1 and 
1%) was suspiciously higher than the Government regulated risk of a similar event 
near Schiphol airport (around 0,001%).39 Thereby once more highlighting the close 
connection between the events of the earthquakes and the politics of knowledge over 
these earthquakes. 
Nonetheless, late 2013 and early 2014 the government heeded the reports and 
concerns and decided on a range of issues. These include, among others, to open a 
dialogue with its sub-national governments (province of Groningen and counties).40 
To install the dialoogtafel as advised by the Commission Meijer. To task the NAM 
to conduct a full-scale below ground survey (which was missing so far). To reduce 
the extraction in the most effected clusters of Loppersum with 80% (while making 
up for the losses in other clusters – with unknown consequences). To increase 
construction standards and preventative measures along with an improvement of the 
process behind the compensation claims. And to offer the region an overall package 
to improve its economic and employment perspectives.41 These measures were 
reinforced in the winter of 2014-2015, at which point the Minister of Economic Affairs 
also initiated a temporary capping of the total gas extraction for the Groningen 
field. In addition, it agreed to all the recommendations of the Dutch Safety Board, 
including an independent damage claim institute (Centrum Veilig Wonen) and the 
official independence of the SSM from the Ministry of Economic Affairs.42 Still, 
while the Ministry of Economic Affairs reduced production at specific clusters and 
even initiated a temporary cap on the total volume to be extracted in the first half of 
2015 (which was extended to the second half of 2015), there remains a strong political 
debate about the installation of permanent extraction quotas.43 Currently, the 
security concerns of the Grunningers are acknowledged, but the parties responsible 
for gas extraction are arguing that, for security of supply reasons, they are bound to 
produce whatever is needed in response to contractual and seasonal demand, and 
38 SSM 2014a; SSM 2014b.
39 Dwarshuis 2014; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 69.
40 Kabinet, Provincie Groningen, and NAM 2014; Kabinet, Provincie Groningen, and NAM 2015.
41 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2014; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 63; Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken 2015a.
42 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015c.
43 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015c; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015f; SSM 2015.
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as such cannot limit themselves by installing a definite extraction cap.44 In other 
words, within their everyday they cannot easily bow down for the everyday experience 
of the local Grunningers. 
9.4 everyday natural gas security in a closed system
With the discovery of the Groningen gas field in 1959 a certain sense of euphoria is 
set to have taken over the mind-set of policy makers and executives alike.45 Initially 
estimated to be a relative small gas field in a time of drastic changes in energy 
technology (especially the promise of nuclear energy), the idea was to get rich fast. 
To pump as much as possible and sell it even faster. This mentality proved wrong on 
both accounts. Alternative technologies did not gain ground as fast as imagined and 
in the decades after the first drills, the estimated size of the Groningen gas field was 
continually scaled upwards to a size that made it one of the largest in the world. Before 
the 1960s, the Dutch did not experience gas insecurity, simply because the level of gas 
consumption was minimal. Nowadays, the Netherlands is highly gas dependent, but 
not seen as gas insecure because most of its gas is extracted domestically. With the 
draining of the Groningen gas field and Dutch natural gas reserves in general this is 
expected to change. In the near future, the Dutch will be gas insecure precisely because 
they have become dependent on it. In the period after the discovery, the extraction 
of Groningen gas led to the construction of not only a nationwide infrastructure, but 
also to a regulatory framework, a gas elite concentrated in the “gas building”, and a 
set of domestic and international discourses and practices around gas extraction that 
structure current and future options and decision-making practices. 
In terms of infrastructure, there are two defining characteristics of the Groningen 
natural gas field that have and will structure the future of gas in the Netherlands. 
First, following the current usage of natural gas as a heating fuel, any gas system has 
to deal with strong seasonal flexibility and thus be able to cope with large changes in 
volume (up to three times the volume in winter compared to summer). The size and 
volume of the Groningen gas field enables it to be used as a ‘swing’ field, a field where 
extraction can be ramped up when temperatures require it. All the other gas fields in 
the Netherlands, the so-called small fields, are too small to be operated on anything 
but a steady output. A second structuring characteristic is the actual quality of the 
gas that is produced from the Groningen gas field. Compared to other natural gas 
fields, both domestic and international, its calorific value is low. This means that for 
high calorific natural gas, like Russian natural gas, to have the same heating value 
44 As confirmed with an interim judgement from the Council of State, see Raad van State 2015a; Raad van 
State 2015b.
45 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 33.
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as the Groningen natural gas its quality needs to be lowered by adding nitrogen. The 
other way around, to remove nitrogen and other impurities from the Groningen gas 
is for now not worth the effort in terms of energy and costs. Both its quality and 
quantity have supported the construction of a very specific gas infrastructure in 
the Netherlands. Domestically, the size of the field has led to an infrastructure to 
which almost all Dutch households are linked for heating and cooking purposes. This 
whole infrastructure, of heaters in particularly, is based on the low calorific value of 
Groningen gas. With the expected demise of the field this infrastructure is becoming 
problematic and leads to a choice between, on the one hand, the replacement of 
the current infrastructure of heaters, or, on the other hand, the addition of more 
conversion capacity. The latter seems more attractive on the short term, as natural 
gas never has the same quality and there is already some conversion capacity in place. 
In relation to the North Western European gas market, any imports and exports are 
already constantly conversed depending on the required standards that are agreed 
in the supply contracts. Unfortunately, the reduction in high calorific gas that is won 
from the 300 small gas fields elsewhere in the Netherlands (to which Groningen gas is 
mixed) makes this conversion capacity even more pressing.46 A catch in this case is 
that, to have enough capacity by 2020, the decisions should already have been made, 
as it takes 5 to 6 years to get the permits and construct the capacity itself.47 
This latter point underlines the regulatory framework around natural gas. In terms 
of the direct regulatory framework on natural gas, both its legal and organizational 
aspects are based on the initial structure that was set up in the 1960s.48 In fact, 
the framework can be traced to Napoleon and his claim for legal ownership of the 
subterranean natural resources for the state. If he had not done that, the farmers and 
Grunningers themselves would have been the legal owners of the natural gas.49 That, 
however, is not the case. Instead, the Netherlands has a framework that distributes 
the legal ownership, extraction rights and profit sharing between the Dutch state 
and the companies involved, through a range of legal entities and subsidiaries, 
which nowadays is bundled under the heading of the “gas building”.50 This whole 
building was originally set up with one task in mind: to win the natural gas as quickly 
as possible. It was not until a policy brief in 1974, after the 1973 oil crisis, that the 
Government initiated its small gas field policy (het kleineveldenbeleid).51 This policy 
aimed to preserve Dutch natural resources and the Groningen field in particular by 
46 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2013d.
47 Of course, it also builds on the assumption that gas will remain a prevalent energy source. 
48 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 33.
49 Blanken 2013.
50 Ministerie van Economische Zaken and Ministerie van Financiën 2003; Van Gastel, van Maanen, and 
Kuijken 2014.
51 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 34.
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supporting the development of the economically less viable small gas fields elsewhere 
in the Netherlands. It gave the supplies from those small fields prevalence on the grid 
and changed the function of the Groningen field into a swing field with the aim to 
level out disruptions and to meet final demand. Weirdly, this small field policy only 
entered officially into law 25 years later with a redraft of the Gaswet in 2000.52 Over 
the years, this framework and the ‘gas building’ have been periodically challenged and 
limited from the outside. One instance was the 2004 EU third energy package, which, 
among other things, envisioned a liberalization of gas markets. The pro-European 
government at the time quickly and decisively split up the company responsible 
for the transport and sale of Dutch natural gas (former Gasunie), into a company 
responsible for transport (new Gasunie) and the company GasTerra responsible for 
sales. Likewise, domestic, European and international contract law places restrictions 
on the “gas building”, especially in relation to the long term international gas contracts 
which define for decades the quantity and quality of the gas that needs to be delivered 
and bought.53
The “gas building” itself, as mentioned above, consists of a range of corporations, 
subsidiaries and legal entities. On the one hand, Shell and ExxonMobil have, through 
the NAM, the license to operate the Groningen natural gas field. Both also own shares 
of GasTerra, the company responsible for the sale of the natural gas. The Dutch state 
(read the Ministry of Economic Affairs) pulls its weight through a legal entity called 
EBN. The NAM and EBN both cooperate in and own the Maatschap Groningen, 
which is responsible for the actual exploitation of the natural gas fields. The Dutch 
state also owns shares of GasTerra both directly and indirectly (through EBN).54 
All in all, the Dutch Safety Board concludes that, through these constructions and 
the close personal connections between the boards of GasTerra and the Maatschap 
Groningen, the decision-making on Dutch natural gas is made in a closed system that 
is effectively owned by Shell, ExxonMobil and the Dutch State: a system devoid of any 
opposition and ruled by ten persons at most.55 
The close connection between Shell, ExxonMobil and the Dutch state is turning 
out quite expensive in this respect. With the decoupling of the Gasunie and its 
subsequent nationalization, the state paid Shell and ExxonMobil 6.4 billion euro for 
their ownership of the grid. Only a month later, the Dutch regulator (de)valued the 
grid at 4.8 billion euro and ordered its transit fees based on that amount.56 After 
the profit on the decoupling, Shell and ExxonMobil offered a large section of the 
52 Ibid.
53 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2013d.
54 Interestingly, the Ministry of Finance owns Gasunie, which is the company responsible for the Dutch 
gas grid.
55 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 8, 75, 88.
56 Heilbron et al. 2014.
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German gas grid (the BEB grid) to the state-owned Gasunie. While the Netherlands 
is not dependent on Russian gas, it does import Russian gas and expects to increase 
its imports in the future to balance the reduction of its emptying domestic fields. 
For this post-gas era, the Dutch state has launched an ambitious strategy to become 
the ‘gas roundabout’ of North-Western Europe, combining its central position and 
its natural storage facilities. This roundabout ambition of the board of the Gasunie 
and the Dutch state, together with a short time-frame and a less than careful 
consideration of the underlying finances (in particular the pressure on transit fees by 
the German regulator), again led to a structural overpayment. Both adventures have 
made the now publicly owned Gasunie to take losses and devaluate its investments to 
an amount of 2.9 billion euro.57 In both cases, the companies involved benefit from 
the everyday ambition and future energy security concerns of the government (our 
national interest). 
In all of this, the position of the Minister of Economic Affairs is of particular 
interest. First, he is responsible for the supply security of Dutch energy demand and 
thus the volume of gas that is extracted.58 Second, he decides on the license to operate 
and the extraction plans of the NAM. Third, he controlled, until recently, the activities 
of the NAM through the SSM which fell under his Ministerial responsibility. Fourth, 
he partakes in the actual extraction of natural gas through its ownership of EBN. And, 
fifth, he does so while having a very strong financial interest in the extraction itself: 
the Groningen field alone earned the Netherlands around 10 billion euro in 2013 (the 
state takes 90% of earnings, the companies Shell and ExxonMobil the other 10%).59 
Most of this money is used directly in government spending. The Netherlands does 
not have a sovereign wealth fund, and since 2011, a part of the money is also no longer 
labelled for the development of infrastructure and scientific research.
It is this framework and the practices resulting from it, which the Dutch Safety 
Board describes as problematic, not just on a national level but also in relation to 
the everyday safety concerns of individual citizens. The board describes the everyday 
decision-making of these organizations as driven by three shared main paradigms: (1) 
maximum profits and winnings, (2) an optimal and strategic use of natural resources, 
and (3) a continuity of Dutch gas supplies for both citizens and industry.60 In 
addition, the board concludes that ‘all efforts within the “gas building” are aimed 
towards an imperceptible extraction of natural gas.’61 Together these four discourses 
and habits structure the everyday practices within the “gas building” concerning 
57 Ibid.
58 ANP 2015.
59 DvhN 2014a; Commissie Meijer 2013, 16; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2014, 5.
60 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 70–71.
61 Ibid., 74 [translation by author].
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the Groningen natural gas field. Importantly, they exclude the safety and insecurity 
concerns of the locals, except as a condition to be met for the other goals.62 This, 
in turn, preconditioned the initial response from the organizations to claims of 
insecurity by locals, and it explains why these responses, for a long time, have been 
soothing instead of informative. The communication of the “gas building” towards 
the public has, until 2012, mainly involved an overly simplified and technocratic 
discussion of the known numbers and risks.63 More precise, the communications 
followed the scientific updates of the magnitude without repeating the mentioned 
uncertainties and knowledge gaps. As this message suited the NAM (and the rest of 
the gas building), it saw no need to spend additional funds to study the methodological 
uncertainties, except when outside events forced them to do so. 
This whole debate takes place in an everyday context of European and international 
energy related developments. Globally, the energy markets are influenced by debates 
on climate change and peak oil/gas debates, which, in turn, spark the debate on an 
energy transition. Simultaneously, the last decade witnessed several important shifts 
in markets and technology, including the growing demand for energy in Asia and 
the development of shale gas in the United States. These relate to other technological 
developments on renewable energy technologies (among which Power to Gas), but 
also more heavily discussed technologies like fracking or Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS). On a European level, the 2004 liberalization package and its effects 
on the “gas building” have already been mentioned. Other EU regulation on, for 
example, the free movement of goods prohibits potential one-sided limitations on 
Dutch natural gas exports. The EU is also actively supporting the development of 
EU wide interconnections to create more regional gas flows and is pushing for more 
interregional short-term natural gas markets. These markets are growing in volume 
and are successfully lowering prices, but they also increase the uncertainty in long-
term gas security as they reduce the need for long-term gas contracts. For now, 
however, most of the Dutch natural gas is still traded on long-term contracts.64 
Arguing that one event explains why suddenly the concerns of the Grunningers 
are taken seriously makes little sense. There clearly is not even a single everyday. 
Instead, there are many small localities bound together in a constantly changing 
assemblage. The above describes part of the assemblage as experienced on a daily 
basis by the people in charge of the Groningen gas field. This includes their history, 
their main discursive settings of profit maximization and security of supply, as well 
as their attitude and capacity to deal with conflicting arguments. It also includes the 
wider context within which they operate and which forces them to choose between 
62 Ibid., 71. Legally the NAM is responsible for the safety and security of the production processes.
63 Ibid., 81–82, 86.
64 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2013d.
283
9Chapter 9
the known international legal and economic obligations of the Netherlands and the, 
for them unproven and uncertain, safety concerns of local Grunningers. 
9.5 The local everyday experience in east groningen
The everyday of the local inhabitants above the Groningen gas field, the Grunningers, 
looks a smite different. Their everyday deals not with energy security concerns, 
contractual obligations and other risk assessments. Instead, they deal on a daily 
basis with a steady increase in frequency and magnitude of induced earthquakes 
caused by the natural gas extraction, low economic growth, high unemployment, 
decreasing house values, difficulties in getting their earthquake damages reimbursed 
by the NAM, and, for a long time, having to deal with the poor communication 
from the government and natural gas companies on the actual risks to which they 
were exposed. As a recent agreement between the government, province, counties 
and NAM acknowledged: ‘There is a sense of displeasure in the region following the 
fact that for a long time the risks of gas extraction have been denied. This denial 
turned out unproven.’65 After the first earthquake in 1986, it took 7 years and a large 
interdisciplinary study for the government and the NAM to acknowledge officially 
that the quakes were directly linked to the gas extraction.66 Until that study in 
1993, the NAM ridiculed any claims that proposed such a link. Once recognized, it 
took another 20 years for the “gas building” to start taking the risks and potential 
consequences of these induced earthquakes seriously. In those 20 years every three or 
four years NAM, government and knowledge institutes have been forced to increase 
their estimates on the frequency and magnitude of potential quakes. The Grunningers 
have been living their everyday life for the last three decades with this shadow of an 
eventful material reality and the uncertain knowledge claims that accompany it. 
A major part of this everyday is focused on the handling of the damage caused by the 
induced earthquakes, damage which so far has mainly consisted of cracks in the walls 
and roofs. Initially, the concerns were limited to only a small number of individuals 
with actual experience with earthquake damage, but with the increasing number and 
frequency of earthquakes, the support for interest groups like the Groningen Ground 
Movement (Groninger Bodem Beweging) grew. After the 2012 Huizinge earthquake, 
its membership doubled, and after the SSM report, it doubled once more.67 With the 
2014 earthquake near Garmerwolde, the first earthquake experienced in the populated 
city of Groningen, other parties also became involved.68 Among them large 
institutions, like the provincial and county governments themselves, the University 
65 Kabinet, Provincie Groningen, and NAM 2014, 8.
66 Begeleidingscommissie Onderzoek Aardbevingen 1993; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015.
67 Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015, 5; GBB 2011.
68 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015a, 2.
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and the University Medical Centre Groningen, the local Water Board (waterschap) 
responsible for the water management and dikes, cultural heritage organizations, and 
local utility and infrastructure companies.69 The political cloud following a possible 
impact on public infrastructure, on dikes and hospital equipment, churches and 
monuments, government and other public buildings, as well as the electricity grid and, 
ironically, the natural gas pipelines, is hard to miss.70 Contrary to the concerns of 
individual local residents, who have been struggling for compensation for their homes 
for decades, these institutions are mainly concerned with the earthquake resistance of 
their infrastructure, calling for compensation from the NAM for additional structural 
reinforcements. Reinforcements, it should be noted, which contrary to other countries 
have never before been necessary in the Netherlands. In fact, the Dutch construction 
regulations stand alone in not following the European earthquake construction 
standards, a situation which now is adjusted rapidly. In the meantime, however, 
these companies and institutions are arguing that the potentiality of earthquakes is 
hindering local business development and (foreign) direct investment in the region.71 
Recently, the government and NAM have agreed to help reinforce buildings within the 
area, among others by installing a null-measurement to rule out lack of maintenance 
and other non-earth quake related structural flaws. However, for now, they only help 
the buildings where the risk of collapse is 1 in 10.000; contrary to general Dutch 
procedures which state that the risk of building collapse should never be higher than 1 
on 100.000. The reason provided for this exception is that it enables a faster support for 
those 30.000 to 90.000 buildings that are most at risk.72
Additional funding for earthquake resistant construction was not on the agenda 
in the early 1990s. Even after acknowledging the relations between gas extraction 
in 1993, the NAM (as the exploiting agency legally responsible for the safety of its 
operations) argued that there was no evidence that earthquakes up to 3.3 on the 
Richter scale could lead to any damage and hence was unwilling to discuss any form 
of damage compensation.73 In 1997, a 3.4 earthquake forced the NAM to reconsider 
its position on compensation and it installed procedures and a fund to compensate 
for earthquake related damage. Nevertheless, it did not change the burden of proof: 
to this day (e.g. June 2015), it is up to the residents to proof that the earthquakes cause 
the damage.74 This is a returning political debate and complaint of the Grunningers 
69 DvhN 2013; DvhN 2014b; ARUP 2013; Korff et al. 2014.
70 De Veer 2014.
71 Sikkom 2015; ARUP 2013; Korff et al. 2014; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015b; Stuurgroep NPR 
2015; Commissie Meijer 2013.
72 Zuidervaart 2015.
73 Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015, 6.
74 In principle only, as there are currently multiple ways for people to ask second opinions and to ask the Tcbb 
for advice or to ask a judge to lighten the burden of proof. See: Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015d.
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because of the difficulty of proving that the damage is a result of an earthquake 
instead of a lack of maintenance or structural flaws within the construction of one’s 
home.75 In each case, it involves the use of outside expertise to assess the cause of 
the damage. Until 2012, the NAM only worked with its own experts and locals could 
ask the Tcbb (an advisory council on mining) for advice if they disagreed with the 
results. To the locals that sounded a lot like a student grading his own paper.76 After 
2012, the NAM has started to pay for a second opinion if so desired by the resident, 
but still relied on its own list of experts for the first assessment.77 These assessments 
are described by locals as complex, long, and to some degree as hostile. The external 
inspectors hired by the NAM are not from the region themselves and are seen by 
locals as first and foremost trying to minimize the costs for the NAM.78 Moreover, 
while the NAM compensates the actual damage to one’s property, other costs are 
excluded, including missed income while attending to the repairs or mental health 
complaints due to stress and feelings of insecurity.79 As of January 2015, these tasks 
have been moved from the NAM to the independent Centrum Veilig Wonen. What is 
more, this independent center is not shy of work. Between the Huizinge earthquake 
late 2012 and the first quarter of 2015 there have been over 39.000 claims, compared 
to a total of 2.200 before the Huizinge earthquake.80
An additional concern for locals in this respect is the devaluation of their homes. 
For who wants to buy, let alone live, in a house that is not constructed to withstand 
earthquakes in a region where they occur. Locals claim that they experience a decrease 
in overall sales and a downward pressure on their real estate price. This is not an 
easy claim to substantiate and not one the Grunningers like to make, as they have 
long been afraid of a self-fulfilling prophecy: a situation where their complaints about 
the damage of the quakes will draw attention to the earthquakes themselves and 
hence reduce interest in their region.81 More important, however, is the difficulty 
to proof the causality. That the reduction in house value is indeed due to the (risks 
of) earthquakes; and not a consequence of the overall deplorable economic situation 
(worsened by the economic crisis of 2008) and the aging population in the Province of 
Groningen. The 2013 reports on the housing market in Groningen, as requested by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, could not find a clear significant statistical correlation 
75 DvhN 2000; Werkman 2001; De Mik 2006; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 44; Ministerie van 
Economische Zaken 2015d.
76 The 2002 installed Tcbb is a technical committee that locals can approach in case of a disagreement with 
the damage assessment of the NAM, it also offers advice to the government on the extraction plans of 
the NAM. Interestingly, it receives very little complaints from Groningen. 
77 Sluis 2012; Minkes 2012.
78 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 83; DvhN 2014a; Van Hofslot 2014a.
79 Spaansen 2014; Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015.
80 NAM 2015c; Schouwman and van Kleef 2014.
81 Commissie Meijer 2013, 22.
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on housing value between the different reference areas.82 The 2014 updates of these 
reports still could not find a correlation yet did acknowledge a downward trend in 
value, some non-significant price differences and concluded that houses are indeed a 
bit longer on the market.83 These observations still do not match with the everyday 
experience of the inhabitants who struggle to sell their houses.84 The Groningen 
Ground Movement in particular questions the representative benchmark of the 
study, the ring of Groningen counties around the most affected counties, arguing 
that the earthquakes affect these counties too if indirectly.85 It also conflicts with 
the interests of the counties themselves, who are witness to a downward pressure on 
the taxes that are linked to real estate value. Likewise, social housing corporations 
are supporting the claim for compensation of the depreciation of their properties as 
well.86 As of April 2014, locals can approach the NAM for compensation after selling 
their home if they believe that they have sold their house below market value due to 
the earthquakes.87 
As mentioned, this devaluation takes place in a region classified by Eurostat as 
one of ten richest in Europe with a calculated GDP per inhabitant higher than the 
capital.88 At least, so long as one focusses on the Province. When taking a closer 
look at the four areas of the province, there are large differences between them. The 
GDP per inhabitant in the counties in East Groningen, directly above the Groningen 
gas field, is for example half that of the city of Groningen.89 Not surprising, as East 
Groningen is facing some of the highest unemployment levels of the Netherlands and 
is highly dependent on social welfare and employment programs.90 The gas sector, 
while counting heavily in terms of GDP per inhabitant through its headquarters in 
the city of Groningen, accounted for 5400 direct jobs and 9200 total jobs in the whole 
region in 2013.91 Other than these jobs and some local taxes on the gas infrastructure, 
the local Grunningers have only benefited from the gas extraction indirectly through 
some small funds, which only delivered indirect benefits to the area.92 In the 1960s, 
for example, there was a small fund for industrial development,93 some money for 
82 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 85; Francke and Lee 2013; GBB 2013; Francke and Lee 2014a.
83 Francke and Lee 2014b, 31.




88 Eurostat 2014, 120, 123; Schouwman and van Kleef 2014.
89 Eurostat 2012, 19.
90 Commissie Meijer 2013, 20.
91 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 34.
92 Commissie Meijer 2013, 17.
93 Ironically, aluminium company Aldel was one of the beneficiaries: heavily dependent on substituted 
electricity it went bankrupt in 2014 as it could not compete with smelters in the US and Germany who 
benefited from downward pressure on electricity prices following the development of shale gas and the 
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the lease of the land on which the pumps were constructed, and some donations 
to local social activities. More hurtful to the Grunningers is the fact that the large 
development fund that between 1995 and 2011 was used to distribute and invest part 
of the natural gas earnings (the FSE funds), only spent 1% of its portfolio in the region 
where the gas was extracted from (with 10% of Dutch population).94 Perhaps this 
should not have come a surprise: the Grunningers directly above the gas field in their 
remote corner of the Netherlands were also some of the last to be connected to the 
actual domestic gas grid for heating and cooking.95 
In their everyday, the locals do not only experience the earthquakes themselves and 
the damages resulting from them, but they also have to deal with the compensatory 
practices to tackle the damages, the reluctant acknowledgement of their problems, the 
soothing communication by the “gas building” and the perceived unequal distribution 
of the gas benefits.96 Together these impacts lead to feelings of insecurity and 
distrust.97 Still, it took the Huizinge earthquake and the subsequent SSM report for 
the Grunningers to start voice their concerns in earnest. In large part perhaps due to 
the media attention itself, which for the first time enabled the Grunningers a serious 
nationwide public platform. A platform that both contributed to the overall national 
debate as well as reinforced the fears and anxieties of the Grunningers themselves.98 
Moreover, this platform received constant impulses with the SSM report in 2013, the 
outcome and debate of the studies in January 2014, national elections in March 2014, 
the decision on reduction in the winter of 2014, and in July 2015, etc. Alternatively, 
the identity of the Grunningers too is contributed as an explanation for the slow 
build-up of public pressure. Within the Netherlands, the Grunningers are known for 
their stubborn non-complaining attitude.99 They stand-by and weather the world: “t 
komt wel goud jongh” (“everything will be all right mate”).100 For a long time, so the 
argument goes, the Grunningers were loyal and felt a sense of pride for helping the 
country to develop as whole.101 Many also believed that ‘they in The Hague’ knew 
better, something that slowly changed in time with the constant adjustment of the 
risk analysis and maximum magnitude of the earthquakes. The locals, in their search 
for certainty, started to read the actual scientific reports. The SSM report can be 




96 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 70; Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015, 7–9.
97 Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015.
98 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 86.
99 Ibid., 6; Commissie Meijer 2013, 36; Kelckhoven 2014.
100 For 12 other phrases describing this waiting attitude of Grunningers see: Dwarshuis 2015.
101 Commissie Meijer 2013, 21.
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on the uncertainty in the analyses used so far, but also supported earlier readings 
of the Grunningers. As Van der Voort and Vanclay argue: ‘[t]he publication of the 
SSM report was an impact in itself with people becoming more anxious about what 
will happen to them.’102 With the report and the media attention following it, people 
actually learned that there was no certainty in store for them. 
Most likely, it is a combination of both. As Marres argues, publics are created and 
media coverage is a necessity for this.103 Some Grunningers have always tried to raise 
their voice. It took the 2012 earthquake, the 2013 SSM report and subsequent debate for 
these people to be heard and for other Grunningers to put aside their reservations and 
show their support. This makes the Groningen natural gas case different from other 
Dutch debates on for example the extraction of natural gas under the Waddenzee or 
the debates on a Carbon Capture and Storage test under the village of Barendrecht.104 
Both of these cases were more public than the Groningen gas extraction. The long 
history of the Groningen gas extraction with its limited number of corporations 
and governmental departments involved, its limited number of jobs, its silent and 
hidden infrastructure (most of the extraction and transport is below ground),105 
and the gradual evolution of the earthquakes means that it is a whisper, an everyday. 
Contrast this with the debates on the environmentally protected Waddenzee (1995-
2007) and the CCS project in Barendrecht (2007-2010). Both involved a range of 
corporations and a range of ministries (environment, spatial development, finance, 
domestic affairs), both projects were highly visible as the infrastructure still needed 
to be constructed, and in both cases environmental NGO’s and local inhabitants were 
actively seeking media coverage from the start to pressure the government over the 
uncertainties behind the projects. 
9.6 The struggle to know the everyday
Much of the debate so far has had to do with the materiality of the earthquakes 
(their damage and subsequent compensatory practices) and with the politics and 
uncertainties behind them. In this section, the debate on the earthquakes of Groningen 
will be analyzed with a focus on the knowledge development over time, in large part 
following and building on the extensive report of the Dutch Safety Board.106 While 
scientific research is assumed to be neutral, the Groningen gas debate shows that (1) it 
follows events, (2) that what is not monitored and measured cannot be known and that 
the decision to monitor is a political one, (3) that there is little independent expertise, 
102 Van der Voort and Vanclay 2015, 8.
103 Marres 2005.
104 For the comparison see: Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 75.
105 See also: Barry 2013b.
106 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015.
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(4) that research not up to standards is easily ridiculed even when the concern itself 
is justified, (5) that researchers have little incentives to work on the uncertainties in 
their models, (6) especially when the institutions using the results are happy with the 
outcomes anyway.
Above it was already argued that the NAM was reluctant to acknowledge a causal 
relation between the Groningen gas field and the earthquakes in the region. That it 
had to back down and admit to the causality in 1993. And that, ever since, it has been 
forced to upgrade its risk assessments every couple of years while maintaining that 
the tremors would be small and carry little to no damage. This reluctance contrasts 
with another issue that follows gas extraction, namely that the ground subsides 
(lowers) due to the absence of the pressure of underground gas. The NAM had already 
recognized and has been actively studying this consequence from 1971 onwards.107 
Without the shock factor of earthquakes and with shifting estimates on the level 
of subsidence – ranging from a meter (1972) to 30cm (1975) to 65cm (1984) and 
more recently settling on 45 cm (2010) – the NAM nevertheless initiated a damage 
assessment and compensation procedure in 1983.108
The 1986 earthquake near Assen, a town just below the Province of Groningen 
with its own small gas field, did not fit this model of subsidence and was hence not 
connected to the gas extraction. However, contrary to other orally reported “booms” 
and “air tremors”, this earthquake was strong enough to be picked up by the sensors 
of the KNMI in the middle of the country. The institute confirmed that it was indeed 
an earthquake but was unwilling to speculate about its origins.109 Interestingly, in 
both the case of subsidence and the earthquakes, individuals had been calling for 
attention to them long before the NAM acknowledged the issues. A local engineer 
already mentioned subsidence in 1963, while a local geographer by the name of Van 
der Sluis argued that the gas extraction and earthquakes were causally linked after 
the Assen earthquake.110 His studies were blatantly rejected by the NAM as utter 
nonsense.111 Nevertheless, Van der Sluis gained enough media attention for the 
Province of Groningen to install a commission to study the possibility of induced 
earthquakes, with scholars from MIT flown-in to offer their expertise. Based on the 
advice of these scholars, the commission concluded that there was indeed a small 
possibility for light earthquakes up to 3 on the Richter scale. Simultaneously, the 
Dutch Technical University of Delft scrutinized Van der Sluis work and concluded 
that while his proposed causal relation had no scientific basis, his initial assumption 
107 NAM 1975; NAM 1985.
108 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 34–35; Van den Berg 2015.
109 Van den Berg 2015.
110 Havermans 2015; Commissie Meijer 2013; Meij 1994.
111 Van Hamersvelt 2013.
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of a possible causality needed further study. Moreover, after the Van der Sluis reports, 
the Dutch Parliament started to ask questions to the Minister of Economic Affairs, 
who in turn ordered the KNMI (for which the earthquake was unexplainable as 
it lacked any data) to install a number of seismographs around Assen in 1989 and 
around the Groningen field in 1992.
It took another independent and interdisciplinary commission, installed in 1991 
after more parliamentary questions, to acknowledge in full the causality between 
gas extraction and earthquakes. In 1993, the Begeleidingscommissie Onderzoek 
Aardbevingen (BOA) officially concluded that earthquakes were a real possibility 
but that they would be small, with a maximum of 3.3 on the Richter scale. It also 
concluded that the data gathered so far was very premature and that it was impossible 
to draw useful conclusions form it. In particular, it highlighted that current models 
were based on natural earthquakes and not gas quakes, that the timespan of data 
gathering was too short and lacked enough events (earthquakes) for reliable results, 
that the different regions and gas fields were intermingled, and that there was a 
severe lack of knowledge on the underground itself. The Dutch Safety Board recently 
concluded that the delay of 7 years cannot be justified, especially for a region that is 
not prone to natural earthquakes itself. For that reason, it questions the ‘gas building’ 
and its knowledge institutes (KNMI, TNO, and the Technical University of Delft) for 
not taking their responsibility to properly study the earthquakes and question their 
own methods.112 The Board also highlights how the NAM and government used the 
BOA study and its focus on 3.3 on the Richter scale in its public communication, 
without highlighting its reservations.113
Two years later, in 1995, the KNMI updated its results after several stronger tremors. 
It concluded that earthquakes in the Groningen field would max at 3.3 on the Richter 
scale and 3.4 for the smaller fields around Groningen. One of the consequences of 
this report was another increase in the number of installed seismographs to monitor 
the gas field. That same year, the NAM published a brochure in which it still used 
the BOA conclusions instead of the updated KNMI data. In 1997, two years after the 
KNMI estimated a maximum magnitude of 3.4 an earthquake near Roswinkel in the 
Province of Groningen reached this magnitude. The strongest yet, it was higher than 
the NAM’s publicly acknowledged 3.3 and resulted in 200 claims for compensation. 
In response to this earthquake, the KNMI and TNO both conducted new studies and 
now concluded that a magnitude of 3.8 could very well be possible in 1998. Moreover, 
TNO highlighted for the first time that earthquakes closer to the surface, as those in 
Groningen, are stronger than deeper earthquakes and thus that the numbers might 
differ from the actual experience with the earthquakes. The KNMI, in turn, explicitly 




discussed the uncertainty behind the estimation of earthquakes higher than 3.0 
following the limited number of events, but also found that the energy released by the 
earthquakes remained steady (meaning that their predictability increased).
After a number of legal changes and the protests and impact assessments in 
relation to potential gas extraction form the Waddenzee region, the 2003 Mining Law 
forced the NAM to put forward extraction plans, which included an assessment of 
earthquake risks. In the first accepted plan, the magnitude of 3.8 on the Richter scale 
was maintained by the NAM. Additional research by TNO later that year increased 
the number of tremors above 1.5 Richter, from two or three to a potential five or 
six per year. That same year, three earthquakes stronger than 2.7 in the cluster of 
Loppersum resulted in public commotion, national media attention and a range 
of public meetings. The subsequent 2004 leaflet of the NAM mentioned 3.8 as the 
maximum, but for the first time acknowledged that this number could be corrected 
if necessary and thereby implicitly admitted that a maximum magnitude cannot be 
estimated upfront. Because the Mining law of 2003 dictated that extraction plans 
needed to include an assessment of earthquake and subsidence risks, the number of 
studies increased, as did the number of seismographs with the financial support of the 
NAM.114 The 2004 KNMI report is of particular interest in this regard, as it, firstly, 
increased the maximum magnitude to 3.9 in line with an update of its database, and 
secondly, acknowledged that it was using static models for a situation that was not 
static, but that it simply lacked the tools to cope with the fluctuating gas extraction 
and its relation with the induced earthquakes.115 The KNMI argued that in order to 
develop such a non-stationary model, it would need more information on the specifics 
of the sub-surface areas of the gas fields. This data can only be gathered and shared by 
the NAM, which it passed over until late 2013.116 
Repeated earthquakes in 2006, one of which reached 3.5 on the Richter scale, 
reinforced public concerns. As these earthquakes fell within the official estimates, 
the NAM and Economic Affairs kept to the earlier scientific conclusions: a maximum 
of 3.9 and limited to no damage to the buildings above the fields. This was repeated 
and confirmed by the Tcbb in the updated extraction plan of 2007, in which the NAM 
actually proposed a strategic capping of the Groningen gas field. Not against the 
earthquakes, but in order to prolong the economic lifespan of the field. The Province 
of Groningen, however, grew concerned and initiated its own study in 2008. The 
parties involved in this study, TNO and Deltares, confirmed the earlier KNMI results. 
In a twist, however, the Province of Groningen had also invited local inhabitants to 
reflect on these results and these were both more critical in general and, based on 
114 Wassing, van Eck, and van Eijs 2004; Van Eck et al. 2004; Van Eck et al. 2006.
115 Van Eck et al. 2004.
116 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 63.
292
9shaking uP The everyday duTch naTural gas deBaTe
the official reports questioned the methods themselves by arguing against the use 
of static models and aggregation of data from non-comparable gas fields.117 Two 
remarks, which ultimately can be traced back all the way to the BOA report in 1993. 
A year later, in 2009, the SSM observed a relative high number of earthquakes near 
Loppersum and tasked TNO to study this. TNO in its report cautiously concluded 
for the first time that there could be a link between the volume extracted and the 
frequency of the earthquakes. The SSM subsequently asked NAM to reflect on these 
findings, which the NAM promised to do together with its update of the Groningen 
gas field itself. In the end, this report was delayed by three years and even then was 
mainly concerned with extraction, not with the possible effects of volume reductions. 
The last major important report before the Huizinge earthquake is from the KNMI 
in 2012, in which it concludes that the initial assumption on a stable seismic energy 
could no longer be maintained, thus supporting the need for non-static models.
After the Huizinge earthquake and the report by the SSM, the number of studies 
increased dramatically. Many of these reports were commissioned by the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, which kept receiving conflicting advice from the SSM, TNO, 
KNMI and NAM. To cope with these conflicting positions and the public concern, it 
ordered the first official interdisciplinary analysis of all aspects of the gas extraction 
chain since the 1993 BOA report.118 Before 2013, Economic Affairs passively relied 
on the reports of the KNMI and other knowledge institutes and it expected these 
reports to be paid for by the NAM after its legal obligation to take the necessary safety 
precautions. However, as the Dutch Safety Board concludes, the NAM, as the exploiter 
most knowledgeable of the gas fields, does not mind the results from the reports 
that the earthquakes will only have a minimum impact and sees no cause to order 
additional studies on the uncertainties mentioned in the reports.119 It even took the 
“independent” supervisory body SSM until 2012 to question the uncertainties in the 
reports. With the NAM unwilling to study the scientific uncertainties, the Ministry 
relying on advice and the SSM (and the expert council Tcbb) confirming the official 
reports, there was little incentive for KNMI and TNO to build alternative models. 
They tried, in part by looking at international research, but then quickly ran in to the 
unique material qualities of the Groningen gas field.120 In short, for a long time the 
knowledge gathered on the Groningen induced earthquakes ‘focused on the number, 





121 Ibid., 63 [translation by author].
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This focus on the number worked both ways. It simplified matters for the ‘gas 
building’, but in time it also fueled the distrust of the Grunningers. Two aspects 
are striking in this respect. First, the shift in position from the SSM highlighted 
the power and independent life of numbers. In its 2013 report, the SSM emphasized 
the uncertainty of the scientific models and the lack of any certainty to predict a 
maximum magnitude. Within the same report, however, the SSM used KNMI data 
and calculated the likelihood of an earthquake of 3.9 if one takes a maximum of 5.0 
on the Richter scale. The Dutch Safety Board notices that after the publication of its 
analysis the job is done for the SSM, while in the Province of Groningen this number 
of 5.0 started to take on a life of its own, as the Province, counties and emergency 
services started to take it on board in their regional safety and security plans.122 The 
expertise of the SSM carries a weight of which it was not aware. The focus on risk 
calculations and the sovereignty of these numbers seems to have made people forget 
that each of these risks still needs a value judgement on the threshold to act or not. 
Clearly, locals judge the thresholds of these risks differently than the “gas building”. 
Second, this simplification effect (reducing everything to one number) follows 
from a strong knowledge inequality within the debate on the earthquakes. There is a 
small group of people who “know” about earthquakes (geologists and scientists from 
TNO and KNMI), within a slightly larger group of people who “decide” and have 
knowledge on natural gas (the gas building), over an even larger group of people who 
are affected (Grunningers). Hence, the Commission Meijer advised on ways to level 
this inequality, among which the afore mentioned dialoogtafel: a regular roundtable 
meeting that includes a range of local representatives, counties and province, 
knowledge institutes, the NAM and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.123 In this 
respect, the lack of independent expertise is important as well. Most people who 
have knowledge on gas extraction, let alone on earthquakes in the Netherlands have 
studied together or have worked together on one instance or another. As a result, there 
is a danger that outside comments are set aside as irrelevant and critical supervision 
by ‘independent’ institutes becomes a little bit less critical. Local Grunningers are 
clearly aware of this, which further fuels their distrust.124 And while it is known 
by now that the earthquakes are linked to the gas extraction in a non-static model, 
that their maximum magnitude and frequency are uncertain and that their seismic 
energy increases, what is not (yet) known is whether a reduction of gas extraction will 
reduce the earthquakes. Initial results from the reduction in the cluster of Loppersum 
are promising, but it is unclear what happens in the other clusters where extraction 
122 Ibid., 84–85.
123 Commissie Meijer 2013, 25.
124 Van Hofslot 2014b.
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has increased to make up for the lost volume from Loppersum.125 One thing is for 
sure: earthquakes are not concerned with our uncertainties. Even if the gas extraction 
is completely halted today, they will continue as the ground settles for a number of 
years (up to another 1100 earthquakes by a recent estimate that was printed in a 
local newspaper).126
9.7 reflection
Everything is part of the everyday, yet nothing is the everyday all the time. As an 
alternative, this chapter argues for a multiplicity of the everyday. By combining 
insights from new materialism and CSS under the heading of the everyday, the Dutch 
natural gas debate is here analyzed through an analysis of the everyday life of two 
“opposing” parties: those residing near and suffering from gas extraction practices 
and those organizing and deciding on the gas extraction practices. If the everyday is 
the mundane or the routine, that what is unobserved, than the everyday experience of 
the local Grunningers with induced earthquakes does not fit this definition. For them 
the earthquakes are not an unobserved everyday but a daily lived experience. Their 
everyday consists of 60 years of gas extraction in their region and a neglect by the 
“West”. Recently, this everyday is broken up by two opposing trends: an increasing 
frequency and magnitude of earthquakes together with the minimal reactions of 
the NAM and Economic Affairs, and an overall decreasing regional economic and 
social environment. For the people within the “gas building” – the closed system 
of government and gas companies – the earthquakes are neither an unobserved 
everyday nor a lived experience, but instead a small complicating factor that for a long 
time could be dealt with by following normal procedures. These everyday procedures 
were guided by a set of ideas, discourses and practices over (1) national security of 
supply, (2) profit maximization, (3) a strategic optimization of the natural resources 
and (4) a silent flow of operations, in a context of international and European energy 
markets, politics and technological developments. If the everyday is described as the 
most powerful way of governance, than these everyday habits of the “gas building” for 
a long time constituted the base of the everyday life of the local Grunningers.
When reflecting on the struggling multiplicity of the everyday, this chapter 
emphasizes three trajectories. First, the material reality of the earthquakes, the 
Groningen gas field and the gas extraction infrastructure, which keeps the debate 
localized (no earthquakes and damages in Germany) and situated in a Northern-
European market at the same time. Second, the ontological politics over these 
earthquakes in terms of their origin and their potential impact, as well as the knowledge 
125 See also: Schouwman and van Kleef 2014.
126 Van Hofslot 2015.
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politics related to the scientific uncertainty of the models behind the earthquakes 
and their future trends. Third, the struggle by locals and concerned individuals to 
attributed a sense of urgency to both the materiality of the earthquakes and their 
future uncertainty. The first two can be read with insights from new materialism in 
mind, while the latter fits a security analysis. Clearly, the earthquakes are securitized 
by locals in a number of securitizing moves (following new record magnitude 
earthquakes), while they simultaneously are placed within the risk analysis of the 
“gas building” in an attempt to forgo a (political) judgement on the actual events. The 
fact that locals are dependent on third parties for their safety and security, parties 
who themselves are not under threat, was, in a Luhmannian fashion, the main reason 
for the Dutch Safety Board to adhere to the request of Economic Affairs to study 
the decision-making on natural gas in the first place.127 In this respect the year 
2012 turned out as a break in the everyday gas extraction practices, not because of 
the earthquakes nor the numbers behind them, but because of a value shift within 
the risk assessments themselves to include the safety and security concerns of local 
inhabitants.128 In other words, to acknowledge and problematize the uncertainty 
behind risk assessments, which until that moment was situated in an organizational 
and regulatory framework that did not have any interest in them for economic and 
political reasons.
In reflection, this illustration highlights in particular the importance of the 
everyday understanding of energy security – here defined in terms of security of 
supply. Throughout the debate, there is one thing that has not changed and that is 
the understanding of security of supply. In fact, the government has compromised 
on all aspects of the gas supply chain, except for security of supply. For example, 
both the strategic use of natural resources and the profit maximization habits have 
been compromised with decisions on additional reductions and more and broader 
financial compensation. What did not change, what keeps the pumps working even 
at Loppersum are security of supply considerations.129 It is this master frame and 
the taken-for-granted nationalized calculations and materiality that the Grunningers 
confront. While conceptually defined by the IEA and academia, energy security is 
something that is reinforced and constructed in localized offices and desks at the 
NAM and Economic Affairs, as well as the laboratories of the KNMI and TNO, the 
media that report on it, the judge that rules in favor of it, and at the kitchen tables 
of the Grunningers. Counterintuitively, in their resistance against the gas extraction 
practices the local Grunningers actually reified the principle of energy security as 
127 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 6; See Luhmann 1993.
128 Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015, 7–8.
129 Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2015e; Van den Hove 2015; De Volkskrant 2015; DvhN 2015.
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a state-centric security of supply concern, because they never really tried to move 
around it. 
In the end, there are many ways to tell a story like the one above. As David versus 
Goliath, as the NAM losing its social license to operate, as a numbers game, in terms 
of risks versus security, or as the resistance and dominance of materialdiscursive 
practices. This chapter chose a combination of the latter two under the heading of the 
everyday. Perhaps, however, it has analyzed the wrong everyday. Instead of analyzing 
the everyday habits and concerns of two parties directly related to the gas extraction 
in the North of the Netherlands, perhaps it should have been focusing on the everyday 
of the 7 million households who, on a cold winter night, turn up their thermostat and 





10.  The PerformaTiviTy, resisTance and 
PoliTics of smarT grids 
‘A smarter grid applies technologies, tools and techniques 
available now to bring knowledge to power – knowledge 
capable of making the grid work far more efficiently...’1
10.1 introduction
A smart grid is about the delivery of power, but there is power in and behind a 
smart grid as well.2 Perhaps less visible and more diffuse than in the old “dumb” 
electricity grid, but there nevertheless. This chapter takes stock of the current politics 
on smart grids through the insights on power from the French philosopher Michel 
Foucault.3 With the help of Foucault, it becomes possible to question the notion 
that smart grids are a win-win option for all parties involved, and, in particular, the 
idea that a decentralization of electricity production leads to a democratization of 
the electricity grids. To make this argument this chapter, firstly, shifts the focus from 
electricity towards an understanding of smart grids as an infrastructure that gathers, 
analyses and problematizes consumption data. Smart grids are about knowledge as 
much as they are about electricity, which opens them up to a Foucauldian reflection 
on the power/knowledge nexus. Secondly, while smart grids are favored to increase 
consumer choice, in reality they enable a political economy geared towards a 
particular way of life by organizing the circulation of electricity towards a specific 
pro-environmentally oriented consumer. These arguments for pro-environmental 
consumer behavior and demand side management (DSM) will be questioned below 
with Foucault’s idea that power is exercised through the ‘conduct of conduct’ and the 
securing of freedom. 
Together these two points lead to an understanding of energy security as an accepted 
and productive form of security. A form of security that is geared to the conservation of 
a particular highly electrified way of life, one that pushes for technological innovation 
and investments in smart grids and creates particular vulnerable subjects. For the 
thesis, this example on smart grids offers an alternative reading of energy security. The 
smart grids example shows how energy security is widely accepted, but while pushing 
for the development of smart grids, is undergoing a transformation itself. From a 
mercantilist state centric security of supply argument, energy security within smart 
1 The U.S. Department of Energy n.d., 3.
2 An abbreviated version of this chapter appeared in Beaulieu, A., J. de Wilde, J.M.A. Scherpen (eds.) 2016 
Smart Grids from a Global Perspective: Bridging Old and New Energy Systems. Springer Publishers.




grids is shifting into a resilient understanding of energy security. No longer is access 
for all at all times the core value, but the stability of the grid for the benefit of the most 
is turning into the core organizing principle of new smart electricity grids. To make 
this argument, this chapter builds on the insights from critical sociological research 
on the position of consumers within smart grids, smart meters and smart homes.4 
This literature itself builds on insights on consumption and sustainability, and while 
these are obviously critical in orientation, they are not explicitly Foucauldian.5 
Research using an explicit Foucauldian approach in relation to electricity often focus 
on general infrastructure development.6 In relation to smart grids, Foucault has 
only recently been used to reflect upon the eco-friendly nudging of consumers, the 
agency of and governing through smart meters, and the governing behind the coding 
of smart grids.7 
The chapter will continue by introducing smart grids in chapter 10.2 through 
a brief sketch of the reasons that are offered for the construction and development 
of them. Chapter 10.3 moves to the politics of smart grids and the range of choices 
behind it. Chapter 10.4 briefly discusses Foucault’s later work and his understanding 
of power. Chapter 10.5 highlights the close connection between power/knowledge 
by discussing the exclusions behind the visualizations and discourses around smart 
grids. It also discusses issues of expertise and the creation of particular subjectivized 
consumers. The subsequent chapter 10.6 shifts to the actual apparatus that is installed 
to govern such a particular eco-friendly, monetary rationalized consumer with the 
help of Foucault’s concept of governing as the ‘conduct of conduct’. Chapter 10.7 
discusses the role of risk and resilience in securing the organized freedom of smart 
grids. Chapter 10.8 reflects on the decentralization behind smart grids in relation 
to democratization. It argues for centralizing tendencies of information within the 
decentralization of production. The last chapter concludes by arguing for a shift from 
the current technical-economic debate on smart grids into a political debate that 
moves beyond privacy considerations alone.
10.2 The solution offered by smart grids
Smart grids roughly entail the utilization of ICT infrastructure to organize the 
production, distribution and consumption of electricity. Irrespective how one defines 
4 Darby 2010; Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010; Darby and McKenna 2012; Balta-Ozkan et al. 2013; 
Geelen, Reinders, and Keyson 2013; Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013; Schick and Winthereik 2013; 
Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013; Batel and Devine-Wright 2014; Goulden et al. 2014; Naus 
et al. 2014.
5 Miller and Rose 1997; Rutherford 2007; Spaargaren and Mol 2008; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Shove 
2010; Shove and Walker 2010.
6 Graham and Marvin 1996; Collier 2011.
7 Respectively, Hargreaves 2010; Marres 2011; Klauser 2013; Klauser, Paasche, and Söderström 2014.
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smart grids, a shared understanding is that the electricity grid and ICT infrastructure 
are linked through smart meters and (automated) switches. The high-voltage grids 
and their interconnections rely on smart metering, as do the micro and low-voltage 
smart grids in order to combine and organize local decentralized production, 
storage capacity and variable consumption based on price incentives. In addition, 
on a household level smart meters and their data enable the further integration 
and communication between consumer applications.8 All of these rely on smart 
meters for the nonstop measurement of, and two-way communication about the 
actual production and consumption of electricity on all levels of the grid. Without 
smart meters to measure and communicate the constant flow of electricity it is not 
possible to use algorithms to automatically control, protect, record, and ultimately, to 
optimize the grids, whether at the supply, transmission or demand side.9 Moreover, 
based on the information from smart meters and a further fusion of information and 
communication technology into the electricity grid it becomes possible to act at a 
distance based on real time information. 
Smart grids are seen as the solution for a range of issues in high-energy consuming 
countries (and developing countries as well), including a necessary modernization of 
the existing grid, climate change and security of supply concerns.10 In terms of the 
modernization, smart grids are deemed necessary because the current electricity grid 
are old and largely pre-date the information revolution. On average the electricity 
networks, especially the high voltage lines, have seen little change in the last 10 to 15 
years, irrespective the growing overall demand for electricity and the recent increase 
of electrified transport and heating in particular.11 In fact, most of the European 
high voltage cables are over 40 years old and are reaching the end of their lifespan.12 
Similarly, over half of Europe’s coal and nuclear power stations are over 30 years old.13 
In the coming years, both the grid and half of the baseload generation capacity are 
in need of an upgrade. These aging assets alone would justify a modernization of the 
electricity grids, yet they do not justify the evolution into a smart grid per se. It is for 
example a very real possibility for the current grids to refer back to ‘copper plating’: 
to add capacity by putting more copper in the ground. The continuing quest to reduce 
redundancy in the grids and increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness, however, 
heavily structures the debate about smart grids and explains why copper plating is 
questioned as the best way to modernize the grid.
8 Balta-Ozkan et al. 2013.
9 IEEE n.d.
10 European Commission 2005, 13; Battaglini et al. 2009, 913; Darby and McKenna 2012, 761; IEA 2013, 9; 
European Commission 2011.
11 Battaglini et al. 2009, 913; Darby and McKenna 2012, 761.
12 IEA 2013, 9; Battaglini et al. 2009, 913; European Commission 2005, 13.




In addition to a modernization, smart grids are constructed to cope with climate 
change and security of supply concerns based on three desires: a reduction in demand, 
a reduction of CO2 emissions and an increasing resilience against extreme weather 
events. First, climate change concerns lead to a search for an overall reduction in energy 
demand. This position is often summarized with the logic of the Trias Energetica: 
to prevent climate change, reduce overall demand, then increase Renewable Energy 
Sources (RES), and lastly, if you have to use fossil fuels do so as efficient as possible. 
Smart grids are seen as a particular good option to help manage all three aspects of 
the Trias Energetica. They are expected to help integrate RES (see below), increase 
efficiency and reduce overall demand by enabling a process called Demand Side 
Management (DSM). This latter process builds on the real-time knowledge of and 
two-way communication between consumers, transmission operators and producers 
that is provided by smart grids and which is expected to make people aware of what 
they use, when, where, on what and at what cost, financially and environmentally. 
Together with flexible pricing the hope is that DSM will not only shift peak loads 
(demand of end-consumers), but also reduces the demand for electricity on a 
structural basis. 
Second, there is a push for more renewable energy sources to minimize CO2 
emissions – which in line with the 2014 IPCC report should be read as striving for 
negative emissions.14 While the increase in renewable energy from solar and wind 
proves beneficial for the climate and offers a solution to the potential peak fossil fuel 
argument, the introduction of more renewable energy sources and an increase in 
new loads on an already strained grid, like electric vehicles and heat pumps, comes 
with the intermittent and distributed nature of these resources and appliances. This 
challenges the Western electricity grids on both an operational level, a planning 
level and a financial level.15 Operationally, the variability of wind and solar 
sources needs to be incorporated in the grid, meaning that the grid needs to be 
able to deal with drastically shifting load curves. A challenge that is complicated 
by the geographically dispersed location of the production sites, which are either 
located far away from urban regions (connection) or produced through many small 
scale production units in local neighborhoods (coordination). Financially, the 
marginal cost-free energy production of renewables provides a downward pressure 
on wholesale electricity prices and hence provides a disincentive for investments in 
large baseload generation like gas, coal and nuclear. Without these investments the 
available back-up capacity is reduced, which, on the short term, could endanger the 
14 Bruckner et al. 2014, 58.
15 IEA 2013, 7–9; see also: Römer et al. 2012.
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stability of the electricity system.16 Together with fears of more extreme weather 
events and patterns, this leads to the third appeal based on climate change: a call 
for more resilient electricity grids that are better able to resist such extremes while 
simultaneously also able to minimize the adverse effects in the event that the grids 
are compromised nonetheless (e.g. decentralized production).
To cope with these challenges of higher variability and geographically dispersed 
electricity supply, while increasing the resilience of the grid as a whole, smart grids 
with their decentralized production and storage are the preferred but not the only 
option. An alternative could be to curtail the variability of supply during stress 
moments, to reduce the amount of RES, invest in copper plating, or to create capacity 
markets that support back-up capacity. Each of these options has its downsides in 
terms of social acceptability, financial costs and environmental impact. A smarter 
grid offers a convincing solution to many of, if not all the issues that are currently 
related to electricity production and consumption – including to those that result 
from the smart grid – and is sold as a no-regrets option that is beneficial for all.17 
Specific reference is often made to consumers who are said to face less disruptions and 
have more insight in their usage and thus their costs; generators, who are better able 
to optimize their production in line with actual demand; utility (service) companies, 
who are able to target customers with individualized offers, have the option to 
create and sell new products, and can reduce fraud and theft; and transmission 
and distribution operators, who are better able to optimize their grids and reduce 
downtimes; even if that necessitates the shutdown of loads. In fact, one of the few 
strong arguments against smart meters and smart grids is privacy.18 While privacy 
concerns slow down the distribution of smart meters, as happened in the Netherlands 
for instance, the academic, commercial and political support for smart grids is strong.
A major promoter is the European Union. In its 20/20/20 directive, the EU has 
obligated itself to increase the use of renewable energy and thus implicitly accepted 
an increased variability in the grid.19 It thus requires itself to deal with the resulting 
challenges, which it does along a two-track approach. The first track centers on the 
creation of a so-called “super-grid”, which aims to create a European wide high 
voltage grid through the construction of interconnectors in order to integrate the 
16 IEA 2013, 8. The IEA discusses these challenges against a background of ‘power system reliability’, which 
it explains by referring to ‘adequacy’ (meeting aggregate power requirements, now and in the future), 
‘system security’ (the ability to cope with disruptions), and ‘fuel security’ (access to fuel supplies needed 
for electricity generation).
17 Clastres 2011, 5401; Ngar-yin Mah et al. 2012, 133; El-hawary 2014, 241.
18 Cavoukian, Polonetsky, and Wolf 2010; Cuijpers and Koops 2013; Brown 2014.





various regional markets in Europe.20 According to Blarke & Jenkins, the proven 
technology behind this option makes such a super-grid the most viable option for the 
European Commission.21 However, while the second track is more challenging, the 
Commission also sees the development of smart grids as more promising. Already 
in 2006, a year before the 20/20/20 targets, the EU, by way of the Energy Efficiency 
Directive, required member states to encourage the spread of smart meters.22 A call 
that has been formalized since, and, pending a cost-benefit analysis, should lead to an 
80% European dispersal rate of smart meters by 2020.23
Now in terms of what smart grids precisely are, the literature is less clear. Largely 
because the field and the grids themselves are in an early stage of development. 
There are ideas about what direction to take and early real-life experiments, but 
the smart grids as such have not yet materialized in full. Clearly, smart grids build 
on the combination of ICT and electricity grids, but its extent and organization 
remain open. The earliest mentioning of smart grids, smart homes and automated 
metering can be traced to the 1930s with an upsurge in the 1970s and especially the 
1990s when ICT was far enough advanced (after the development of microchips) 
to make smart grids a real technical possibility.24 The first modern definition and 
conceptualization of smart grids stems from 1997, when Vu et al., introduce the 
concept of SMARTGrids:
The Self-Managing and Reliable Transmission Grid (SMARTGrid) is seen 
as the future of protection and control systems. It is an automated system of 
monitoring, control, and protection devices that improves the reliability of the 
transmission grid by preventing wide-spread break-ups.25
The grid of Vu et al. combines a constant measurement of the grid with automated 
control systems. Although the concept of smart grids has been extended, such a 
technically oriented functional definition is still prevalent today.26 The United 
States Department of Energy, for example, defines smart grids based on the six main 
20 Blarke and Jenkins 2013; European Commission 2010c; European Commission 2010a.
21 Blarke and Jenkins 2013, 382; European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013.
22 Brown 2014, 173; The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2006; European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2012.
23 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2012; Brown 2014, 2009; The European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2009 Annex 1, art 2.
24 Darby 2010; Darby 2014; Stirling 1994.
25 Vu, Begouic, and Novosel 1997, 43.
26 The IEEE describes a smart grid as: ‘The “smart grid” has come to describe a next-generation electrical 
power system that is typified by the increased use of communications and information technology in 
the generation, delivery and consumption of electrical energy.’ IEEE n.d.  for similar definitions the 
summary in El-hawary 2014, 241.
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functions that such a constant measurement and automated control system could 
fulfil: 
Enabling Informed Participation by Customers; Accommodating All 
Generation & Storage Options; Enabling New Products, Services, & Markets; 
Providing Power Quality for the Range of Needs; Optimizing Asset Utilization 
& Operating Efficiency; Operating Resiliently: Disturbances, Attacks, & 
Natural Disasters.27 
The EU’s definition, in turn, is less technical but defines smart grids in terms of its 
more abstract economic and behavioral functions and goals: 
“smart grid” means an electricity network that can integrate in a cost efficient 
manner the behaviour and actions of all users connected to it, including 
generators, consumers and those that both generate and consume, in order to 
ensure an economically efficient and sustainable power system with low losses 
and high levels of quality, security of supply and safety.28
Clearly, a well-defined and broadly shared definition of smart grids is missing. In 
part, this is due to the different reasons that each stakeholder, region and country 
has to develop such smart grids. The main reason why the US is interested in smart 
grids, for example, is the instability of its current stressed out grid. Japan instead tries 
to reduce its import dependency and nuclear base load capacity, while Europe has a 
stronger focus on climate change and CO2 reduction. In addition, smart grids offer 
different functions for consumers, transmission companies and producers. Based on 
these differences it makes sense that the concept is defined differently and that the 
development of the respective grids differ as well. Add its overall novelty and ongoing 
evolution and what is left is an open concept with multiple definitions that often 
contain both descriptive and prescriptive elements. That said, behind the definitions 
lies one shared understanding, namely a preferred evolution of the grid from a 
centrally organized grid to a decentralized electricity grid, as depicted in Figure 4.29 
This decentralization requires an organization focused on the totality of the 
electricity grids. Hence wat is needed for a (re)turn to localized (renewable) electricity 
production, with the stability and coverage of modern day electricity grids, is the 
constant measurement and analysis of all aspects of the electricity grid. In other 
words, smart meters. Through smart meters, the electricity infrastructure is coupled 
with modern information networks on three levels. First, by visualizing the real-time 
27 U.S. Department of Energy 2012, 4.
28 European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013, para. 2 sub 7.




electricity flows to places all over the world. Second, by enabling the aggregation 
and evaluation of this data “in the cloud” on a scale not witnessed before. Third, 
by communicating these insights back to the relevant actors, machines or switches 
it becomes possible to act from a distance in the benefit of the grid. In fact, when 
considering how the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (the largest and 
most influential professional association in the world) visualizes a smart grid, all of 
this takes place literally in the cloud (Figure 5).30
A successful fusion between these two aspects is expected to result in a smart grid 
where generators, transmission system operators and consumers are all able to see 
what is going on and adapt their behavior or position if necessary. Not only that, the 
potential of smart technologies is that they enable the active management of electricity 
consumption through DSM. The idea behind DSM is that through instantaneous 
price setting it becomes possible at times of high variability, peak demand, congestion 
or disruptions to set higher prices that reflect the instability of the electricity grid 
and thereby influence consumers to reduce or shift their loads.31 For example, end-
consumers can respond by shifting their load and consumption to another moment in 
time, reduce their consumption structurally, smooth their consumption out or increase 
30 IEEE 2014. As based on the NIST framework, see NIST 2010, 33.
31 There are multiple ways to organize dynamic pricing: (1) time-of-use pricing (TOUP): long-term 
average tariffs like day-night tariffs, (2) critical day pricing (CDP): daily prices communicated one day 
in advance, (3) critical peak pricing (CPP): day-ahead warning for short peaks and subsequent prices, 
(4) peak time rebates (PTR): offering rebates for electricity not used during peaks, (5) real-time pricing 
(RTP): generally price settings on an hourly basis. An additional option is to contractually organize 
utility companies to automatically control specific appliances, in particular air conditioning, for the 
benefit of the grid. See Alexander 2010; Faruqui 2010; Darby and McKenna 2012; Geelen, Reinders, and 
Keyson 2013, 154.
Figure 4: Transformation of the Electricity Grid
Source: IEEE through Power Electronics 2009, fig. 1
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their consumption in response to negative pricing. Similarly, producers and prosumers 
can decide to reduce their production or store it for later use. In addition to the financially 
organized DSM, there are two alternative interpretations to guide the grid. The first can 
be found in code orange situations: the actual and automated control of Distribution 
System Operators (DSO’s) in times of emergencies or stress to absorb shocks and protect 
essential public services, like hospitals, by shutting down non-essential elements of the 
grid based on connectivity profiles.32 A second alternative demand response option 
is based on consumption awareness.33 By informing consumers of the environmental 
impacts of their actual consumption and by comparing this to consumption patterns 
of their neighbors, family and friends, it is hoped that they structurally change their 
consumption patterns and consume less and more efficiently. 
First pilot projects show that dynamic pricing, pending the form it is organized, 
reduces overall consumption on average by 5 to 15 percent and peak consumption up 
to 30 percent.34 The results, however, differ widely between pilot projects and lead to 
calls that a decent efficiency program could contribute as much as demand response 
based on dynamic pricing.35 The IEA nonetheless argues that DSM is economic, 
secure and sustainable.36 Economic, as the grid as a whole can be organized more 
efficiently, leading to better investments. Secure, as the grid becomes more flexible 
and responsive (resilient) while reducing operating and capacity reserves. And 
sustainable, because it is believed that higher prices will lead to lower consumption 
overall. In addition, DSM makes it possible to incorporate larger shares of variability 
32 Darby and McKenna 2012, 763; USEF 2014.
33 Darby and McKenna 2012, 761.
34 Ibid., 762–767; Faruqui, Harris, and Hledik 2010, 6224; Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013, 120.
35 Alexander 2010; Darby and McKenna 2012. 
36 IEA 2013, 19.





into the grid and thus to expand renewable energy resources as well as to enable the 
grid to cope with the increase in electric cars and heating or cooling appliances, 
with their strong but irregular peaks. Most of the literature on smart grids follows 
a similar line of argumentation to the IEA and sells smart grids as a win-win or no-
regrets option that is beneficial for all.37 In short, the grid is no longer envisioned as a 
‘predict and provide’ network, a modern “smart” electricity grid combines real-time 
production and consumption data, automated control systems and (price) incentives 
for consumer demand response.38 
10.3 The Politics of smart grids
The above gives the impression that the electricity grid is in need of modernization, 
that ICT is part of this modernization, and that it is a matter of time and investments 
before the last technical challenges will be solved and a functional smart grid is rolled-
out.39 To be clear, smart grids are not just about technology. Strengers articulates 
this point in arguing that ‘imagining a world without [smart technology] seems as 
unrealistic as imagining a world in which we all use it in a rational and deliberative 
way.’40 Smart grids are a real but ongoing technological, social, economic, judicial 
and political development that faces multiple hurdles, which all need to be resolved 
before a full-scale implementation is possible. While these challenges do indeed 
include technological uncertainties, including (ironically) the speed of technological 
developments, most of the literature focusses on economic, policy and regulatory 
challenges against a background of lacking consumer enthusiasm to participate in 
smart grid projects and demand response programs in particular.41 This section 
will briefly touch upon the main economic and regulatory challenges, including 
investment risks, slow regulation, (cyber)security and privacy considerations. 
Besides the technological challenges, an important obstacle can be found in the 
economic investment risks that accompany smart meters and smart grids. At play 
here is what Römer et al. have described as a discrepancy between the private costs 
of a stakeholder and his or her individual benefits and the broader external benefits 
for society as a whole when multiple stakeholders invest in smart technology.42 The 
external cost and redundancy benefits are clear. Faruqui, Harris & Hledik estimate that 
smart grid technology could help avoid 5 to 8 percent of the current peak generation 
37 Clastres 2011, 5401; El-hawary 2014, 241; Ngar-yin Mah et al. 2012, 133.
38 Darby and McKenna 2012, 759.
39 El-hawary 2014, 243.
40 Strengers 2013; as quoted by Darby 2014, 241.
41 Giordano et al. 2013, 11; El-hawary 2014; Faruqui, Harris, and Hledik 2010; Carrie Armel et al. 2013, 
213.
42 Römer et al. 2012, 491, 494.
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capacity, which is only used 1 percent of the year.43 These savings are a clear benefit 
for society, in particular as a similar argument can be made for the transmission 
network.44 However, such gains can only be made with a wide distribution of smart 
meters and its accompanying infrastructure, and this is not yet the case.45 Individual 
stakeholders, so far, have not been interested in joining the initial programs. A clear 
indication of the lack of enthusiasm for smart meters (financial or otherwise) is 
that most smart meters so far have been installed due to government and European 
regulations.46 Verbong, Beemsterboer & Sengers conclude that this is the case because 
current private benefits of smart technology and renewable production are limited to 
less than 0.5 percent of the price level, and so provide limited economic incentives 
to invest in expensive meters.47 According to Verbong, Beemsterboer & Sengers this 
is due to (1) the limitations for consumers to sell their own renewable generated 
electricity, (2) a lack of variable pricing schemes, and (3) the transmission cost, which 
are only paid by consumers and not by traditional generators.48 For now, this leads to 
a situation where stakeholders witness an upward pressure on electricity prices due to 
the need for investments and the costs of regulation.49 
Regulation and policy choices are key in the debate on smart electricity systems. 
On the one hand, international, European and national climate and renewable 
energy regulation provide a direct push for the transformation of the energy system 
and electricity grid. On the other hand, the privacy debate discussed below clearly 
shows how regulation has a hard time keeping up with technological innovation and 
the markets that (try to) implement these innovations. In addition to an inability to 
react swiftly to the consequences of the introduction of smart grids, regulation is 
also said to be a barrier for the installation of these grids. The permitting procedures, 
in particular, are said to be ‘too long, too complex, and lacking transparency.’50 In 
part, this is due to the lack of consumer enthusiasm, which translates to a lack of 
public acceptance, distrust and active resistance towards these new developments. 
Another reason why regulatory frameworks are hesitant to allow change is the 
natural monopoly tendency within large-scale infrastructures, like the electricity 
grids, which can only be disrupted by government regulation.51 Clastres therefore 
identifies a ‘dual regulation’ challenge: the need to combine and develop regulation 
43 Faruqui, Harris, and Hledik 2010, 6223–6224.
44 Huygen 2010.
45 Clastres 2011, 5404.
46 McKenna, Richardson, and Thomson 2012; Römer et al. 2012.McKenna 2012
47 Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013, 120.
48 Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013.
49 Clastres 2011, 5401–5402.
50 Steinbach 2013, 225.




that prevents monopolies but supports both existing centralized electricity supply 
and grids while enabling and supporting new decentralized generation and 
distribution options.52 
Another hot issue, from both a technical and regulatory perspective is the (cyber)
security of these smart grids. Verbong, Beemsterboer & Sengers phrase the current 
phase of smart grids as ‘a trial balancing functionality and control.’53 Linking the 
electricity infrastructure with an extended ICT infrastructure results in a blend of 
the fears and vulnerabilities of both systems.54 Two-way communication, long 
distance automated operational control and the data storage are all three vulnerable 
to outside manipulation. Together with a closer connection to other infrastructure 
systems (telecommunications, gas, etc.) and a possible cascade effect if one of these 
systems breaks down, the question of how to protect these systems is gaining traction. 
For smart grids, encryption is said to be a key issue to protect the communication of 
the sensors along the grid and their databases. However, such a technical fix by the 
ICT sector is only a partial solution, as it does not for example counter the feeding of 
wrong information through the multitude of sensors that constitute the system in the 
first place.55 
The control and ownership of the data also opens the debate to the question of 
privacy. Smart grids rely on near-real time information and the analysis of stored 
information as provided by smart meters. On the one hand, there is little discussion 
that the gathering and storage of data on electricity usage (how much, when, where 
and, pending the measurement interval, which applications) will help all parties 
involved in better organizing the production, transportation and consumption of 
electricity.56 Similarly, consumers hardly object to the collection of energy usage 
data by companies for their yearly energy bill.57 On the other hand, the use of this 
data is a source of monetary value. As a potential source of wealth and lacking external 
regulation, there are few incentives for the commercial industry, which constructs 
and designs the smart grids, to limit the collection, analysis and authorized access to 
this data.58 Actually, Römer et al. identify three ways in which energy consumption 
data can be of value.59 First, data could be analyzed on a personal level, by creating 
profiles of an individual’s electricity consumption that can be targeted for the sale 
52 Clastres 2011, 5405.
53 Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013, 122.
54 Wissner 2011, 2515; Commission of the European Communities 2006; European Commission 2010a; 
ENISA 2012; El-hawary 2014.
55 On the last point see: Farhangi 2010; Farhangi 2014.
56 Savirimuthu 2013, 169.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 167.
59 Römer et al. 2012, 491.
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of new services. Second, on a more aggregated level, the consumption data, when 
combined and de-personalized, could support commercial (marketing) interests 
and investment decisions on the level of the decentralized grid. Lastly, there is the 
possibility that smart meters can be used as a surveillance technology by recording 
and visualizing activities within one’s home.60 
Figure 6, as provided and discussed by Quin, provides an example of the kind of 
information that can be gained from smart meter data on the daily energy consumption 
from a home.61 Depending on the security of the system, either the authorities or 
other (commercial) parties could do this, although of course members within the 
same household can also use smart meters to monitor each other’s whereabouts and 
activities.62 
Regulators use multiple instruments to balance privacy and security concerns with 
the functionality of smart meters. These include consumer consent, privacy by design, 
and regulatory oversight. Consumer consent is currently the principal instrument.63 
However, as Savarimuthu argues, this is an illusionary practice as consumers are (1) 
facing an information gap and only discover the extent of their consent after having 
provided it. What is more, they are (2) seduced to do so with financial incentives 
at early stages, and (3) use products that actively ‘encourage consumers through 
60 Savirimuthu 2013, 162, 168; McKenna, Richardson, and Thomson 2012, 808.
61 Quinn 2009.
62 McKenna, Richardson, and Thomson 2012.
63 Brown 2014, 176.





design and technological functionalities to disclose a wide range of information’.64 
To counter this last aspect the idea of privacy by design is introduced, which proposes 
to incorporate privacy concerns directly into the meters and software packages.65 
Brown provides the example of an in-home display attached to the smart meter that 
provides local feedback versus the same analysis done remotely over the internet by 
third parties, and he argues that if both offer the same service there is no reason to 
design the system to send the data away.66 Privacy-by-design again shows that there 
are no straightforward technological choices. 
In addition to privacy-by-design, other options include regulation and oversight. 
For example, the legal limitation on the readings from smart meters by only 
measuring power (and not voltage and frequency which would ease the identification 
of individual appliances) and by reducing the intervals from direct to half-hourly 
or hourly measurements (with consent) or (bi-) monthly measurements (without 
consent) provides another data protection measurement.67 Another approach is more 
judicial and focusses on the oversight and control by the authorities on companies 
using the data of smart meters in line with laws and regulations.68 Consumer consent 
and other measures related to the access, gathering and analyses of the data of smart 
meters, however, are all data protection measures and as such do not touch upon 
the broader and more abstract question of privacy itself.69 Instead of discussing the 
privacy of big data on a political level, it is transformed into a technical and legal issue 
that plugs the holes. 
10.4 Power, knowledge and the conducting of choice 
As an infrastructure under development, smart grids are highly interdisciplinary, 
and are constructed and planned on a trial and error basis. As such, they are created 
and governed on historic experience and future problematizations. The later work of 
Foucault is especially suited to analyze the political dynamics behind such a process 
owing to his radical reinterpretation of power. Power, for Foucault, is not something 
that one person has over another; it is not tangible or intentional. Chapter 8 described 
power, not as the ability to control the light switch and turn something on or off, 
but everything that lies behind one’s ability and desire to pull the switch in the first 
place. It is that what makes people act, not the act itself. It has no source and no 
64 Savirimuthu 2013, 170, 175, 166.
65 Brown 2014, 177.
66 Ibid., 178. Geelen et al. turn this perspective around by arguing for the design of products to ‘attract’ 
consumers (a la Apple) to participate and use smart meters and the services. See: Geelen, Reinders, and 
Keyson 2013.
67 Brown 2014, 183; McKenna, Richardson, and Thomson 2012, 809.
68 El-hawary 2014, 243.
69 Savirimuthu 2013, 171.
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end, but it circulates and transforms. It is not in the hands of a king but ‘located 
and exercised at the level of life’ and therefore resembles life in all its messiness and 
dynamics.70 What is more, Foucault argues that power is not only restrictive but 
productive as well. It not only forbids but also opens up particular ways of life, mainly 
through the production of particular subjects: individuals or consumers behaving 
within and conform a distinctive system of thought.71 Those who can influence 
the system of thought thus influence what kind of subjects (e.g. consumers) exist. 
It is this interpretation of power/knowledge, together with Foucault’s ideas on how 
power is exercised in modern life, by conducting the milieu of the consumer instead 
of the consumer itself, that make him relevant to reflect upon the politics behind 
smart grids. 
The power/knowledge nexus is Foucault’s way of describing the close linkages 
between these two concepts. It describes how knowledge, its systematic gathering, 
categorization and analysis, always also contains ways to structure and dominate.72 
As Rouse was quoted in the chapter on biopower: ‘A more extensive and finer-grained 
knowledge enables a more continuous and pervasive control of what people do, which 
in turn offers further possibilities for more intrusive inquiry and disclosure.’73 In 
particular, it describes the practice of governing a group of people (a population) by 
gaining knowledge over that group and by defining in the gathering of knowledge 
what is to be normal behavior. In relation to smart grids, this knowledge on groups is 
closely related, of course, to the data gathered over consumption practices. Important, 
in this respect, is Foucault’s claim that such a definition of the norm is not something 
that is intentionally practiced by those in charge. The discussion on the visualizations 
behind smart grids below will show how such norms instead stem from embedded 
assumptions about subjects. In turn, these assumptions relate to other preformed 
assumptions and are part of broader systems of knowledge and discourse. These 
discourses are self-reinforcing, they delimit the extent of thought and speech while 
regulating these processes, they create binary systems of inclusion and exclusion 
based on monitoring and classification, and they put forward what is true and what 
is false.74 Regarding smart grids there are four discourses that are of importance, 
and these will return throughout this chapter. Besides the environmental discourse, 
these are technical competence and optimization, neoliberal markets, resilience, and 
decentralization.
70 Lobo-Guerrero 2007, 330.
71 Foucault 1982.
72 Foucault 1980.
73 Rouse 2005, 96–97.




In relation to the exercise of power, Foucault discusses how a population is redirected 
towards ‘acceptable’ behavior through ‘the right disposition of things arranged so as 
to lead to a suitable end.’75 By differentiating between individually focused pastoral 
power, disciplinary power and biopower, Foucault introduces how power is exercised 
in modern societies not on humans directly but via their milieu by influencing 
their desires and the parameters of their ability to act and to think. The political 
administration of biopower conducts the actual ways of individuals by ‘[s]tructuring 
the desires, proprieties and possibilities that shape the operation of life working on 
and through subjective freedoms.’76 In a way, it is about organizing freedom: people 
are allowed to act, think and choose, as they like, within the boundaries set and 
towards a particular preferred way of life. For Walters and Haahr this means that ‘[f]
reedom has become a tool, a technology for the achievement of specific governmental 
objectives […].’77 Within this space of freedom, the preferred way of life (the norm) 
needs to be secured against those that break it. Either by disciplining individuals 
towards the norm or by excluding persons from the population as a whole. For this, a 
security apparatus is constructed, based on a constant surveillance and monitoring of 
the circulation of goods and people.78 In doing so, these security apparatuses, which 
are installed to conduct the conduct of individuals, return to knowledge and its close 
relation with power.
10.5 knowing the grid and its consumers
Even a cursory glance on the academic literature on smart grids, as provide above, 
shows that the development of a smarter grid is not a technical exercise, that there is 
no silver bullet solution for all regions and cases and that no house or household is 
equal. The quote at the beginning of this chapter – that ICT is ‘bringing knowledge 
to power’ – might capture the essence of a smart grid, but does not come close to 
a Foucauldian understanding of the intricate relationship between knowledge and 
power. More precise, the way knowledge is gathered and presented is an exercise of 
power itself. For example, an important aspect of the debate about smart grids is 
that it is yet unclear how they will materialize in an eventual large-scale roll0ut. The 
visual representations that are modelling smart grids are an important technology to 
manage this uncertainty, as they simplify the complexity of smart grids and thereby 
structure future pathways. Additionally, visualizations play an important role within 
smart grids in relation to consumer behavior. Through different visual representations 
of the information from smart meters, consumers are activated to change their 
75 Foucault 2007, 96.
76 Dillon and Reid 2001, 48.
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consumption patterns. This is attempted, not just though the visualization itself, but 
also through the visualized comparison with neighbors and communities.
First, to show how visual representations can influence the direction of 
future smart grid development, the work of Schick & Winthereik is of particular 
interest. In their article, they use a Latourian inspired STS analyses to focus on an 
interdisciplinary Smart Grid event where two graphic models of smart grids were 
presented.79 In comparing these two visual representations of a future smart grid, 
Schick & Winthereik conclude that consumers are depicted as either active or passive 
participants. Selecting one of these visual representations as an image for the future 
grid hence shapes the actual grid based on an implicit answer to the question whether 
consumers can be trusted to adapt their consumption if necessary. A crude example, 
especially when compared to the article by Schick & Winthereik, is a comparison of 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 in this chapter. Even a brief glance shows a clear conceptual 
difference: where Figure 4 depicts a flat horizontal organized grid of connections 
clearly emphasizing the electric infrastructure, Figure 5 depicts a double-layered 
system of electricity infrastructure at the bottom and ICT enabled services in “the 
cloud”. Schick & Winthereik argue in line with Latour that such representations of 
incomplete systems are presented to gather support in order to become the guiding 
model of a ‘roadmap to the future.’80 These visualizations act not as mobile templates 
or blueprints, although they are that as well, but they primarily work by creating a 
shared understanding over the assumptions behind these visualizations. 
Second, the assumptions behind visualization do not only play a role at an 
abstract planning level. On the contrary, on a household level the visualization 
of smart meter data is designed specifically to activate consumers to modify their 
consumption patterns. Engineers, designers and software developers are working 
hard to visualize the electricity consumption in such a way that it nudges consumers 
to act. They do so by designing hardware and software as beautiful and easy to use as 
possible, while at the same time trying to visualize the information in such a way that 
it is alarming enough to make people act. This is achieved through DSM, by showing 
price savings, CO2 emissions or a comparison with family or neighbors. With the 
increasingly detailed knowledge over household consumption levels, these visual 
cues become stronger as they are being tailored to each specific household in ever-
increasing detail. Naturally, behind these design decisions too there is an implicit 
understanding on the activity of consumers as either active ‘energy managers’ or 
passive ‘energy consumers’.81 
79 Schick and Winthereik 2013, 85.
80 Ibid. What Amoore 2013 has called the sovereignty of visuality. See chapter 5.5.
81 Goulden et al. 2014. Interestingly, as Jaap de Wilde pointed out to me, many of the energy security 




The double conception of subjects as active or passive consumers stems from 
the main discourse behind smart grids: one of technological competence and 
optimization. This technical theology presents smart grids as a viable and optimal 
technological solution that is cheap, environmental friendly and secure. It comes in 
two flavors. A weak from that utilizes ICT technology and automation to provide 
the best information to consumers, to inform them so that they can become their 
own ‘energy managers’. And a strong version, which instead portrays consumers 
as a complicating factor to the roll-out of smart grids and more efficient energy 
consumption, and therefore as a factor that should be “managed”. Preferably, by 
designing a fully automated system that reduces total energy consumption without 
consumers taking notice, let alone wait for them to adjust their consumption patterns 
and daily routines. For example, Eising, Van Onna & Alkemade show how electric 
vehicles and their batteries could be used to reduce the stress on the networks, but for 
now are only adding stress to the network because consumers plug-in their car during 
general peak-hours: the moment they come home from work.82 
This strong vision of passive consumers and its fully automated smart grid is not 
without critique. It is for instance criticized for hiding the amount of work it takes to 
change a person’s consumption patterns, thereby removing social status incentives 
for consumers to do so.83 Moreover, in their respective articles, Strengers, Darby & 
Mckenna, and Royston question whether such a focus on automation and ease of use 
‘could lead to an exacerbation of energy-intensive practices, within fully automated, 
climate-controlled, hi-tech lifestyles.’84 Social research has already shown something 
like this as the near-real time visualization of electricity use has a number of 
unintended feedback loops as well as social consequences.85 For example, Hargreaves, 
Nye & Burgess argue that, on the long run, visual clues lead to a new normalization. 
After an initial period of deciding on good versus bad consumption patterns, ‘over 
the course of the trial interviewees had come to accept their normal consumption 
levels and patterns as exactly that, ‘normal’ and thus not in need of further chance or 
reduction.’86 In other words, Hargreaves, Nye & Burgess argue that after some time 
the visualization of energy consumption starts to support household decisions on 
their settled minimum comfort levels. From that moment on these visualizations only 
strengthen ‘potential unsustainable levels of energy consumption’ and hinder a more 
drastic reduction in consumption.87 
82 Eising, van Onna, and Alkemade 2014, 450.
83 Marres 2011.
84 Royston 2014, 1244; Strengers 2013; Darby and McKenna 2012, 762.
85 Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010; Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013; Verbong, Beemsterboer, and 
Sengers 2013; Naus et al. 2014.
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Another consequence of such a take on consumers is that the weak version sees 
consumers as becoming their own ‘energy experts’, while the strong version instead 
creates an elite of experts that makes decisions based upon aggregated data and other 
mediated information.88 In the visualization and judgement on aspects of the daily 
energy practices of consumers, a line is drawn between experts and non-experts, and 
the crossing of this distance becomes a problem in itself. To cross it, experts often 
call for an ‘increase[d] communication’ with local stakeholders and communities to 
convince them to participate and to allow construction to take place.89 However, more 
communication alone is not always enough. Batel & Devine-Wright show how experts 
use the NIMBY metaphor to square away the complaints of local communities.90 
Likewise, experts tend to put aside the reservations that consumers have about smart 
grids and renewable energy projects as an inability of consumers to take in “the 
overall picture” and to act in the interest of the grid. This conclusion justifies in turn 
the use of a ‘decide-announce-defend’ strategy that excludes non-experts from the 
decision-making.91 Yet, when it comes to smart grids and renewable energy, non-
expert stakeholders voice a range of arguments that are often profounder then experts 
grant them. Verbong, Beemsterboer & Sengers, for example, note how households 
not only question a loss of privacy and a lack of control but also foresee difficulties in 
changing their behavior in line with the intention behind smart grids and the systems 
that are installed.92 As they conclude: ‘[t]he perception of end-users as barriers to 
change is representative for a technocratic view on users and user behavior.’93
10.6 conducting the conduct of consumers 
In addition to the visualization and the automation and enlightenment of consumers, 
smart grids and DSM are constructed around the notion of price incentives. As stated 
above, the idea is to activate consumers by setting prices that reflect the instability 
of the electricity grid.94 This incentivizes producers and prosumers to increase their 
production while end-consumers can either shift their load in time or alter their 
consumption volumes. As argued, the results of financial DSM differ between pilot 
projects, which leads some to argue that a decent efficiency program could contribute 
as much to the results as a demand response system based on dynamic pricing.95 
88 Strengers 2013; Royston 2014.
89 Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012, 20.
90 Batel and Devine-Wright 2014.
91 Cotton and Devine-Wright 2012, 21, 33.
92 Verbong, Beemsterboer, and Sengers 2013.
93 Ibid., 122.
94 Alexander 2010; Faruqui, Harris, and Hledik 2010.




In line with this conclusion, Hargreaves, Nye & Burgess argue that the idea of 
smart grids principally rest not only on the earlier mentioned technocratic but also on 
the neoliberal assumption that feedback mechanisms will push rational consumers to 
adjust their consumption based on an individual cost benefit analyses. When pushed 
to its extreme, such an assumption implies that consumers who do not react to price 
incentives are considered irrational and unwilling. This, of course, is not the case.96 
Quite the contrary, Hargreaves, Nye & Burgess show that most adjusted behavior is 
based on a range of mechanisms, none of them price related. Instead, many have to 
do with in-house power struggles and decisions on the different levels of comfortable 
living.97 Even in comparable households energy consumption can differ: some people 
deem a large aquarium to be a life’s necessity while others put on an extra sweater 
when it freezes.98 
In Foucault’s terms, we are witness to technologies that try to create energy 
consumers who are free to respond to price incentives. In the current electricity 
market, prices are more or less fixed, although large consumers (industry, etc.) 
often pay reduced tariffs and consumers are sometimes able to enter day-night tariff 
schemes. With floating prices that differ over time and per region, the markets 
behind smart grids are said to be able to respond more rapidly to both fluctuating 
generation and possible congestions within the grid. In other words, to secure the 
stability of the grid individual consumers are given more freedom to decide upon 
their consumption and production, to choose utility and service companies, to decide 
upon the sources of production, and so on. What a Foucauldian inspired approach 
shows, however, is that consumers simultaneously, through the price incentives 
behind DSM, are “trained” to behave in the interest of the system as a whole (to 
move towards the norm). In other words, consumers are seen to be empowered by 
smart grids as their range of options increases and they gain more information 
about themselves, but simultaneously are not trusted to behave “responsible” and 
“rational”. They are trained to behave appropriately while the grid is simultaneously 
secured against any irrational behavior, via the construction of automated control 
systems and other solutions that keep the consumer “out”. Obviously, one can debate 
the ethics of such a system, but one way or another ‘[i]n most versions of a distributed 
energy future, customers will effectively be enlisted as co-managers of the system, 
even if they are not conscious of it.’99 
96 Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010, 6112; Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013; Verbong, Beemsterboer, 
and Sengers 2013, 119; Royston 2014.
97 Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013.
98 Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2010, 6112.
99 Darby and McKenna 2012, 767; Faruqui 2010.
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10.7 securing free electricity markets
The shift from load following to generation following is a perfect example of 
Foucault’s conducting the conduct of consumers. As an organized freedom it requires 
security through constant surveillance (smart meters) and intervention (network 
switches). Above we have identified a number of ‘problematized’ issues, ranging from 
intermittency of RES to the security and privacy consequences of smart grids. In the 
end, all of these are perceived threats against the stability of the electricity grid, in 
particular the 50Hz frequency of the grid (its norm) and anything that endangers 
the continuous balancing towards this particular frequency. What smart grids do 
differently is that they target supply imbalances by accepting them and subsequently 
forcing through an imbalance on the demand side by “punishing” or “nudging” 
excess demand. In other words, the security of smart grids is based on the protection 
of the system by accepting and integrating new levels of volatility and uncertainty on 
an individual level. A level of volatility that will only increase as the introduction of 
DSM, itself meant to cope with the entry of intermittent RES and the quest to decrease 
redundancy in the system, will lead to less back-up capacity and a more volatile system 
with more uncertainty and an even greater demand for just in time-management. 
The question then becomes who will manage such a smartly organized power 
system. The grid and its smart components still need to be maintained, decisions still 
need to be made in emergencies and “externalities” still need to be incorporated. The 
last two indicate that smart grids still need a form of classic centralized control with 
regulation and a regulatory body to manage and visualize those instances when the 
markets do not deliver. The instantaneousness of electricity, however, implies that 
on a daily basis it is the “market” that is responsible for a functioning daily routine 
of these new power systems. Actual control in a smart grid is thus outsourced to 
its ‘managers of unease’: the grid operators, software developers, automatic control 
systems, but also insurance and broker companies.100 From a Foucauldian perspective 
these latter companies in particularly will take a central position within the future 
governing of smart grids through the sale of risk portfolios. On the one hand, these 
portfolios pool groups of consumers, prosumers and producers and will represent 
them on the market. On the other hand, these companies will offer different packages 
of “security” by offering end-consumers different prices based on such risk portfolios. 
Those who want to insure themselves against price hikes, blackouts or drops in prices 
(for prosumers) will have to pay an insurance premium. More importantly, in order 
to be allowed to participate in such schemes these companies will set up the terms of 
conditions for end-users to live by. This results in a situation where these companies 





With their profiles, these companies actively influence the behavior and actions of 
end-consumers as well as structure the materiality of the electricity grid and the 
overall way people live and organize their lives.101 
In the current “dumb” power systems, such profiles are based on aggregated 
statistical data and effectively cover only the type of house and the number of 
people within the household. The new profiles will be based on data from smart 
meters that show the exact electricity consumption in kWh (and possible frequency 
and voltage) of individuals in near-real time. At first glance, this would indicate 
a shift away from Foucault’s biopower, which uses statistical analyses about risky 
individuals in relation to a population, towards a more disciplinary form of power 
with direct financial “control” over individuals who are known to “misbehave”, as 
opposed to being at risk. Then again, this decision on what counts as risky behavior 
can be seen as a norm. One that, moreover, is applied through a market system 
that manages the conduct of these individuals purely on an indirect base. In other 
words, the direct knowledge over individuals and populations still works towards 
a broader biopolitical norm. Two things have changed, however, the population 
that is governed and the norm itself. The population addressed in smart grids has 
shifted from producers and passive consumers, to a population made up of active 
consumers, prosumers and producers. Such a changing population is witness to the 
changing norms and ideas about “acceptable” or “unacceptable” behavior in relation 
to the stability of the smart grid and overall climate friendly energy consumption 
within society.
In addition, the biopolitical norm or apparatus is changing as well. In 
strengthening a neo-liberal market discourse, the traditional discourse of security 
that is based on reserves and spare capacity is slowly replaced by a security 
discourse that is assembled around the logic of resilience.102 The logic behind 
resilience presupposes a constant vulnerability of individuals to (external) shocks, 
which need to be countered by a constant process of adaptation on the level of the 
individual.103 This logic is increasingly questioned within the security literature. 
For example, Joseph  remarks how, in the focus on individuals, resilience acts as a 
way to de-socialize risk by attributing the responsibility of risk decisions away from 
101 Lobo-Guerrero 2012.
102 Lovins and Lovins 1982.
103 O’Malley 2010; Reid 2012; Joseph 2013. On the other hand, Corry argues that resilience, while being 
closely related to neoliberalism, also shapes other forms of governance that counter neoliberalism. In 
particular, he mentions global environmental risks for which resilience implies practices of ‘collectivism’ 
instead of individualism, ‘self-reflection, self-critique and adaptive learning, and the need to build 
redundancy and diversity into soci0-ecological systems’ – all practices that reject a neoliberal rationality. 
See Corry 2014, 271. 
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the level of the state onto individuals.104 Similarly, but counterintuitively, Bourbeau 
highlights that resilience could slow down social change when people who are 
resilient against shocks also adapt to intended social changes.105 Bourbeau’s point 
reinforces the argument above that visualization and automation could potentially 
lead to increased energy consumption patterns. What these critics of resilience 
argue is that resilience requires and presupposes a kind of fatality; it forces 
individuals to take advantage of a given newish-like situation, instead of trying to 
change it for the better on a social level as security does.106 In respect to smart grids, 
security initially meant that all people should always have access to electricity. 
A resilient reading opens this position by arguing that the stability of the grid 
sometimes demands that people and appliances should be cut off. While following 
seemingly automatically from the discourses and technology itself, this is still a 
political choice with social consequences. Foremost of which, that decentralized 
energy production favors those with the capital and capacity to produce electricity. 
With a just-in-time logic, a reduction in redundancy and back-up capacity, and 
an increasing organizational complexity, such a system hides the political choices 
on responsibility and accountability while shifting from an insecure towards a 
vulnerable electricity grid that is deemed “too big to fail”.
10.8 decentralization of electricity
Local production, local markets and resilient self-healing two-way communicating 
grids all point toward a shift in the structure of the electricity grid from a centrally 
organized system towards a decentralized system (Figure 4). For some, such a 
decentralized energy production is more resilient to accidents and attacks, for 
others this organizational discourse of decentralization equals to an increase in 
democratization.107 Greenpeace for example argues that 
Decentralising energy would also democratise energy, providing real 
opportunities for local political leadership on climate change, and curbing the 
influence of the centralized industry’s powerful vested interests. By enabling 
local action and empowering individuals and communities as producers, 
decentralisation has the potential to bring about a massive cultural change in 
our attitude to and use of energy.108
104 Joseph 2013, 262.
105 Bourbeau 2013, 8–10.
106 Evans and Reid 2013, 86; Joseph 2013, 262.
107 Lovins and Lovins 1982; Sweet 2009; Greenpeace 2005; Kunze and Becker 2014.




Democratizing energy thus entails a twofold argument. First, that decentralized 
energy production brings “power to the people” by breaking the oligopoly of the 
energy companies that currently control the electricity markets. And, second, 
decentralization is seen as a positive empowering development as it increases the range 
of options for people while they become more actively involved in local communities. 
It is unclear what the effects of a decentralized grid will be on society and democracy. 
While the ‘democratic energy’ movement so far mainly comprises of NGO’s and other 
small social movements – although increasingly small communities, cities, regions, 
and companies follow along – it cannot be denied that there is a clear link between 
the way energy and society are organized.109 There is little doubt that a decentralized 
energy system will affect current societies, just as it will affect international relations, 
which presently are heavily influenced by global energy practices and resulting capital 
flows. However, as Winner already argued in 1980:
Thus, some proponents of energy from renewable resources now believe they have 
at last discovered a set of intrinsically democratic, egalitarian, communitarian 
technologies. In my best estimation, however, the social consequences of building 
renewable energy systems will surely depend on the specific configurations of 
both hardware and the social institutions created to bring that energy to us. It 
may be that we will find ways to turn this silk purse into a sow’s ear.110
In this respect, there are two remarks that can be made. First, while it is possible to 
see the current “old” system as undemocratic, there is a clear link between the current 
centralized way in which energy is organized and the democratic organization of 
society.111 Mitchell analyses how the centralization of energy also helped those 
working the supply lines in this fossil fuel system gain political influence, through 
strikes, which enabled them to play an important role in pushing for further 
democracy (an influence that now shifts to hackers?). This insight leads him to 
conclude, in line with Winner above, that not ‘forms of energy determine modes of 
politics, but that energy is a field of technical uncertainty rather than determinism, 
and that the building of solutions to future energy needs is also the building of new 
forms of collective life.’112
In a sense, decentralized electricity production has only become a real possibility 
when ICT enabled DSM. This is transforming a sector that has been characterized 
by centralized oligopolies and non-adjustable demand, which followed seemingly 
logically from the physical characteristics of the electricity grids and their high 
109 Lakoff and Collier 2010; Mitchell 2013; Miller, Richter, and O’Leary 2015.
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upfront capital investments. However, second, what is not changing as much 
is the organization of the grid itself, which will remain strongly hierarchical as 
both the electricity and ICT infrastructure have centralizing tendencies. The grids 
themselves still need to be build and coordinated, because not all production and 
storage is localized at all times. The organization of markets and their imminent 
price setting requires the centralization of supply and demand data while still 
being run by the concentration logic of capital. Similarly, the ICT infrastructure 
needs construction, maintenance and application. Here again, while ICT has strong 
decentralizing characteristics (open source coding, block chain verification) there 
are centralizing tendencies as well. This can be witnessed for example in the binary 
and hierarchical way that program code is organized, as well as the hierarchies 
of IT departments in companies or governments. In addition, IT equipment has 
strong inclusionary characteristics as software works better with more people using 
it. This implies that most successful programs and ICT infrastructure are owned by 
a limited number of companies (e.g. Google buying Nest) – an inherent tendency 
comparable to the capital-intensive monopolies behind old electricity grids. Also 
inherent in the gathering of data is the desire to link different databases for new 
and more effective/efficient insights across sectors, smart meter data among them. 
Lastly, the stability of the grid will always require some centralization. Even when 
code orange decisions become fully automated, they are still initially set and 
executed by someone.
10.9 reflection
A modern “smart” electricity grid combines real-time production and consumption 
data, automated control systems and (price) incentives for consumer demand 
response by integrating ICT infrastructure in the organization of electricity grids. 
These smart grids are sold as win-win and no-regrets options that are beneficial for 
all parties associated with the electricity grid. That said, it is unclear what smart grids 
entail, let alone how to define them. This results in part from the different positions 
of the parties involved to develop them, whether based on climate change and 
demand reduction, infrastructure modernization and stability improvements, cost 
reductions, the integration of volatile renewable energy sources or a combination of 
them all. It also results from strong debates on the main economic and regulatory 
challenges, including investment risks, slow regulation, (cyber)security and privacy 
considerations. All of these are voiced against a background of a lack of consumer 
enthusiasm and different regional contexts. Instead of seeing this as a negative, it was 
concluded that the inability to clearly define smart grids makes the topic of smart 




by security and risk considerations showing themselves in different technologies of 
power and underlying discourses.
In line with the argument above and Foucault’s concepts of the power/knowledge 
nexus, the conduct of conduct and the security apparatuses, there is cause to question 
the current conduct of smart grids and shift the current techno-economic debate 
into a political debate that moves beyond privacy considerations alone. The power/
knowledge nexus around smart grids, exemplified through the role of visualization, 
enables two extreme subjectivities of consumers as either active or passive. When 
meeting in the middle, what we have are consumers that are in equal parts informed 
over, trained on and excluded from active decision-making on their own consumption. 
Likewise, the four discourses of technological optimization, neoliberal markets, 
decentralization and resilience are each on their own only points of discussion, but 
together form a self-reinforcing logic that is hard to question at all. Together they not 
only reject opposition (that is their political prerogative), but they constrain different 
ways of thinking. For example, the potential realization that smart grids are not 
purely a win-win option. In this sense, Foucault’s theoretical insights do not prescribe 
or predict and they cannot be used as a blueprint for the construction of a smarter 
and more socially acceptable grid. Instead, what a Foucauldian perspective adds to 
the smart grid debate is an understanding that by offering freedoms to consumers, 
by creating a free market, there is need for an apparatus that secures these freedoms 
as well. With an infrastructure system that is deemed “too big to fail”, it is this 
security apparatus that is currently debated and constructed in addition to the actual 
construction of an ICT infrastructure and the modernization of the power grid.
In conclusion, two reflections or lessons summarize this chapter and the example 
on smart grids. First, the debates about smart grids are only partly about electricity 
but mainly about the gathering, problematization and analyses of consumption 
data. They are about uncertain futures, knowledge gathering, problematizations 
and the resulting management of the production, transportation and consumption 
of electricity. In this respect, and more in general with regard to how people deal 
with uncertainty, the question remains whether the amount of data gathered, in this 
instance from smart meters, will really reduce the uncertainty experienced. In other 
words, whether decision-making in relation to the management of the electricity 
grid will eventually become easier or actually more complicated because we learn 
how much we still do not know about a power system that is gaining in complexity 
and volatility. The theoretical approaches to risk and security discussed earlier in 
this thesis would argue negatively, as they show that security cannot be resolved and 
always moves to new topics, to new uncertainties, to new fields and futures that we 
feel we need to know.
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Second, smart grids offer another way of governing life by organizing the 
circulation of electricity based on consumer choice. The security of the grid is opened 
up by installing markets, which are based on a financialization of the imbalance in 
the grids. In turn, there is a need to secure these freedoms, from outside interference, 
individual misbehavior and from collective failures that endanger the grid itself. 
Security considerations and markets balance and reinforce each other based on 
practices of risk and the need to secure or profit from uncertain futures. Interestingly, 
they conflict as well. While smart grids show that the problem of climate change 
requires a change in lifestyle, a Foucauldian approach based on practices of risk does 
not deal with this because the lifestyle, or the current form of circulation, is exactly 
the referent object that is secured in this debate. The discussion on automation makes 
this perfectly clear: the goals is to uphold current lifestyles. The debate on smart grids, 
however, also offers a clear example of an alternative form of resistance against such 
practices of risk and security. If security is drawing the boundaries between the routine 
and the exception, between security and the political, only another interpretation of 
security can break such a boundary. The security apparatus of smart grids is exactly 
doing that. It is changing the definition of energy security. The delivery of electricity 
to all people at all times is being opened up with the risk and resilience inspired 
practices around smart grids: people are imagining the voluntarily, contractual, 
financial, automatic options of shifting peak loads, even if this means the shutdown 
of appliances and whole areas to protect the rest of the grid.

V.  concluSIon 

11
11.  The PoliTical markeTs of a socieTy of 
unlimiTed desire
‘What lies at the bottom of the bottomless well isn’t oil, it’s logic. […] 
It will all run out but we will always find more. Some say this is not good 
for the planet, but that’s how it works, regardless. What we will forever seek, 
and forever find, is not energy but the logic of power.’1
11.1 The Tightrope walker
At one moment in his book, Achterhuis describes the world we live in with the 
metaphor of a tightrope walker. He depicts a world wherein our current society acts 
as an agent who is constantly collecting goods, yet needs to keep moving to stay 
upright. With each good that the agent picks up he becomes heavier and more packed, 
forcing him to speed up to keep his balance and able to move to the next good. Always 
forwards at increasing speeds, never able to look back and reflect on what he carries 
or leaves in his wake.2 Achterhuis uses this metaphor to criticize the insatiable 
desire of relative scarcity that lies behind modern resource use and the consequential 
imbalance that this creates with local and planetary environmental boundaries. The 
desire for more and the fear of falling (behind) are two core elements that shape the 
politics of energy security. Neither of them are reflected upon within the literature 
and policy work on energy security. Perhaps because there is no need, for who does 
not know what is desired and what is feared when discussing energy security? Who 
would object to the shared concern that energy needs to be secured and who does 
not agree that all humans are entitled to a shared minimum energy consumption? 
Yet, even the brief personal reflection that opened this thesis indicates that there is 
not one energy security, but that what is secured or desired differs across time, space 
and purse.
Simultaneously, the academic literature is having trouble defining energy security 
nor is it able to explain the constant proliferation of energy security that finds its 
origin in the association between energy and security.3 Where the current literature 
tries to get to the heart of what energy security is, this thesis aimed to unpack the 
concept of energy security by discussing its performative practices. It approached 
these practices from multiple angles, disciplines and theories in order to come to an 
understanding of what energy security does. In other words, to open the intuitive 
common sense behind energy security to an actual discussion of its underlying 
1 Huber and Mills 2006, xix.
2 Achterhuis 1988, 106–107. 




processes. In doing so, this thesis does not argue that the approach it offers is better 
than the current literature and policy work on energy security – it goes against its 
performative approach to even claim such a position. Instead, what this thesis offers 
are alternative ways of thinking and questioning the phenomenon of energy security. 
It offers alternatives that move away from the primary concerns within energy security 
and its self-reinforcing logics, to its use and the practices that shape it. In other words, 
the value of a performative approach lies in the interruption of many ontological and 
epistemological a priori assumptions that characterize current studies on energy 
security, in addition to a reflection on its effects or how it is used instrumentally to 
govern life. As Der Derian argues: 
A [performative] response is not, then for all its purported relativism, 
axiomatically apolitical or amoral: It is in fact an attempt to understand — 
without resort to external authorities or transcendental values — why one 
moral or political system attains a higher status and exercises more influence 
than another at a particular historical moment.4
The three parts of this thesis together introduce this performative approach to the 
concept of energy security. Not by offering a theory, method or specific performative 
reading, but via a broad performative mode of reasoning that is open to multiple 
theories and methods. In doing so, it problematizes current understandings of 
energy security in Part I, discusses its underlying practices in Part II, and offers two 
illustrations that showcase the potential of such an approach in Part III.
What results is an understanding of energy security that is both (re)produced 
and productive. Among others, it is produced by the theories and observations that 
claim to observe it. It is produced by the ontological politics of security that try to 
imagine, define and control surprising events and undesired futures. It is produced by 
individuals who use both descriptive and proscriptive elements in their definitions. 
It is produced through policies of diversification, contract law or price fluctuations 
on energy markets. It is produced in the construction of new back-up capacity, the 
installation of reverse-flow techniques and the overhaul of an energy infrastructure. 
In short, energy security is continuously produced and reproduced with each iterative 
use of the concept and its practices. These practices are inherently fragile and always 
open to resistance and change. Energy security proliferates, not because it cannot be 
defined, but because its usage changes constantly. Simultaneously, energy security 
is productive. It reifies concerns of absolute scarcity and the neorealist geopolitical 
concerns that come with this. It reifies inherent assumptions on passive consumers 
that justify a further governing of them. It produces an environment that favors a 
4 Der Derian 2009, 193 [emphasis in original].
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security of abundance (see below) and thereby excludes those who cannot compete at 
that level. It reproduces a technical and capital-intensive mode of reasoning to solve 
fundamental social problems. Most importantly, it conserves current ways of life, 
even if it has to change itself to make that happen.
Counterintuitively, by studying the practices that shape energy security and the 
consequences that result from it, the result of this search for a fuller understanding 
of energy security is a new understanding of what energy security is. What emerges 
from this thesis is a multiplicity of energy security. A multiplicity as energy security is, 
simultaneously, energy insecurity, a speech act with strong normative consequences, a 
risk calculation, a discourse that structures thought, a localized node within a network 
of actor-networks, a materialdiscursive phenomenon based on an agential cut, a set 
of relations with strategic intent, and a way to govern the present by conducting the 
conduct of humans in their relationship with things. It is all of these in addition to 
the more traditional understandings of security of supply and the security of energy 
systems, resources, services and so on, that together bring energy security into being as 
a distinct desirable reality. Trying to define energy security/insecurity more narrowly 
is therefore not just a discussion about power; it is the exercise of a form of power. 
With this in mind, it can be concluded that even though the proliferation of energy 
security definitions is driven by demands for a more emancipated, complete and 
truthful definition, the totalization behind the search for this perfectly emancipated 
definition continuously hides the multiplicity of energy security.
11.2 core Themes
The metaphor of a tightrope walker captures a number of other insights that have been 
discussed in this thesis as well. First, the balancing act itself does not just refer to the 
relation between environmental boundaries and unlimited desires, but also illustrates 
the constant balancing between (energy) security and (energy) insecurity, between 
scarcity and abundance, between materiality and language, between construction 
and deconstruction, between the freedom to choose and the governing of those who 
choose wrongly. Second, the relentless forward movement not only refers to the 
unlimited desire for goods, but also to the desire for knowledge. Often considered 
to be progress, for energy systems this form of knowledge is limited to a particular 
mode of thought – a capitalist driven search for more data and better technology – 
that is unable to reflect on its own practices and therefore unable to think society 
differently.5 Third, the agent is also of interest. For who or what is the agent balancing 
on the tightrope? Society? Which society? The moment the black box of society is 
opened, the multitude and constantly shifting sets of relations between humans, 




animals, technology, economy, nature and so forth that shape it come forward, only 
to be differentiated by the distinctions of the observer, irrespective whether scholars 
observe the agent or the agent observes its environment. 
Looking back, the challenge merited by this thesis is not that it offers a black box, 
but that it is anything but a black box. In unpacking the underlying practices behind 
energy security, what have been discussed are the basic epistemology and ontology 
assumptions within social theory. To argue for a systemization of these many insights 
would counteract the approach followed here. Nevertheless, there are five themes that 
constantly return across the chapters in this thesis. These themes of performativity, 
relationality, knowledge, ethics and resistance are closely related and they deserve 
further study in relation to energy (security), natural resources and broader socio-
technical systems. 
A first theme – inherent to the approach chosen for this thesis – is performativity: 
the enactment or becoming of “things” whether as phenomena, knowledge, discourse, 
concepts, objects, networks or controversies. It describes the move by which 
thoughts and observations become shared knowledge and subsequently manifest via 
codification, materialization and other non-discursive practices. While only explicitly 
discussed in the chapter on materiality, performativity returns in all chapters. It 
returned in the chapter on energy security when discussing the logics behind energy 
security. In relation to security, it relates to its productive nature, as discussed in both 
theories on security (speech acts) and risk (governing). Performativity returned in 
the discussions on scarcity where both scarcification and relative scarcity adhere to 
it explicitly, as explained with Luhmann’s work on the self-reproduction of the latter 
(although of course all four categories are performed, even in this thesis). In turn, the 
work of Foucault on materialization of power and non-discursive acts actually inspired 
Butler to write about performativity and define it as the ‘process of materialization 
that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we 
call matter.’6 As a process, it builds upon an iterative process of enactment, and 
because it is an iterative process, it is inherently open to failure and change. Contra 
Butler, who takes performativity as the process through which discourse creates its 
effects, scholars working under the new materialist header take a broader perspective 
on performativity by including the independent folding and shifting relationships 
of things as well. Performativity, in this sense, is the coming together of ‘men in 
their relationship with things’ in their continuing use.7 In short, a performative 
perspective forces observers to look for the iterative and repetitive folding and closure 
of taken for granted notions to find the controversies and exclusionary practices 
hidden within them. 
6 Butler 1993, 9 [emphasis in original].
7 Foucault 2007, 96.
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A second core theme is relationality. An alternative description of performativity 
could very well be the materialization of potentiality through localized relationships 
with strategic intent. This returns in discussions on security, where threats, risk 
and other insecurities are described as contextually relative, to different people in 
particular times at particular places, and therefore never total, as there is always more 
to secure. Scarcity follows a similar logic, as both the interaction between scarcity 
and abundance and the self-reinforcing logic of relative scarcity, through mimetic 
contagion and the social limits to growth, offer another on-going relationality that 
constantly moves forward. Obviously, the chapter on materiality discussed relational 
ontologies as the only way to understand change and durability. With a focus on the 
constant breaking and securing of relations between nodes in a network or between 
the internal and external relations of an object, such an ontology focusses on the 
work that is needed to relate and associate different things together – and their 
inherent potential to failure and change. Lastly, the chapter on power described the 
relationality of the milieu – filled with men, things, discourse, morality, etc. – as the 
medium and instrument of governmentality. The illustration of the natural gas debate 
in Groningen discussed how the gas field and its earthquakes are geographically 
localized and yet at the same time relate to European and international gas markets 
through its infrastructure, policy papers, economic markets and legal contracts. 
The third is knowledge. Its gathering, analysis and problematization. Security 
builds on a constant search for knowledge of the future and the decision on whether 
futures are to be feared or desired, with the help of a range of techniques that include 
imagination, calculation and performances. In fact, security is argued to be non-
material as it deals with events that have not yet happened. Scarcity in turn deals with 
knowledge of the flow and circulation of natural resources, the reserves, production 
and consumption levels, spills and losses along the supply chains, etc. Materiality, 
whether seen as artefacts or through the power/knowledge nexus of Foucault, is 
intimately related to knowledge through practices of observation of things and with 
things, through the materialization of knowledge, or through the knowledge over 
populations and the milieu with biopower. The illustrations in chapter 9 and 10 
detail the importance of knowledge, its politics (measuring gas-induced earthquakes) 
and materialization (construction of smart grids). Together with chapter 7, these 
chapters also indicate how closely an ontological politics (on what exist) relates to an 
epistemological politics (over ways of knowing). 
In hindsight, it is knowledge, and the politics around it, that is so paradoxical for 
a critical and performative understanding of energy security. On the one hand, the 
search for knowledge by the “traditional” literature is argued to be blind for its own 
performative effects. Yet, on the other hand, those same knowledge practices are the 




cannot do without the more traditional studies on energy security. A performative 
approach, in a sense, is just as empty as security. It needs positivist knowledge to make 
its claims. More important, it will always find something to criticize in these positivist 
approaches because it focusses on the exclusionary practices that are inherent to any 
form of observation. 
This relates to an awareness of ethics, the fourth theme. The theme of ethics returns 
most strongly in Barad’s claim of the inseparable ontology, epistemology and ethics 
that lies at the core of a relational ontology.8 More precise, she sees ethics resulting 
from the differences that are part of the assemblage, but which are identified post-hoc 
as separate from the ethic-onto-epistemology that is our world. Similarly, security is 
highly ethical as it decides on inclusions and exclusions that come about through the 
(speech) act or practices that materialize undesired futures in the present and, at the 
same time, define the referent object, the other and the self. Furthermore, security 
builds on its urgency and dramatization logic to push for action and overrule ethical 
concerns based on epistemological grounds that are not normally accepted. Within 
scarcity, it is possible to see similar processes at work. Once people break with the idea 
that scarcity is something that derives from nature, it becomes essentially a security 
argument that defines and closes particular events and draws strong normative 
boundaries between haves and have-nots, not to mention potential third-party 
victims of the relative desires of the wealthy. For new materialism and discourse-
oriented scholars, this is also not a new argument. Where Barad argues for more 
attention to the ethics of agential observational cuts, Foucault describes how ethics 
and morality are not only discourse, but also part of the power/knowledge nexus and 
something that materializes within the sets of relations that act as the vector of power. 
A last theme, one not explicitly discussed in the chapters, is resistance. A 
consequence of the boundaries that are drawn in knowledge gathering practices, 
security decisions and speech acts, the successful folding and association of a set of 
relations or the materialization of discourse, is that something is always excluded. 
When everything stems from difference, as Bryant argues, this implies that with each 
performativity comes the option of resistance, whether as failure or willful act.9 In 
the case of energy security, from a developed country’s perspective, the circulation 
of energy supplies is governed through a political economic assemblage of energy 
(resources, infrastructure), security (bio- and geometrics, security and scarcity 
logics) and markets. This assemblage secures, on the one hand, the access to and 
production of energy (e.g. an energy intensive lifestyle with both its environmental 
consequences and comfort and health benefits), and on the other hand, the flow and 
circulation of energy according to its respective mobile norms (e.g. the smart grid 
8 Barad 2007.
9 De Goede 2012.
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example). Simultaneously, these forms of governing are constantly resisted. Chapter 
6 on scarcity discussed the structural violence of relative scarcity and the effects of 
the current consumption system on third parties. In terms of actual resistance, the 
chapter on food security highlighted the clear counter discourse and practices of the 
food sovereignty approach, just as the smart grid illustration showed how the energy 
security debates are strongly influenced by the move to a decentralized and renewable 
electricity system as a counter to the current centralized fossil fuel system. Likewise, 
although on a sub-national level, the natural gas illustration focused on the resistance 
and securitization of the locals to official sedimented gas extraction practices. 
The easiest way to capture the close connections between these five themes 
is to square them under the header of politics. Especially, as politics takes such a 
prominent position throughout this thesis, ranging from discussions on the politics 
of energy security, to the distinction between politics of security and insecurity, 
the shifts in Securitization Theory (from the non-political via the political to the 
extraordinary), knowledge politics, ontic politics and biopolitics. All of these touch 
upon different forms of politics. To be clear, politics here relates to the techniques 
and distinctions that enable or close the political: the space of contestation where 
debate takes place.10 Choosing one over the other, arguing that security is a subset 
of biopolitics or that knowledge politics is a prerequisite for ontological politics is an 
observer distinction (and thus a politics on its own) that misses what this multiplicity 
with its range of insights adds. While a politics of knowledge inherently bequests a 
politics of ontology, as being will always depend on knowing, the discussion on new 
materialism shows how these epistemological choices are made in contexts that are 
not ontological neutral, but always have a preference for a focus on language, society, 
relations, networks, or – yes – politics. The five themes and their forms of politics thus 
have in common that they play out in a space of contestation. What is more, together 
they make up the politics of energy security. 
11.3 discussion
The thesis started with a brief history of the evolution of the concept of energy security 
in the academic literature and progressively increased in abstraction level from that 
chapter onwards. Going back down the slide, there are a number of closing remarks 
in relation to the current energy security literature, potential areas of further study, 
its policy relevance and, lastly, towards the general interaction between political 
economy and security that can be made and which helps turn this parabolic thesis 
into a circulatory one.




The performative reading of energy security in this thesis offers an alternative 
understanding of energy security and with it three reflections on the manner in which 
energy is studied. Briefly, in terms of an alternative understanding this thesis offers 
a reading of energy security that approaches it ontologically as a set of relations with 
strategic intent: relations that cover both past, present and future; geology, political 
economy to culture; fear and desires; infrastructure and discourse. Epistemological, 
the response of Cherp to Sovacool, that a definition of energy security ‘takes more than 
just asking around’ is interesting in this regard, as this thesis’ performative stance 
would argue that it is exactly that – a shared relational understanding. At the same 
time, this thesis shows that energy security entails much more than a shared social 
understanding, and that it includes the work to generate these shared understandings 
as well as its effects in terms of materialization and forms of governing.11 
There are three specific insights that can be derived from this approach. The first 
entails the idea that energy security tries to capture both a politics of security and a 
politics of insecurity. It discusses both securing abundance and securitizing scarcity, 
often simultaneously. However, in the conflation of these two positions it becomes 
possible for the wealthy to secure their abundance, by dominating the discourse and 
by exercising their capital-intensive techno-politics through which this dominance 
materializes. For security scholars like Booth, this results in an ethical obligation to 
make sure that the insecurity of have-nots (structurally doing without) always precedes 
the insecurity concerns of the haves (potential disruptions).12 A second insight refers 
to the traditional neo-realist and liberalist theoretical applications. In short, these do 
not just observe energy politics, but also engage in its politics by reinforcing the very 
ideas they are claiming to observe. Most of all, this thesis points to a third insight that 
security and abundance are forever out of reach of humans, not because they cannot 
be reached but because the moment they are the focus shifts to something else. The 
proliferation of energy security definitions, the totalizing tendency of security, the 
unlimited relative desire that brings about relative scarcity, are all indications that 
the tightrope walker will keep moving forward. Of course, along the way we might 
be getting better at managing it, perhaps even for Barad’s wider “us”. However, where 
such a management remains within current logics and socio-technological systems, 
a performative understanding with its awareness of the shaping and mooring of 
these practices offers a first step to move away from the management to an actual 
transformation of these systems.
In terms of future studies, two main avenues deserve further contemplation. 
First, there are many unexplored avenues in terms of a fuller theorization of energy 
security. This thesis has opened this project by moving the energy security debate 
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beyond its realist confirmations and sometimes simple applications of Securitization 
Theory to a range of theoretical sources and inroads that is nowhere near complete. 
Energy security and theory are not enemies and much potential is still to be found by 
engaging with the works that have not been really touched in this thesis, among which, 
the work of Deleuze & Guattari, Wittgenstein, Habermas or an updated reading of 
Marx. Also needed are further reflections on the relationship between energy security 
and ethics. Not to mention a proper comparative analysis of the security discourses 
of natural resources in general.
Second, in addition to a more theoretical reflection, a direct follow-up to the 
performative approach taken here would be to build on the illustrations of this thesis 
and provide for a number of actual case studies that study how energy security is 
made and how it affects society in doing so. This would enable a deeper understanding 
of specific performative practices and it would fine-tune the theories from where 
these performative readings originate. To continue where the illustrations stopped, 
by analyzing the relationality of energy security at the intersection of knowledge 
practices, security claims and materialization on both local and international levels. 
For example by studying the performativity of the IEA as a knowledge broker. In 
doing so, the field of energy security (and the other natural resources) will itself 
contribute to the CSS and new materialist literature, as it offers an interesting field at 
the crossing between security and political markets, especially with a focus on goods 
and resources that support most of the Western way of life. 
Turning to policy relevance, there are two observations that can be drawn from 
this thesis. First, trying to convince policy makers that what they do is performative 
does not make much sense, because telling them that how they approach and define 
energy security is shaping the reality of energy is self-evident as that is the goal of 
policymaking. A performative reading also does not help them with this, as it does 
not provide for projections or blueprints. What it offers instead is a deeper and self-
reflexive understanding on their position in the overall relationality, based on which 
it becomes possible to argue for an ethical and normative awareness of energy security 
that extends beyond the self, a particular political economy or sociotechnical system. 
The argument of Patterson is worth keeping in mind here; that what people really 
want to secure are not the current production and transmission infrastructures, but 
the services that energy enables them to enjoy.13 Second, besides a reflection on the 
role and effects of security claims in policy debates, this thesis calls for a more acute 
awareness to the core positions and assumptions within the debates on future energy 
systems. In particular, how the primary assumptions of neo-Malthusians, Ricardians 





about men, markets, nature, limits and technological innovation. Just as geopolitics 
and environmentalists will never completely trust the quick techno-fixes of engineers 
and neoclassic economists, so Distributionists will always argue for the importance 
of social and legal access to natural resources. Instead of spending their energy on 
convincing each other of the only right position (with or without the help of energy 
security claims), they could also spend it on the continuing search for acceptable 
compromises. 
This thesis started by briefly touching upon the role that security plays within 
political economy and then turned towards energy security for a closer look at this 
interaction. The energy security analysis in turn brought out the need to unpack both 
security and scarcity theoretically. While not the core project of this thesis, there are 
five insights in these chapters that are worth closing with. From the security side of 
this relation three things stand out. First, security is frequently considered a political 
rationality that is superimposed on energy and food debates. As such, it is argued that 
security is an unnecessary complication that more often than not, further complicates 
rather than acknowledges the proper distribution of natural resources.14 However, 
this thesis shows that security is productive as well. Second, while productive, security 
arguments are often conservative and through technologies and artefacts often lock-in 
existing practices, systems and vested interests (material, financial and intellectual) 
and thereby hinder potential socially desired transformations. Third, both security 
and neoliberal markets share that failure is almost never cause to question the initial 
practice itself, only that people should do better next time. 
From the market side, the relation is further complicated by two additional 
insights. First, markets thrive on uncertainty. They profit from fear and are inherently 
driven to reinforce security concerns in order to offer (newer, better, more efficient) 
counter-measures. Simultaneously, markets offer a form of uncertainty themselves 
that security practices find hard to tackle because the early physiocrats already argued 
that this uncertainty cannot be known and therefore should be left alone. Nevertheless, 
the uncertainty whether markets provide for long-term social beneficial investments 
and the unacceptability of a potential failure of ‘too big to fail’ industries is often 
cause for policy and security to intervene in these markets regardless. Secondly, one of 
the strongest security arguments concerning economic markets is scarcity. However, 
scarcity is not something markets solve, but something they disperse over time and 
across space. Markets need the discrepancies between scarcity/abundance and poor/
wealthy to work, and as such pure markets have no incentive nor the ability to counter 
(the logic of) scarcity as such. 
14 See for example Fischhendler and Nathan 2014, 160.
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These intra-actions between security and markets return repeatedly in the 
proliferation of energy security, but only become visible when one takes a performative 
stance and focusses on what energy security does instead of what it is. Only after 
seeing energy security as an instrument of governance at the intersection between 
security logics and energy markets is it possible to study its effects. By unpacking the 
underlying drivers of energy security, what emerges is an image of a tightrope walker’s 
unrelenting but constantly adjusting drive forwards, as its unlimited relative desires 
initiate a never-ending form of relative scarcity and, consequentially, an infinite series 
of undesired futures with the equally limitless desire to secure them. Thereby further 
reinforcing its desire to move forward at ever-increasing speeds, unable to look back at 
the material world and the exclusions and waste it leaves in its wake. That is, until the 
assemblages of the socio-material world object. Which they constantly do, but which 
only reinforces the walker’s need for new interpretations and a desire to order the 
assemblages where it is part of. Consequently, from a performative perspective, there 
is always a need to keep questioning these interpretations and study the processes by 
which they are produced, the exclusions they hide and the effects they produce. In 
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Senglish and duTch summaries 
english summary
Energy security is a concept that is known in the literature for its ‘slippery’ nature 
and subsequent wide range of definitions. Instead of another attempt at grasping the 
essence of this concept, Securing Abundance reformulates the problem and moves 
away from a definitional problem to a theoretical reflection and problematization 
of its current use. It offers a performative reading of energy security that builds on 
a deeper understanding of some of the implicit underlying social processes behind 
energy security. After a short historical analysis of the proliferation of energy 
security, including a short comparison with a similar proliferation in food security 
and a reflection on the ways scholars try to make sense of energy security, Securing 
Abundance unpacks four social practices that drive energy security. These include 
the logics of security, a critical reflection on the notion of scarcity, an analysis of the 
relation between the materiality of socio-technical systems and the knowledge people 
have over such systems, and the (power) politics that combine all these practices. 
Each of these is unpacked, not to offer the approach to analyze energy security, but 
to show how energy security works, how it comes to be, what its effects are and what 
role current ways of thinking about energy security play within these processes. Two 
illustrations, one on the Dutch natural gas debate and another on the transition to a 
smarter electricity grid, highlight the use and some of the insights that can be gained 
from such a performative approach to energy security.
Part I offers an analysis of the current energy security literature. Its three 
chapters all deal with the proliferation of energy security and the manner in which 
it is analyzed. Chapter 2 provides a brief historical perspective of the meaning of 
energy security and its proliferation in terms of referent objects and scale. It finds 
a concept that has evolved in line with the growing importance of energy in society 
and proliferated from an initial understanding in terms of security of supply into a 
concept that also covers economic, environmental, human rights and systemic aspects. 
Chapter 3 offers a similar historical reflection on food security, to show that these 
dynamics are not unique to energy. Whereas the food security literature differs from 
energy in its material characteristics, market structures and long-standing critical 
reflections, they both share a similar security logic. Chapter 4 reflects briefly on the 
different methods and approaches that the energy security literature uses to make 
sense of its issue area. It discusses the qualitative and quantitative methods used to 
define energy security, in addition to the theorization of and the search for the logics 
of energy security. In short, Part I argues that the search for a definition of energy 
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security might repeatedly add new variables, but does not provide any reasons as to 
why it constantly proliferates. Moreover, it states that the use of current methods and 
theories, from a performative perspective, do not provide for an objective reading, 
but help shape a specific form of energy security. In fact, it is argued that the search 
for a central definition of energy security is totalizing, as it hides the multiplicity of 
energy security and is inhibitive of a broader understanding of the phenomena and 
its underlying social processes. 
Part II details four of these social processes. Chapter 5 focusses on security with 
the help of the critical security literature. This chapter defined security broadly as 
the mode through which people identify undesirable futures and act upon them in 
the present. Initially, it identified a range of forms of insecurity, different techniques 
used to identify undesired futures and several security logics that enable people to 
act in the present on such futures. The latter half of the chapter discusses security as 
a performative act. It finds a logic that (1) always discriminates, as there are always 
things and persons excluded from that what is to be secured. A logic, which (2) is 
productive and not just conservative as it helps create those values it is trying to secure. 
It is a logic that (3) is called upon in political arenas to provide a level of urgency to 
its referent object. And it is a logic (4) that through risk assessment and insurance 
practices structures large part of our daily lives. Above all this chapter sketches an 
image of security as inherently empty and constantly bound to new referent objects. 
The moment people think themselves secure, is also the moment new insecurities 
arise. A disturbing conclusion, but simultaneously also hopeful as it means that we 
can secure increasingly more specific or “luxurious” aspects of life. In short, security 
offers one explanation for the proliferation of energy security.
A second explanation is provided in chapter 6. This chapter on scarcity 
problematizes the taken for granted idea that energy (in all forms) is scarce. More 
precise, it questions what we understand by scarcity as it finds four different meanings. 
Across this literature, scarcity is simultaneously discussed in terms of shortages 
(geopolitics), absolute scarcity (neo-Malthusians), scarcification (Distributionists) 
and relative scarcity (Ricardians). Together these four meanings break with the idea 
that scarcity is a given natural phenomenon. Still it is this assumption of a certain 
given demand and only limited supplies that often supports technical supply-side 
solutions to scarcity. However, such solutions move past the idea that demand 
itself is something inherently driven by social processes. By discussing the relative 
desire inherent to relative scarcity, the form of scarcity most prevalent in modern 
economies, this chapter offers a second explanation for the proliferation of energy 
security. In addition, this chapter leads to the conclusion that a focus on the fear for 
shortages and absolute scarcity often removes any incentives to debate the ethics and 
morality behind relative scarcity (the urgency of security hides the ethical choices 
388
SEnglish and dutch summariEs 
behind security). An example are economic markets, which are based on relative 
scarcity and hence, theoretically, have no incentive to actually create abundance: for 
the moment abundance exist, markets cease to function. Scarcity is one of the main 
concerns captured by energy security, but like security scarcity is an empty concept, 
a self-referential and inclusionary norm that people have to follow. There is always 
something else that people desire, and in their desire through mimetic contagion 
make scarce in the process. If not for themselves than for others. 
Chapter 7 starts from the question how the materiality of energy systems relates 
to the social and linguistic driven explanations provided in the chapters so far. This 
chapter theorizes the relationship between the knowledge people have over energy 
systems and the materiality of these energy systems, to understand the durability, 
spatiality and eventfulness that spring from these systems. Through multiple theories, 
ranging from critical International Relations theories to a number of theories squared 
under the header of ‘new materialism’, this chapter makes four points. First, it builds 
on the critical literature and its epistemological argument that all observations are 
pre-structured by previous knowledge and assumptions, with the realization that the 
material-knowledge duality is a post hoc explanation that does not relate to the world 
“out there”, but nevertheless is needed academically to understand the world we live 
in. Second, this chapter, building on the new materialist literature, argues that we 
should study the political processes through which matter comes to matter, in terms 
of both knowledge and its effects, and give ample voice to the mediating role of objects 
in these processes. Third, to study these processes, what needs to be studied are the 
knowledge practices through which we get to know matter. More specific, this chapter 
ends with the idea that observation, by humans, objects or a mix of both, is based on 
the creation of distinctions between that what is and what is not observed. As in the 
case of security, such distinctions are ultimately ethical choices, as each observation 
assembles and folds a set of relations together that make up what we understand as the 
ontology of an (unknown or uncertain) phenomenon. Together these new materialist 
theories offer a world of materialdiscursive relationships, their becoming and breaking 
apart, a world of artificial distinctions and boundaries customized in social laws, but 
also a world of artefacts and other hard material achievements.
The mentioning of the politics of mattering, as well as his insights on security 
and scarcity all point to the later work of Michel Foucault. Chapter 8 discusses his 
insights on power/knowledge and governmentality, and pays special attention to the 
indirect workings of power through the acceptance of the reality behind circulation 
and the manipulation of the milieu wherein these circulations take place. In short, 
chapter 8 provides for a reading of energy security in terms of a political process that 
is (1) productive and (2) based on knowledge gathering practices, and can be seen 
as (3) a form of governing and materialization that, among others, (4) facilitates in 
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drawing the boundaries on a social level between nature, economics, the political, 
and society. After these four theoretical chapters, it is no longer possible to define 
energy security, except perhaps as a set of materialdiscursive relations, one that is 
continuously performed and disrupted by other sets and consists of humans, things, 
knowledge, morality, practices, and so on. In this reading, each call for energy security 
is a performative act that both produces and is producing a particular understanding 
of energy security.
Part III clarifies these theoretical chapters with two performative illustrations. 
Chapter 9 studies the Dutch natural gas debate and analyzes the ‘struggle’ between 
the security argumentation of the local inhabitants  and the risk assessments of the 
decision-makers over the earthquakes that result from the gas extraction and the 
knowledge practices through which we have come to know them. Of interest for this 
thesis is the notion of energy security behind this debate. For although the debate fits 
a broader reading of energy security, the more traditional security of supply concerns 
seemed to be the only constant in this debate (and is accordingly reinforced by this 
debate). Chapter 10 breaks with such a traditional and state centric understanding. 
By approaching smart grids primarily in terms of a knowledge gathering system 
(through smart meters), it becomes possible to use a Foucauldian reading and focus 
on the organization of the ‘free’ markets behind smart grids, which conduct the 
conduct of consumers for the benefit of the grids. In the subsequent examination of 
the main discourses behind smart grids, it became clear that energy security is one 
of the factors that drives the transformation of the electricity grids, but in this move 
is also transformed itself as smart grids shift its maxim from security of supply to 
questions of resilience.
What results from a performative reading of energy security is not a blueprint 
complete with policy recommendations. Instead, a performative reading offers a fuller 
account of the processes that make energy security both (re)produced and productive. 
Moreover, in the end a better understanding of what energy security does might 
also contribute to a better understanding of what energy security is. The value of a 
performative reading can be found primarily in its ethical reflection, which is made 
possible by escaping the a priori ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
characterize current studies of energy security. For instance, it makes it possible to 
differentiate calls for energy security stemming from a security of abundance or from 
a securitization of scarcity position. Often these are conflated and thereby enable the 
wealthy, by using the fear for scarcity, to legitimize the securing of their abundance by 
dominating the discourse (in part by forwarding definitions of energy security) and 
by exercising their capital-intensive techno-politics through which this dominance 
materializes. Only by reflexively “escaping” the logics and practices of energy security 
are we able to open up the hidden assumptions behind it and, subsequently, move 
390
SEnglish and dutch summariEs 
beyond a management of our current energy systems to a transformation of them. 
Respectively, the proliferation behind our fears (security) and desires (scarcity) does 
not only necessitates a constant update of the definitions of energy security, but also 
requires a continuous performative reading that discusses the underlying social 
processes, the exclusions inherent to them and the consequences it produces. In other 
words, it necessitates a constant reflection on the politics of energy security. 
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nederlandse samenvatting 
Energieveiligheid en energiezekerheid zijn twee Nederlandse vertalingen van het 
veelomvattende Engelse begrip energy security. Dit overkoepelende fenomeen staat 
bekend om zijn ondefinieerbare aard, met vele onderzoekers die op verschillende 
manieren pogen een centrale betekenis te geven aan dit maatschappelijk, economisch 
en politiek beladen begrip. In plaats van een zoveelste poging om dit begrip te 
duiden, bouwt Securing Abundance op een herformulering van het probleem. Het 
biedt geen nieuwe definitie van energy security, maar kijkt naar de praktijken die 
energy security vormgeven en die resulteren naar aanleiding van haar gebruik. Het 
kijkt naar wat energy security doet, met als doel een breder begrip te krijgen van de 
sociale praktijken die impliciet ten grondslag liggen aan het gebruik van dit begrip. 
Na een korte historische analyse van het uitdijende begrip energy security, inclusief 
een vergelijking met eenzelfde proliferatie ten aanzien van voedsel en een analyse 
van de manieren waarop energy security in de literatuur wordt geanalyseerd, worden 
er vier sociale praktijken nader bekeken. Dit zijn de sociale logica van veiligheid, 
een verdieping en problematisering van het schaarste vraagstuk, de relatie tussen de 
materialiteit van socio-technische systemen en de kennis die men heeft over zulke 
(energie) systemen, en de machtspolitiek die achter al deze processen plaatsvindt. Ten 
slotte worden er twee illustraties gegeven – één over de gasbevingen in Groningen en 
een ander over de ontwikkelingen ten aanzien van slimme elektriciteitsnetwerken – 
om een eerste aanzet te geven tot de inzichten die deze alternatieve performatieve kijk 
met zich meebrengt. 
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift analyseert het begrip energy security. Haar 
drie hoofdstukken hebben ieder te maken met de proliferatie van het begrip en de 
manier waarop deze proliferatie tot stand komt en geanalyseerd wordt. Hoofdstuk 2 
gaat in op de proliferatie van het begrip, zowel qua inhoud (referentieobject) en schaal 
(analyseniveaus en reikwijdte). Het detailleert een begrip dat zich van oorsprong 
richtte op leveringsveiligheidsvraagstukken, maar intussen ook economische, 
ecologische, systematische en individuele aspecten bevat in lijn met het toenemende 
belang van energie in onze samenleving. Hoofdstuk 3 geeft eenzelfde historische 
analyse van het begrip food security, als een spiegel die weergeeft dat de proliferatie van 
energy security niet op zichzelf staat. Waar beide velden verschillen op materialiteit, 
marktorganisatie en de hoeveelheid kritische reflectie in de academische literatuur, 
kan geconcludeerd worden dat ze eenzelfde constant uitdijende veiligheidslogica 
delen. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat kort in op de verschillende manieren waarop energy security 
in de afgelopen jaren door de academische literatuur benaderd is. Het beschrijft de 
kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve categorisatie achter de zoektocht naar een definitie van 
energy security, alsook de theoretische analyse en de identificatie van verschillende 
logica’s verborgen achter het fenomeen energy security. In het kort wordt in deel I 
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gesteld dat de zoektocht naar een definitie van het fenomeen energy security wellicht 
constant nieuwe variabelen toevoegt maar geenszins inzicht geeft in de redenen 
waarom het alsmaar omvattender wordt. Daarnaast biedt het gebruik van de huidige 
methoden en theorieën, in het licht van een performatieve lezing, geen objectieve 
analyse, maar helpt het een specifieke vorm van energy security tot stand te brengen. 
Het argument dat hier naar voren wordt gebracht stelt dat juist de zoektocht naar een 
eenduidige definitie van wat energy security is, een breder begrip van het fenomeen en 
de onderliggende sociale processen verbergt. 
Deel II gaat in op vier van dergelijke sociale processen. Hoofdstuk 5 gaat dieper in 
op veiligheid met behulp van de kritische veiligheidsliteratuur. Dit hoofdstuk benadert 
veiligheid in brede zin als zijnde de processen en de logica waarmee onwenselijke 
toekomsten worden geïdentificeerd en worden vermeden door in het heden te 
handelen. In eerste instantie analyseert het een aantal vormen van onveiligheid, 
verschillende technieken die gebruikt worden om kennis te nemen van onzekere 
toekomsten en verschillende logica om zulke toekomsten tegemoet te treden. Daarna 
gaat dit hoofdstuk in op wat veiligheid doet. Het schets een rationaliteit die (1) te allen 
tijden discrimineert omdat er altijd zaken en personen uitgesloten worden van dat 
wat beveiligd wordt. Een rationaliteit die (2) productief is en niet enkel conservatief 
omdat in het zekerstellen van bepaalde waarden deze tegelijkertijd vorm gegeven 
worden. Een rationaliteit die (3) gebruikt wordt in politieke processen om bepaalde 
aspecten van urgentie te voorzien. Maar ook een rationaliteit die (4) via risicoanalyses 
en verzekeringen van enorme invloed is op ons dagelijks leven. Bovenal schets 
dit hoofdstuk een beeld van veiligheid als iets dat niet gebonden is aan specifieke 
objecten en zodoende constant nieuwe aspecten tot zich neemt. Het moment dat men 
denkt veilig te zijn, is ook het moment dat nieuwe onveiligheden opdoemen. Een 
verontrustende conclusie, maar tegelijkertijd ook een teken van luxe omdat er een 
zekere progressie achter zit. Kortom, veiligheid geeft een eerste verklaring voor de 
constante proliferatie van het fenomeen energy security. 
Een tweede verklaring wordt gegeven in hoofdstuk 6. Dit hoofdstuk over schaarste 
problematiseert de vanzelfsprekendheid van het idee dat energie (in al haar vormen) 
schaars is. Het stelt dat schaarste in dit geval vier dingen kan betekenen: dat er acute 
tekorten zijn (geopolitiek), dat er sprake is van absolute schaarste (neomalthusiaanse 
logica) of relatieve schaarste (Ricardian logica) of dat de tekorten worden gecreëerd, 
hier beschreven als scarcification (distributie logica). In al deze vormen is schaarste 
geen natuurlijk fenomeen en gaat de vaak technologisch gedreven zoektocht naar 
meer aanbod voorbij aan het feit dat de vraag niet vanzelfsprekend is maar gedreven 
wordt door sociale processen. Door in te gaan op het relatieve verlangen achter 
relatieve schaarste, de schaarste waar moderne economieën door gedreven worden, 
geeft dit hoofdstuk een verklaring voor de proliferatie van energie en daarmee een 
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tweede verklaring voor de proliferatie van energy security. Daarnaast kan op basis 
van dit hoofdstuk geconcludeerd worden dat de angst voor absolute schaarste en 
daadwerkelijke tekorten veelal een diepere ethische en normatieve reflectie ten aanzien 
van relatieve schaarste verbergt (de urgentie van veiligheid verbergt de ethiek achter 
de keuzes over veiligheid). Een gevolg hiervan is bijvoorbeeld dat markten, gedreven 
door een proces van relatieve schaarste, geen aansporing hebben om daadwerkelijk 
overvloed te creëren: het moment dat er overvloed heerst, houden markten op te 
bestaan. Schaarste is één van de belangrijkste zorgen binnen energy security, maar 
net als veiligheid is schaarste een leeg fenomeen, een inclusieve autopoietische logica 
waar men zich als een norm tot moet verhouden. Er zal altijd iets nieuws zijn dat 
mensen verlangen en juist door hun verlangen schaars maken; is het niet voor zichzelf 
dan wel voor anderen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 start vanuit de vraag hoe de materialiteit van energiesystemen zich 
verhoudt tot de linguïstische en sociale verklaringen die gegeven worden in eerdere 
hoofdstukken. Het theoretiseert de verhouding tussen de kennis die we hebben over 
energiesystemen en de materialiteit van deze infrastructurele werken om duiding 
te geven aan haar relatieve stabiliteit, de ruimtelijke ordening en de verrassende 
gebeurtenissen die er uit voortkomen. Via verschillende theorieën, van kritische 
theorieën in de Internationale Betrekkingen tot theorieën die vallen onder de 
noemer ´nieuw materialisme’, biedt dit hoofdstuk vier punten. Ten eerste bouwt het 
op de kritische literatuur en haar epistemologische argument dat alle kennis die we 
hebben gemedieerd wordt door eerdere kennis, waarbij moet worden aangetekend 
dat de materialiteit-kennis dualiteit een post hoc rationalisatie is die in werkelijkheid 
niet standhoudt maar analytisch noodzakelijk is om tot een beter begrip van beide 
te komen. Ten tweede, voortbouwend op de nieuw materialistische literatuur, stelt 
dit hoofdstuk dat er gekeken moet worden naar de politieke processen die ervoor 
zorgen dat materialiteit van belang wordt, zowel in termen van kennis als in termen 
van effecten, waarbij de objecten zelf ook een belangrijke bemiddelende rol spelen. 
Ten derde moet er, om deze processen in kaart te brengen, gekeken worden naar de 
praktijken waarmee we kennis nemen van materialiteit. Meer specifiek eindigt dit 
hoofdstuk met het idee dat observatie, door mensen, dingen en veelal een mix van 
beide, een scheiding creëert tussen dat wat wel of niet bestudeerd wordt. Net als 
met veiligheid zijn dit feitelijk ethische keuzes, omdat met iedere observatie een set 
van relaties wordt samengesteld die samen duiding geven aan de ontologie van een 
(onbekend of onzeker) fenomeen. Deze nieuw materialistische theorieën geven samen 
een beeld van materiëlediscursieve relaties die doorlopend tot stand komen en weer 
breken en onderwijl een distinctie maken die gecodeerd en gesedimenteerd wordt in 
sociale structuren en artefacten.
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De verwijzing naar de politiek achter het belang van materialiteit, alsmede 
zijn inzichten ten aanzien van veiligheid en schaarste leiden naar het latere werk 
van Michel Foucault. Hoofdstuk 8 beschrijft zijn inzichten ten aanzien van macht 
en governmentality en besteedt aandacht aan indirecte vormen van macht die 
uitgevoerd worden door de acceptatie van circulaties en hun beïnvloeding door het 
milieu waarin ze plaatsvinden te sturen. Samenvattend geeft hoofdstuk 8 een beeld 
van energy security als zijnde een politiek proces dat (1) productief is, (2) gebaseerd op 
kennisvergaring en (3) daarmee een vorm van machtsuitoefening via de materialisatie 
van distincties, (4) waaronder ook de grenzen tussen wat we zien als natuur, economie, 
politiek en de samenleving. Na deze vier hoofdstukken is het niet langer mogelijk om 
energy security te definiëren, hoogstens kan het omschreven worden als een set van 
materiëlediscursieve relaties die uitgevoerd wordt en op zijn beurt beïnvloed wordt 
door andere sets, bestaande uit mensen, dingen, kennis, moraliteit, sociale praktijken, 
etc. Iedere roep om energy security is in dit perspectief een performatieve handeling 
die een specifieke kijk met zich meebrengt en daarmee zowel geproduceerd wordt als 
productief is voor deze kijk op de wereld.
Deel III illustreert deze theoretische hoofdstukken door twee performatieve 
voorbeelden te geven. Hoofdstuk 9 kijkt naar het Groningse gasdebat en analyseert 
de ‘strijd’ tussen de veiligheidsargumenten van lokale bewoners en de risicoanalyses 
van bestuurders in relatie tot de daadwerkelijke aardbevingen en de kennispraktijken 
die deze kenbaar maken, inclusief de verschuiving in waardeoordelen over deze 
kennispraktijken. Vooral van belang voor dit proefschrift is het idee van energy 
security zoals dat in dit debat stilzwijgend wordt aangenomen. Hoewel dit debat 
zeer zeker zijn plaats heeft binnen een bredere benadering van energy security, blijkt 
de traditionele interpretatie als leveringszekerheid het enige non-discussiepunt 
in dit debat te zijn (en daarmee versterkt als centraal paradigma). Hoofdstuk 10 
breekt deels met deze traditionele staat centrische interpretatie. Door slimme 
elektriciteitsnetwerken primair te interpreteren in termen van kennisvergaring (met 
behulp van slimme meters) wordt het mogelijk om ze via een Foucaultiaanse lezing 
te benaderen en de focus te leggen op de organisatie van nieuwe ‘vrije’ markten die 
consumenten aanzetten tot handelingen ten bate van het netwerk. In de daarop 
volgende analyse van de huidige ideeën ten aanzien van slimme elektriciteitsnetwerken 
concludeert dit hoofdstuk dat energy security ten grondslag ligt aan de transformatie 
van de netwerken, maar al doende zelf ook transformeert omdat deze netwerken de 
traditionele veiligheidslogica van leveringszekerheid loslaten en herinterpreteren in 
termen van veerkracht en weerbaarheid (resilience). 
Wat resulteert van een performatieve lezing van energy security is geen blauwdruk 
gevuld met beleidsaanbevelingen. In plaats daarvan leidt een dergelijke performatieve 
lezing tot een beter begrip van de processen die energy security produceren en die 
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geproduceerd worden door het gebruik van energy security. Sterker, de conclusie 
stelt dat een beter begrip van wat het doet uiteindelijk ook leidt tot een beter begrip 
van wat energy security is. De waarde van een performatieve benadering ligt in de 
(ethische) reflectie die het biedt doordat het kan ontsnappen aan de ontologische 
en epistemologische a priori assumpties die ten grondslag liggen aan de huidige 
gebruikelijke analyses van het fenomeen. Bijvoorbeeld doordat het mogelijk wordt 
een onderscheid te maken tussen het veiligstellen van overvloed en het verzekeren 
van schaarse goederen, waarbij zij die al in overvloed leven gebruik kunnen maken 
van de angst voor het laatste en tegelijkertijd het discourse kunnen domineren (mede 
door definities van energy security) en via een kapitaalintensieve techno-politiek 
de wereld naar hun hand kunnen vormen. Enkel door aan de logica te ontsnappen 
wordt het mogelijk om de huidige systemen niet alleen te managen maar ook te 
transformeren. De proliferatie achter onze angsten (veiligheid) en verlangens 
(schaarste) dwingt bovendien niet alleen voor een continue revisie van de definities 
van energy security, maar vereist ook een constante performatieve lezing die ingaat 
op de achterliggende processen, de uitsluitingen die er aan ten grondslag liggen en 
de gevolgen die het produceert. Met andere woorden, een constante reflectie op de 
politiek van energy security. 
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‘The objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies 
of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major 
national values and objectives.’
Bohi and Toman 
(1993, 1-2)
‘Energy insecurity can be defined as the loss of economic welfare that 




‘[E]nergy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the well-
being of its citizens and the proper functioning of the economy, the 
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, 
at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), 
while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards 
sustainable development. (...) Security of supply does not seek to 
maximise energy self-sufficiency or to minimise dependence, but aims 
to reduce the risks linked to such dependence.’
Bielecki (2002, 
237)
‘Energy security is commonly defined as reliable and adequate supply 
of energy at reasonable prices.’
Barton et al. 
(2004, 5)
‘as a condition in which a nation and all, or most of its citizens and 
business have access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices 





Four ‘A’s’: Availability (physical); Accessibility (political-economic 




‘Energy security is defined as an uninterruptible supply of energy, in 
terms of quantities required to meet demand at affordable prices.’
Patterson (2008) ‘The energy security that worries politicians concerns supplies of 
imported oil and natural gas, not the secure delivery of energy services, 
such as keeping the lights on.’
1 WEC 2008, 4; Metcalf 2013, 2; APERC 2007; Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011; Sovacool and Brown 2010, 81; 
Goldthau and Sovacool 2012, 235; European Commission 2000, 2; IEA 2010a, 559; Yergin 1988, 112; 
Winzer 2012, 36; Bohi and Toman 1993, 1–2; Cherp and Jewell 2011b; Hughes 2009, 2461; Barton et al. 
2004, 5; Kleber 2009, 2; Bielecki 2002, 237; Chester 2010, 893; Cherp and Jewell 2014, 415; Patterson 
2008; Jansen and Seebregts 2010, 1655; Jansen and Van der Welle 2011, 241; von Hippel et al. 2011a, 
78; Yergin 2012, 269. For similar overviews and tables see: Sovacool 2011a; Cherp and Jewell 2011b; 
Sovacool and Mukherjee 2011; Winzer 2012; Hughes 2012, 228–229; Boersma 2013. As Jaap de Wilde 
noticed: many of these definitions discuss passive consumers, to be pleased and in need of governance, 








‘The four ‘R’s of energy security explain the actions needed to improve 
energy security, beginning with understanding the problem (review), 
using less energy (reduce), shifting to secure sources (replace), and 
limiting new demand to secure sources (restrict).’
Kleber (2009, 2) ‘Energy security is the capacity to avoid adverse impact of energy 
disruptions caused either by natural, accidental or intentional 
events affecting energy and utility supply and distribution systems. 
[it ] possess[es] five characteristics: surety [access], survivability 
[resilient and durable resources/supply chains], supply [having 
resources], sufficiency [adequate to demand] and sustainability [limit 
environmental impact].’  
Sovacool and 
Brown(2010, 81)
‘We argue, […], that energy security should be based on the 
interconnected factors of availability, affordability, efficiency, and 
environmental stewardship.’
IEA (2010,559) ‘Energy security, broadly defined, means adequate, affordable and 
reliable supplies of energy. It matters because energy is essential to 
economic growth and human development. No energy system can be 
entirely secure in the short term, because disruptions or shortages can 
arise unexpectedly, whether through sabotage, political intervention, 
strikes, technical failures, accidents or natural disasters. In the longer 
term, under-investment in energy production or transportation 
capacity can lead to shortages and consequently unacceptably high 
prices. So energy security, in practice, is best seen as a problem of 
risk management, that is reducing to an acceptable level the risks and 
consequences of disruptions and adverse long-term market trends.’
Chester (2010, 
893)
‘These findings lead to the contention that the concept of energy 
security is inherently slippery because it is polysemic in nature. 
The concept has many possible meanings. Energy security may be 
delineated through multiple dimensions and it takes on different 
specificities depending on the country (or continent), timeframe or 




‘Let us coin the certainty level of enduring, uninterrupted access of the 
population in a defined region to affordably and competitively priced, 




Divide APERC’s four ‘A’s into five dimensions: Availability, 
Affordability, Technology Development, Sustainability, and Regulation
Cherp and Jewell 
(2011)
Three discourses: a discourse of sovereignty, in terms of military and 
geopolitical security of supply considerations; one of robustness, 
in terms of the technical vulnerability of production and transport 
capacity; and one of resilience, meaning security from multiple 
unpredictable complex systemic disruptions
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Table 2: Definitions of Energy Security (Continued)
Source1 Definition
Jensen and Van 
der Welle (2011, 
241)
‘We propose to use the term energy services security (ESS) instead 
of energy security as the notion that covers the central topic of this 
chapter. Hereafter, ESS refers to the extent to which the population in 
a defined area (country or region) can have access to affordably and 
competitively priced, environmentally acceptable energy services of 
adequate quality.’ 
Von Hippel et al. 
(2011, 78)
A nation state is energy secure to the degree that fuel and energy 
services are available to ensure: (a) survival of the nation, (b) 
protection of national welfare, and (c) minimization of risks associated 




‘Energy security, defined as the way of equitably providing available, 
affordable, reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, proactively 
governed, and socially acceptable energy services to end-users, is 
gaining ever more prominence on contemporary policy agendas. 
Energy security has supply-side and demand-side components.’ 
Winzer (2012, 
36)
‘…we suggest narrowing down the concept of energy security to the 
concept of energy supply continuity. This reduces the overlap between 




‘The usual definition of energy security is pretty straightforward: the 
availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices. Yet there are 
several dimensions. The first is physical security […]. Second, access to 
energy is critical […]. Third, energy security is also a system […]. And 
finally and crucially, if longer-term in nature – is investment.’
Metcalf (2013, 2) ‘Energy security is the ability of households, business, and government 
to accommodate disruptions in supply in energy markets.’
Cherp and Jewell 
(2014, 415)
‘We define energy security as low vulnerability of vital energy systems.’
Table 3: Definitions of Food Security (Continued)
Source2 Definition
FAO 1943 ‘to consider the goal of freedom from want in relation to food and 
agriculture’, which was defined as ‘a secure, an adequate, and a suitable 
supply of food for every man’. In addition, ‘adequate reserves should be 
maintained to meet all consumption needs’ and ‘provision should be 









‘Availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic 
foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to 
offset fluctuations in production and prices.’ (quoted in FAO 2006, 1).
FAO (1983) ‘Ensuring that all people at all times have both physical and economic 
access to the basic food that they need.’ (quoted in FAO 2006, 1)
World Bank 
(1986, v)
“Food security has to do with access by all people at all times to enough 
food for an active and healthy life”
Jonsson and 
Toole (1991)
‘Access to food, adequate in quantity and quality, to fulfil all 
nutritional requirements for all household members throughout the 
year.’ (as given by Maxwell, S. (1996) in Appendix 1).
FAO (1996, 1) “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.
Clay, Edward 
(2002, 6)
‘Since food insecurity is about risks and uncertainty, the formal 
analysis of food security should include both chronic poverty-related 
undernutrition and also transitory, acute insecurity that reflects 
economic and food system volatility’
FAO (2006, 1) Food security consists of four dimensions: 
‘Food availability: The availability of sufficient quantities of food of 
appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports 
(including food aid).
Food access: Access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) 
for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. Entitlements 
are defined as the set of all commodity bundles over which a person 
can establish command given the legal, political, economic and 
social arrangements of the community in which they live (including 
traditional rights such as access to common resources).
Utilization: Utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, 
sanitation and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being 
where all physiological needs are met. This brings out the importance 
of non-food inputs in food security.
Stability: To be food secure, a population, household or individual must 
have access to adequate food at all times. They should not risk losing 
access to food as a consequence of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic or 
climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food insecurity). The 
concept of stability can therefore refer to both the availability and 
access dimensions of food security.’
2 Clay 2002, 6; World Bank 1986, v; Devereux and Maxwell 2001, 14; FAO 1996a, 1; FAO 2006b; FAO 2009, 
2; FAO 2015; World Bank 2007, 94; Maxwell 1996; Lawrence and McMichael 2012, 135; Shepherd 2012, 
196; De Schutter 2014, 3.
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The commonly accepted definition of food security is — when all 
people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic access to 
sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and 
food preferences for an active and healthy life.1 
The chronically food insecure never have enough to eat. The 
seasonally food insecure fall below adequate consumption levels in 
the lean season. And the transitory food insecure fall below the food 
consumption threshold as a result of an economic or natural shock 
such as a drought, sometimes with long-lasting consequences. 
Investments in agriculture are important to increase food security.’
FAO (2009, 2) This report calls for a “right to food approach” which is defined as 
people’s control over resources which allow them to produce or obtain 
access or entitlement to food as well as improved governance at the 
international, national and local levels, which suggests the importance 




‘In 1996 at the Rome Food Summit, the international peasant coalition, 
La Vía Campesina, stated that ‘food sovereignty is a necessary 
precondition of genuine food security’. Food sovereignty is about 
democratic control over national food policy and the right of people 
and communities to control how and what food is produced, and for 
whom. It was originally coined as a strategic concept to politicize the 




‘Using the principles of emancipatory realism, it proposes reframing 
food security in terms of securing vulnerable populations from the 
structural violence of hunger, which, prima facie, offers the prospect of 
some practical assistance to tackling the considerable issue of hunger.’
De Schutter 
(2014, 3)
‘The right to food is the right of every individual, alone or in 
community with others, to have physical and economic access at all 
times to sufficient, adequate and culturally acceptable food that is 
produced and consumed sustainably, preserving access to food for 
future generations.’
FAO (2015, 63) ‘Food security. A situation that exists when all people, at all times, 
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious  food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for 
an active and healthy life.  Based on this definition, four food security 
dimensions can be identified: food availability, economic and physical 
access to food, food utilization and stability over time.’
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Table 3: Definitions of Food Security (Continued)
Source2 Definition
FAO (2015, 63) ‘Food insecurity. A situation that exists when people lack secure access 
to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth 
and development and an active and healthy life. It may be caused by 
the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate 
distribution or inadequate use of food at the household level. Food 
insecurity, poor conditions of health and sanitation and inappropriate 
care and feeding practices are the major causes of poor nutritional 
status. Food insecurity may be chronic, seasonal or transitory.’ 
FAO (2015, 63) ‘Nutrition security. A situation that exists when secure access to an 
appropriately nutritious diet is coupled with a sanitary environment, 
adequate health services and care, in order to ensure a healthy and 
active life for all household members. Nutrition security differs from 
food security in that it also considers the aspects of adequate caring 
practices, health and hygiene in addition to dietary adequacy.’
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Figure 7: Map of Earthquakes in Groningen (Dec 1986 - June 2015)




Figure 8: Frequency and Magnitude of Groningen Earthquakes
Source: NAM (2015a) with data from KNMI (2015)4
Figure 9: Gas Extraction from the Groningen field
Source: NAM (2015b)5















1959 Discovery Groningen gas field
1963 Start extraction
1971 Subsidence concerns  
(secret NAM report)
47,34
1974 Small Gas fields Policy 82,42
1976 Highest extraction volume 87,74
1983 Subsidence Compensation 
procedure
50,06
1986 Assen 2.8 41,55
1989 Debate in parliament on 
subsidence and earthquakes
27,88
1990 MIT report 29,07
1992 (3) 41,51
1993 BOA Report on causality between 
gas extraction and earthquakes;
Magnitude = 3.3
(3) 43,11
1994 KNMI starts to measure quakes 
in earnest, builds network of 
seismometers.
(3) 34,51
1995 KNMI report revises magnitude: 
Groningen = 3.3 /other fields = 3.4
(1) 34,1
1996 KNMI updates seismometers to 
detect quakes from 1.5 (from 2.5)
(2) 42,14









2000 Installation of Tcbb (1) 21,27
2003 New Mining law; NAM proposes 
first extraction plan; Public 
concern increases after three 
relatively strong earthquakes near 
Loppersum; TNO doubles the 
number of estimated earthquakes 















2004 Decoupling of Gasunie, into 
Gasunie and GasTerra; KNMI 
revises magnitude to 3.9 and 
acknowledges non-static character 
of induced earthquakes; NAM 
adds small print to brochure
(1) 32,86
2006 Public concern increases after 





2007 Update of extraction plan NAM (1) Average 




2008 Province of Groningen asks TNO 
& Deltares for a reflection
(1) 41,2
2009 SSM/TNO report on Loppersum 




2012 KNMI report (with MIT) 




2012-12-21 NAM updates extraction plan
2013-01 KNMI update; SSM report and 
advise;
2013-02 Debate on SSM report; Economic 
Affairs initiates 15 studies; NAM 
apologises for long denial of 
causality
2013-10 NAM starts studying 
underground
2013-11-01 Report Commission Meijer 
(Province of Groningen)
2013-11-31 NAM proposes new extraction 
plan
2013-12 Record extraction in 2013 (5) 53,87
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2014–01 New SSM report; Gentleman’s 
agreement of government 
bodies (Vertrouwen op Herstel); 
Parliamentary debate and decision 
of Ministry of Economic Affairs 
on outcome of studies; Decision on 
extraction plan of NAM postponed 
but: reduction of 80% at Loppersum 
and 1.2 bn euro made available 






2014-02 NAM starts to compensate losses 
in home value
2014-09 Earthquake in Garmerwolde 
(2.8), which is sensed in city of 
Groningen.
2014-12 Decision on extraction plan; NAM 
requested to study underground;  
New extraction cap; Responsibility 
of damage assessment and 
compensation moved from NAM 
to Centrum Veilig Wonen;  
Installation of Ombudsman
(5) Average 




2015-01 Max 16.5 
until July 
2015
2015-03 Report Dutch Safety Board
2015-04 Provisional ruling on gas 
extraction: Loppersum cluster 
only open for security of supply.
2015-06 Decision of Ministry of Economic 




Table based on case study, sources include reports from NAM, KNMI, Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid and 
media outlets6
6 Ibid.; KNMI 2015; Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid 2015; Ministerie van Economische Zaken 2013c.
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